

in case of a night attack, with their pistols in their belts, and to act as a corps de reserve. The camp was defended by two company guards, consisting each of four non-commissioned officers and 42 privates, and two subaltern guards of twenty non-commissioned officers and privates. The whole under the command of a field officer of the day. The troops were regularly called up an hour before day, and made to continue under arms until it was quite light. On the morning of the 7th I had risen at a quarter after 4 o'clock, and the signal for calling out the men would have been given in two minutes when the attack commenced. It began on the left flank, but a single gun was fired by the sentinels or by the guard in that direction, which made no resistance, but abandoned their officer and fled into the camp, and the first notice which the troops of that flank had of the danger, was from the yells of the savages within a short distance of the line; but even under those circumstances, the men were not wanting to themselves, or to the occasion. Such of them as were awake, or easily awakened, seized their arms and took their stations; others which were more tardy, had to contend with the enemy in the doors of their tents.

The storm first fell on Capt. Barton's company of the 4th U. States regiment, and Capt. Geiger's company of mounted riflemen, which formed the left angle of the rear line. The fire upon these were excessively severe, and they suffered considerably before relief could be brought to them.—

Some few Indians passed into the encampment near the angle, and one or two penetrated to some distance before they were killed. I believe all the other companies were under arms and tolerably formed before they were fired on. The morning was dark and cloudy—our fires afforded a partial light, which if it gave us some opportunity of taking our positions, was still more advantageous to the enemy, affording them the means of taking a surer aim. They were therefore extinguished as soon as possible. Under all these discouraging circumstances, the troops (nineteen twentieth of whom had never been in an action before) behaved in a manner that can never be too much applauded. They took their places without noise, and with less confusion than could have been expected from veterans placed in a similar situation.

As soon as I could mount my horse, I rode to the angle that was attacked—I found that Barton's company had suffered severely and the left of Geiger's entirely broken. I immediately ordered Cook's company, and the late Capt. Wintworth's, under Lieut. Peters, to be brought up from the centre of the rear line, where the ground was much more defensible, and formed a cross the angle in support of Barton's and Geiger's. My attention was then engaged by a heavy fire upon the left of the front line, where were stationed the small company of U. States Riflemen (then however, armed with muskets) and the companies of Baen, Snelling, and Prescott of the 4th Regiment. I found Major Davies forming the Dragoons in the rear of the companies, and understanding that those heaviest part of the enemy's fire proceeded from some trees about fifteen or twenty paces in front of those companies, I directed the Major to dislodge them with a party of the Dragoons. Unfortunately the Major's gallantry determined him to execute the order with a smaller force than was sufficient, which enabled the enemy to avoid him in front, and attack his flanks. The Major was mortally wounded, and his party driven back. The Indians were however immediately and gallantly dislodged from their advantageous position, by Capt. Snelling, at the head of his company. In the course of a few minutes after the commencement of attack, the fire extended along the left flank, the whole of the front, the right flank, and part of the rear line. Upon Spencer's mounted riflemen, and the right of Warwick's company, which was posted on the right of the rear line, it was excessively severe. Captain Spencer, and his first and second Lieutenants were killed, and Captain Warrick was mortally wounded—those companies, however, still bravely maintained their posts, but Spencer's had suffered so severely, and having originally too much ground to occupy, I reinforced them with Robb's company of riflemen, which had been driven, or by mistake ordered from their position, on the left flank towards the centre of the camp, and filled the vacancy that had been occupied by Robb and Pres-

cott's company of the 4th U. States Regiment. My great object was to keep the lines entire, to prevent the enemy from breaking into the camp until day light, which should enable me to make a general and effectual charge. With this view I had reinforced every part of the line that had suffered much; and as soon as the approach of morning had discovered itself, I withdrew from the front line Snelling's, Posey's (under Lieut. Albright) and Scott's and from the rear line, Willow's companies and drew them up upon the left flank, and at the same time I ordered Cook's and Baen's companies, the former from the rear and the latter from the front line to reinforce the right flank; foreseeing that at these points the enemy would make their last efforts. Major Wells, who commanded on the left flank, not knowing my intentions precisely, had taken the command of these companies, and had charged the enemy before I had formed the body of Dragoons with which I meant to support the infantry; a small detachment of these were however ready, and proved amply sufficient for the purpose. The Indians were driven by the Infantry at the point of the bayonet, and the dragoons pursued and forced them into a marsh, where they could not be followed. Captain Cook and Lieut. Larabee had, agreeable to my order, marched their companies to the right flank, had formed them under the fire of the enemy, and being then joined by the Riflemen of that flank, had charged the Indians, killed a number, and put the rest to a precipitate flight. A favorable opportunity was here offered to pursue the enemy with dragoons, but being engaged at that time on the other flank, I did not observe it until it was too late.

I have thus, sir, given you the particulars of an action, which was certainly maintained with the greatest obstinacy and perseverance by both parties. The Indians manifested a ferocity uncommon even to them. To their savage fury, our troops opposed that cool and deliberate valor, which is characteristic of the Christian soldiers.

The most pleasing part of my duty, (that of naming to you the corps and individuals who particularly distinguished themselves) is yet to be performed. There is however considerable difficulty in it—where merit was so common it is almost impossible to discriminate.

The whole of the Infantry formed a brigade under the immediate orders of Colonel Boyd. The Colonel throughout the action manifested equal zeal and bravery in carrying into execution my orders, in keeping the men to their posts, and exhorting them to fight with valor. His brigade Major Clark, and his aid de camp, George Croghan, were also very serviceably employed. Colonel Joseph Bartholomew, a very valuable officer, commanded under Col. Boyd the militia, infantry; he was wounded early in the action and his services lost to me. Major G. R. C. Floyd, the senior of the 4th U. States Regiment, commanded immediately the battalion of that Regiment which was in the front line. His conduct during the action was entirely to my satisfaction. Lieut. Col. Decker who commanded the battalion of militia on the right of the rear line, preserved his command in good order; he was however but partially attacked. I have before mentioned to you that Maj. Gen. Wells, of the 4th division of Kentucky militia, acted under my command as a Major, at the head of two companies of mounted volunteers; the General maintained the fame which he had already acquired in almost every campaign and in almost every battle which has been fought with the Indians since the settlement of Kentucky. Of the several corps, the 4th U. States Regiment, and two small companies attached to it, were certainly the most conspicuous for undaunted valor. The companies commanded by Capt. Cook, Snelling and Barton, Lieut. Peters and Hawkins, were placed in situations where they could render most service and encounter most dangers, and those officers eminently distinguished themselves.—

Capt. Prescott and Brown performed their duty entirely to my satisfaction, as did Posey's company of the 7th Regiment, headed by Lieut. Albright.

In short, sir, they supported the fame of American Regulars, and I have never heard that a single individual was out of the line of his duty. Several of the militia companies were in no wise inferior to the Regulars. Spencer's Geiger's and Warrick's

maintained their posts amidst a monstrous carnage, as indeed did Robb's after it was posted on the left flank; its loss of men (17 killed and wounded) and keeping its ground is sufficient evidence of its firmness. Wilson's and Scott's companies charged with the Regular troops, and proved themselves worthy of doing so. Norris's company also behaved well; Hargroves and Wilkin's company were placed in a situation where they had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves, or I am satisfied they would have done it. This was the case with the squadron of Dragoons also. After Major Davies had received his wound, knowing it to be mortal, I promoted Capt. Parke to the majority, than whom there is no better officer.

My two aid-de-camps, Majors Hurst & Taylor, with Lieut. Adams, of the Fourth Regiment, afforded me the most essential aid, as well in the action, as throughout the campaign.

The arrangements of Capt. Piatt in the quarter master's department were highly judicious, and his exertions on all occasions, particularly in bringing off the wounded, deserve my warmest thanks. But in giving merited praise to the living, let me not forget the gallant dead. Col. Abraham Owen, commandant of the 18th Ken. regt. joined me a few days before the action as a private in Capt. Geiger's company, he accepted the appointed of volunteer aid-de-camp to me; he fell early in the action. The representatives of his state will inform you that he possessed not a better citizen nor a braver man. Major J. H. Davis was known as an able lawyer, and a great orator; he joined me as a private volunteer, and on the recommendation of the officers of that corps, was appointed to command the 3d troop of dragoons. His conduct in that capacity justified their choice; never was there an officer possessed of more ardor and his duties with propriety, and no man would have encountered greater danger to purchase military fame. Captain Baen of the 4th U. States Regiment, was killed early in the action; he was unquestionably a good officer and valiant soldier.

Capt. Spencer and Warrick, and Lieut. Mc'Mahan and Berry were all my particular friends; I have ever had the utmost confidence in their valor, and I was not deceived. Spencer was wounded in the head—he exhorted his men to fight valiantly—he was shot through both thighs, and fell, still continuing to encourage them—he was raised up, and received a ball through the body, which put an immediate end to his existence!—Warrick was shot immediately through the body; being taken to the Surgery to be dressed, as soon as it was over, (being a man of great bodily vigor, and still able to walk) he insisted upon going back to head his company, although it was evident he had but a few hours to live.

All these gentlemen, sir, Capt. Baen excepted, have left wives, and five of them large families of children; this is the case too with many of the privates among the militia who fell in the action, or who have since died of their wounds. Will the bounty of their country be withheld from their helpless orphans, many of whom will be in the most destitute condition and perhaps want even the necessities of life?—With respect to the number of Indians that were engaged against us, I am possessed of no data by which I can form a correct statement. It must however, have been considerable and perhaps not much inferior to our own; which deducting the Dragoons, who were unable to do us much service was very little above 700, non-commissioned officers and privates; I am convinced there were at least six hundred.

The Prophet had three weeks before 450 of his own proper followers, I am induced to believe that he was joined by a number of the lawless vagabonds who live on the Illinois river, as large trails were seen coming from that direction. Indeed I shall not be surprised to find that some of those who professed the warmest friendship for us were arrayed against us—'tis certain that one of this description came out from the town and spoke to me the night before the action. The Potawattimie chief whom I mentioned to have been wounded and taken prisoner, in my letter of the 8th inst. I left on the battle ground, after having taken all the care of him in my power; I requested him to inform those of his own tribe who had joined the Prophet, and the Kickapoos and Winnebagoes, that if they would immediately abandon the Prophet, and return to their own tribes their past

conduct would be forgiven, and that we would treat them as we formerly had done. He assured me that he would do so, and that there was no doubt of their compliance. Indeed he said he was certain they would put the Prophet to death. I think upon the whole there will be no further hostilities; but of this I shall be enabled to give you some more certain information in a few days.

The troops left the battle ground on the 9th inst. it took every wagon to transport the wounded. We managed however to bring off the public property, although almost all the private baggage of the officers was necessarily destroyed.

It may perhaps be imagined, sir, that some means might have been adopted to have made a more early discovery of the approach of the enemy to our camp on the morning of the 7th inst. but if I had employed two thirds of the army as outposts, it would have been ineffectual; the Indians in such a night would have found means to have passed between them—placed in the situation that we were, there is no other mode of avoiding a surprise than by a chain of sentinels so close together that the enemy cannot pass between without discovery and having the army in such readiness that they can get to their alarm posts at a moments warning. Our troops could not have been better prepared than they were, unless they had been kept under arms the whole night, as they lay with their accoutrements on, and their arms by their sides, and the moment they were up they were at their posts. If the sentinels and the guards had done their duty, even the troops on the left flank would have been prepared to receive the Indians.

I have the honor to enclose you a correct return of our killed and wounded. The wounded suffered very much before their arrival here, but they were comfortably fixed, and every attention has been and shall continue to be paid to them. Doctor Foster is not only possessed of professional merit, but is moreover a man of feeling and honor.

I am not convinced, sir, that the Indians lost any more men than we did—they left from thirty six to forty on the field.—They were seen to take off not only the wounded but the dead. An Indian that was killed and scalped in the beginning of the action by one of our men was found in the houses, and many graves which were fresh dug; one of them was opened and found to contain three dead bodies.

Our infantry used principally cartridges containing twelve buck shot, which were admirably calculated for a night action.

I have before mentioned you, sir, that Col. Miller was prevented from illness going on the expedition—he rendered essential service in the command of Fort Harrison; he is an officer of great merit.

There are so many circumstances which it is important for you to know, respecting the situation of this country, that I have thought it best to commit this dispatch to my aid-de-camp Major Taylor, who will have the honor of delivering this to you, and who will be able to give you more satisfaction than I could do by writing.—Major Taylor (who is also one of our Supreme Judges) is a man of integrity and honor, and you may rely upon any statements he may make.

With the highest respect,

I have the honor to be,

Sir, your humble servant,

WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

P. S. Not a man of ours was taken prisoner, and of three scalps which were taken, two of them were recovered.

The Hon. WM. EUSTIS,

Secretary at War.

A General Return of the killed and wounded of the Army under the command of His Excellency William Henry Harrison, Governor and Commander in Chief of the Indiana Territory, in the action with the Indians, near the Prophet's Town, Nov. 7, 1811.

KILLED—One Aid-de-camp, one Captain, two Subalterns, one Sergeant, two Corporals, thirty Privates.

WOUNDED, since dead—One Major, two Captains, twenty two Privates.

WOUNDED—Two Lieut. Colonels, one Adjutant, one Surgeon's Mate, two Captains, three Subalterns, nine Sergeants, five Corporals, one Musician, one hundred and two Privates.

Total of killed and wounded—188.