

VIEW AND TIMES AND SWITZERLAND COUNTY DEMOCRAT.

use of the people of the State is the best practice in mail establishment. To arrive at that end it is indispensable that the Post Office Department shall be enabled to control the hours at which the mails shall be carried over railroads, as it now does over all other roads. Should serious inconveniences arise from the inadequacy of the compensation now provided by law, or from unreasonable demands by any of the railroad companies, the subject is of such general importance as to require the prompt attention of Congress.

In relation to steamboat lines, the most efficient remedy is obvious, and has been suggested by the Postmaster General. The War and Navy Departments already employ steamboats in their service, and although it is by no means desirable that the Government should undertake the transportation of passengers or freight as a business, there can be no reasonable objection to running boats, temporarily, whenever it may be necessary to put down attempts at extortion, to be discontinued as soon as reasonable contracts can be obtained.

The suggestions of the Postmaster General relative to the inadequacy of the legal allowance to witnesses in cases of prosecutions for mail depredations, merit your serious consideration. The safety of the mails requires that such prosecutions shall be efficient, and justice to the citizen whose time is required to bog down the public demands not only that his expenses shall be paid, but that he shall receive a reasonable compensation.

The Reports from the War, Navy, and Post Office Departments will accompany this communication, and one from the Treasury Department will be presented to Congress in a few days.

For various details in respect to the matters in charge of these departments, I would refer you to those important documents, satisfied that you will find in them many valuable suggestions, which will be found well deserving the attention of the Legislature.

From a report made in December of last year by the Secretary of State, to the Senate, showing the trial docket of each of the circuit courts, and the number of miles each judge has to travel in the performance of his duties, a great inequality appears in the amount of labor assigned to each judge. The number of terms to be held in each of the courts composing the ninth circuit, the distance between the places at which they sit, and from thence to the seat of Government, are represented to be such as to render it impossible, for the judge of that circuit to perform, in a manner corresponding with the public exigencies, his term and circuit duties. A revision, therefore, of the present arrangement of the circuit seems to be called for and is recommended to your notice.

I think it proper to call your attention to the power assumed by Territorial Legislatures to authorize the issue of bonds by corporate companies on the guarantee of the Territory. Congress passed a law in 1836, providing that no act of a Territorial Legislature incorporating banks should have the force of law until approved by Congress, but acts of a very exceptional character previously passed by the Legislature of Florida, were suffered to remain in force, by virtue of which bonds may be issued to a very large amount by those institutions, upon the faith of the Territory. A resolution intended to be a joint one passed the Senate at the same session, expressing the sense of Congress that the laws in question ought not to be permitted to remain in force unless amended in many material respects, but it failed in the House of Representatives for want of time, and the desired amendment have not been made. The interests involved are of great importance and the subject deserves your early and careful attention.

The continued agitation of the question relative to the best mode of keeping and disbursing the public money, still injuriously affects the business of the country. The suspension of specie payments in 1837, rendered the use of deposits rather than embracement than aid, and of necessity placed the custody of most of the public money afterwards collected in charge of the public officers. The new securities for its safety, which this required, were a principal cause of my convening an extra session of Congress, but in consequence of a disagreement between the two Houses, neither then, nor at any subsequent period, has there been any legislation on the subject. The effort made at the last session to obtain the authority of Congress to punish the use of public money for private purposes as a crime, a measure attended under other Government with signal advantage, was also unsuccessful, from diversities of opinion in that body, notwithstanding the anxiety doubtless felt by it to afford every practicable security. The result of this is still to leave the custody of the public money without those safeguards which have been for several years earnestly desired by the Executive; and as the remedy is only to be found in the action of the Legislature, it imposes on me the duty of again submitting to you the propriety of passing a law, providing for the safe keeping of the public money, and especially to ask that its use for private purposes by any officers intrusted with it, may be declared to be a felony, punishable with penalties proportioned to the magnitude of the offence.

These circumstances, added to known defects in the existing laws and unusual derangement in the general operations of trade, have, during the last three years, much increased the difficulties attendant on the collection, keeping, and disbursement of the revenue, and called forth corresponding exertions from those having them in charge. Happily these have been successful beyond expectation. Vast sums have been collected and disbursed by the several departments with unexpected cheapness and ease; transfers have been readily made to every part of the Union, however distant; and defalcations have been far less than might have been anticipated, from the absence of adequate legal restraints. Since the officers of the Treasury and Post Office Departments were charged with the custody of most of the public money received by them, there have been collected sixty-six millions of dollars, and, excluding the case of the late collector at New York, the aggregate amount of losses sustained in the collection cannot, it is believed, exceed sixty thousand dollars. The defalcation of the late collector at that city, of the extent and circumstances of which Congress has been fully informed, ran through all the modes of keeping the public money that have been hitherto in use, and was distinguished by an aggravated disregard of every restraint, and cannot, therefore, be usefully referred to as a test of the comparative safety of either.

Additional information will also be supplied by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, in reply to a call made upon that officer by the House of Representatives at the last session, requiring detailed information on the subject of defaults by public officers or agents under each Administration, from 1789 to 1837. This document will be submitted to you in a few days. The general results, (independent of the post office, which is kept separately and will be stated by itself,) so far as they bear upon this subject, are, that the losses which have been, and are likely to be, sustained by any class of agents, have been—the greatest by banks, including, as required in the resolution, their depreciated paper received for public dues; that the next largest have been by disbursing officers, and the least by collectors and receivers. If the losses on duty bonds are included, they alone will be threefold those by both collectors and receivers. Our whole experience, therefore, furnishes the strongest evidence that the desired legislation of Congress is wanting to insure, in those operations, the highest degree of security and facility. Such, also, appears to have been the experience of other nations. From the results of inquiries made by the Secretary of the Treasury in regard to the practice among them, I am enabled to state, that in twenty-two out of twenty-seven foreign Governments, from which undoubted information has been obtained, the public money are kept in charge of public officers. This concurrence of opinion in favor of that system is perhaps as great as exists on any question of internal administration.

In the mode of business and official restraints on disbursing officers, no legal change was produced by the suspension of specie payments. The report last referred to will be found to contain, also, much useful information in relation to this subject.

I have heretofore assigned to Congress my reasons for believing that the establishment of an independent National Treasury, as contemplated by the Constitution, is necessary to the safe action of the Federal Government. The suspension of specie payments in 1837, by the banks having the custody of the public money showed in so alarming a degree our independence on those institutions for the performance of duties required by law, that I then recommend the entire dissolution of that connexion. This recommendation has been subjected, as I desired it should be, to severe scrutiny and animated discussion; and I allow myself to believe that, notwithstanding the efforts of that circuit to perform, in a manner corresponding with the public exigencies, his term and circuit duties. A revision, therefore, of the present arrangement of the circuit seems to be called for and is recommended to your notice.

Recent events have also continued to develop new objections to such a connexion. Nelson is any bank, under the existing system, and practice, able to meet, on demand, all its liabilities for deposits and notes in circulation. It maintains specie payments, and transacts a profitable business, only by the confidence of the public in its solvency; and whenever this is destroyed, the demands of its depositors and noteholders—pressed, more rapidly than it can make collections from its debtors—force it to stop payment. This loss of confidence with its consequences occurred in 1837, and afforded the apology of the banks for their suspension. The public then acquiesced in the validity of the excuse; and, while the State Legislatures did not exact from them their forfeited charters, Congress, in accordance with the recommendation of the Executive, allowed them time to pay over the public money they held, although compelled to issue Treasury notes to supply the deficiency thus created.

It now appears that there are other motives than a want of public confidence under which the banks seek to justify themselves in a refusal to meet their obligations. Scarcely were the country and Government relieved, in a degree, from the difficulties occasioned by the general suspension of 1837, when a partial one, occurring within thirty months of the former, produced new and serious embarrassments, though it had no palliation in such circumstances as were alleged in justification of that which had previously taken place. There was nothing in the condition of the country to endanger a well managed banking institution; commerce was deranged by no foreign war; every branch of manufacturing industry was crowned with rich rewards; and the more than usual abundance of our harvests, after supplying our domestic wants, had left our granaries and store-houses, filled with a surplus for exportation. It is in the midst of this, that an irredeemable and depreciated paper currency is entailed upon the people by a large portion of the banks. They are not driven to it by the exhibition of a loss of public confidence, or of a sudden pressure from their depositors or noteholders, but they excuse themselves by alleging that the current of business, and exchange with foreign countries, which draws the precious metals from their vaults, would require, in order to meet it, a larger curtailment of their loans to a comparatively small portion of the community, that it will be convenient for them to bear, or perhaps safe for the banks to exact. The plea has ceased to be one of necessity. Convenience and policy are now deemed sufficient to warrant these institutions in disregarding their solemn obligations. Such conduct is not merely an injury to individual creditors, but it is a wrong to the whole community, from whose liberality they hold most valuable privileges—whose rights they violate, whose business they derange and the value of whose property they render unstable and insecure. It must be evident that this new ground for bank suspensions, in reference to which their action is not only disconnected with, but wholly independent of, that of the public money, gives a character to their suspension more alarming than any which they exhibited before, and greatly increases the impropriety of relying on the banks in the transactions of the Government.

A large and highly respectable portion of our banking institutions are, it affords me unfeigned pleasure to state, exempted from all blame on account of this second delinquency. They have, to their great credit, not only continued to meet their engagements, but have even repudiated the grounds of suspension now resorted to. It is only by such a course that the confidence and good will of the community can be preserved, and, in the sequel, the best interests of the institutions themselves promoted.

New dangers to the banks are also daily disclosed from the extension of that system of extravagant credit of which they are the pillars. Formerly our foreign commerce was principally founded on an exchange of commodities, including the precious metals, and fearing in its trans-

actions with the foreign market, they were compelled to discount bills of exchange, and to give credit to their debtors. They have, however, largely stimulated this system among others, have usurped the business, while they impair the stability, of the mercantile community; they have become borrowers instead of lenders; they establish their agencies abroad; they deal largely in stocks and merchandise; they encourage the issue of State securities until the foreign market is glutted with them; and, unsatisfied with the legitimate use of their own capital and the exercise of their lawful privileges, they raise, by large loans, additional means for every variety of speculation. The disasters attendant on this deviation from the former course of business in this country, are now shared alike by banks and individuals, to an extent of which there is perhaps no previous example in the annals of our country. So long as a willingness of the foreign lender, and a sufficient export of our productions to meet any necessary partial payments, leave the flow of credit undisturbed, all appears to be prosperous; but as soon as it is checked by any hesitation or unavailability of payment abroad, or by an inability to make payment there in our productions, the evils of the system are disclosed. The paper currency which might serve for domestic purposes, is useless to pay the debt due in Europe. Gold and silver are therefore drawn, in exchange for their notes, from the banks. To keep up their supply of coin, these institutions are obliged to call upon their own debtors, who pay them principally in their own notes, which are as unavailable to them as they are to the merchants to meet the foreign demands. The calls of the banks, therefore, in such emergencies, of necessity, exceed that demand, and produce a corresponding curtailment of their accommodations and of the currency, at the very moment when the state of trade renders it most inconvenient to be borne. The intensity of the pressure on the community is in proportion to the previous liberality of credit and consequent expansion of the currency; forced sales of property are made at the time when the means of purchasing are most reduced, and the worst calamities to individuals are, only at last arrested, by an open violation of their obligations by the banks, a refusal to pay specie for their notes, and an imposition upon the community of a fluctuating and depreciated currency.

These consequences are inherent in the present system. They are not influenced by the banks being large or small, created by National or State Governments. They are the results of the irresistible laws of trade and credit. In the recent events which have so strikingly illustrated the certain effects of these laws, we have seen the bank of the largest capital in the Union established under a National charter, and lately strengthened, as we were authoritatively informed, by exchanging that for a State charter, with new and unusual privileges—in a condition too, as it is said, of entire soundness and great prosperity—not merely unable to resist these effects, but the first to yield to them.

Now it is to be overlooked that there exists a chain of necessary dependance among these institutions which obliges them to a great extent to follow the course of others, notwithstanding its injustice to their own immediate creditors, or injury to the particular community in which they are placed. This dependence of a bank, which is in proportion to the extent of its debts for circulation and deposits, is not merely on others, but on itself, and on all those which connect it with the centre of trade. Distant banks may fail, without seriously affecting those in our principal commercial cities; but the failure of the latter is felt at the extremities of the Union. The suspension at New York, in 1837, was every where, with very few exceptions, followed, as soon as it was known; that recently at Philadelphia immediately affected the banks of the South and West in a similar manner. This dependence of our whole banking system on the institutions in a few large cities, is not found in the laws of their organization, but in the scope of trade and exchange. The banks at that centre to which currency flows, and where it is required in payment for merchandise, hold the power of controlling those in regions whence it comes, while the latter possess no means of restraining them; so that the value of individual property, and the prosperity of trade, through the whole interior of the country, are made to depend on the good or bad management of the banking institutions in the great seats of trade on the sea-board.

But this chain of dependance does not stop here. It does not terminate at Philadelphia or New York. It reaches across the ocean, and ends in London, the centre of the credit system. The same laws of trade, which give to the banks in our principle cities power over the whole banking system of the United States, subject the former, in their turn, to the money power in Great Britain. It is not denied that the suspension of the New York banks in 1837, which was followed in quick succession throughout the Union, was produced by an application of that power, and it is now alleged, in extenuation of the present condition of so large a portion of our banks, that their embarrassments have arisen from the same cause.

From this influence they cannot now entirely escape, for it has its origin in the credit currencies of the two countries; it is strengthened by the current of trade and exchange, which centres in London, and is rendered almost irresistible by the large debts contracted thereby by our merchants, our banks, and our states. It is thus that an introduction of a new bank into the most distant of our villages, places the business of that village within the influence of the money power in England. It is thus that every new debt which we contract in that country, seriously affects our own currency, and extends over the pursuits of our citizens in powerful influence.

We cannot escape from this by making new banks, great or small, State or National. The same chains which bind those now existing to the centre of this system of paper credit, must equally fetter every similar institution we create. It is only by the extent to which this system has been pushed of late, that we have been made fully aware of its irresistible tendency to subject our own banks and currency to a vast controlling power in a foreign land; and it adds a new argument to those which illustrate their precarious situation. Endangered in the first place by their own mismanagement, and again by the conduct of every institution which connects them with the centre of trade in our own country, they are yet subjected, beyond all this, to the effect of whatever measures policy, necessity, or caprice may induce those who control the credits of England to resort to. I mean not to comment in such cases, be also retained in specie, can

upon these measures present or past, and, much less to discourage the prosecution of fair commercial dealing between the two countries, based on reciprocal benefits; but it having now been made manifest that the power of inflicting these and similar injuries, is by the resistless law of a credit currency and credit trade, equally capable of extending their consequences through all the ramifications of our banking system, and by that means indirectly obtaining, particularly where our banks are used as depositories of the public moneys, a dangerous political influence in the United States, I have deemed it my duty to bring the subject to your notice and ask for its serious consideration.

Is an argument required beyond the exposition of these facts, to show the impropriety of using our banking institutions as depositories of the public money? Can we venture not only to encounter the risk of their individual and mutual mismanagement, but at the same time, to place our foreign and domestic policy entirely under the control of a foreign moneyed interest? To do so is to impair the independence of our Government, as the present credit system has already impaired the independence of our banks. It is to submit all its important operations, whether of peace or war, to be controlled, or diverted at first by our own banks, and then by a power abroad, greater than themselves. I cannot bring myself to depict the humiliation in which this Government and people might stand, or later be reduced, if the means for defending their rights, are to be made dependent upon those who may have the most powerful of motives to impair them.

Nor is it only in reference to the effect of this state of things on the independence of our Government or of our banks, that the subject presents itself for consideration; it is to be viewed also in its relations to the general trade of our country. The time is not long past when a deficiency of foreign crops was thought to afford a profitable market for the surplus of our industry; but now we await with feverish anxiety the news of the English harvest, not so much from motives of commendable sympathy, but fearful lest an anticipated failure should narrow the field of credit.

Does not this speak volumes to the patriotic? Can a system be beneficial, wise, or just, which creates greater anxiety for interests dependent on foreign credit, than for the general prosperity of our own country and the profitable exportation of the surplus produce of our labor? The circumstances to which I have thus adverted appear to me to afford weighty reasons, developed by late events, to be adduced to those which I have on former occasions offered, when submitting to your better knowledge and discernment the propriety of separating the custody of the public money from banking institutions. Nor has any thing occurred to lessen, in my opinion, the force of what has been heretofore urged. The only ground on which that custody can be desired by the banks is the profitable use which they may make of the money. Such we would be regarded in individuals as a breach of trust, or of a crime of great magnitude, and yet it may be reasonably doubted whether, first and last, it is not attended with more mischievous consequences, when permitted to the former than to the latter. The practice of permitting the public money to be used by its keepers, as here, is believed to be peculiar to this country, and to exist scarcely any where else. To procure it here, improper influences are appealed to; usury connections are established between the Government and vast numbers of powerful State institutions; other motives than the public good are brought to bear both on the Executive and Legislative departments, and selfish combinations, leading to special legislation, are formed. It is made the interest of banking institutions and their stockholders throughout the Union to use their exertions for the increase of taxation and the accumulation of a surplus revenue; and, while an excuse is afforded, the means are furnished, for those excessive issues which lead to extravagant trading and speculation, and are the forerunners of a vast debt abroad, and a suspension of the banks at home.

Indeed I cannot think that a serious objection would, any where be raised to the receipt and payment of gold and silver in all public transactions, were it not from an apprehension, that a surplus in the Treasury might withdraw a large portion of it from circulation, and lock it up unprofitably in the public vaults. It would, in my opinion, be difficult to prevent such an inconvenience from occurring; but the authentic statements which I have already submitted to you in regard to the actual amount in the public Treasury at any one time during the period embraced in them, and the little probability of a different state of the Treasury for at least some years to come, seem to render it unnecessary to dwell upon it. Congress, moreover, as I have before observed, will in every year have an opportunity to guard against it, should the occurrence of any circumstances lead us to apprehend injury from this source. Viewing the subject in all its aspects, I cannot believe that any period will be more auspicious than the present for the adoption of all measures necessary to maintain the sanctity of our own engagements, and to aid in securing to the community that abundant supply of the precious metals which add so much to their prosperity, and gives such increased stability to all their dealings.

In a country so commercial as ours, banks in some form will probably always exist; but this serves only to render it the more incumbent on us, notwithstanding the discouragements of the past, to strive in our respective stations to mitigate the evils they produce—to take from them, as rapidly as the obligations of public faith and a careful consideration of the immediate interests of the community will permit, the unjust character of monopolies; to check, so far as may be practicable by prudent legislation, these temptations of interest and those opportunities for their dangerous indulgence, which beset them on every side; and to confine them strictly to the performance of their paramount duty, that of aiding the operations of commerce, rather than consulting their own exclusive advantage. These and other salutary reforms may, it is believed, be accomplished without the violation of any of the great principles of the social compact, the observance of which is indispensable to its existence, or interfering in any way with the useful and profitable employment of real capital.

Institutions so framed have existed and still exist elsewhere, giving to commercial intercourse all necessary facilities, without inflating or depreciating the currency, or stimulating speculation. Thus accomplishing their legitimate ends, they have gained the surest guarantee for their protection and encouragement in the good will of the community. Among a people so just as ours, the same results could not fail to attend a similar course. The direct supervision of the banks belongs, from the nature of our Government, to the States who authorize them. But as the conduct of the Federal Government in the management of its revenue has also a powerful though less immediate influence upon them, it becomes our duty to see that a proper direction is given to it. While the keeping of the public revenue in a separate and independent Treasury, and of collecting it in gold and silver, will have a salutary influence on the system of paper credit, with which all banks are connected, and thus aid those that are sound and well managed, it will at the same time sensibly check such as are otherwise, by at once withholding the means of extravagance afforded by the public funds, and restraining them from excessive issues of notes which they would be constantly called upon to redeem.

I am aware it has been urged that this contro-

versy be made a matter of complaint. Our own importers merchants, by whom the residue of the duties is paid, are not only peculiarly interested in maintaining a sound currency, which the measure in question will especially promote, but are, from the nature of their dealings, best able to know when specie will be needed, and to procure it with the least difficulty or sacrifice. Regarding, too, almost universally in places where the revenue is received, and where the drafts used by the Government for its disbursements most concentrate, they have every opportunity to obtain and use them in place of specie, should it be for their interest or convenience. Of the number of these drafts, and the facilities they afford, as well as of the rapidity with which the public funds are drawn and disbursed, an idea may be formed from the fact, that of nearly twenty millions of dollars paid to collectors and receivers during the present year, the average amount in their hands at any one time has not exceeded a million and a half; and of the fifteen millions received by the collector of New York alone during the present year, the average amount held by him, subject to draft during each week, has been less than half a million.

The case and safety of the operations of the Treasury in keeping the public money, are promoted by the application of its own drafts to the public dues. The objection arising from having them too long outstanding, might be obviated, and they yet made to afford to merchants and banks holding them an equivalent for specie, and in that way greatly lessen the amount actually required. Still less inconvenience will attend the requirement of specie in purchases of public lands. Such purchases, except when made on speculation, are, in general, but single transactions, rarely repeated by the same person; and it is a fact, that for the last year and a half, during which the notes of sound banks have been received, more than a moiety of these payments has been voluntarily made in specie, being a larger proportion than would have been required in three years under the graduation proposed.

It is moreover, a principle, than which none is better settled by experience, that the supply of the precious metals will always be found adequate to the uses for which they are required. They abound in countries where no other currency is allowed. In our own States, where small notes are excluded, gold and silver supply their place. When driven to their hiding places by bank suspensions, little firms in the community soon restore them in a sufficient quantity for ordinary purposes. Postage and other public dues have been collected in coin, without serious inconvenience, even in States where a depreciated paper currency has existed for years, and this, with the aid of Treasury notes for a part of the time, was done without interruption during the sojourn of 1837. At the present moment, the receipts and disbursements of the Government are made in legal currency in the largest portion of the Union—no one suggests a departure from this rule; and if it can now be successfully carried out, it will be surely attended with less difficulty when bank notes are again redeemed in specie.

Indeed I cannot think that a serious objection would, any where be raised to the receipt and payment of gold and silver in all public transactions, were it not from an apprehension, that a surplus in the Treasury might withdraw a large portion of it from circulation, and lock it up unprofitably in the public vaults. It would, in my opinion, be difficult to prevent such an inconvenience from occurring; but the authentic statements which I have already submitted to you in regard to the actual amount in the public Treasury at any one time during the period embraced in them, and the little probability of a different state of the Treasury for at least some years to come, seem to render it unnecessary to dwell upon it. Congress, moreover, as I have before observed, will in every year have an opportunity to guard against it, should the occurrence of any circumstances lead us to apprehend injury from this source. Viewing the subject in all its aspects, I cannot believe that any period will be more auspicious than the present for the adoption of all measures necessary to maintain the sanctity of our own engagements, and to aid in securing to the community that abundant supply of the precious metals which add so much to their prosperity, and gives such increased stability to all their dealings.

In a country so commercial as ours, banks in some form will probably always exist; but this serves only to render it the more incumbent on us, notwithstanding the discouragements of the past, to strive in our respective stations to mitigate the evils they produce—to take from them, as rapidly as the obligations of public faith and a careful consideration of the immediate interests of the community will permit, the unjust character of monopolies; to check, so far as may be practicable by prudent legislation, these temptations of interest and those opportunities for their dangerous indulgence, which beset them on every side; and to confine them strictly to the performance of their paramount duty, that of aiding the operations of commerce, rather than consulting their own exclusive advantage. These and other salutary reforms may, it is believed, be accomplished without the violation of any of the great principles of the social compact, the observance of which is indispensable to its