

\$250,000—and this including the Lock at the National Road, which we know must be forever useless. And yet the gentleman complains of bad management of extravagance, and would place it all upon the whigs! There has been bad management; there has been extravagance, but this has been no more the fault of the whigs than of the loco focos. Ample proof of this assertion can be found on every page of our history. In the canvass for Governor in 1837, the contest was between Wallace and Dumont, and the object of the leaders of the loco foco party was to unite that party with the improvement whigs on Dumont. Wallace was thus driven, to identify himself with the system; he was elected by them; and in his inaugural address he spoke their language. Governor Noble, in his message, did precisely as might have been expected from a man of his good sense and experience; he recommended classification. Mr. Morgan of Rush county, a whig, moved in the Senate on the 14th Dec. 1837, Journal page 169, a resolution approving Gov. Noble's message on this subject. Mr. Dunning a loco foco, Journal 170, moved to amend the resolution, by striking it out and inserting an approval of Gov. Wallace's inaugural. The amendment of Mr. Dunning was amended by inserting a resolution decidedly opposed to classification, which was inserted in the place of Mr. Morgan's, and then the resolution, thus amended, was adopted. Journal page 172, by 33 yeas to 15 noes—12 loco focos voted for it. Messrs. Catheart, Crawford, Dobson, Dunning, Elliott, Ewing, Hackett, Kenney, Moore, Trask, Tuley and Watt of Union, whilst only nine voted against it.

But the gentleman from Franklin does not only find fault with the Board of which he was a part, but he has told us, that the Fund Commissioners have also acted very wrong. He says that Dr. Coe and others, by their bad management, have caused us to become liable for interest on near three millions of money which we have not received, and perhaps never shall receive. This is a mistake. But, first let me say, that the gentleman can no more drive me to the defense of Dr. Coe, than to the defense of the system, and for the same reason. Nevertheless it is in my power to do one act of justice to Dr. Coe. I can earnestly say, that I never saw or heard anything to cause me to entertain the least doubt of his integrity. And I am proud that now a fair opportunity is presented to me, to renew the remembrance of at least one praiseworthy act of Dr. Coe, in the discharge of his duties. Soon after the organization of the Board of improvement, and before more than one or two thousands of dollars could be necessary, one of the Commissioners drew a draft on Dr. Coe for ten thousand dollars. Dr. Coe had the goodness to refuse payment of it. That Commissioner was not then, is not now, a whig. The gentleman from Franklin knows it. Whence does the gentleman get the proofs for his assertion about near three millions. He must include the bank loan of one million, on which we have not paid any interest, and shall not have to pay any, until the money on the bonds is paid over. He must include the improvement debt of \$1,700,000 due from the Morris canal and other New York banks, on which we have not paid any interest, and shall not, until the money is paid to us. And then, he must include the Cohen compromise property; for the interest of this, we receive rent on the Spermaceti Factory, interest on the Baltimore mortgages, and interest on the cash instalments. I ask the gentleman for the particulars; for the documents. I ask him to make good his charge, if he can. And if he will, he may be assured that I will go with him, whether he be a system man as I have always understood him to be, as I believe he was elected, and as I think he was understood here, until the day before yesterday, to be, or whether he be an anti-system man as he has talked, I will go with him to forest out such abuses, and will cheerfully leave his inconsistencies to him and his constituents.

It was with regret Mr. Speaker, that I found myself compelled to be absent, while the gentleman from Switzerland (Mr. Fisher) addressed the House. But as I knew that gentleman was expected to speak about financial matters, several friends at my request, were careful to note his remarks, and I know them. That gentleman, any more than the other, did not attempt to sustain the report. But he did assume three propositions, substantially as follows:

- 1st. That the bank of the United States has not been affected by the war of the government upon it.
- 2d. That the gold bill and specie circular were beneficial measures, and were now approved generally.
- 3d. That the increase of bank capital had not been more than in proportion to the increase of business in general.

It is a task to my credulity, to believe that any intelligent gentleman, could assert the first proposition; although the boldness of the assumption so well accords with much of that recklessness of theory which marks that gentleman's arguments and opinions, that it is not so surprising, coming from him as it might be from another.

The bank of the U. S. not affected by the war of the government upon it! Who can believe it! That war, sir, compelled the bank to lessen its issues; to take a charter from the State of Pennsylvania, at the expense of an excessive premium; and to wind up its western and southern branches. Above all, sir, deserted by its patrons at home, under the influence of the great and ruinous outcry against it, raised by the administration, the pet banks and all the minions of power, that bank was compelled to send abroad for specie

to sustain itself. The proposition is so absurd that further I will not speak of it. The gentleman asserts that the gold bill and specie circular have been beneficial—are approved by the people—and that to the first we must attribute that great blessing, an increase of \$53,000,000 of specie in the country.

The gold bill was the beginning of that exhibition of ignorance and folly, of sheer quackery, Benton's humbuggery, by which this country has been plunged into its present state of misery and distress—a distress not peculiar to Indiana, as asserted in the report, but pervading every part of the U. S. We have fifty-three millions of specie more than we had. The gentleman attributes it to the administration. But is it a blessing? Has it rendered us more prosperous, or more happy? It has not. The same cause which gave us the specie, for which we are yet in debt, gave us also, foreign indebtedness to the amount of two hundred millions. We are a nation of financiers! we have raised the wind most beautifully! but now the day of reckoning has come. The fifty-three millions was a great curse to the country, a curse, because we are in debt for it because it stimulated the creation of more banks; and, especially, because it served to keep up the Benton humbug. It is not difficult to trace the operation of the gold bill, if we will look to the commercial history of the country. For some years previous to the passage of that bill, this country, according to the treasury reports, exported each year an average amount of specie, of about one-half million of dollars more than was imported; nevertheless the country was prosperous. The supply of specie was kept up by the amounts brought in, by emigrants from Europe, and by traders on the western frontier, and not noticed on the books of the treasury. During that time, too, the imports from abroad exceeded the exports, about three and a half millions of dollars per year, being about 7 per cent. advance on the amount of the exports, and merely a fair profit. That surplus, I believe to have been clear profit, and hence, the prosperity of the country. The gold bill was the first sowing of that wind, whence sprung the whirlwind, that is now sweeping over the land—the crop of distress we are now reaping. By that bill, the price of gold was raised; and owing to the scarcity of specie amongst us, the price of silver was affected. The merchants who had before shipped the half million of specie to Europe annually, were thus induced to ship produce; it was better for them to send produce without a profit, than specie at a loss; an increased demand for produce, to the amount of one-half million of dollars annually, was thus created; and this too, at an increased price. The increased demand for his produce, stimulated the increased price enabled, the farmer to extend the indulgence of himself and family in the use of foreign goods; thus, an increased demand for foreign goods was created; and the excess of imports was increased; but that increased excess, was not a profit; it was a debt still chargeable against us, a debt yet to be paid. In this manner, the increased demand for exports, and the increased demand for imports, acted upon each other in a rapid progression, and the results of Dr. Benton's first dose of No. 6, would have been soon developed; but that other causes, more mighty in their effects, were called into action, and in their immensely covered up those. Dr. Benton's nose was given in the morning; it excited a vast scheme of speculation, which by its operation, on the foreign exchanges, would have soon caused specie, the bill notwithstanding, to leave the country; and would have thus, soon reduced our apparent increased prosperity and excited surprise, into mere rapacious nakedness. But just as the delirium, consequent upon the first dose of stimulus, was beginning to exhibit itself, Dr. Kendall stepped in and swore that it was 11 o'clock.

This brings me to the third proposition of the gentleman from Switzerland (Mr. Fisher), that the increase of banks has not been more than the increase of business in the country.

After the gold bill, came Dr. Kendall's quackery—the removal of the deposits from the bank of the United States, and the State bank alliance. Dr. Kendall became a traveller—he went from city to city—he administered his stimulating medicine gratuitously—and hence sprung the increase of banks, the most unbounded speculations in public lands, and in town lots—hence sprung evils, so vast in their influences, so overpowering in their effects, that the gold humbug was forgotten, sunk, precisely as the morning hithers are forgotten in the eleven o'clock drum.

The removal of the deposits, the State bank alliance, the increase of discounts, and the increase of State banks, were all parts of the same measure, and are chargeable to the Party in Power, and to none other. To the country, it is immaterial whether this great evil is to be attributed to the late, or present administration. It belongs to the kitchen cabinet—to the men then and now in power. Those men by their recommendations encouraged the increase of State banks, and by their official acts enforced an increase of bank discounts. These men, thus brought upon us unbounded speculations, and now say that it was the fault of the credit system—the fault of that system which is the peculiar offspring of well regulated liberty, which is peculiar to free States, and which is founded upon, and cannot exist without, the utmost inviolability of character, of person, and of property, compatible with the administration of the laws. Those men abused the credit system—and the gentleman from Switzerland, when he asserts, that

the banks were not increased beyond the want of the increased business of the country, not only contradicts our own experience, but the present dogmas of the party to whose skirts he hangs. The increase of State banks was an administrative measure. If proof is wanting, I tell you, that the Globe recommended it—that the greatest increase took place in the administration States—and that a majority of the Representatives who, in our own House, voted for our own bank, were administration men. And, sir, the increase of discounts by the State deposit banks was not only a party measure, but was actually recommended by the Secretary of the Treasury, an old federalist to be sure, who has since been placed in the highest judicial station in our land, next after Marshall, but with a wide space between them—I mean Mr. Taney. In the letters of the Secretary of the Treasury, to the banks at different periods, selected as deposit banks, advice, instructions I should say, will always be found substantially as follows:

"The deposits of the public money will enable you to afford increased facilities to the commercial and other classes of the community, and the Department anticipates from you the adoption of such a course respecting your accommodations as will prove acceptable to the people and safe to the government." dated, Oct. 9, 1833, and signed, R. B. Taney, Secretary of the Treasury. Similar instructions were given to all the deposit banks, including the State bank of Indiana, on whose files an original may yet be found. At the time, the whole world well. For base party purposes, war was made upon the bank of the United States—and then an increase of State banks was stimulated and an increase of discounts was ordered, to divert the popular attention, precisely as the gentleman from Switzerland, would draw our attention from the examination of facts, by the investigation of theories. But, sir, their effort did not answer, and his will not.

Al! Mr. Speaker, I have caught the literary passion of that gentleman. I must quote poetry—if you do not like it, it is a mere difference of taste. Al! Mr. Speaker,

Woe for the hour,
When to liberty's tower,
The Fisher of theories,
With false notions came!
The sun went to bed—
The moon hid her head,
And wept behind the clouds,
For the Fisher-man's shame!

Under the influence of the party in power, from 1839 to 1847, the State bank system increased as follows:

32 banks to 634 banks.
145 millions of capital to 390 millions.
200 millions of discounts to 525 millions.
61 millions of circulation to 119 millions.

And, sir, while with one breath, this gentleman tells you, that this increase, sufficient to revolutionize the monetary affairs of any nation, and which has now revolutionized those of our country, not our State alone, but the whole country, was not more than the business of the country required—he will, if occasion require, turn round, and in the next breath assert, that he is a sub-treasury specie-elastic hard-money currency man.

The gentleman from Switzerland, in his conclusion, favored us with a grand flourish, upon the excellence of the administration of Gen. Jackson. But he forgot in his enumeration, that Gen. Jackson, as he suggested an increase of banks and of bank paper so also suggested to the States, State systems of internal improvement, to be sustained by a distribution of the surplus revenue. To me, it has often seemed wonderful, that the country could sustain, as long as it did, the vast increase of circulation founded upon fictitious capital. The gentleman (Mr. Fisher) accounts for it by saying that, it was only commensurate with the increase business of the country. To prove this, he points to the sales of public lands—and thus would substitute the effect for the cause. The increase of banks induced the speculations in lands, and it is contrary to common sense to suppose otherwise. So too, he has pointed to the increase of exports, especially of cotton. That increase has been more an increase of price than of quantity. The same sort of cotton which in March 1830, sold for ten cents per pound, sold in March 1837, for sixteen cents—and the same sort of pork which in March 1830, sold for nine dollars per barrel, sold in March 1837, for eighteen dollars and a quarter.

The country could not have sustained this vast increase of circulation, but that quackery was piled upon quackery, humbuggery upon humbuggery, and stimulus upon stimulus—but that the gold bill was followed by the State bank system, and that by the State improvement system, each accompanied with its own trains of apparent prosperity, all driving, us into the vast ocean of speculation.

On the 13th of January, 1837, in the Senate of the United States, Mr. Calhoun, in bold tones, foretold the results which must follow, and which have followed, the measures of the administration. I shall read from his speech on the removal of the deposits.

"What then is the real question which now agitates the country? I answer, it is a struggle between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government—a struggle not in relation to the existence of the bank, but which, Congress or President, shall have the power to create a bank, and the consequent control over the currency of the country. This is the real question. Let us not

deceive ourselves—this league, this association of banks, created by the Executive—bound together by its influence—united in common articles of association—vivified and sustained by receiving the deposits of the public money, and having their notes converted, by being received every where by the Treasury, into the common currency of the country, is to all intents and purposes, a bank of the United States—the Executive bank of the United States as distinguished from that of Congress. However it might fail to perform satisfactorily the useful functions of the bank of the United States, as incorporated by law, it would outstrip it, far outstrip it, in all its dangerous qualities, in extending the power, the influence, and the corruption of the government. It was impossible to conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these objects—not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions of the country, and with it the entire money power for the purpose of speculation, speculation and corruption would be placed under the control of the Executive—a system of menaces and promises will be established—the menace to the banks in possession of the deposits, but which might not be entirely subservient to Executive views—and of promise of future favors, to those who may not yet enjoy its favors. Between the two, the banks would be left without influence, honor, or honesty—and a system of speculation and stock jobbing would commence, unequalled in the annals of our country. I fear they have already commenced."

Does not the gentleman from Switzerland apprehend the force of this language? Do not you, Mr. Speaker, and the majority here, feel its truth—has not the whole country realized it? Mr. Calhoun is distinguished for many of the rare qualities of the great statesman. Some of these, he exhibited in the extract I have read, in his prediction of the ruin which the administration was bringing upon the country. But times have changed. Then, I attached consequences to all Mr. Calhoun said. Now, sir, I do not attach any, to anything he may say. He is now reposing in the Foot-stool Administration, and doubtless thinks that he will yet sit enthroned in the Capitol. He is mistaken. Many men with heads as clear, and hearts as firm, and arms as strong, have realized the truth of the school boy lesson, that there is but one step from the Capitol to the Tarpeian Rock.

Mr. Judah continued: I now approach the remarks of the last gentleman (Mr. Lane), whose remarks I feel bound to answer. That gentleman informed the House, that he owed a debt to Indiana, which was determined to strive to pay. And so do I. But that gentleman is a man of many dominies! He grew up in New York—he lived for a time in Ohio—for a time in Kentucky—and, he has lived for many years in Indiana. I have had but two—the homes of my boyhood and of my manhood—after God's mercy and my own exertion, I owe all, of private fortune and public reputation to the people of Knox county—they have upheld and sustained me—whether in good fortune or in bad—whether in days of triumph, or in days of adversity—they have never forsaken me. Can the gentleman from Dearborn say the same, of all, or of any of his homes? That gentleman told of heavenly qualities, which he loved. But there is one love, which ought to warm all our hearts, and which cannot find a resting place in bosoms warmed only by the fire of ambition. I mean the love of our country. That gentleman called on the dominant party to rally—and hoped, they would get all right! But I hope, that he will cease to exhibit himself as a mere partisan leader, that he will soon forget his caucus tactics, and engage with me in the only worthy strife—the effort to do the most public good.

The gentleman from Dearborn, did not pause to enquire, whether the report was true or false, in its statements or conclusions. But he was pleased to assume these propositions for discussion—neither of which had anything to do with the report. He said that the present difficulties of our country had been attributed and falsely, to

- 1st. The opposition of Jackson's administration to the bank of the United States.
- 2d. The specie circular and bank suspension.
- 3d. To the Maysville veto—and, by these digressions, he hoped to withdraw attention from the report, and to unite the party. He went back to the state of the bank of the U. S. in 1819—and has, in his most impressive manner said, that if the bank could secure a sound currency to the country, it could have done it in 1820. The transactions of those years were matters of observation to him—to me, they are matters of history, but of well known history. However, he might have spared all his labor, if his object is to identify me with the bank of the U. S. Up to this day, not one word in support of the bank of the U. S. has passed my lips—but, I will avail myself of this opportunity to declare my settled opinion—the opinion of one whose political opinions are all drawn from the Jefferson school—the opinion of an original Jackson man, long accustomed to the battle cry—"a single term, reform, and retrenchment," that, I prefer a bank chartered by Congress to State banks selected and controlled by the Executive—and that I prefer a bank of the U. S. to the union of the purse with the sword, commonly called the sub-treasuries. I regret the necessity which drives me to support a national bank—but we must

choose between it and a system of corruption and of plunder, whose only sanction the President himself can only find in the examples of more than twenty foreign and monarchical governments. The President in his message tells us, that out of twenty-six governments, twenty-two prefer the union of the purse with the sword—and he calls on us to yield our opinions to the example of this majority. But it will not do. Such examples are not for us.

To return to the proper subject. The gentleman alluded to the state of the bank in 1819, and referred to its effects in 1821. The gentleman forgot to review the financial history of the country from 1811 to 1819, so necessary to a proper understanding of the state of affairs in 1819 and 1820. He is better able than I to look back upon those times—he was a man then—and doubtless he would have done so, if he had been sincere about his discussion—if he had not feared to give the facts, and trust to the honest convictions those facts would induce.

Sir, in 1811, the battle of Tippecanoe was fought, and the war with England followed. At that time we only had State banks—and in a short time, all of the south of New England, suspended specie payment. The necessities of the times compelled the government and the people to sanction the suspension. In 1814, such men as Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun, driven by the situation of the country, forgot their abstract opinions, their party theories, and their personal prejudices, and united with Mr. Madison in creating the bank of the U. S. The leading republicans of that day sacrificed all personal considerations on the common altar of their Father land. The object was to restore the currency, to regulate the exchanges, and to aid the treasury. But, sir, those men never dreamed, that Mr. Taney or Mr. Woodbury, could be called to preside in the treasury department!

The bank was chartered and went into operation. But before these objects expected from it could have been realized, a bank mania seized upon the States. Many banks were created in the old States, more in the new—near fifty Dick Johnson banks were created at one batch in Kentucky. Similar creations took place in Ohio, and throughout the western valley. Speculation was thus excited—and then, the budding prosperity of the land was tipped, and withered. Such, in a few words, is the history of those times. The gentleman from Dearborn, could look back from 1819 to 1819 and 1820—he could forget the causes which induced the financial difficulties then existing—he could forget the circumstances which contributed to the ultimate recovery of the country from those difficulties—and then ask us, coolly and calmly, if the bank of the U. S. could be of any service, why it did not relieve the country in 1819 and 1820? This question, the gentleman puts in his best manner—a manner, most unlike anything on earth, unless it is the indelible manner thrown by Hogarth into one of his pictures—that picture, in which he represents the Old Bawd meeting the Curate's daughter. The bank of the U. S. accomplished all it could accomplish. It could not at once, regulate the currency, nor control the exchanges. But so soon as the Dick Johnson creation of banks had passed away—so soon as the bank litters in other states had passed away—the bank of the U. S. did come up to the objects of its institution, and, until after 1839 we had a sound currency, and reasonable and fair exchanges.

For many years, whilst the bank of the U. S. exercised its functions in all the vigor of that institution, men in Maine, in Georgia, or in Missouri, could pay debts in any State in the Union, for a discount not exceeding one half per cent. With U. S. bank notes in his pocket, a man could travel from the Atlantic to the Desert, from the Gulf to the Lakes, without being shaved.

But now, how is it, under the treatment of such Doctors as Benton and Kendall! Now, we have no such bank bills—now, we can scarcely go from county to county without being shaved—now, we are all under the power of the shavers. At this time, instead of one half per cent, three per cent, is less than the average loss to the people of the State, on their exchange—and it is an important difference. Our imports from the east are estimated at about two millions of dollars annually. One half per cent, on that would be \$10,000, but three per cent, is \$60,000. The difference is \$50,000 per year. Upon this estimate the loss of the people of this State, since the bank of the U. S. was crushed by the administration, may be calculated. It exceeds \$30,000. The loss to the people of Indiana is just about the difference between \$60,000 and \$60,000. So much, sir, for the effects of the humbuggery on us, in exchanges alone! No man can controvert these estimates. No public man amongst us can fold his arms and say, what of that? It cannot be passed over as a slight matter. It is serious to the merchant, but more serious to the people, who are compelled to repay to the merchant his exchange, with the usual profit on it. Will the eulogies of your party, sir, on the late and present gracious administrations, or will the solemn mockeries of the gentleman from Dearborn, give back to our people this money? Your eulogies are but tinkling sounds—your promises are but chaff; we want corn.

(To be concluded next week.)

Thousands are hated, whilst none are ever loved, without a real cause. The amiable alone can be loved.

GAZETTE.

VINCENNES.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1840.

The Union of the Whigs for the sake of the Union.

NOMINATION BY THE WHIG NATIONAL CONVENTION.

FOR PRESIDENT,
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON
OF OHIO.

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT,
JOHN TYLER
OF VIRGINIA.

ONE TERM.—Mr. PENNINGTON, of Ohio, stated in the Convention, that it was the wish of General HARRISON, if elected to the Presidency, to serve only ONE TERM.

TRUE WHIG DOCTRINE.—One Pennsylvanian Term—the Integrity of the Public servants—the safety of the Public Money—and the general good of the People.—Gov. Barbour.

FOR GOVERNOR,
Samuel Digger, of Rush County

FOR LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR,
Samuel Hall, of Gibson County.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.

SENATORIAL.

JONATHAN J. CARTY, of Fayette.

JOSEPH G. MARSHALL, of Jefferson.

REPRESENTATIVE.

1st District, JOHN W. PATNE, of Harrison.
2d do. R. W. THOMPSON, of Lawrence.
3d do. J. W. WHITE, of Jefferson.
4th do. JAMES R. CHAYES, of Ripley.
5th do. CARRER R. SMITH, of Fayette.
6th do. WM. HEROD, of Bartholomew.
7th do. HENRY S. LANE, of Montgomery.

Whig Committee of Correspondence for Knox county.

Samuel Hill, Hiram Decker, R. Y. Caddington, George R. Gibson, Wm. R. McCord, Albert G. Sloan.

We are authorized to announce Benjamin F. Norton as a candidate for Constable at the approaching April election.

We are authorized to announce Levi Cornover as a candidate for Constable at the coming election.

We are authorized to announce William Green as a candidate for Constable at the ensuing election.

We are authorized to announce Thomas Welton as a candidate for Constable at the April election.

We are authorized to announce E. M. Jones as a candidate for Constable at the April election.

We are authorized to announce Daniel P. McDonald as a candidate for Constable at the approaching election.

We are authorized to announce William Garnar as a candidate for Constable at the ensuing election.

Mr. Caddington.

Please to say in your next paper that Lemuel Gardner will serve as Constable of Vincennes Township, if elected.

MANY VOTERS.

Advertisements, intended for immediate insertion, must, to secure insertion, be handed in by Thursday afternoon, of which our advertising friends will please take note.

The Vincennes Gazette approves of the course pursued by Morris and Co. towards Bolton and Cain.—*Pacific American.*

Not quite. They (Bolton and Cain) ought to be driven with hisses and scoffs from every respectable society they intrude their slanderous presence into.

The editors of the Paoli True American, might better be a little careful how they use such gratuitous assertions of "expected misrepresentation" when speaking of us, or he will as like as any other way, "wake up the wrong passenger."

The Wabash has continued to rise since our last, and is now generally over its banks above and below us, wherever they are low. All the streams and rivers in the valley, are also high. White river, it is said, is higher than it has been for twenty years. Embarrass is also very high.

Accident.—The Great Western Mail, hence, west, was lost, with stage and team, at Embarrass river, on Thursday morning last. The river has risen so high, as to run around the west end of the bridge, and the driver and others not being aware of any washing having taken place, passed over, and was immediately engulfed in a vortex some fifteen feet deep. The way mail only was saved. The driver swam to shore. Happily, there were no passengers in the stage at the time.

We are requested to say that the regular monthly meeting of the "Old Knox Temperance Society," will take place at the Methodist Episcopal Church, on Monday evening next the 2d March at early candle-lighting.

The members are requested to attend, and such of the citizens as feel friendly to the cause, are invited to be present.

We hear that almost the last act of our loco-foco legislature, was to pass a stay law, the tendency of which will be to cripple business of all kinds, and foster rogues.