

myth. The people neither knew nor cared what had become of them.

Owing to the nefarious exception in the legal-tender currency in favor of the interest on the public debt and duties on imports, a Gold Exchange was organized in New York, and gold was bought with which to pay the semi-annual coupons of the bonds and the duties on imported goods. Trading in gold and in the speculative margins of gold became a business, in some sense the greatest of all the businesses; certainly it was the most picturesque.

It was under these conditions that the great bulk of the national debt was put into the form of bonds. The bonds were purchased with the legal money of the country. They were purchased at par according to the standard of the universal currency. The advantage in purchasing them was generally given by the government to the purchasers. Already the bondholder was a lord and the government a serf. Inducements were freely offered to stimulate the sale of the bonds. Payments were made easy; slight discounts were not unusual; interest was sometimes advanced; and many other methods were adopted to make the sale of the national securities free and copious. Finally, the purchaser of bonds to the value of fifty thousand dollars might receive as a gratuity forty-five thousand dollars in paper money, and with that establish a bank of issue, discount and loan.

In this manner the national debt became a bond.

From that day to the present the bond industry has been the one ever-flourishing, permanent, and deep-down industry, not indeed of the American people, but of the class who hold the national securities and live by them. This industry has combined with the two leading political parties, and has made and kept them a unit for more than twenty years. This industry has insinuated itself into the government, and has become the energizing and controlling force in the public life of the nation; and before it all other industries have been compelled to stagger and bend and break, until the bond not only rules but reigns.

No one has ever calculated with certainty the average cost of the government bond to the original purchasers. To do so is a complicated problem. They were of many series, extending over a span of years, and were bought at different crises when the premium on gold was rising or falling. The higher the premium rose, the cheaper the bonds were, as tested by the measurement of gold. By this measurement it is probable that the average cost of the five-twenty to the purchasers was not more than fifty-five, or certainly not more than sixty-five cents to the gold dollar. Nearly all other series were purchased at a like enormous discount, as tested by the standard of coin. In the sale of the bonds, before the debt reached its maximum in March of 1866, the standard of the legal-tender paper was uniformly observed. It was by the common measure of the money of the country that the whole original debt was sold, and mostly by that measure that it was funded and refunded for at least fourteen years after Appomattox. But the mythical gold barometer kept in the safe in Lombard Street in London showed that the purchases of the bonds were actually made at prices ranging from about forty-six to seventy cents to the coin dollar.

By the close of the war the seven-thirty bonds were already falling due. The five-twenty would be due in a short time. That is, in a short time the government would have the option but not the necessity of redeeming them. And now it was that the fundholding interest put itself in antagonism to the national welfare, and conceived the project of doubling its investment at one stroke by compelling the payment of all the bonds in coin. They had been purchased on the basis of one currency. That currency was worth only about half as much, unit for unit, as the mythical metallic currency which had now become only a reminiscence. Or, to put it the other way, the phantom metallic currency was worth at least two to one of the currency of all business, of all manufacture, of all production, of all accounting; that is, two for one of the currency of the people and the nation. The holders of the bonds perceived that if, under these conditions, they secure a statutory declaration of the payment of both principal and interest of the five-twenty bonds in coin, then they would have gained, at the expense of the overburdened nation, not only the principal and the legitimate interest to which they were entitled and which ought to have satisfied, but also about two for one on their whole investment!

The stake was worthy of the trial. The game might well be played with all the skill and intrigue and specious formality of which human nature is capable. On one side of the table sat the representatives of the bond; on the other side sat the American people; and the bond won! By the Act of March 18, 1869, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the Public Credit," etc., but which ought to have been entitled "An Act to Transfer the Resources of the American People to the Hands of a Few Under Sanction of Law," it was decreed that the bondholder should have his two for one; that the five-twenty and all like obligations of the government, whether they were or were not by their own terms payable in coin, should now be made so payable; that the national

credit required that a bond which had been purchased in one currency should be paid in another currency worth twice as much; that the property loaned to the republic for the suppression of the Rebellion should be returned twofold beside the interest; that the holder of the national obligation, in addition to being preserved whole and harmless, should be enriched by law at the expense of the people; but that the widow who had given her four sons to her country and had followed them one by one to their last resting places under the apple tree in the orchard, should receive back nothing but weeds and that celestial sorrow which transfigured her face evermore into the face of an angel!

* Let no one aver that making war without making a national debt is an absurd vagary. That would be to condemn as a financial quack no less a personage than William E. Gladstone! Mr. Gladstone is without a doubt the greatest statesman in finance that England has produced within the present century. It has been the one ruling and undeviating principle of his policy, alike in peace and in war, to make the annual revenues under all circumstances meet the annual expenditures of the empire. He began to battle for this principle in 1853 when as chancellor of the exchequer he had to provide the means for the prosecution of the Crimean war. On this question he and Disraeli divided forever. The former proposed to provide the means of war by increasing the annual revenues; the latter proposed to borrow. Mr. Gladstone did adopt the method of paying as he went, and held to it until the overthrow of the Aberdeen ministry. He stoutly affirmed in presenting his first budget that war or no war, the national debt of Great Britain should not be increased but that the cost of supporting the British army in Asia should be met year by year, as an increase in the income-taxes and excises. This policy was supported by the prince-consort who declared it to be "manly, statesmanlike and honest;" the policy of borrowing the prince characterized as "convenient, cowardly, and perhaps popular." He ought to have added suicidal. As long as Gladstone remained in office he forced the revenues to meet the expenditures within the year. His principle through life has been, in every emergency, not to borrow, but to tax—that is, to take.

* The American people have never realized the incalculable sums which have been paid out of their treasury in the ostensible work of discharging the interest and principle of the war debt of the nation. Sometime, perhaps, the final aggregate may be made up and historically recorded. Within the first ten years after the conclusion of the war, that is, at the close of the fiscal year 1874-5, the government had already paid in interest on the public debt \$1,420,577. And this was but the beginning. At the close of the year 1895 the interest account has reached the prodigious total of more than two billion six hundred and thirty five millions of dollars!

* The verification of this astounding truth is as plain and irrefutable as any other arithmetical result. On the first of March 1895, the national debt was in exact figures..... \$2,827,868,959.46 For the sake of easy computation the same may be stated in round numbers at..... 2,825,000,000.00 The debt at the close of the year 1895 (statement for November) is..... 1,126,379,166.09 For convenience of counting, the same may be given in round numbers as \$1,125,000,000.00 To this add ten per cent (a low estimate) for the present average premium on the debt (interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing) above par of gold..... 112,500,000.00 Total present gold value of debt..... \$1,237,500,000.00 On the first of March 1866, the current prices of nine leading staples of the American market, selected broadly from the whole, were as follows.

Wheat per bushel, from \$1.78 to \$2; average..... \$1.90 Flour per barrel, \$0.50 to \$1; average..... 10.75 Cotton per pound..... .48 Mess pork per barrel..... 28.37 Sugar per pound..... 11.25 Wool per pound 50 cents to 55 cents; average..... .53 Beef per cwt., \$12 to \$18.50; average..... 15.25 Bar iron per pound, 6 cents to 7½ cents; average..... .0675 Superior farming lands in Ohio and Mississippi valleys (approximately) per acre..... 75.00

At the close of 1895 (figures of November) the prices current for the same staples were as follows.

Wheat per bushel..... \$0.58 Flour per barrel..... 3.50 Cot per pound..... .085 Mess pork per barrel..... 8.20

Sugar per pound, 4½ to 5½ cents; average..... .05

Wool per pound, 20 to 23 cents; average..... .215

Beef per cwt., \$5.50 to \$10.50; average..... 9.50

Bar iron per pound, 1½ to 3½ cents; average..... .0267

Superior farming lands, same as above, in Ohio and Mississippi valleys (approximately), per acre..... 35.00

The national debt on the first of March, 1866, would therefore purchase of the above staples as follows.

Of wheat..... 1,486,842,105 bushels

Of flour..... 262,790,697 barrels

Of cotton..... 5,885,416,666 pounds

Of mess pork..... 99,576,313 barrels

Of sugar..... 25,393,348,314 pounds

Of wool..... 5,330,188,672 pounds

Of beef..... 181,967,213 cwt.

Of bar iron..... 41,851,851 pounds

Of superior farming lands as above (approximately)..... 37,666,666 acres

The national debt at the close of the year 1895 will purchase of the above staples as follows:

Of wheat..... 2,133,620,689 bushels

Of flour..... 353,571,428 barrels

Of cotton..... 14,558,821,529 pounds

Of mess pork..... 150,915,833 barrels

Of sugar..... 24,750,000,000 pounds

Of wool..... 5,751,812,953 pounds

Of beef..... 130,263,136 cwt.

Of bar iron..... 46,348,314,666 pounds

Of superior farming lands as above (approximately)..... 2,309,523 acres

From this calculation it is seen that the purchasing power of the debt at the close of 1895 is far greater than that it was on March 1, 1866, as follows:

In the case of wheat by..... 646,778,584 bushels

In the case of flour by..... 90,780,731 barrels

In the case of cotton by..... 8,673,406,863 pounds

In the case of mess pork by..... 51,330,540 barrels

In the case of wool by..... 425,625,274 pounds

In the case of bar iron by..... 4,496,462,755 pounds

The purchasing power of the national debt at the close of 1895 is, by like deduction, less than was that of the national debt in March 1, 1866, as follows:

In the case of sugar by..... 643,348,314 pounds

In the case of beef by..... 51,704,076 cwt.

In the case of farm lands as above by (approximately)..... 2,309,523 acres

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