

JAPS ADVANCE ON SINGAPORE

Invaders Take Batu Pahat, Anchor of the British Left Flank.

(Continued from Page One)

houses above Singapore on the east coast.

Despite the admission of the loss of Batu Pahat, reports reached here that the Japanese were now forced to strain to maintain their offensive because of their considerable losses and the fact that it took reinforcements longer to reach the front.

It was disclosed also that Thailand planes, by virtue of a declaration of war by the Thai government yesterday against Great Britain and the United States, had joined the already powerful Japanese air force in attacks on the Australian lines.

A dispatch from Australian headquarters said that 200 more men of a big Australian-Indian force which had been cut off for a week had now rejoined the Imperial advanced troops after working through the Japanese lines.

They had held the west coast front after a Japanese break through south of the Muar River Jan. 16. It was indicated that they had saved the entire imperial line before they were isolated, apparently hopelessly, and were told by radio that no help could be sent them.

The front is so close to Singapore now that it is possible for correspondents to make fast visits each day and get back to Singapore.

ARRANGE RITES FOR JEANNETTE E. CULL

Services for Mrs. Jeannette E. Cull will be held at 3 p.m. Wednesday at the Harry W. Moore Peace Chapel. Burial will be in Crown Hill.

Mrs. Cull was found dead at her home, Sargent Road and 86th St., yesterday morning. She was 32.

Her husband, Joseph Cull, and her father, Elbert Williamson, of 310 N. Kealing Ave., said that Mrs. Cull had been ill about 10 years and that she recently had made a trip to Texas in the hope of recovering from a nervous breakdown.

Mrs. Cull was a member of the East Tenth Street Methodist Church.

Besides her husband and father, she is survived by her mother, Mrs. Addie Williamson; a son, David, 13; a daughter, Mary Anne, 12; two brothers, Orval E. Williamson and Charles M. Williamson, all of Indianapolis.

SMILE BEAUTY SHOP
622 Mass. Ave. LI-0028

Fighting Men, Given Up for Dead, Trek Through Jungle Mud to Reach Home Line

By HAROLD GUARD
United Press Staff Correspondent

SINGAPORE, Jan. 24 (Delayed) — Men who refused to quit when they were given up for dead or captured straggled back into the Imperial lines today, a band of mosquito-bitten heroes bearing with them their wounded.

They were the remnant of an Australian and Indian force which had fought so fiercely against a Japanese onslaught last Sunday that they did not realize they had been flanked and cut off. They held for almost a week the vital road which runs from Muar to Yongpeng.

After almost 100 hours of fighting the Aussies asked if they might send their wounded through. The Japanese refused, except on condition of absolute surrender. They decided to go on fighting.

Thursday, a message was flashed to them from headquarters of Maj. Gen. Gordon Bennett, commander of the Australian forces in Malaya.

"Regret there is little prospect of any successful help for you. Lloyd's party, if successful, should have appeared before this. Twenty of your men and a number of Indians already have returned along the road, which is still in our possession. You may at your discretion

leave the wounded with volunteers, destroy heavy equipment and escape. Sorry unable to help after your heroic effort. Good luck. (Signed) Gordon Bennett."

"Saturday night," a survivor related, "we took up a position nine miles from the Muar. The first attack came about 7 p.m. We managed to beat it off. There was nothing more till Sunday morning, when Jap infantry attacked, followed by tanks. Our anti-tank batteries polished off 10 Jap tanks."

"Again the Japs retired. We began to prepare to push on toward the Muar to try to contact the Indians."

"The Japs must have infiltrated to our rear because Sunday night they made a surprise attack with bayonets. However, we came off best."

"The sniping continued Monday, although it was fairly quiet until 4 p.m. Then a terrific artillery barrage started and a heavier infantry force attacked again. We started to withdraw between 5 and 6 p.m."

"I and 15 others were cut off from the main force and dashed into the jungle. We waded waist high in the jungle swamps for 26 hours, but managed to rejoin the battalion."

It was decided to continue the withdrawal eastward. What was left of the battalion on Tuesday morning moved about four miles.

DANGER GROWS IN AUSTRALIA

10,000 Jap Troops Landed In Islands Off North Coast, Say Reports.

By BRYDON TAVES
United Press Staff Correspondent

MELBOURNE, Australia, Jan. 26.—Ten thousand Japanese troops have been landed at Rabaul, in the Bismarck Islands, and the Japanese have effected a new landing in the Buka Passage at the north end of the Solomons, the Government reported today.

The powerful Japanese force now concentrated at Rabaul, 800 miles northeast of Australia, was landed from a 17-ship invasion fleet. In addition the Japanese had invasion forces at Kavieng, in New Ireland Island, near Rabaul; at Kieta in the Solomon Islands and in the island-dotted Buka Passage.

Japs Near Australia

This passage, at the northwest end of the Solomons, is a stepping stone between the Solomons and New Ireland, in the Bismarcks. It separates Bougainville, of which Kieta is the chief town, and Buka Island, only 125 miles from New Ireland.

It was feared here that the Japanese had succeeded in landing troops at isolated spots in New Guinea, only 100 miles across the Torres Strait from Australia.

A government statement said civilians had been evacuated from Madang, on the east coast of New Guinea, and from Tulagi Island in the Solomons. Wewak, in northeast New Guinea, was bombed today. A test blackout was arranged for the entire Eastern coast of Australia, in expectation of Japanese air raids on the continent, and a general blackout was expected soon.

It was announced that the Government intended to register every male up to the age of 60 for military or auxiliary service within the next four weeks, and it was understood that registration of all women would follow.

Prime Minister John Curtin announced in a speech today that negotiations were proceeding to secure Australia's representation on the staff of the United Nations Far East command.

Bushmen Aid Defense

Deputy Prime Minister P. M. Forde, who is war minister, announced that Australian defense forces were fighting "magnificently" against the Japanese in the hills behind Rabaul.

The government said that most of the defenders were militiamen, and that they included many fierce, experienced bushmen.

The bushmen, most of them from the Victoria area of southeastern Australia, and the other militiamen had been specially trained in jungle warfare and sent to the northeastern islands in expectation of a Japanese sneak attack.

They were reported by the Government to be fighting stubbornly in the hills against Japanese attempts to filter in from the Rabaul area.

Invasion Fleet Bombed

A Royal Australian Air Force communiqué said Australian planes bombed the big Japanese invasion fleet off Rabaul Saturday night and it was known, despite bad visibility, that some ships were hit. One Australian plane was missing.

The Government was getting nearly all its reports from the threatened areas by means of airplane reconnaissance, as communications had been cut off for days.

Mobilization of defense forces proceeded swiftly today, and all defense factories speeded production, on what is normally a complete holiday—Australia Day, anniversary of the landing of the first settlers at Sydney, Jan. 26, 1788. It was the first time that the defense forces had been in action on home territory in the 154 years of the country's history.

The report listed the following "causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack":

"Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by the Japanese and adherence by the United States to such laws and customs."

"Retributions which prevented effective counter-espionage."

Enlisted Men Exonerated

"Emphasis in the warning messages (from Washington) on the probability of aggressive Japanese action in the Far East, and on antisabotage measures."

"Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department."

"Non-receipt by the interested

Cry Raised to Punish Guilty at Hawaii; Unified Land Command Is Also Demanded

(Continued from Page One)

senior Republican member of the House Naval Affairs Committee and a reserve Marine officer, was first up for unification.

"The report on the Pearl Harbor tragedy," he said, "demonstrates the need for a unified command for the Hawaiian outpost, a move I have recommended for over four years."

Rep. Maas and Rep. Hamilton Fish of New York both called for a full Congressional investigation. Chairman David J. Walsh (D. Mass.) of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee said his group would begin at once a thorough study of the report to determine whether there should be further investigation of higher Army and Navy officials.

Senator C. Wayland Brooks (R. Ill.) wanted such an inquiry to determine why Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox had agreed to "sending of our military and naval equipment to other countries" when our most important outpost was "inadequately supplied."

Congressional astonishment that Kimmel and Short each was only superficially acquainted with the other's preparedness measures may translate itself into considerable debate on which command unification will figure.

With either an Army or Navy officer in command of all land, sea and air forces in a given area—like Hawaii—it is scarcely possible for an Army officer to "assume" mistakenly that the Navy was conducting adequate offshore patrols or for a Navy officer to make the mistake of "assuming" that the Army was operating its sound detector devices 24 hours a day.

It was assumed that in all vital areas for defense, both the Army and Navy would institute immediately plans for consolidation of authority and closer co-operation on steps taken.

Two Sunk Hour Before Attack

Two sensational examples of failure to take even last-minute precautions were cited in the report—the sinking of a Japanese submarine outside Pearl Harbor more than an hour before the air attack and the detection of approaching aircraft nearly an hour before the actual attack.

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Report Summarized

1. Short and Kimmel were aware that previous Japanese actions indicated that hostilities might be undertaken prior to a formal declaration of war.

2. On three occasions, Short and Kimmel were advised by Washington officials and by naval intelligence that hostilities in the Pacific were probable.

3. Short and Kimmel without exception believed the chances of a raid, while the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, were "practically nil."

4. Short and Kimmel independently took such action as each deemed appropriate but neither informed the other of what he was doing.

5. On Nov. 27, when Admiral Harold R. Stark, chief of naval operations, sent Kimmel a message which Stark characterized as a "war warning," there was sufficiently trained personnel available at Pearl Harbor to operate the aircraft warning system 24 hours a day. An arc of nearly 360 degrees around

the failure to take appropriate steps upon detection of the approaching aircraft was probably the most tragic example of might-have-beens. The air warning system closed down at 7 a.m. ordinarily, but a young non-commissioned officer who wanted to practice asked and received permission to stay on.

At 7:02 a.m., he detected what he thought was a large group of aircraft some 100 miles north of Pearl Harbor and reported the same at 7:30 a.m. to an "inexperienced" lieutenant. The latter assumed they were friendly craft, since some American planes were believed to be operating in the vicinity.

Thus the last opportunity for a general alarm before the Japanese planes arrived was passed up.

Anti-Submarine Net Opened

Earlier a submarine was sighted by the U.S. destroyer Antares. No alarm was sounded. Only another destroyer and a patrol plane were sent to investigate. Between 6:33 and 6:45 a.m., they sank the submarine. It was not until 7:55 a.m. that the full onslaught of the Japanese attack began.

The board said there were deficiencies of personnel and equipment for adequate defense of Hawaii, but added that full use was not made of the men and materials available.

It cited an anti-submarine net supposedly guarding the entrance to Pearl Harbor, which was opened at 4:58 a.m. on Dec. 7 for the entrance of two mine sweepers and was not closed until 8:40 a.m.—45 minutes after the Japanese attack began.

Meanwhile, an enemy submarine sneaked into the harbor, but was sunk apparently before its torpedoes could do any damage.

The report listed the following "causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack":

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Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court (seated in car) is besieged by Washington newsmen as he leaves the White House after delivering to President Roosevelt the report fixing the blame for the success of the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor.

parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of Dec. 7, 1941."

The report concluded with exhortation of other officers and enlisted men on the island, asserting that "except for a negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding (Saturday) evening did not affect their efficiency."

Other highlights of the report:

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