

The Indianapolis Times

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No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely, on any subject whatever.—Constitution of Indiana.

IS THIS ECONOMY?

President Bryan of the Indiana University has listed some twenty-eight instructors and professors who have left that institution in the past five years, attracted by larger salaries paid in other colleges and universities.

His figures are an indictment of the policy of the State toward its institutions of higher education.

The fact that other institutions have come to this State for its teachers and leaders is evidence that Indiana has had and has men who are esteemed and honored for their ability and their learning.

Other universities do not seek mediocre or inefficient men.

They seek men who have made their marks and who bring confidence and honor to them.

The students of Indiana are entitled to the best instructors and to the best educators.

The young men and women who leave the State universities will contribute largely to the future of this State, will probably direct its destiny.

It is a sad commentary on the matter of public policy that the State university should not be able to compete in salaries with any other State institution for learning.

This State has wealth. It has resources. It has man power. It is second to none.

Those who engage in the profession of teaching should not be compelled to pay for the privilege of teaching Indiana.

They may be expected to respond to invitations which show a larger appreciation of their ability and their services.

The best in teaching talent is none too good for this State and certainly the State Legislature should make provision where the best may be retained.

It is not economy to drive from this State its leaders of thought through a low scale of salaries.

It is time to awake to the fact that the most important institutions in the State are those which are devoted to education—and to appreciate the services of those who are building for the future with a compensation which will compare with any offered by any other State.

A PLATFORM

A man in public life, if he looks upon his office as a mere instrument to give him power and glory, is only an empty shell. But if he keeps his petty ego suppressed and looks upon his office as a fortunate instrument to serve the people, to establish justice, to increase good will—then his office becomes an altar of righteousness, a hiding place of the Almighty."

One of the candidates for the long-term senatorship adopted this lofty ideal of public office, written by Edward Markham, as his platform.

Quite right. It was not Senator Watson. He would probably need an interpreter to tell him what it meant.

THE SKYSCRAPER CHURCH

In New York they are building a skyscraper church.

The structure will tower some twenty—or is it thirty?—stories high. It will pay its cost and its running expenses.

And—oh, yes—there'll be a very fine church auditorium tucked away in a corner somewhere.

They didn't conduct an "endowment fund campaign" to build it. Regular business methods were applied. Bonds were issued, mortgages secured, just as in the erection of any other office building. Members of the congregation bought bonds, which will pay 5 per cent.

That church will prosper. Little doubt about that. It will never have to give chicken pie suppers to make up a deficit in the pastor's salary. There'll never need to be any bake sales or rummage auctions in the parish house to meet that church's bills. It doubtless will have a bland, slightly plump secretary, who'll have as neat a set of books as you'd care to see.

We're a business nation. You can't escape it. We even apply business methods to our religion. And—if we sometimes measure the success of a church by the size of its building and the state of its funds—well, that's only natural.

But isn't it rather strange, when you stop to think that this \$5,000,000 church, with its gold bonds and gilt-edged mortgages and lucrative property, was erected in the memory of One who gave His whole life to demonstrate that material possessions are of no value whatever?

PERSHING REFUSES

Gen. John J. Pershing's refusal to become a candidate for the office of national commander of the American Legion doesn't add to the chances of the legion's projected pilgrimage to France to commemorate the 10th anniversary of this country's entrance into the World War.

Though a legion committee has been working for two years or more on plans for the trip, it remains for the Philadelphia convention to vote on it in October.

Recent indications of French hostility to the United States have been a decided wrench in the machinery.

When General Pershing's name was first suggested for the legion commandery the point was strongly emphasized that, regardless of other Franco-American feeling, Pershing, personally, was as popular on the other side of the water as ever—a fact amply demonstrated during his recent stay in Paris.

The theory was that his leadership of the new, peace-time expeditionary force would eliminate all possibility of friction between the French and the visiting Americans.

The prevailing opinion seems to be that, after all, the legion will go.

Firstly, the bitterness arising from debt settlement talk has a little substance.

Secondly, the legion would like the trip and the bulk of the French—who are no more debt-talking politicians than the bulk of Americans—undoubtedly would welcome it.

Thirdly, calling the affair off, after it has been so much discussed, certainly would create a painful international impression.

At the same, General Pershing's acceptance of the legion commandery, with his indorsement of the expedition, would have cinched matters. His refusal leaves the outcome open to question.

BACK TO COVER

It was inevitable that Senator Watson should revert to his old methods of campaigning.

He is driven finally to seek the power and prestige of Coolidge as a cloak for his own political and official record—and now has the temerity to appeal in the name of Coolidge and Secretary Mellon for votes for himself.

It requires rather good courage or a very definite brazenness for Watson to attempt to get under cover this year.

He has been apologizing for Coolidge all during the summer when he went among the farmers to tell them that Coolidge was wrong and that he was right in his farm relief measures.

He was apologetic for the President in the matter of the World Court, although he stands charged openly and without denial, with having explained to two friends of Coolidge that his own vote against the court was cast only when he knew that it would not be needed to pass the Coolidge measure.

It is all the more brazen when the incident of the visit of Secretary of Labor Davis to this city is recalled and the press sent from the room while Davis spoke, probably in a fear that he might speak on the question of Watson's record.

But Watson, in his thirty years of office holding, has always been able to hide behind some powerful figure and divert attention from his own record and his own activities.

He has ridden into office so successfully in the past by this plan that it was certain, sooner or later, he would repeat the same tactics.

He would much prefer that the people think of Coolidge than of Watson when they go to the ballot boxes and is now trying to make them believe that the whole Administration depends upon him for its policies and its integrity.

It may be well for the people of Indiana to note that Postmaster General New is making speeches in Illinois, not in Indiana.

To those who think, especially Republicans who admire President Coolidge, this is a sufficient answer to the Watson plea for support in the name of Coolidge.

NOT USELESS

A German historian has just presented a new and intimate account of the career of former Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany.

His portrait is hardly flattering, even though his treatment of the dethroned emperor is sympathetic. He shows how Europe again and again was led to the verge of war because of Wilhelm's passion for playing the "great power" game. He shows how Wilhelm rejected an alliance with England, a score of years ago, because he wanted to develop a big navy—as a sort of toy, one gathers—and with Germany and Britain allied this would have been impossible. He shows how the foreign policy of Germany again and again was shaped, not in accordance with the aspirations of its people, but in accord with Wilhelm's own overweening ambitions.

In order to make her railroads good security, Germany must give some guarantees, recognize prior claims and arrange a financial set up that will leave no doubt of her ability to pay.

Such a financial set up cannot be arranged unless the amount of German reparations is fixed, and the amount cannot be fixed unless it is reasonably set down.

If the amount of German reparations were cut down to satisfy the need of an American loan, and if the allies were to get less in consequence, they would be in a pretty good position to ask further reduction of their debts.

The whole maneuver is designed to develop a situation which will force the United States to reduce allied debts, if not cancel them.

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