

INDIANA PALLADIUM.

BY VICTOR M. COLE.

Terms—\$3 PER YEAR.....33¹ PER CENT. DISCOUNT MADE ON ADVANCE, OR 16¹ ON HALF YEARLY PAYMENTS.

VOL. XI.]

LAWRENCEBURGH, (IA.) SATURDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1835.

NO. 41.

From the Indiana Journal.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS IN INDIANA.

No. 1.

The subject upon which I propose to submit a few thoughts, is by no means new to the people of Indiana. It is one upon which they have bestowed much reflection—which they have ever viewed with the deepest interest, and in regard to which great unanimity of opinion seems to prevail. To show that public sentiment has ever set strongly in favor of internal improvement, requires nothing more than a reference to our past history. We see evidence of the fact in the early exertions of our public men in Congress and elsewhere, in favor of the object—in the spontaneous movements of the people which have been witnessed in different parts of the state and at various times, since the formation of our State Government: and lastly, in the very liberal appropriation made by the last Legislature for the purpose of ascertaining the practicability and cost of constructing works of internal improvement in the various sections of the State. That this policy should be popular in Indiana is not surprising, when we consider that she is, and must ever be, peculiarly an agricultural State—that the larger portion of her territory is situated remote from navigable streams, and that her productions are chiefly of that kind which are valueless without facilities for transportation. In fact, to suppose that a different sentiment could prevail, would be to suppose the people ignorant of their own resources, unable to discern their true interests, and blind to the practical illustrations afforded by neighboring States.

It is fortunate for Indiana, that in embarking in a judicious system of internal improvement, as I trust, she will do, she does not venture upon an untried, and therefore, uncertain experiment. This responsibility has been encountered by other States; the result is before us—and we have only to follow on, guided by the unerring light of experience. We have the States of New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, successively commence extensive systems of improvement, and borrow millions for their completion. And we have seen that the people of these States have been greatly benefited by this policy—that although their taxes may have been increased for a time, yet the very operation which produces this increase, has invariably brought with it enlarged means for sustaining the burthen. In such case, there have been those who have predicted bankruptcy to the State and oppression and ruin to the people, as the result of this policy: but it is worthy of remark, that in no single instance have these predictions been in any degree fulfilled. If, at the present day, we look around upon our sister States, and institute a comparison between them, we shall find that their general prosperity, and their increase in wealth and political influence, bear a very near proportion to their enterprise and zeal in the cause of internal improvement.

But though the voice of the people of this State may be, as it undoubtedly is, strongly and unequivocally in favor of internal improvement as a system of policy, yet this will avail nothing so long as there exists so much diversity of opinion in relation to the particular measure by which this policy is to be carried into effect. To accomplish any thing valuable, there must be some sacrifice of sectional interest for the general good; there must be harmony of sentiment in regard to the details of the subject generally, and there must be unity of action and concentration of effort. But these desirable results can be brought about only by a full examination of the subject in all its bearings, and a free and candid interchange of opinion on the various questions which will probably arise. And it is for the purpose of calling public attention to the investigation of these important details, more than any thing else, that I take up my pen.

For the sake of perspicuity, I shall consider the subject under the various heads into which it naturally divides itself. I shall inquire, first, whether our improvements shall be constructed by state authority or by companies; secondly, whether canals or rail roads should be preferred; and thirdly, what particular measures of legislation are at this time, necessary to secure to the people of every portion of the State, the benefits resulting from this policy. H.

No. 2.

Shall our public works be constructed by the State, or through the agency of incorporated companies?

In the older States we find that both modes have been pursued. New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio have constructed all their principal canals and roads by borrowing money on the faith and credit of the State, and expending it through the agency of a board of State officers; while in Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Kentucky, their public works have been constructed by companies. It is for us to ascertain the degree of success which has attended the two modes in other States—to notice the advantages and disadvantages resulting from each, and by comparing our situation and circumstances with theirs, to determine which course of policy will be likely to produce the happiest results in our State.

After a careful consideration of this important question in all its bearings, I am decidedly of opinion that Indiana should not longer depend upon incorporated companies for the accomplishment of this object; but that if any thing valuable is effected it must be by embarking in the cause of internal improvement as a State enterprise. In proof of the correctness of this position, reference might be made to the fact that we have now on our statute book ten or twelve acts of incorporation for rail roads or turnpikes, most of which were passed several years since, and yet no part of the improvements contemplated has been put in successful operation, and only two or three miles have even been placed under contract. I certainly mean to cast no censure upon these companies. The directors, as well as the citizens along the several routes, have manifested a praise-worthy zeal on this subject. It is not the want of capital, that has caused this delay. In a country so new as ours, it is not to be supposed that much surplus capital could be found for investment in stocks. Every farmer wishes to employ all his means in improving his farm, and every merchant is anxious to add to his stock in trade. And the true interests of the State requires that they should thus employ their capital. It is upon the cultivation of the soil—the improvement of our natural resources, and the accumulation of individual wealth, that the prosperity and independence of the State depends. Let us not cripple the energies and limit the resources of our citizens, by asking them to invest their last dollar in rail road or canal stocks. Experience affords sufficient proof that foreign capital will not, at this time, come to our aid.

Howthen, it may be asked, are these improvements to be made? I answer, by borrowing the capital from others, providing means for the payment of the interest, and pledging the faith of the State for the ultimate discharge of the principal. This is entirely practicable and safe. Although the people of Indiana may not be wealthy, yet their credit is good, and when united together, and acting through their representatives as a State, they can command any amount of money; and the disbursement of this money will so far enliven the business of the country, as to enable us without difficulty to pay the interest, until relieved from this burthen by the pro-

fits of the public works; and posterity, having the advantages and revenues of these improvements, can very readily pay off the principal.

But even if we had capital in our State, sufficient to construct these public works, is it consistent with their true interests for the people to surrender the control of these great avenues of their trade into the hands of capitalists who, perhaps, may have no identity of interest with us, and whose chief object, therefore, would be to realize the largest profit on the investment made? For it should be recollected, that although these stocks may be subscribed for by our citizens, to whom we might safely confide our interest, yet they are transferable, and when they become valuable will be sought after by capitalists from abroad, and a few years only may elapse before the balance of power in the directory of these public works may be found in the hands of persons residing elsewhere. The interest of these stockholders will prompt them to tax the people in the way of tolls as high as the limit fixed by the charter (which is generally high) will allow; and if the people should find this oppressive, what control over the subject will they possess? Under the charters heretofore granted by this State, they will have none whatever. In proof that my fears on this subject are not without some foundation, I might refer to the experience of the country on this point, and particularly in regard to the Louisville canal. The charges already exacted by this company have been considered so oppressive that the people residing above the falls have petitioned Congress for relief. The committee on roads and canals in the United States Senate, to whom the subject was referred, and of which Gov. Hendricks of this State was chairman, made an able report on the subject, fully admitting the justice of the complaint made by the petitioners, and urging Congress to grant relief by purchasing the stock. The exactions of this company, the petitions of the people in consequence thereof, and the proceedings of Congress on the subject, if properly considered, will be found greatly to strengthen my position, that the great leading thoroughfares projected in Indiana, ought to be constructed by the State, so that they may be at all times under the control of the people. It is not a sufficient reply to this argument to say that these evils would be regulated by competition. The magnitude and cost of the improvements to which I allude, forbid the expectation that parallel routes would spring up, as is sometimes the case with local works.

In submitting my views on this subject, I must not be understood as expressing the opinion that it is better to have no public improvements than that they should be made by companies. All the inconvenience and oppression which can result to the people from this state of dependence upon the holders of stock, cannot equal the disadvantages to which they must be subjected by the absence of such improvements. But there is another mode of accomplishing the object, by which all the benefits can be secured, without any of the evils which have been referred to. Neither do I mean to say that no charter should be granted for internal improvement. Works which are local in their nature, and of no great cost, such as branch canals or rail roads, or bridges over streams, &c. may be properly committed to companies; for in such cases the effect of any attempted monopoly could be counteracted by competition.

When internal improvements are constructed by State enterprise, every benefit which can flow from such works is secured to the community. The people, through their representatives, have at all times entire control of their public works, as well during their construction as after they are completed. They can, at pleasure, reduce or increase the rate of tolls, and when the time shall come that high rates of toll are no longer required, these public works may be made free, or a toll levied only sufficient to keep them in repair, as the interest of the public may seem to require.

An opinion is entertained by some, that more economy may be observed and a stricter accountability be enforced by private companies than by States; but if facts be appealed to, I doubt whether this opinion will be supported. Let a comparison be made between the Louisville canal and those constructed by the State of Ohio, or between the canals of Virginia and Maryland and those of New York, and the result will be found favorable to State management, both as it regards economy and efficiency. The fact that charters have already been granted for several works, will not, it is supposed, present any obstacle to their construction by the State, should that be preferred by the Legislature; for it is to be presumed that these charters will be promptly surrendered, if the State will guarantee the completion of the improvements. H.

Col. Johnson's Reception. It having been ascertained yesterday that Col. R. M. Johnson would arrive in our city in the evening, a number of the friends of democratic principles called upon him at the Louisville Hotel to pay their respects. From dark until near ten o'clock there was a constant succession of visitors, amounting altogether to not less than five or six hundred. At about 9 o'clock the company partook of a collation, served up in Messrs Drake and Haskell's usual neat and tasteful style. After the health of "the Hero of the Thames" had been drank, with rapturous applause, Col. Johnson returned his thanks for the compliment in a few brief and pertinent remarks. He did not, he said, claim the honor of being the chief actor on that occasion; he had endeavored to perform, to the best of his ability, the duty allotted to him, as leader of the force which was principally engaged on that day; but vain would have been his utmost efforts without the aid of the brave men under his command, many of whom sealed their devotion to their country with their blood on the battle field of the Thames. He did not claim any peculiar merit for the part which he had taken in the late war; he had voted for it in Congress, and he felt bound to show to his constituents and the country that he was willing to bear a full share of the burthens and dangers imposed upon the country, by baring his breast to the common enemy, and partaking in the dangers and toils of the war. The reception which he had experienced from his fellow citizens was alike flattering and unexpected; that he might almost claim to be a citizen of Louisville, being born on the banks of Beargrass, about fifty-four years ago, and that feeling the most cordial wishes for the success of our city, he begged leave to propose as a toast—"The City of Louisville—rich in wealth, industry and intelligence, may it never want the fostering protection which springs from free and just institutions."

During the delivery of his address, (of which we have given but a faint outline) and at the conclusion, the Colonel was repeatedly and enthusiastically applauded. Indeed we have never, on any occasion, witnessed a more cordial and heart-cheering welcome, than the one given to Col. Johnson. It was the spontaneous outpouring of the love and gratitude of the people, springing direct from the strong affection with which he is regarded by the great

body of our citizens, and without any previous preparation. A band of music was in attendance, which played during the evening many appropriate airs. Louisville Ad.

HONOR TO THE BRAVE.

Congress at its last session adopted the following resolution:—

A RESOLUTION presenting a gold medal to Croghan, and a sword to each of the officers under his command, for their gallantry and good conduct, in the defence of Fort Stephenson, in eighteen hundred and thirteen.

Resolved, &c. That the President of the United States be requested to cause a gold medal to be struck with suitable emblems and devices, and presented to Colonel Croghan, in testimony of his high sense entertained by Congress of his gallantry and good conduct in the defence of Fort Stephenson: and that he present a sword to each of the following officers engaged in that affair: to Captain James Hunter, to the eldest male representative of Lieutenant Benjamin Johnston, and Lieutenants Cyrus A. Baylor, John Meek, Ensign Joseph Duncan, and the nearest male representative of Ensign Edmund Shipp, deceased.

Approved, February 13th, 1835.

The gallant defence of Fort Stephenson, whether we take into consideration the circumstances attending it, or the consequence resulting from it, was among the most brilliant achievements of the late war. To it may be attributed the subsequent victory on the lake, and the protection of the entire frontier.—That the main object of the British was an attack on Erie, and the destruction or capture of our naval stores at that place, is matter of history. In a despatch of the 8th of July, Gen. de Rottenburg wrote to Commodore Barclay, as follows:—

ST. DAVIS, 18th July, 1813.

Sir,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th inst. and have to inform you in reply thereto, that a force of nearly 400 men are directed to march in successive divisions upon Long Point, as detailed in my letter to Genl. Procter of this day's date. I am fully impressed with the indispensable necessity of an attack upon Presque Isle (Erie,) and should co-operate with you long ago, had I possessed the means of doing—I trust it will not yet be too late, and that you will loss no time in making your arrangements for taking up the troops from Long Point.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obt. serv't,

FRANCIS DE ROTTENBURG.

COMMODORE BARCLAY, &c. M. Gen.

And Sir George Proctor, writing to General Proctor, on the 11th of July, 1813, says:—

"The ordnance and naval stores you require must be taken from the enemy, whose resources on Lake Erie must become yours. I am much mistaken if you do not find Captain Barclay well disposed to play that game."

They made the attempt, and on the 16th of August, Gen. De Rottenburg wrote to Gen. Proctor:—"I sincerely lament that you have been compelled by your Indian force to undertake an expedition contrary to your own judgment, and ultimately with inadequate numbers, the result of which has been so disastrous. I knew by experience that no reliance can be placed on Indians—they move off at the moment when they are most wanted."

This was after the attack had been made and failed; but, had Fort Stevenson been carried, Erie would have fallen, our naval stores collected there captured, and the supremacy of the Lake been lost. The consequences would have been fatal.

The following is Col. Croghan's letter to the committee of the Senate:

GEORGETOWN, 5th June, 1834.

Sir.—I received this morning the letter which you did me the honor to address to me yesterday. The inquires which the military committee makes of me in relation to the affair of Lower Sandusky, in August 1813, I will endeavor to answer as succinctly as may consist with perspicuity.

On the 21st of July, 1813, General Harrison, then at Lower Sandusky, being informed by an express from Fort Meigs that the enemy had invested the place with a force of 5000 regular troops and Indians, fell back upon Seneca Heights, leaving me in command of Fort Stevenson, (Lower Sandusky,) with a garrison of less than one hundred and forty effectives. The Fort, a slight stockade flanked by four block houses, was at the time ill calculated for defence, it had no ditch or other outward defence to oppose an assaulting force, and its armament consisted only of one six pounder, seven charges of powder thereto, a pig of lead, (afterwards cut up into slugs to serve as cannister,) and perhaps forty rounds per man of musket cartridges.

On the departure of Gen. Harrison, I traced out a ditch about the work of six feet in width, and forthwith commenced its excavation with every pick, shovel and spade that could be found; axe men being at the time directed to cut away the trees and bushes to musket shot distance from the pickets.

The work advanced rapidly, but at the moment of its completion, on the morning of the 30th of July, I received an order from Gen. Harrison, dated the evening before at Seneca, directing me to abandon the Fort, set fire to it, and retreat to Head Quarters at Seneca. The order I determined at all hazards not to carry into effect; but deeming it important to know the sentiments of my officers on the subject, I submitted without remark the order to them for consideration and reply.—Lieuts. Johnson and Baylor, and Ensigns Shipp and Duncan were for holding the place; Lieut. Meeks, and it is believed Capt. Hunter and Lieut. Anthony were in favor of its abandonment; the two latter however did not give an expression of their opinion. A few hours after my note of refusal to Gen. Harrison (which was couched in terms that the enemy could not and he alone could understand) I received an order to deliver up my command to an officer sent to relieve me, and report myself at his head quarters, which I did on the evening of that day.

Early on the following morning I was remanded to my post, and on reassuming the command I was highly gratified in witnessing the general satisfaction that seemed to pervade the garrison, and in receiving the heartfelt greetings of the four officers just mentioned, who had sustained me in the course I had chosen to adopt.

On the following day and at noon, the advance of the enemy made its appearance, and about three o'clock his whole force had invested the fort, when after a surrender had been demanded and refused, a fire was opened from a gunboat in the river, and a howitzer placed under cover of a ravine, within 150 yards of the place. No shots were returned by the fort; for in truth such was the dire necessity for husbanding our ammunition, that I gave a positive order, under no circumstances to fire at an enemy at a greater distance than thirty feet. Before day-light on the morning of the 2d of August, believing that a fire would be concentrated upon the block house (the N. E.) contained our only piece of artillery, with a view to dismount it, I directed it to be removed into the Northern Block house, and to be pointed so as to rake the ditch in the direction of the North West angle of the fort. My anticipations were in due season realized; four guns were placed upon the block house first named and with such precision as to pludge several shot directly through the embrasure at which the piece had been standing.

After this, the enemy's fire was principally directed against the North Western angle of the fort, with a view to effect a breach, which care was taken to prevent. About 6 o'clock in the afternoon, the sound of a bugle gave notice of some immediate movement, and in a few minutes the enemy was seen advancing to the assault in several columns. The North Eastern face commanded by Lieut. Johnson, was first attacked; but the attacking column was firmly received, and the Lieut. being reinforced by Ensign Duncan, who came very promptly to his assistance with his whole command, was enabled in a few minutes to beat it back with a loss.

The north Western angle was then vigorously assaulted, Lieut. Meeks, however, who commanded at that point, aided by the advice of the ever active and gallant Shipp, met the overwhelming force opposed to him with so deadly a fire of musketry as to cause its recoil. In spite of every effort the enemy gained the ditch, and was endeavoring to cut away the pickets, when he was stopped in his career by a destructive fire then opened upon him from the six pounder under the direction of Sergt. Weaver, (a volunteer,) with five or six Pittsburgh and Petersburgh volunteers.—The enemy behaved in the most daring and determined manner; but after the second discharge from the six pounder, it was clearly to be seen that his obstinacy could avail him nothing. Before the firing had ceased at this point, a column of 200 men advanced against the South Eastern face of the work, but it shared the fate of the other columns. Lieut. Baylor, who had charge of that part of the line, being aided by the reserve under Ensign Duncan, (who had been previously ordered to afford relief whenever it was wanted,) soon compelled it to retreat precipitately and in confusion.

I had ocular proof of the gallantry of Lieuts. Johnson, Meeks and Baylor, and Ensigns Shipp and Duncan. Capt. Hunter I did not see during the assault, he being confined to the block house upon the right of his company, but he doubtless performed his duty most faithfully.

The consequences hinged upon the attack on Sandusky, were important; had it succeeded, Gen. Harrison would most probably have been compelled to fall back upon Upper Sandusky, thus leaving the whole frontier open to the incursions of the Indians; and the enemy flushed with success would have continued down the lake in prosecution of the exclusive objects of the campaign—the destruction of the stores and boats at Cleveland, and of the fleet under Commodore Perry at Erie, both of which have been accomplished without any material loss.

I may seem to attach too much importance to the affair, but not more I think than facts warrant. The British accounts already before the committee, assure us that an attack on Erie, was meditated, and that it was not made in consequence of the refusal of the Indians to pass down the south side of the lake without first taking Fort Sandusky: and the letter of Gen. Duncan, also before the committee (and which can be confirmed by many now at the seat of Government,) is equally explicit as to the course that would probably have been pursued by Gen. Harrison had Sandusky fallen.

I have the honor to be,

Most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

G. CROGHAN.

To the Hon. W. C. Preston.
[to be Continued.]

ASSAULTS AND BATTERIES. Every now and then, our peace-loving community becomes suddenly seized with a fever of belligerence; and the disorder generally begins to exhibit itself about 12, on Saturday night, and continues to rage, but with intermittent fury, until the Sunday night following, by which time, the pugnaciously affected commonly exhaust all their cash and credit, at the run dispensaries, and are then taken to the assault and battery hospital, in Leverett st. where their cases are particularly inquired into by Doctor Justice, who prescribes to them a dose of fine-and-costs—a most villainous compound, by the way, not found in any pharmacopæia, in the country; and bitter to the pocket, but withal, very salutary in its operation on the patient. Yesterday morning, there were no less than six unfortunate invalids afflicted with this "dangerous and disorderly" disease, transferred from the noiseless, damp, and dark Pest-House, to the Examining Hall, where the unpalatable physic is usually to be publicly administered. The first in order, was

Job Riley, brought up by Watchman Bond.—Symptoms very decided.—On Saturday night, a man, not known to Bond, was walking quietly up Washington; suddenly Riley, who was little in the rear, stepped up after the stranger, at a very quick pace, and, without uttering a word, up fist and knocked him half-a-cross the street. Bond immediately ran to the stranger's rescue, but the latter, suspecting him to be in league with his unprovoked assailant, picked himself up in a marvellous hurry, and scurried up Washington street, in double-quick