Western Sun & General Advertiser, Volume 25, Number 15, Vincennes, Knox County, 3 May 1834 — Page 1

VmCBSTOTBS, (ZU SATURDAY, LX&Y 3, 283S.

Stir SStarterti Sun

IS published at $2 50 cents, for 52 numbers; which may be discharged by the payment of $2 at the time of subscribing. Payment in advance being the mutual interest of both parties, that mode is toli'cited. A failure to notify a wish to discontinue at the expiration of the time subscribed for will be considered a new engagement; and no subscriber at liberty to discontinue, until all arrearages are paid. Subscribers must pay the postage on their pa $)crs when sent by mail. Letters by mail to the Editor on business must be paid, or Ihey will not be attended to. Pec puce will be received at the cash snarket price, for subscriptions, if delivered within the year. Advertisements not exceeding one square, will be inserter v"ree times ior one dollar, and twentttVe cents for each after insertion longer ones in the same proportion. Vr-Persons sending adver tisements, must snecifv the number of times they wish them inserted, or they will be continued until ordered out, and must be piid for accordingly. LIST Or AGENTS. John Murphy, Washington, Ind. John Vantrees, do do. John Arbuthnot, Princeton, Ind. John I. Necly, do. Thomas Cissell, Mount Pleasant, Ind. Post-Master, Owl Prairie, Ind. Post-Master, Bloomfield, Ind. Post-Master, Sandersville, Ind. Post-Master, Owen3ville, Ind. Post-Master, Sliukaifs Mills, Ind. Jesse Y.Wil born, Mount Vernon, Ind. Levi Price, Evansville, Ind. John VV. Davis, Carlisle, Ind. Isaac Ong, Merom, Ind. Post-Master, 'Firman's Creek, Ind. John C. Rciley, Lawrenccville, 111. Post-Master, Palestine, 111. Post-Master, Boosville, Ind. Post-Master, Kockport, Ind. Lev. is (ie r. M.Ncw-Harmony, Ind. CONGRESSIONAL IN SENATE. Thursday, April 17j 1S3I. Several messages were received from the President of the Untied States, by Mr. Donelsox, his Private Secretary; among them the following PROTEST: To the Senate of the United States. It nopears by the published journal of the Senate, that on the2tth of December last, a resolution was offered by a member of the Seuate, which, after a protracted debate, was, on the twenty -eighth day of March last, modified by the mover, and passed bv the votes of twenty six Senators out "of forty-six who were present and voted, in the following words, viz; "ResolccJ. That the President, in the late Executive proceedings in relation to Ihe public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.r' Having had the honor, through the voluntary suffrages of the American People, to fill" the office of President of the United States during the period which may be presumed to have been referred to in this resolution, it is sufficiently evident that the censure it inflicts was intended for myself. Without notice, unheard and untried, I thus find myself charged on the records ot the Senate, and in a form hitherto unknown in our history, with the high crime of violating the laws and constiM-j tion of my country. It can seldom be necessary for any department of the government when assailed in conversation or debate, or by the strictures of the press or of popular assemblies, to step out of its ordinary path for the purpose of vindicating its couducl, or of pointing out any irregularity or injustice in the manner of the attack B it when the chief Executive Magistrate is. bv one of the most important branches of j the government, in its official capacity, in a public manner, and by its recorded sentence, but without precedent, competent nuthoritv,or just cause. declared guilty ot a breach of the laws and constitution, it is duo to his station, to public opinion, and to a proper self respect, that :he officer thus denounced should promptly expose the wrong which has been done. la the present case, moreover, there is oven a stronger necessity for such a vindication. Bv an express provision of the constitution, before the President of the United Slates can enter on the execution V of his otfice, he is required to take an oath or affirmation in the following words: Yeas Messrs. Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Vlav, Clayton, Kwmg, Frelinnhuy sen, Kent, Knight, Leigh, Muigum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston. Robbins, Siksbee, Smith, Southard, Spr igue, Swift, Touiliusou, Tyler, i ganuti, WebsterftaNS Messrs. Benton, Brown, Porpyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King, of Ala. King, of Ua , Linn, McKeaii, Sloo're, Morris, Robinson, Shcpley, Tallniadge, Tipton, White, Wilkius, Wright.

"Idosolemnlv swear (or nffirm) that I

will faithfully execute the offico of President of the United States; and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend, the constitution of the United States." The duty of defending, so far as in him lies, the integrity of the constitution, would indeed have resulted from the very nature of his office; but by thus expressing it in the official oath or affirmation, which, in this respect, differ from thatof every other functionary, the founders of our Republic have attested their sense of its importance, and have given to it a peculiar solemnity and force. Bound to the performance of this duty by the oath I have taken, by the strongest obligations of gratitude to the American People, and by the ties which unite my every earthly interest with the welfare and glory of mv country; and perfectly convinced that the discussion and passage of the above mentioned resolution were not only unauthorized by the constitution, but in many respects repugnant to its provisions and subversive of the rights secured by it to other co-ordinate departments, I deem it an imperative duty, to maintain the supremacy of that sacred instrument, and the immunities of the department entrusted to my care, by all means consistent with mv own lawful powers, with the rights of others, and with the genius of our ciril institutions. To this end, I have caused this my solemn protest against the aforesaid proceedings, to be placed on the files of the Executive Department, and to be transmitted to the Senate. It is alike due to the subject, tke Senate, and the People, that the views which 1 h ive taken of the proceedings referred to, and which compel me to regard them in the light that has been mentioned, should be exhibited at length, and with the freedom and firmness which are required by an occasion so unprecedented and peculiar. Under the constitution of the United States, the powers and functions of the various departments of tho Federal gCrnment,and their responsibilities for violation or neglect of duty, are clcar!Mtied or result by necessary inference. Tho Legislative power, subject to tho qualified negative of the President, is vested in the Congress of the United States, composed of the Senate and House of Representatives. The Executive power is vested exclusively in the President, except that in tho conclusion of treaties and in certain appointments to office, he is to act with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Judicial power is vested exclusively in the Supreme and other courts of th United States, except in cases of impeachment, for a hich purpose the accusatory power is vested in the House of Representatives, and that of hearing and determining, in the Senate. But although for the special purposes which have bceu mentioned, there is an occasional intermixture of the powers of the different departments, yet with these exceptions, each of the three great departments is independent of the others in its sphere of action; and w hen it deviates from that sphere, is not responsible to the others, further than it is express! v made so in the constitution. In every other respect, each of thcis the coequal of the other two, antJJJSfce the servants of the American People, without power or right to control or censure each other in the service of their common superior, save only in the manner and to the degree which that superior has prescribed. The responsibilities of the President am numerous and weighty. He is liable t( impeachment for high crimes and mis demeanors, and, on due conviction, to re moval from office, and perpatual disqualification; and notwithstanding such conweti'm, he may also be indicted and punished accordiug to law. He is also liat le to the private action of any party who may haveYen injured by his illegal mandates o5ucti(ns, m the same manner and to the same extent as the humblest functionary. In addition to the responsibilities which may thus be enforced by impeachment, criminal prosecution, or suit at law, he is also accountable at the bar of public opinion, for every act of his administration. Subject only to the restraints of Truth and Justice, the free People of the United States have the undouoted riht, as individuals or collectively, orally or in writing, at such times, and in such language and form as they may think proper, to discuss his official conduct, and to express and promulgate their opinion concerning it. Indirectly, also, his conduct may come under review in either i ranch of the Legislature, or in the Sen ate when acting in its Executive capacity, and so far as the executive or legislative proceedings of these bodies may require it, it may be examined by them. Theso are believed to be the proper and onlv nvdes,in which the President of the United States is to bo held accountable for his official conduct. Tested by these principles, the resolution of tho Seuate is wholly unauthorized bv tho constitution, and in derogation of its entire spirit. It assumes that a single brauch of the Legislative department inav, for tho purposes of a public censure, ami without any view to legislation or impcacbiueatj take uuy consider, ami decide

upon, the official acts of the Executive.

But in no part of the constitution is the President subjected to any such responsi bility; and in no part of that instrument is any such power conferred ou either branch of the Legislature. The justice of these conclusions will be illustrated and confirmed bv a brief ana lysis of the powers of .the Senate, and a comparison ot their recent proceedings with those powers. Tho high functions assigned bv the constitution to the Senate, are in their na tore either Legislative, Executive, or Judi cial. It is only in the exercise of its Ju dicial powers, when sitting as a Court for the trial of Impeachments, that the Sen ate is expressly authorized and necessari ly required to consider and decide upon the conduct of the President, or any other public officer. Indirectly, however, as has already been suggested, it may frequently be called on to perform that of fice. Cases may occur in the course of its Legislative or Executive proceedings, in which it may be indispensable to the proper exercise of its powers, that it should inquire into, and deride upon, the conduct of the President or finer public officers; and in every such case, its constitutional right to do so is cheerfally conceded. But to authorize the Senate to enter on such a task in its Legislative or Executive capacity, the inquiry must actu ally grow out of and tend to some Legis lative or Executive action; and the decis ion, when expressed, must take the form of some appropriate Legislative or Executive act. The resolution in question was introduced, discussed, and passed, not as a joint, but as a separate resolution. It asserts no legislative power, proposes no legislative action; and neither possesses tho form nor any of the attributes of a legislative measure. It docs not appear to have been entertained or passed, with any view or expectation of its issuing in a law or joint resolution, or in the repeal of any law or joint resolution, or in any other legislative action. Whilst wanting both tho form and substance of a legislative measure, it is equally manifest, that the resolution was not justified by any of the Executive powers conferred on the Senate. These powers relate exclusively to the consideration of treaties and nominations to office; and they aro exercised in secret session, and with closed doors. This resolution docs not apply to any treaty or nomination, and was passed in a public session. Nor does this proceeding in any way belong to that class of incidental resolutions which relate to the officers of the Senate, to their chamber, and other appurtenances, or to subjects of order, and other matters of the like nature in all which either House may lawfully proceed, without any co-operation with the other, or with the President. On the contrary, the whsle phraseology and sense of tho resolution seem to be judicial. Its essence, true character, and only practical effect, are to be found in the conduct which it charges upon the President, and in the judgment which it pronounces on that conduct. The resolution, therefore, though discussed and adopted by the Senate in its legislative capacity, is, in its office, and in all its characteristics, essentially judicial. That the Senate possesses a high Judicial power, and that instances may occur in which tho President of the United States will be amenable to it, is uadeniabio. But under the provisions of the constitution, it would seem to be equally plain that neither the President nor anyother officer can be rightfully subjected to the operation of the Judicial power of the Senate, except in the cases and under ths forms prescribed by the constitution . The constitution declares that "the President. Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed frm office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, hribcry, or other high crimes and misdemeanors1 that the House of Representatives "shall have the sole power of impeachment" that the Senate "shall have the sole power to tryall impeachments" that "when sitting for that purpose, thev shall be on oath or affirmation" that "when the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside" that "no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present" and that "judgment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hld and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States." The resolution above quoted, charges in substance that in certain proceedings relating to the public revenue, the President has usurped authority and power not conferred upon him by tho constitution and laws, and that in doing so he violated both. Any such act constitutes a high crime one of the highest, indeed, which the President can commi a crime which justly exposes him to impeachment by the House of Representatives, and upon due conviction, to removal from office, and to the complete and immutable disfranchisement prescribed by the Constitution. The resolution, then, was in substance an impeachment of the President; and in its passage, amounts to a declaration by a majority of thu &aatoa that he is guilty gf

is spread upon ihe journals of the Senate published to tho nation and to the world made part of our enduring archives and incorporated in the history of the age. The punishment of removal from office and future disqualification, doe9 not, it is true, follow this decision; nor would it have followed the like decision, if tho regular forms of proceeding had been pursued, because the requisite number did not concur in the result. But the moral influence of a solemn declaration, by a majority of the Senate, that the accused is guilty of the offence charged upon him, has been as effectually secured, as if the like declaration had been made upon an impeachment expressed in the same terms. Indeed, a greater practical effect has been gained, because the votes given for the resolution, though not sufficient to authorize a judgment of guilty on an impeachment, wero numerous enough to carry that resolution. That the resolution does not expressly ..... " alleuge that the assumption of power ami authontv. which it condemns, was inten- . . . . tional and corrupt, is no answer to the preceding view of its character and effect. The act thus condemned, necessarily im plies volition and esign in the individual to whom it is imputed, and being unlawful that it was prompted by improper motives, and committed with an unlawful intent. The charge is not of a mistake in the txcrcisc of supposed powers, hut of the assumption of powers not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derocration of both, arid nothing is suggested to excuse or pallittc tho turpitude ot the act. in xne absence ot anv such excuse, or palliation, there is only room for one inference; and that is, that the intent was unlawful and corrupt. Basidcs, the resolution not on'y contains no mitigating suggestion, but on the contrary, it holds up the act complained of, as justly obnoxious to censure and reprobation: and thus as distinctly stamps it with impurity of mo tive, as it the strongest epithets bad been used. Tho President of the United States, therefore, has been, by a maiority of his constitutional triers, accused and fumd guilty of an impeachable offence: but in no part of this proceeding have tho direction of the constitution been observed. The impeachment, instead of bain" orew V1 ferrcd and prosecuted by the House of Keprcsentatives, originated in the Senate. and was prosecuted without the aid or con currence of ihe other House. The oath or affirmation prescribed bv the constiiution, was not takn by the Senators; the Chief Justice did not preside; no notice of 1 he charge was given to the accused; and no opportunity affrdcd him to res pond to the accusation, to meet his accu sers face to face, to cross examine the witnesses, to procure counteracting testimo ny, or to be heard in his defence. The safeguards and formalities which the con stitution has connected with the power of impeachment, wore doubtless supposed by the framcrs of that instrument, to be es sential to the protection of the public ser vant, to the attainment ot justice, and to the order, impartiality, and dignity ol the procedure. These safe euards and formalitics were not only practically disregarded, in the commencement and conduct of these proceedings, but in their resuit, I find myself convicted by less than two-thirds ot the members present, of an impeachable offence. In vain mav it be alleged in defcrc of this proceeding, that the form of tho dilution is not that of an impeachment, or t a ludcment thereupon; that the punishCJ ment prescribed in the constitution does not follow its adoption, or that in this case, no impeachmout is to be expected irom tuc nouse oi lieprcseniauves. it is because it did not assume the form of an impeachment, that it is tho more palpably repugnant to the constitution; lor it is through that form only that the President is judicially responsible to the Senate; and though neither removal from office nor future disqualification ensues, yet it is not to be presumed, that the framers of the constitution considered either or both of those results, as constituting the whole of the punishmeat thev prescribed. The judgment of guilty by the highest tribuv ft nai in the union; the stigma it would inflict on the offender, his family and fame: and the perpetual record on the journal, handing down to tuturc generations the story of his disgrace, were doubtles re a garued by them as the bitterest portions, if not the very essence of that punishment. So far, therefore, as some of its most material narts are concerned, the e passage, recording, and promulgation of - I B ft the resolution, are an attempt to bring them on the President, in a manner unau-i thorized bv the contitutioa. To shield him and other officers who are liable to imncachmeiit. from conaeuuenccs so mo-! mentous, except when really merited by j official delinquencies, the constitution has most carefully guarded the whole process of impeachment. A majority of the House ot Kepreseutalives, must mink me oihcer guilty, before he can be charged. Two thirds ot the senate rausi prouounce mm guilty or he i deemed to be innocent. Forty-six Senator appear by tho journal to have been prcttut when tho vote on the

an impeachable offence. As such, it

resolution was taken. If. after all th

lemnities of an impeachment, thirty of those Senators had voted that the President was guilty, yet would he have been acquitted; but by theoodeof proceeding adopted in the present case, a lasting re. cord of conviction has been entered up by the votes of twenty-six Senators, without an impeachment or trial; whilst the constitution expressly declares that to the entry of such a judgment, an accusation by the House of Representatives, a trial by the Senate, and a concurrence of two thirds in the vete of guilty, shall be indispensable pre-requisitea. Whether or not an impeachment was to be expected from the House of Representatives, was a point on which the Senate had no constitutional right to speculate and in respect to which, even had it pscsed the spirit of prophecy, its anticipatio-.u would have furnished no just grounds for this procedure. Admitting that there waa reason to believe that a violation of tho constitution and laws, had been actually .....j.v.. uy me t rcsiueni, stui it was the duty of the Senate, as his sole constitutional judges, tow.it for an impeachment until the other House should think proper to prefer it. The members of the Senato could have no right to infer that no impeachment was intended. On the contrary, every legal and rational presuraptioo on their part ought to havo been, that if there was good reason to believe him guilt? of an impeachable offence, the Housa of Representatives would perform its constitutional duty, bj arraigning the offender before the justice of his country. Tho contrary presumption would involve an implication derogatory to the integrity an! honor of the Representative! of the People But suppose the suspicion thus implied were actually entertained, and fof good cause, how can it justify the assumption by the Senate of powers not conferred by the constitution? It is only necessary to look at the condition in which tho Senate and the President have been placed by this proceeding to perceive iu utter incompatibility with tho provisions and tho spirit of the constitution, and with the plaiuest dictates of humanity and justice. If the House of Representatives shall be of opinion that there is just ground for the censure pronounced upon tho President then will it be the solemn duty of that House to prefer the proper accusation, and to cause him to be brought to trial by th constitutional tribunal t A majority of its members have already considered the case and have not only formed, but expressed a deliberate judgment upon its merits. It ia the policy of our benign system of jurisprudence, to secure, in all criminal proceedings, and even in the most trivial litigations, a fair unprejudiced, and impartial trial. And surely it cannot Ikj less important that such a trial should be secured to tho highest .ffiYer of the Government. The constitution makes the House of Representatives the exclusive judge, it the first instance, of the question. ivfi.liA the President has cornmited an impeach able ottence. A majority of the Senate, where interference with this preliminary question, has for the best of all reasons, been studiously excluded, anticipate tho action of the H.iuse of Renreaentnti'voa assurno not only the function which belongs exclusively to that body, but convert themselves into accusers. rinn.i counsel, and judges, and prejudge tho y-" iiiua pjcscuu me appall ing spectacle, in a free state of jndfres going through a labored preparation for an impartial neanng and decision by a previous ex parte investigation and KtntrnrA m r vp? against the supposed offender. There is no more settkd axiom in tht government whence we derived the moaei oi mis part 01 our constitution, than . .... that "the ljrds cannot era peach anv to themselves, nor ioin in the because they are judges " Independently oi ine general reat-oa on which this rule is founded, its propriety and importance are greatly increased by the nature of tho impeaching power. The p jwer of arraigning the high officers of the Government, before a tribunal whose sentenco may expel them from their seats and Lrnd them as infamous, is eminently a popular remedy; a remedy designed to be employed for the protection of private right and public liberty, against the abuses ot justice and the encroachments of arbitrary power. But the framers of the constitution were also undoubtedly aware, that this formidable instrument had been, and might be abused: and that from its very nature, an capeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, whatever might fcc ita result, would in most cases lie accompanied by so much of dishonor and reproach, solicitude and suffering, as to make tho power of prefering it, one of the highest solemnity and importance. It was due to both these considerations, that the impeaching power should be lodged in tho hands of those who, from the mode of their election and the tenure of their offices, would most accurately express the popular will, and at the same time be most directly aud speedily amenable to the people. The theory of ihese wise aud benignant intentions is, in the present case, sllectually defeated by the proceedings of tho Senate. The members of that body ropreicntj nut the People, but tho Slater