Western Sun & General Advertiser, Volume 21, Number 46, Vincennes, Knox County, 25 December 1830 — Page 2

csn be otberwiit frdrd hn ts billi for revenue and coneouontly subject to fhe ru,e in that irsppct prescribed by the constitution. If theintere" of the government in private companies if mbordinate to thiil of individuals, the Iu;masemcnt and control of o portion of the miblic funds ia delegated to an authoiity unknown to ihe constitution, and beyond the supervision of our constituents: if superior, it cficers and agents will be constantly exposed to the imputation of favoritism and oppression. Direct prejudice to the public interest, or an alienation of the HSVctions and respect of portions of the people, may, therefore, in addition to the general discredit resulting to the government from embarking with its constituents in pecuniary speculations, be looked for as the probable fruit of Buch associations It is no an-

wer to this objection to say that the extent of consequences like these cannot be great Irum a limited and small number of investments, because experience in other matters teaches u, and w e are not at liberty to disregard its admonitions, that, unless an entire stop be put to them, it will soon be impossible to prevent their accumulation, until they are spread over the whole country, and made to embrace muy of the private aud appropriate concerns ot individuals. The power which the general government would acquire within the several states by b -coming the principal stockholder in corporations, controlling every canal and each sixty or hundred miles of every important road, and giving a proportionate vote in all her elections, almost is inconceivable, and, in my view, dangerous to the liberties of the people. This mode of aiding such works, is, al-o, in its nature, deceptive, and in many cases conducive to improvidence in the administration of the national funds. Appropriations will be obtained with much greater facility , and grant d with less security to the public intertst, when the measure is thus diagui?d, than when dt fiuite and direct expenditures of money are asked lor. Thetntetest of the nation would doubtless be better served by avoiding all such indirect modes of aiding particular objects In a government like ours, more especially, should all public acts be. as far as practicable, Simple, undisguised, ai:d intelligible, that they may become tit subjects for the approbation and animadversion of the people. The bill authorizing a suh-cription to the Louisville and Portland canal atfoM? a striking illustration of the difficulty of withholding additional appropriations tor the same object, when the first erroneous step has been taken by instituting a partnership between the government and private companies. It proposes a third subscription on the part of the United States, when each preceding one was at the time regarded as the eiteut of the aid which government was to render to that work; -und the accompanying bill for light houses, fcic. contains an appropriation for a survey of the bed of the river, with a ti-w to its improvement, by removing the ob traction which the canal isuesigned to avoid This improvement, ii successful, would afford free passage to the river, aud render the canal entirely useless. To such improvidence is the course of legislation subject, in relation to internal improvements and local matters, even with the best intentions ou the part of con gr. ss. Although the motives which have influenced me in this matter may be already suthciently (sited, 1 am, nevertheless, induced by its importance to add a tew observatious ol a general character. In my objection to the bill autnorizing sub scriptions to the Mnysville aud Itockviile road Companies, 1 expressed my views fully in regard to the power of congress to construct roads and canals within a state, or to appropriate mo ney tor improvements of a local character I at the same time intimated my bthel, that the right to make appropriations for such as are l a national character had been so generally act cd upon, and so long acquiesced in by the fed al and state government', and the constiiu- . its of each, as to justify its exercise on the ground of continued and uninterrupted usage; but that it was, nevertheless, highly expedient that appropriations, even of that character, should, w ith the exception nade at the time, be deterred until the national debt is paid, and thai, in the mean while, some geneial rule lor the action of the government in that re spect ought to be established. These suggestions w ere not necessary to the decision of the question then before me, and were, 1 readily admit, intended to awaken the attention, and draw forth the opinions and ob servations ol our constituents, upon a subject of the highest importance to their interests, and one destined to exert a powerful itiibience upon the future operations of our political syMtm. I 1 .a It It aiiow oi no it iiiuuai io which a purine man in this country, iu case of doubt and difficulty, can appeal with greater advantage or more propriety, than the judgment of the people and although 1 mut necessarily, in the dis Charge of my oihcial duties, be governed by the dictatesof my own judgment, I have no desire to conceal my anxious wish to conform, as far as 1 can, to the iews of thoe for v bom 1 act. All irregular expressions of public opinion are of necessity attended w itb some doubt as to their accuracy; but, making full allowances on that account, 1 cannot, 1 think, deceive myself in believing that the acts referred to, as well as the suggestions which I allowed myself to make iu relation to their bearing upon tho future operations of the government, have been approved by the great body of the people. That those w hose immediate pecuniary interests are to be affected by proposed expenditures should shrink from the application of a rule which prefers their more general and remote interests to those which are personal and immediate, is t be expected. But even such objections must, from the nature of our population, be but temporary iu their duration, and if it were otherwise, our course should be the same, for the time is yet, 1 hope, far distant, when those entrusted w ith pow er to be exercised for the good ol the whole, will consider it either honest or .e to purchnse local favor at the sacrifice of principle aud the general good. So understanding public sentiment, and thoroughly satisfied that the uest interests of our common country uuperioilv require that the course vUi hi h.ive recommended in this regard should be adopted, I have, upon the most mature oeliwratiou, determined to puisne it. It is due to candor, as well s to uiv own fVel-In-., that 1 should express the reluctaiue and a- x.ety which I man ;il all times eminence in xercising the undoubted hiht uf the executive to wiihhold his assent irom bill on other grounds U.uu thtir uiiooii-ututiou ilit v Xhat this rjght should uot be exercised on s'hght occasions, ull will admit. Ills oid i,i mailers of deep interest, when the pnnpio involved tt be justly regarded as next in buiKM-Jance lo iniracti.ms et the constitution it-eif, thit neb a step cjiu be expected to meet uh the l probation ot the people. Such an occasion d I cohi itutiously believe the pres, nt tu lie. Iu the discharge of this delicate and hutdy re,K)Usihle dutv, 1 am u taii.ed in the redeet ... I. .... 1 " r . . i . . , oe-iue I c.otitih-i)t with trie obligation of offi - L; t.1.1"! ?;rV f " l oir j r rma-Kn, too , tint, whatever liberal in.Jituu ..! haw to fe.ir from the emToa hiui ltie ecrcie ol luis Power lias Keen Hi ( n vols, p i , win. h ins i. en r e - rj wuerc the can: u sj much true sad

bloody contention, but littlt danger is lobe

.m,r.K,cuiruraH ,.recpact.inj wnim inai n,i- rrfnam in the treasury after the nationthonty denies to itelf the exercise of powers , , , . , ,, , , J

that bring in their train influence and patronge of great extent, und thus excludi the operation of personal interests, every where the banco! official trust. I derive, too, no small degreeof satisfaction from the reflection, that, f I have mistaken the interest and wishes of the people, the constitution affords the means of loon redressing the error, by selecting for the place their favor has bestowed uuon me, a CH.ztui w nose opines may accord with their . . . . ' . . own. l trust, m the men Time, the interetsoi - the nation will be saved from prejudice, by a rigid application of that portioo ol the public funds which miht otherwise be applied to d it f rent objects to that highest of all our obliga lions, the payment of the public debt, and an opportunity" be afforded lor the adoption of some better rule for the operations of the goveruinent iu this matter than any whu h nas nun erto been acted upon. Profoundly impressed with the importance of the subject, not merely as it relates to Ihe gene ral prosperity of the country, but to the snfely of the federal sj stem, I cannot avoid repeating my earnest hope that all good citizens who take a proper interest iu the success and harmon) of - our admirable political institutions, and who are incapablo of desiring to convert an opposite state ol things into means for the gratification of personal ambition, will, laying aside minor considerations, aud discarding local prejudices, unite their honest exertions to establ.sb some lived and general principle. which shall be calculated to effect the greatest extent of public gojd iu regard to the subject ol internal improvement, and afford the least ground for sectional diseoiiteut. rl he general ground ot my objections to local appropriations has been heretofore expressed; and 1 shall endeavor to avoid a lepetition of what has been already ur ged the itnpoilauce of sustaining the Slate sovereignties, as tar as iscouHstenl wnh the righltul action ot thetedera! Government, and of preserv ing the great est attainable harmony between them. 1 will now only add an eipresHon ot my conviction a conviction winch every lay's experience serves to count m that ihe political creed which inculcates the puruit oi inose greai opjects as a para mount duty is the true faith, and one to which ne are mainly indebted for the pie ent success ot the entire system, and to w Inch we must aloue look tor ils future stability. That there, are diversities in the inter ests of the different States which compose this extensive conlederacy, must be ad mitted. I hose diversities arising lrom situation , climate, population, am! pursuit, are doubtless, as it is natural they should be, great!) exaggerated by jealousies and and the spirit of rivalry so inseparable from neighboring communities These circumstances' make it the duty of those who are entrusted with the management ot i aiiairs to neutralize their enects as far as practicable, by making the beneti cial operation of the Fedeial Government as equal and equitable among the seve ral States as can be done consistently with the great end ot its institution. It i only necessary to refer to undoubt ed fact?, to see how tar the past acts of ihe Government upon the subject under consideration have fallen shoit of thi object. The expenditures heretofoie made for internal improvement amount to upwards of five millions of dollars, and have been distributed in vciy unequal proportions amonjrst the States. The es timated expense of works of which stir vey shave been made, togethers with that of olheis projected aud partially surveyed amount to more than ninety six millions of dollars. That such improvements, on account of particular circumstances, may be more advantageously and beneficially made in some States than iu others, is doubtless true: hut that they are of a character which should prevent an equitable distri bution of the funds amonv: the several is not to be conceded. The want ot thiequitable distribution cannot fail to prove a prolific source oi irritation amongit the States. We have it constantly befoie our eyes, that professions of superior zeal in the caueof internal improvement, and a dis position to lavish the public fund 9 upon ob jects of that character, are daily and earnestly put forth by aspirants to power, as constituting the highest claims to the confidence of the people. Would it be strange under such circumstances, and in times of great ex itement, that grants of this description snouid nmi their motives in objects which may uot accord with the public good? those who have not had occasion to see and regret the indication of a sinister influence in these matters in past times, have been more fortunate than mvself in then observations of the course of public utlairs. Ii to these evils be added the combinations and angry conten Hons to which such a course ot things givesnse, with their baleful influences upon tbe legislation ot Longress, touching the leading and appropriate duties ol the Feoeral Government, it was but doing justice to the character of our people to expect the seveie condemnation ot the past which Ihe recent exhibition ot publie sentiment has evinced Nothing short of a radical change in the action of the Government upon the stit ject can, in my opinion, remedy the evil. If. as it would be natural to expect. tbe Stales winch have been least tavored in past appropriations should insist on be ing tedressed in those heiealter to be made at the expense of the States which have so largely and disproportionately participated, we have, as matteis now stand, but little security that the at eropi ( ....j . , , would do tnoie than change the mequalt Ii on. oequa,ter to another. -p. 1 , . ' ,,u ye"g the subject, I have here. ! l0I0re lelt it ni) duly io lecomiia'tnl the j adopiiuu of some pun lor the distribution

ap-0fihe surplus fundi which Dirty at atiy time

neen pam, among me ataics, m prnpoi uon to llje nuir.uer oi their representative, to he applied by them to objects of internal improvement, Alil.n..,i, tu;a u..- . ..:.u r...... """UB'I "11 I'ldll lld IllCt M IIU IdTUI in pome portions of the Union, it has aUo elicited objections which merit delibeiate consideration. A brief notice of these ohjertion, her . lprprore. I tru,. , ' - " wt irgaiucu us out 01 piace. 1 hey rest, as tar as thev have come to my knowledge, on the following grounds: 1st An objection to the ratio of dislnhu lion: l2d. An apprehension that the existence of such a regulation would produce improvident and oppressive taxation to raise the lutids for distribution: 3d. That the mode proposed would lead to the con stiuction ot woiks of a local nature, to the exclusion of such as are general ; and, lad, that it would create an injuiious and discreditable dependance, on the part ot State Governments upon the re- eral power. Of fhose who object to the ratio of representation as the basis of distribution, some insist that the importation of th re-pective States would constitute one that would be more equitable,atid others,agaiu. that the extent of their respective territo ries would turmofi a standard which would be more expedient, and suthciently equi table. The ratio of representation piesented itself to my mind, and it still does, as one of obvious equity, because of its being the ratio ot contribution, whether the tund to be distributed be derived from the customs or from direct taxation It does noi follow, however, that is adop lion is indispensable to the establishment ot the system proposed . There may be considerations aiuiertainintr to the snbiprt o J - - - w hich would render a departure, to some extent, trora ihe rule of contribution, pro per. or is u ausoiuteiy necessary that ihe basis of distribution be confined to one ground. It may, if, in the judgment of those whose right it is to fix it, it be deetned politic and just to give it that character, have regard to several. In mv first message, I stated it to be my opinion that i. is not probable that any adjustment of the tai iff upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the Government without a considerable surplus in the. Treasury, beyond what may be required for its current service " "l have had no catne to change that opinion, but much to confirm it. Should these ex pectations be realized, a suitable fund would thus be produced fur the plan un der consideration to operate upon; and if ihere be no such fund, its adoption will, in my opinion, work no injury to any inter est; for I cannot assent to the justness of the apprehension that the establishment of the proposed system would lend to the encouragement of improvident legislation of the character supposed Whatever the proper authority, in the exercise of constitutional power, shall, at any time hereafter, decide to be for the general good, will, in that as iu other respects, deserve and receive the acquiescence and support ot the whole country; and we have ample security that every abuse of power in that regard, by the agents of the people, will receive a speedy and effectual corrective at their hands. The views which I take of the future, founded on the obvious and increasing improvement of all classes of our fellow citizens, in public and private virtues, leave me without much appiehension on that head. I do not doubt that those who come af ter us, will be as much alive as we are to the obligations upon all tbe trustees ot political power to exempt thsse lor whom they act from all unnecessary burthens, and as sensible of the great truth, that the resources of the nation, beyond those required for the immediate and necessary purposes of the Government, can no wheie be so weU deposited us in the pockets of the people. It may sometime happen that the io terestsof particular States would not be deemed to coincide with the general interest in relation to improvement withia such States. But if the danger to be au prehended from this source is sufficient to require it, a discretion might be reserved toCongiess, to direct to such improve ments of a general character as the States concerned might not be disposed to unite in the application of the quotas of those States, under the restriction of confining to each State the expenditure ot its ap propriate quota. It may however be as snmed as a sale general rule, that such imptovemenU a to increase the prosperity of the respective States in which they are made, by giving new facilities to trade, and thereby augmenting the wealth and comfort of their inhabitants, constitute the surest mode of conferring permanent and substantial advantages upon the whole. I he strength as well as the true glory ot tne conlederacy is mainly founded on the prosperity aud power ot the several indtpendant sovereignties of which it is composed, and the certainty with which they can be brught into successful, active cooperation, thiough the agency of the Fedtral Government. It is moreover, within the knowledge of such as are at all conversant with public affairs, that scheuies of internal improvement have, from lime to time, been proposed, which, from extent and seemtug magnificence, were regarded as of national concernment, but which, upon fuller consideration aud further expeiicuce, would now be rejected with great uuao-imity.

That the plan under ccniiiJeration would derite important advantages from its certainty, and that the moneys set a part for these purposes would be more

judiciously applied and economically ex. pended under the direction oi me state Legislatures, in which every part of each State is immediately represented, cannot, I thinK.be doubted In the new States particularly, where a compaiitively small population is scattered over an extensive surface, and the representation in Congress consequently very limited, it is natural to expect that tbe appropriations made by the Federal Government would be more likely to be expended in the vicinity of those members through whose immediate aeency they were obtained, than if the funds were placed under the W 9 control of the Legislature, in which every county of the State has its own representative. This supposition does not necssarily impugn the motives of such Congressional representatives, nor is it so intended. Vv e are all sensible ol the bias

to which the strongest minds and purest President and Vice President. The nehearts are, under such circumstances, lia cessity for its amendment is made so clear

fde. In respect to the last objection, Us probable effect under the dignity and independence of the State Governments, it appears to me only necssary to state the ca-e as it is, and as it would be if the measure pioposed were adoped, to show that tne operation is most likely to be the very reverse of that which the objection supposes. In the one case, the State would re ceive its quota of the n .tional revenue tor domestic use upon a fixed pnnciple, as a matter ot right, and from a fund to the creation of which it had itself contri buted its fair proportion. Suiely there can be nothing derogatory in that. As matters now stand, the States themselves, .i : i . I in meir sovereign cuaiacieis, aic inn uu frequently petitioners at the bar ot the Federal Legislature for such allowances out of the national treasury as it may com port with their pleasure or sense ot duty to bestow upon them. It cannot requue argument to Drove which ot the two courses is most compatible with the et tiriency or respectability of the State Governments But all these are matters for discussion & dispassionate consideration That the de-ired adjustment would be attended with difficulty, affords no reason why it should not be attempted. The effective operation of such motives would have pre vented the adoption of the constitution under which we have so long lived, and under th benign influence of which our beloved country has so signally prospered The framers of that sacred instrument had greater difficulties to overcome, and they did overcome them The patriotism of the people, directed by a deep conviction of tbe importance ol the Union, produced mutual concs-ion and recipro cal forbearance. Strict right was merged in a snirit of compromise, and the result ------ r 1 ' has consecrated their disinterested de votion to the general weal. Unless the American people have degenerated, the same result can be again effected, when ever experience points out the necessity of a resort to the same means to uphold the fabric which their fathers have reared. It is beyond the power of man to make a system of government like ours, or any other, operate with precise equality upon states siiunten line tnose wnicn compose this confederacy ; nor is inequal ity always injustice. Every State cannot expect to shape the measures of the Geu eral Government, to suit its own particular interests. The causes which prevent it are seated in the nature of things, and cannot be entirely counteracted by human means. Mutual forbearance, therefore. becomes a duty obligatory upon all, and we may, I am confident, count on a cheerful compliance with this high injunction on the part ot our constituents. It is not to be supposed that they will object to make such comparatively inconsiderable sacrifices for the preservation of rights and privileges which other less favour ed portions of the world have in vain waded thiough seas of blood to acquire. Our course is a sate one, if it be but faithfully adhered to Acquiescence in the constitutionally expressed will of the majonty, and the exercise of that will in a spirit of moderation, justice, and brother ly kind. .ess, constitute a cement which would forever preserve our Union. Those who cherish and inculcate bentimente like these, render a most esseutial service to their country ; whilst those who seek to weaken their influence, are, however conscientious and praiseworthy theii in tention, in eflect its worst enemies. if the intelligence and influence of the country, instead ot laboring to foment sectional prejudices, to be made subservient to party warfare, were, in good faith, applied to the eradication of causes of local discoutent, by the improvement of our institutions, and by facilitating their adaption to the condition of the times, this task would prove one oi less difficulty. May we not hope that the obvious interests of our common couutry, and the dictates of an enlightened patriotism, will, in the end, lead the public mind in that direction. After all, the nature of the subject does not admit ot a plan wholly free lrom ob jection. That which has for some time j been in operation is, perhaps, the worst jthat could exist; and every advance that can ne made in its improvement is a matter eminently worthy of jour most deliberate attention. It is very possible that one better calculated to eiicct the objects in view may yet

be defiied. If toitiitobe hoped that those who disapprove of the past, and dissent from v? hat is proposed for the future, will feel it their doty to direct their attention to it, as they must be sensible that unless some fixed rule for the action of the Federal Government in this respect is established, the course now attempted to be arrtsted will be again resorted to. Any mode which is calculated to give the greatest degree of effect and harmony to our legislation upon th

fcubject which shall best serve to keep the movements ot the Federal Government within the sphere intended by those who modelled and those who adopted it whi h shall lead to the extin?uili of the national debt in the shortest period and impose the lightest burdens upon our con stituents, shall recive lrom me a cordial and firm support. Among the objects of erreat national concern, I cannot omit to press again upon yourattention, that part of the Consiitution which regulates the election of to my mind by the observation of its evils, and by the many discussions which they have elicited on the floor of Congress and elsewhere, that I should be wanlinc to my duty where 1 to withhold another expression of my deep solicitude upon the subject. Our svstem. fortunate!? contemplates a recurrence to first princi " j j ples; ditlenng in this respect, from all that have preceded it, and securing it, I tiust equally against the decay and the commo tions which have marked the progress of other Governments Our fellow citizens. too, who, in proportion to their love of liberty, keep a steady e e upon the means of sustaining it, do not requite to be reminded 0f tne duty they owe to themselves to re . .. J . rae(1y aU essential delects in so vital a part of their system While they are sensible that every evil attendant upon its opera tion is not necessarily indicative of a bad organization, but may proceed from tem porary causes, yet the habitual presence. oi even single instance of evils which caa be clearly traced to an organic deft.:, will not, I trust, be overlooked through a too scrupulous veneration for the work of their ancestors. The Constitution was an experiment committed to the virtue and intelligence of the great mas of our coun trymen, in whose ranks the framers of it themselves were to perform the part of patriotic observation and scrutiny ; and if they have passed from the stage of exist ence with au increased confidence in its general adaptation to our condition, we should learn from authority so high tbe duty of tortilMiig the points in it w hich time proves to be exposed, rather than bedeter red from approaching them bv the suggestions of fear, or the dictates of miiplaced reverence. A provision which does not secure to the people a direct choice of their Chief Magistrate, but has a tendency to dt lent their will, presented to my mind such an inconsistency with the general spin! of our institutions, that 1 was induced to suggest for our consideration the substitute which appeared to me at the same time the moil likelv to correct thp evil and to meet the views of our constituents. The most mature rf-flpctinn fiinro hum uAm ded strength to the belief that the best mteiests of -ur country require the speedy adoption of some plan calculated to effect thi,. end. A contingencv which sometin es Ujace it in the power of a single member of the House of Representative to decide an election of so hieh and solemn a r.harurter i timust m h.p nennl becomes when it occurs, a source of embarrassment to the individuals thus brought into power, and a cause of distrust of the representative body. Liable v Ml' as the confederacy is, from its great ex tent, to parties founded upon sectional interests, and to a corresponding multiplication of candidates for the Presidency , the tendency of tbe constitutional reference, to the House of Representnttves, is, to devolve the election upon that body in almost every instarce,and, whatever choice may then be made among the candidate! thus presented to them, to swell the influence of particular interests to a degree inconsistent with tbe general good, 'i he consequences of this feature of the Constitution appear far more threatening to the peace and integrity of the Union tban any which I can conceive as likely to result from the simple legislative action of the Federal Government. It was a leadingobject with the framert of the Constitntion to keep as separate as possible the action of the Legislative and Executive branches of tbe Government. To secure this object, nothing if more essential than to preserve the former from the temptations of private interest, and, thereby, so to direct the patronage of the latter as not to permit such temptations to be offered. Experience abundantly demonstrates that every precaution in this respect is a valuable safe guard of liberty, and one which my reflections upon the tendencies ot our system incline me to think should be made still stronger. It was for this reason that, in connection with an amendment of the Constitution, removing all intermediate agency in the choice of the President, I recommended some restrictions upon the re eligibility of that officer, and upon the tenure of offices generally. The reason still exists; aid 1 renew the recommendation, with au ircreased confidence that its adoption will strengthen those checks by which the Constitution designed to secure the inde peuUcnce ot each deparL&eut of the Gov"