The Wabash Courier, Volume 2, Number 29, Terre Haute, Vigo County, 1 February 1834 — Page 1
1
BMT«B«IOH»
IN SENATE—MONDAY, DECEMBER p. REMOVAL. OW THE DEPOSITS.
Mr. CLAY rekimed his spcech. Bebefore I proceed to a consideration of the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the second resolution, I wish to anticipate and answer to an objection, which may be made to the adoption of the first. It may be urged that the Senate, being, in a certain contingency, a court of impeachment, f.ught not to prejudge a uestion which it may be called upon to eci(ie judicially. But, by the Constitulon, the Senate has three characters, legishtive, executive, and judicial. Its orinary, and by far its most important, charcter, is that of its being a component part the Legislative Department. Only hrce or four cases, since the establishment of the Government, (that is, during he period of ne.ir half century,) have ccurred, in which it was necessary that he Senate should act as a judicial triba^1, the least important of all its characters, bw, it would be most strange, ft when conititolional powers were a3sailed, it could n^t assert and vindicate them, because, by possibility, it might be required acta* a court of justice* The first rdtoiutioiiftsserts, only, that the President 4ta« aiiomed the exercise of a power over public treasury not granted by the
Jtttituiicn and the laws. It is silent as motivei and, without the quo animo— deliberate purpose of usurpation—
President would not be liable to imeachment, But if a concurrence of*all the elements be nccessary to make out a charge of wilfjl violation of the Constitu-
tion, does any one believe that the President will now be impeached? And shall we sHcnllv ait by, and see ourselves stript of one of the most essential of nur legislative powers, and the exorcise of it assumed by the President, to whom it is not delegated, without efToit to maintain it, because, against all human probability, he may be hereafter impeached?
The Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, in the first paragraph, commencswith a misstatement of the fact. He 5jj8 have directed?* that the deposits of 1$ if ihe United Slates shall not made ... he Bank of the United States, thi? assertion is regarded in any other an a mere formal sense, it ia not true.— he Secretary may have been the instrument, the clerk, the automaton, in whose arhe the order was issued, but the mea„ur£*was that of the President, by whose authority or command the order was given, nd of this wc have the highest and most ^authentic evidence. The President has told the world that the measure was his own and that he took it upon his own responsibility. And he has exonerated his Cabinet from all responsibility about it.-~ The Secretary ought to have frankly disclosed all (he circumstances of the case, nnd told (he truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. If he had done »o, "W~~rnformcd Congress that the novaf had been decided by the President the 18th day of September last: that it ad been announced to the public on the 80th nnd (hat Mr. Duanc remained in office until ihp 23d« He would have informed Congress that this important measure as decided before he enterted into his ollice, nnd was the cause of his np„„ilmcnf. Yes, sir, (he present Secret*7j- stood up, a witness to the struggle in the mind of his predecessor, between his *8richirtenttc the President and his duty lo the'.country saw him dismissed from I office because he would not violate hiscon-
Icicutioua obligations, and came into Mr. Ijuanc's place,to do what he could not honorably, and would not perform. A son of one of the fathers of democracy, by an Administration professine to be democrate, was expelled from office, and his place applied by a gfcntlerrtan who, throughout |s whole career, has been uniformly opo?ed to democracy! A gentleman, who, ,.t another epoch of the Republic, when it was threatened with civil war, and a dissolution of the Union voted, (although a resident of a slave state,) in the Legislaure of Maryland, against the admission jf Missouri into the Unign, without a restriction incompatible with her rights as a btember af the Confederacy. Mr. l)uwas dismissed because the solemn con-
Ictionsof his duty would not allow him to onform to the President's will because lis logic did not biing his mind to the me conclusions with those of the logic of venerable old gentleman, inhabiting a house not distant from the Capitol sehis watch [here Mr. C. held up his did not keep time with that of the dent. He was dismissed under that table system of proscription, for opin sake, which has finally dared to in itself into the Halls ot Congress—i tern under which three unoffending rks, the fathers of families, the husands of wives, dependent on them lor support, without the slighest imputaof delinquency, have been lecently ceremoniously discharged, and diiveft to bepgary, by a man himSelf the sub|ute of meritorious officer, who has it been in this city a period equal to one thly revolution ot the moon! I tell
Secretary, (said Mr. C., raising his ice^ that, if he touch a single hair of head of any one of the.clerks of the te,(I ana iure he is not disposed to do _in account of his opinions, political or jriaus, if no other member of the
Volume 9.
Senate
it, 1 ill instantly submit a resolution own dismission. [Loud applause ihe gallery.] Xhe Secretary ought to have commuted all these thinjs.he ought to bav* 4 that the Cabinet was divided two two,and one of the members,equallr
Jed with himself on the qoestioa, willto be put into either scale. He ought mw given a foil account of this, tbe important act of Execotire a«thoBtinc* ihe origin of tha Gov«rnmeot he hire Mated wirt) what tussulUad
"8§i:
honor his predecessor retired from office, and on what degrading conditions he accepted fhis vacant place. When a momentous proceeding like this, iy*rying the live °n
of the Legislative and ExecutTfTdepai^ ments, was resolved on, the ministers, against whose advice it was determine, should have resigned their stations. No ministers of any Monarch in Europe, under similar circumstances, would have retained the seals of office. And if, as nobody doubts, there is a cabal behind the curtain,without character and without responsibility, feeding the passions, stimulating the prejudices, and moulding the action of the incumbont of Presidential office.it was ail additional reason for their resignations. There is not a Maitre d'Hotel in Christendom,who, if the scullions were put into command in the parlor and diningroom, would not scoin t^hold his place, and fling it up, in disgust, with indignant pride. ,1 ['$ 1 shall examine the Report before us, 1st. As to the power of the Secretary over the deposits 2dly. His reasons for the exercise of it, and 3dly. The manners of its exercise. 1. The Secretary asserts that the power of removal is exclusively reserved to him that it is absolute and unconditional^o far a» the interests of the Bank are concerned that it is not restricted to anf particular contingencies that the reservation of the power to the Secretary of the Treasury exclusively, is apart of the compact that h£ may exercise it, if ihe public convenience or interest would, in any degree, be promoted that this exclusive power, thus reserved, is so absolute, that the Secretary is not restrained by the considerations that the public deposits in the Bank arc perfectly safe that the Bank promptly meets all demands upon it and that it faithfully performs all its du(ies and that the power of Congress, on the contrary, is so totally excluded that it could not, without a breach of the compact, order the deposits to be changed, even if Congrees were satisfied that they were not safe, or should be convinced that the interests of the people of (he United States imperiously demanded the removal.
Such is the statement which this unassuming Secretary makes of his own authority ||IIe expands his own power to the inost extravagant dimensions and he undertakes to circumscribe that of Congress in the narrowest and most restricted limit?! Who could have expected (hat, after having so confidently maintained for himself such absolute, exclusive,unqualified, and uncontrollable p»we|v he would have let in any body else to share with him its exercise? Yet say#, "As the Secretary of the Treasury presides over one of the Executive departments of the Government, nnd his power over this subject forms a part of the Executive duties of his office, the manner in which it is exercised must be subject to the supervision of the officer" (meaning the President, whose official name his modest) would not allow hilm to pronounce) "to whom the Constitution has confided the whole Executive power, and has required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." If the clause in the compact exclusively vests the power of removal in the Secretary of tho Treasury, what has the President to do with it?" What part of the charter conveys to him any power? If, as the Secretary contends, the clause of the removal, being part of the compact, restricts its exercise to the Secretary, to the entire exclusion of Congress, how does it embrace the President?—especially since both the President and Secretaiy conceive that "the power over the placeofac posit for the public money would seem properly to belong to the Legislative department of the Government?" If the Secretary be correct in asserting that the power of removal is confined to the Secretary of the Treasury, then, Mr. Dunne, while in office, possessed it and his dismission, because he would not exercise a power which belonged to him exclusively, was itself a violation of the charter.
But by what authority does the Secretary assert that tho Treasury Department is one of the Executive Departments of the Government? He has none in the act which
creates
con..il..U«.l distribution of rt* po»e« „f faitoul agents"
the Department he has none
in the Constitution. The Treasury Department is placed by law on different footing from all the other Departments, which are, in the acts creating them, denominated Executive, and placed under the direction of the President# The Treasury Department, on the contrary, is organised on totally different principles. Lxof the officer?, wiih
cepl the appointment the co-operation of the Senate, and the power which is excicised of removing them, the President has, neither by the Constitution nor the law crearing the de part ment, any thing to do with t. The Secretary's reports and responsibility are directly to Congress. The whole scheme of the department is one of checks, each officer acting as a control upon his associates. The Secretary is required by the law to report, not to the President, bat directly to Congress. Either House may require any report from him, or comma«3l his personal attendance before it. It not, therefore, true that the Treasury one of the Executive
deaprtments,subject
to the supervision of the President. And the inference drawn from the erroneous assumption entirely fail*. The Secretary appears to hare no precise idea* either of the constitution Or duties of the departioent over which he preside*,. He saj% •"The Treasury de^rtmeat being frotnwt-
ed with the administration of the finances of the country, it was always the duty of the Secretary, in the absence of any legislative provision on the subject to take care
)e„
was deposited in safe
I. «»oe /lAflAtltA/l in safe
&c The premises of the Secretary are only partially corrcct, and his conclusiqp is directly repugnant to law. It never was the duty of the Secretary to take care that the public money was deposited in safe keeping, in the hands of faithful agents, &c. That duty is expressly, by the act organizing the department, assigned to the
Treasurer
of the United States, who
is placed under oath, and under bond,with
a large
penalty, not to issue a dollar out
of the public treasury but in virtue of warrants granted in pursuance of acts of approbation, "and not otherwise." When the Secretary treats of the power of the President, he puts on corsets, and contracts and prostrates himself before the Executive, in the most graceful, courteous, and lady-like form but when he treats of that of Congress, and of the Treasurer, he swellsand expands himself, and flirts about, with all the airs of high authority.
But I cannot assent to the Secretary interpretation of his power of removal, contained in the chartcr. Congress has not given up its control over the Treasury, or the public deposits, to either the Secretary or the Executive. Congress could not have done so without a treacherous renunciation of its constitutional powers, and a faithless abandonment ©f its duties. And let us see what is the true state of the now matter. Congress has reserved to itself, exclusively, the right to judge of the reasons for removal of the deposits,by requiring the report of them to be made to it and, consequently, the power to ratify or invalidate the act. The Secretary of the Treasury is the fiscal sentinel of Congress, to whom the Bank makes weekly reports, and who is presumed constantly to be well acquainted with its actual condition. He may, consequently, discover the urgent necessity of prompt action, to. save the public treasure, before it is known to Congress, and when, it is not in session. But he is immediately torepoit—to whom?— To the Executive? No, to Congress. For what purpose? That Congress may sanction or disapprove the act.
The power of removal is a reservation for the benefit of the people, not of the Bank. It may be waived. Congress, being a legislative party to the compact, did not thereby deprive itself of ordinary powers of legislation. It cannot, without a breach of the national faith, repeal privileges or stipulations intended for the benefit of the Bank. But it may repeal, moaiiy, or warn the exercise altogether, of those parts of the charter which were intended exclusively for thi: public. Could not Congress repeal altogether the clause of removal? Such a repeal would not injure, but add to the security of the Bank. Could not Congress modify the clause, by revoking (he agency of the Secretary of the Treasury, and substituting that of the Treasurer, or any other officer of Government? Could not Congress, at any time during the twenty years duration of the charter, abolish the office altogether of Secretary of the Treasury, and assign all his present duties tosome newly constituted department? The right and the security of the Bank do nof consist in the form of the agency, nor in the name of the agent, but in this— that, whatever may be its form or its denomination, the removal shall only be made upon urgent and satisfactory reasons. The power of suplemental legislation was exercised by Congress both under the old and new Bank. Three yoars after the establishment of the existing Bank, an act passed better to regulate the election of
Directors, and to punish any one who should attempt, by bribes or present? in any form, to influence the operations of the« institution. „C
As to the'absolute^ unconditional and exclusive power which the Secretary claims to be vested in himself, it is in direct hostility with the principles of our Government, and adverse to the genius of all fiee institutions. The Secretary was made, by the charter, the mere representative or agent of Congress. Its temporary substitute, acting in subordination to it, and bound whenever he did act, to report to bis principal has reasons, that they might be judged of and sanctioned, or overruled. Is it not absurd to say that the agent can ssess more power than the principal? he power of revocation is incident to all agency, unless, in express terms, by the instrument creating it, a diflerenbATOVl
TEBRE-HABTB, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1884. No.
none but those two stipulations of any great importance to the Bank. Each of the two parties to the compact must stand bound to the performance of his engagements, whilst the other is hones||i and faithfully fulfilling his. It is cot to be conceived, in the formation of the compact, that either party could have anticipated that, whikt he was fairly and honest'/ executing every obligation which he had contracted, the other party might arbitrarily or capriciously exonerate himself from the discharge of his obligations.
On this part of the rabject, I conclude that Congress has not parted from, but retains its legitimate power over the deposites that it might modify or repeal altogether the clause of removal in the charter that a breach of material stipulations on the part of the bank would authorize Congress to change the place of the depositee thata corrupt collusion, to defraud the public, between the Bank and a Secretary of the TreasSnPJr, would be a clear justification to -eongrcss to direct a transfer of the public deposits that the Secretary of the Treasury is Ihe mere agent of Congress, in respect to the deposits, acting in subordination to his principal that it results from the nature of all agency that it may be revoked, unless otherwise expressly provided and, finally, that the principal and much less the agent, of one party cannot justly or lawfully violate the compact, or any of its essential povision*, whilst the other party is in the progressive and faithful performance of all his engagements.
to
4-"*^*"4"""
it made.,i-!:'!!jn|e powers, whethe of
vision the
principal or the agent, must be expounded by the principles which govern all contracts. It is true that theJanguagc of the clause of removal, in the charter, is general, but it is not therefore to be torn from the context^Jltis a part only of an entire compact, and is to be interpreted in connexion with every part and with the whole. Upon surveying the entire compact, we preceive that the Bank has come under various duties to the public has undertaken to perform important financial operations for the Government and has paid bonus into the public treasury of a million and a half of dollars. We perceive that, in consideration of the assumption of these heavy engagements, and the payment of that large sum of money, on the part of the Bank, the pablic has ^Ipdlt* ed that the pablic deposits shall i««aia with the Bank, dunog the continu*!ioo of the charter, and that its notes shafl be received by the Government in payment of mil debts, doe*, and taxes. Except tha corporate character conferred, there is
If I am right, in this view of the subject, there is an end of the argument. There was perfect equality and reciprocity between the two parties to the compact. Neither could exonerate himself from the performance of his obligations, whilst the other was honestly proceeding fairly to fulfil all his engagements. But the Secretary of the Treasury tonctdet that the public deposits were perfectly safe in the hands of the Bank that the Bank promptly met every demand upon it and that it faithfully performed all its duties. By these concessions, he surrenrenders the whole argument, admits the complete obligation of the public to perform its part of the compact, nnd demonstrates that no reasons, however plausible or strong, can justify an open breach of a solemn national compact, 9. But he has brought forward various reason? to palliate or justify his violation of the National fjiith and it is now my purpose to proceed, in the second place to examine and consider them. Before I proceed to do this, I hope to be allowed again to call the attention of the Senate to the nature of the office of the Secretary of the Treasury. It is altogether financial and administrative. His duties relate to the finances, their condition and improvement, and to them exclusively. The act creating the Treasury Depart
ment,
and defining the duties of the Secretary, demonstrates this. He has no legislative powers: and Congress neither has nor could dele
gate any to him. His powers, wherever given and in whatever language expressed, must be interpreted by his defined duties. Neither is the Treasury Department an Executive Department, It was expressly created not to be an Executive Department. It is administrative but not Exe eutive. His relations are positive and direct to °I?iaiV°pAt°"nmiCTtte direction of the President (as he is hy various subsequent acts, especially those relating to public loans) it is done by express provision of law and for specified purposes.
With this key to the nature of the office, and the duties of the officer, I will now briefly exainthe various reasons which he assign# for the removal of the public deposits. The first is the nenr approach of the expiration of the charter. But the charter had yet to run about two und half of the 20 years to which it was limitcd.During the whole term, the public deposits were to continue to be made with the bank. It was clearly foreseen, at the commencement of the lerm, as now, that it would expire, and yet Congress did not then, and has never since, tho't proper to provide for the withdrawal of the deposits prior to the expiration of the charter. Whence does the Secretary derive any authority
do what congress had never done? Whence his power to abridge in effect the period of the charter, and to limit it to 17i years, instead of twenty! Was the urgency for the removal of the deposits so great that lie could not wait sixty days, until the assembling of Congress? He admits that they were perfectly safe in the Bank that it promptly met every demand upon it and that it faithfully performed all its duties. Why not, then, await the arrival of Congress? The last time the House of Representatives bad spoken, amonglt the very last acts of the last session, that house had declared its full confidcnce in the safety of the deposits. Why not wait until it could review the subject, with all the new light which the Secretary conld throw upon it, and again proclaim »ts opinion? He comes into office on the 23d September, 1833, and, in three days, with intuitive celerity, he comprehends the whole of the operations of the complex department of the Treasury, perceives that the Government, from its origin, had been in uniform error, and denounces the opinions of all his predecessors! And, hastening to rectify universal wr-jog, in defiance and in contempt of the resolution of the House, he singns an order for the removal of the deposites! It was of no consequence to him whether places of safety, in substitution of the Bank of the United States, oonld be obtained or not without making essential precautionary arrangements, he commands the removal almost instantly to be made.
Why, sir, if the Secretary were right in contending that be alone could order the removal, even be amidst tb«t congress has power to provide for the security of the public BKmcf in the new places to which it micht be transfer red. If be did not deign to consult the representatives of the people as to the propriety of the first step, did not a dec eft respect to tbeir authority and judgment exact from him a delay, for the brief tern of sixty days, that they might consider what was fitting to be dene? The truth 4s, that the Secretary, by law, bas nothing to do with the care and safe keeping of the pablic
mDejr-
As bas been already sbewe, tbat duty is specifically assigned by law to the Treasurer of the United States. And, in assuming upon himself the authority to provide other depositories than the Bank of the United States, be alike tramdied upon the da ties of the Treasurer, and what wat due to Congress. Can any dwbt the wotivs of this precipitancy? Does any body doabt that it was to preclude the action of Congress. or to bring it auder the influence of the Etecstin Veto Let the two Howes, or ther of them, perioral tbeir duty to the country, aod we shall bsreafter see whether, in that respect, at least, Mr. Secivtary will not fail to consummate bis purpose. 3. TUa next reason aasigaod for baealf* proceadfOg, the re-election of the present Chief Magistrate. "I have alsrays(sajs the Secretary,) regarded the renit tion of Prsatdeat of the Caitee Sides a» the declaration nf a anjerity of tha people, that tbe charter ««fM ast to be renewed .n **Its volaot»ry appiieatwataCoagrwsfot tbe renewal
!®».
its charter four years before it expired, and upon the eve of the elettion of President, was vnkcrttooti on all tides as bringing forward that question lor incidental decision at tbe then approaching Section. It was accordingly argued on both sines, before tbe tribunal of the people, and their verdict pronounced against the Bank." What has the Secretary to do with elections? Do they belong to the financial concerns of his department? Why this constant reference to the. result to the last Presidential election? Ought not the President to be content with the triumphant issue of it? Did he want still more votes? The winners ought to forbear making complaints, and be satisfied, whatever tbe losers may be.— After an election is fairly terminated, I have always thought that the best way was to forget all the inoiiicnts of the preceding cavass, and especially the manner in which votes had been cast. If one has been successful, that ought to be sufficient for him if defeated, regrets are unavailing. Oar fellow citizens have a richt (reely to exercise their elective franchise as they please, and no one, certainly no oandidate, has any right to complain about it.
But the argument of the Secretary is, that the question of the Bank was fairly submitted to the people, by the consent of all parties, fully discussed before them, and their vcrdict pronounced agaiust the institution, in the re-elec-tion of the President. His statement of the case requires that we should examine carefully the various messages of the President to ascertain whether the Bank questiqn was fairly and frankly (to use a favorite expression of the President) submitted by him to the people of the United States
In his message of 1829, tbe*President says: The charter of the Bank of the United States expires in 1835, aiid it* stockholders ifkll most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from predp~ itancy in a measure involving such important principles, and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot injustice to the parties interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the Legislature and the People." The charter had then upwards of six years to run. Upon this, solemn invitation of the Chief Magistrats, two years afterwards, the Bank came forward with an application for renewal. Then it was discovered that the npplioation was premature. And the Bank was denounced for accepting the very invitation which had been formally given. The President proceeds:— "Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the Bank are well questioned, by a large number of our fellow citizens." This massage was a non-committal. The President does i.ot announce clearly his own opinion, but states that of a large portion of our fellow citizens. Now we air know that a large and highly respectable number of the people of the United States have always entertained nn opinion adverse to the Bank on both grounds. Tbe President continues:
ulf
uthe
great
such an institution is deemed essen
tial to the fiscal operations of the Government, I submit to the wisdem of tho Legislature whether a national one, founded upon the credit of the Government, and its resouroes, might not be devised." Here again the President, so far from expressing an explicit opinion against nil National Banks, maksa hypothetical admission of the utility of Bank, and distinctly intimates tho practicability of devising one on the basis of the credit and resources of the Government. nr ii, the President says, "nothing has occurred to lessen in any degree, the dangers which many of our citizens apprehended from that institution, as at present organised. In the spirit of improvement and compromise, which distinguishes our country and itslnstitutions, it becomes us to enquire whether it be notpowfrle to secure the advantages afforded by the present Bank through the agency of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles and structure, as to obviate constitutional and other objections." Here again, the President recites the apprehensions of "many of our citiaens," 'rather than avows his own opinion. Again his message is non-commit tal. He admits indeed
advantages afford
ed by tbe present hank," but suggests nn inquiry whether it be po&sible (of course doubting) to secure them by a bank differently constructed. And towards the conclusion of that part of the message, his language fully justifies the implication, that it was not to the bank itself, but to
present form,' that he objected. I The message of 1831, when treating of the bank, was very brief: '•Entertaining the opinions (says the President) heretofore expressed in relation to the bank of the United States, at at present organised"—[non-committal qnce more and what that means, Mr. President, nobody belter knows than you and I—[cheering in the galleries]—"I felt it my duty in my former mes sages, •frankly to disclose them" [Frank disclo sure!] Now, sir, I recollect perfectly well the repressions made on my mind and ou those of other Senator^ with whom I conversed, immediately after that message was read. We thought and said to each other, the Preridcnt has left
door open to pass out. It is not the bank, it is r.ot any l^pnk of the United States to which he is opposed, but it is to the particular organization of the existing bank. And we all concluded tbat, if amendments oould bo made to tho charter satisfactory to tbs President, be Would approve of a bill for its renewal.
We
come
1832, negativing flic bill to recbartrr tbe bank. Here, it might be expected, we shall certainly find clear opinions, nneqnivocally expressed.— The President cannot elude tbe question. He must now be perfectly frank. We shall presently see. He says,
ua
(its
A
now to the famous message of July
bank of the United States
is, in many respects, convenient to the Government, and-useful to the People. Entertaining this opit\iont and deeply impressed with tbe belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank, are authorized by i.be Constitution," itc. "I felt it ray duty, at an early period of my administration, to call tbe attention of Congress to tbe practicability of organizing aa institution, combining all its advantages, and obviating these objections. 1 sincerely regret, that in the net before me I din perceive none of those modifications,4tc. "That a bank of tbe United States, competent to all tbe duties wbicb may be required by tbe Government, might be so organized as not to infringe on our dim delegated powers, or the reserrod rights of the States, 1 do not entertain a doabt. Had the Executive been called on to furnish the project of tnch an institution, tbe duty would have been cheerfully
performed."
Tbe Message is principally employed in discosring the objections wbicb tbe President entertained to tbe particular provisions of tbe Charter, and not to tbe bank itself »a«b as the right of foreigners to bold stock in it its exemption from State taxation iU capacity to bold real estate, Its. Does tbe President, even fn this M*sage, array himself ia opposition to any bank of tbe United States? Does be even oppose himself tbe existing bank under every organization of wbicb it is susceptible On tha coatrary, doe* he not declare tbat be does not entertain a doubt tbat a may be constitutionally organised
Does he not even rebuke Coagres for not calling on hi- to furnish a project of a bank, which be would have cheerfully supplied? Is it not fairiy dedueibte, from tbe message, that tha charter
dends
of tha present bank aright haws been so amended as to nave secured the President** approbation to tbe institatioa. So fkr^a* the Message from being decisive against all banks of tbe United States,or against the existing bank, under an* modification, the President, expressly declares that the question was amounted. He says: "A general discission will now take place,e!leit-: ing new light, and yttling important'principles and anew Congress, elected jn the midst of such dir' and furnishing an equaLrepresentation^oMti according to the laitflps, will bear to the the vcrdict publio^pinion, and, doubt not, this important question to a siitsisfactory resull
This review of the various messages of tVt dent, conclusiveluHBfs that they were for frtts pressing, frankly^BRMjg|ely, any opinion of th Chief Magistrate, gfce^Bfche was opposed to tha amendments of the chartcr ^Attained in tho bill submitted to him for its renewal) and that be required further amendnul^s. It demonstrates that he eater* tained nod abt W. it wan practicable and desirable to establish a Banc of the United States. It justified the hope that he might be ultimately reconciled to ihe continuation of the present Bank, #fth-suitable modifications: and it expressly proclaim*d that the whole subject was adjoarned' to the new Congress, to bo assembled under the last ««a*us.
Accordingly, ia tho canvass which ensued, it w#» boldly asserted by th$ partisans of the President that he was not opposed to a Bank of the United States^ nor to the existing hank, with proper amendments.-— They maintained, at least wherever those friendly to a national bank wem »n the majority, that his*re-elec-tion would be followed by a re-charter of the bank, with proper amendnjSnts. They dwelt, it Is true, with
earnestness, tfcon his objections to the bank,, as present modified^,
and
tution and the laws were the
,|,f
remain in th er? It ii
remain, and Cof ______ tnry ought totaave acquiesoetf unless the exigency had arUen on which alone".. supposed his power over the deposits would beexerefs^ ed. Tho Secietary is greatly mistaken, in believing that tho bank will be less secure in the Wt hours of its existence than previously.
It will then be collecting its resource*, with a view to the immediate payment of it* uotes, and the ukimato division among the stockholders of their capital and at no period of its existence will it be so *trong nnd able to puy all demands upon it. As to the depreciation in the value of its notes in the interior at that time, why, sir, is the Secretary possessed ol tbe least knowledge of the course of tbe trade of the ia* terior, and especially of the Western States? If ho had auy, he could not have made such a suggestion. When the bank itself is not drawing, its notes form the best medium of remittance from tha- interior to the Allan!ioonpituls.
ask®
"especially to the pernioions stock in it but the/
at influence of nevertheless cootcn odThat th^so objeclfons Woutd be cuted, if he was rb-elccted, ami the Bank sustained. I appeal to tbe whole Senate, to my collegue, to the people of Kentucky, and especially to the citizen! of the city of Louisville, for the correctness of this statomeut.
After all this, was it anticipated by the people of the United States that, in the re-election of the President, they were deciding against an institution of such vital importance? Could the/ have imagined that,after an express adjournment of the wholfe matter to a ne.w Congress, by the President himself, he would have prejudged the notion of this new Congress, and pronouncel that a question, expressly by himself referred to its authority, was previously settled by the people? He claimed no such result-in his message, immediately after tho re-election although in it he denounced the Bank as an unsafe depository of the public^ money,and invited Congress to investigate its condition. The President, then, nnd the Secretary of the Treasury,are without all color of justification for their assertions,' that the question of Bauk or no bank was fully and fairly submitted to the people, and a decision pronounced against it by them.
Sir, I am surprised and alar Hied at the new source, of Executive power, which is found in the result of a, Presidential election.
I
had supposed that the consti
Bole
They are sought after by merchants
and traders with avidity, are never below par, and in the absence of bank drafts may commnnd a premium. This will continue to be tho case as%ng as the charter endures, ond especially during the last moments of its existence, when its ability will be unquestionable, Philadelphia being the place of redemption whilst tha notes themselves will bo receivable ia all tho large ci* ties in payment of duties. 5. The Secretary asserts that "il is »H ttawnfow that the superior credit heretofore enjoyed by the notes of the Bank of the United States, was not founded on uny particular confidence in its management or solidity. It was occasioned attogsther by the agreement *a behalf of the publio, in the act of incorporation, receive them in all payments to the United States."— I have rarely seen any State paper characterised*bf so little gravity, dignity, nnd circumspection, as tha Report displays. The Secretary i* perfectly reckless in his assertions of matters of fact, and culpably looia his reasonings Can he believo the assertion which he has made? Can he believe, for example, that if the notes of the bank of tbe Metropolis wero made receivable in all payments to the Government, they would ever acquire, at home and abroad, the credit and confidence which are attached to those of tha Bank of the United States? If he had stated tbat the faculty mentioned, was one of the elements of tha great credit of those notes, the statement would not bavebeen true but who can agree with him that it is the sole cause? The credit of the Bank of the United State* results from the large amount of it* capttal from the great ability and integrity witb which it ha* beeo administered from the pert«cip«tKM» of ibe Government affair* from iU acUafl»*reMi« location from its being lheSW of WepoiU of the
public
'i
source of Executive! ...
authority that the constitution could only be amended in the mode which it has itself prescribed that the iisue of a Presidential election, was merely to place tho Chief Magistrate in the post assigned to him and that he had neither more nor less power, in consequence oC the election, than the constitution defines and delegates. But it seems that if, prior to an election, certain opinions, no matter how ambiguously put forth by a candidate, are known to the people, these loose opinions, in virtue of the election, incorporate thera» selves with the constitution, and tiflerwards are to be regarded and expounded as parts of the iustru-
4. The public money ought not,the Secretary thinks, to remain in the Bank until the last moment of tho existence of the charter. But that was not the question which he had to decide on the 86th of September last. The real question then was, could he not wait sixty days for the meeting of Congress? Thero wero many last moments, near two yeurs an| a half, between the 26th of SeptetokoxajMl^l0
ration of the charter.
the
e^.{*
moneys, wd its notes being
Mtfetvable In *11 payments to the Government, and fronstt* b«i« e»pH.tic-tlyTb« Banker tbe United 8t.u.- Tbi. letter circnwttsece errenge* it with the Seeks of toglsad, fiisct» Am*terdam.Gena», *-C« 6. Tbe expansion aad contraction of the accommodation* of (be Bank to its individual eeaiomert, are held op by the Secretary, »n bold relief, as evidences of misconduct, which justified his withdrawal of tbe deposits. He represents the Bank a» endeavoring to operate on the public, by alternate bribery and oppression, witb the seme object, in both ceaes, of inrtoenciny the election or tbe administration of the Preatdeot. Why thi* perpetual reference of all tbe operations of tbe rnsbtotion to tbeEsecativel Why does the Executive think of nothing b«ii itaclfl It is I! ItisI! It** I. that is
Meant,
appear, to be the
Cffntlf' exclamation. Christianity and cfaanty enjoin us never to ascribe abed motive, if we cm wppoee good one,— The Bank is a nfoneved corporatwn, whose prot» rewit (ram its business. If &*t be extensive, it makes better, if limited, leas profit- Its interest is to make the greatest amonnt of divi
wbicb rt can sefely/ Aad all its actions may be more cer« tainly escribed tft that than any principle. Denunciations and threat* were put forth against it. R»mor*, stamped witth but loo mods authority, were ewcnlwWl of the intention of the Executive to disregard the adfflowtio# of tbe Hoose of Representative*. An aad then sach an agrent—[Here Mr. Clav was interrupted with bant* of epidbttse nrom die galleries.
lay was ioterrepwa Witb which occasioned tbe ia-
Idem
larference
itoases to tbe term* oa which thein Was the Beak, who conld not careleeahr by, without taking nay progmtionery wsssareafc-
ww^a open hostility to it, aad it bad nothing to e*
[S^ceek nruhidU on thefeurtk pef*.]
