The Wabash Courier, Volume 1, Number 19, Terre Haute, Vigo County, 18 October 1832 — Page 2

i£-

Alio# we °°w» air, to take notice of an aniuMDt, llMwded on the practical operation of the Bank. That argument is this. Little ef the stock of the Bank is held in the West, being chiefly owned by citizens

States owe the Bank a heavy debt, so heavy that the interest amounts to a million six hundred thsusaml a year. This interest is carried to the Eastern States, or to 'Europe, •annually, and itt payment it a burden on the people of the West, and drain of their cur#reneyt which no country can. beat without tneomtenience and distress. The true character and the whole value of this argument, are manifest by the mere statement of it.—

The people of the West are, from their situation, necessarily large borrowers.—They need money-capital, and the? borrow it, because they can derive a benefit -from its use, much beyond the interest which they ..pay. They borrow at jsi.x per cent, of the 'Bank, although the value of money with •g, !them is at least as high as eight. Never^thclcs*, although they borrowed at thia low of interest, and although tlffey use all •^*"•^7 ,*-*jthey borrow thus profitably, yet they cannot 4 Npay the interest without ^ijxcoiitmierW

gratuity," a preeent," ha# been possessed by the Bank. And yet there has been found *0 danger to liberty, no introduction of foreign influence, and no accumulation of irresponsible power in a few hands. I cannot *MBt hope, therefore, that the people of the thuUsl States will not now yield up their jjnd**stent to those notions, which would reverse all oar past experience, and persuade us to ditconUnae a nsefal institution, from the influence of vague and unfounded decSanatton against its danger to the public hbrrUii. Oar liberties, indeed, most ctand upon very frail foundationa, if the gttvernmeet cannot, withont endangering them, fit those common fontilitioi. in tiw

the Son^em and Eastern States, and bv for- pass principally into the eif»er». Bat the Western and Southern

anJ^

distress and the^ sir, follows the logical conclusions, that, although they cttrmot pay even the intra without inconvenience and "iittrets,yet less than four years it ample time for the Sank to coil in the wholg, both principal and interett, without causing more than a Jight pressure! 'This is the argument.*— Vhen follows another, which may be thus Stated. It is competent to the State to tax the property of their citizcns, vested in the stock of this Bank, but the power is denied of taxing the stock of foreigner^: therefore, the stock will be worth ten or fifteen per cent. more to foreigners, than to residents, and will of course inevitably leave the country, and make the American people debtors to aliens in nearly the wholo amount due to the Bank, and send across the Atlantic from two to five millions of ppecie every year, to pay the Bank devidends. Mr. President, arguments like thew might be more readily disposed of, were it .not that the high and official source fromwhkh they proceeded, imposes the necessity of treating them with respect. -In the first place, it may safely be denied, that the* stock of the Batik is any moro valuable to foreigners than our own citizens, or an object of greater desire to themtexcept in so far as capital may bo moro abundant in the foreign country, and therefore its owners more in want of opportunity of investment. The foreign stockholder enjoys no exemption from taxation. He is, of course, taxed by his own government for his incomes, devided from this ns well as other property and this is a full answer to the wholo statement. But it may he added, in the second place, that it is not the practice of civilized States to tax the property 0/ foreigners unikr such circumstnnces. Do we tax, or do wo ever tax, the foreign holders of •ur public debt? Doe* Pennsylvania, New Y*rk, or Ohio, tax the foreign holders of •took in tho loans contracted by either of these States Certainly not. Sir, I must confess I had little expected to see, on such an occasion as the present, a laboured and repeated attempt to producc an impression on the public opinion, unfavorable to the Bank, from tho circumstances that foreigners are its stockholdep. I have no hesitation in saying that I deem such a strain of remnrk as tho message contains, on this point, coming from the President of the United States, to be injurious to the credit and character of the country abroad because it manifests a jealousy, a lurking disposition not to respect the property of foreigners, invited hither by our own laws. And, sir, what is its tendency but to cxcito this jealousy, and create groundless prejudices?

From the -commencement of the government it has been thought desirable to invite, rather than to repel, the introduction of foreign capital. Our stocks have all been open to foreign subscriptions and the State Banks, in like ipanncr, are free to foreign ownership. Whatever State has created a debt, has been willing that foreigners should become purchasers, aiid desirous of it. How long is it, sir, since Cdngress itself passed a law, vesting new powers in the President of tho United States over the cities of this district, for the very purpose of increasing their credit abroad, the better to enable them to borrow money to pay their subscriptions to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal! It is easy to say that there is danger to liberty, danger to independence, in a bank open to foreign stockholders—because it is easy to say any thing. But neither ro.Von nor experience proves any soch danger. The foreign stockholder cannot be a director. He has no voice in choice of directors. His money is placed entirely in the management of the directors appointed by the President ami Senate, and by the American stockholders. So far as there is dependence, or influence, either way, it is to the disadvantage of the foreign stockholder. He has parted with the control over his own property, instead of exercising control over the property oc over the actions 01 ottiern. And, sir, let it now be added, in further anwer to this whole class of objections, that experience has abundantly confuted them all. This government has existed forty-three years, and has maintained, in full toing and operation, a Bank, such as is now proposed to be renewed, for thirtysix years out of the forty-three. We have never for a moment had a Bank not subject £0 every one of these objections. Always, foreigners might be stockholders always, foreign stock has been exempt from State taxation, as much as at preeent always the same power and privileges always ail that which is now called a "monopoly," a

coUccflbtt of its revenues, and tbe managettenti of its finances, wbcih all other governnwntii, in commercial countries, find useful injmc8Mttty» In order to justify its alarm for die secarity of independence, the

.. message supposes a case. It suppose* that

subjects of a foreign country

subjects

aBd that we should be involved in war with that country, and then it exclaims, what would be our condition Why,sir,it is plain that all the advantages would be on our side. The Bank would still be onr institution, subject to our own laws, and all its directors elected by ourselves: and our means would be enhanced,, not by the confiscation and plunder, but by the proper use of the foreign capital in our hands. And, sir, it is singular enough, that this very state of war, from which this argument against a Bank is dra^n^ is the very thing which, more than all others, convinced tbe country and the government of the necessity of a National Bank. So much was the want of snch an institution felt, in the late war, that the subject engaged the attention of Congress, constantly, from the declaration of that war down to the time when the existing -Bank was actually established «o that, in this respect, as well as in others, the argument of the message is directly opposed to the whole experience oft the government, and to the general and long settled convictions of the country.

I now proceed, sir, to a few remarks apon the President's constitutional objections to the Batik and 1 cannot forbear iff say, in regard to them, that he appears $0 rtc to ftave trammed very extraordinary grounds of reasoning. Ho denies, that the constitutionality o( the Bank is a sejttled question. 1/ it be not, will it ever become so, or what disputed question can hp, settled I have already observed, that for thirty-six years out of forty-three, during which the Government has been in being, a Bank has existed, snch as is now proposed to be coutin^fd.

As early as 1791, after great deliberation, thf first Bank Charter was passed by Congress and approved by President Washington.— It established an institution, resembling, in all things now objected to, Jthe present Bank. That bank, liko this, could take lands in payment of its debts that charter, like the present, giW tho St$te no power of taxation it allowed foreigners to hold stock, it restrained Congress from creating other banks.* It gave, also, exclusive privileges, and in all particulars it was, acoording to the doctrincs of the message, as objectionable as that now existing. That bank continued twenty ycarrs. In 181*6, the present institution was established, aud has been over since rn full operation. Now, sir, the question of the power of Congreas'to create such institutions, has been contested in every manner tcnown to oui^ Constitution and Laws. The forms of the government furnish a new mode, in which to try this question. It has been discussed over and over againvin Congress it has been a-rgued and solemnly adjudged in the Supreme Court—every President, except the present, has considered it a settled question many of the State Legislatures hnve instructed their Senators to vote for the bank the tribunal of the States, in every instance, havo supported its constitutionality and, beyond all doubt and dispute, the general public opinion of the country, has nt all times given, dnd does now give, its full sanction and approbation to Ihe exercise of this power, as being a constitutional power. There has been no opinion questioning the power, expressed or intimated, at any time, by either House of Congrcss,"by any President, or by any respectable judicial tribunal. Now, sir, if this practice of near forty years, if these repeated exertions of the power, if this solemn adjudication of the Supreme Court, with the concurrence and approbation of public opinion, do not settle thequestion, how is any question ever to be settled, about which any one may choose to raise a doubt? Tho argument of the message, upon the Congressional precedents, is either a bold and gross fallacy, or else it is an assertion without proofs, and against known facts. The message admits, that in 1791, Congress decided in favor of a bank bat it adds that another Congress, in 1811, decided against it. Now, if it be meant that in 1811, Congress decided against the Bank on Constitutional ground, then the assertion is wholly incorrect, and against notorious facts. It is perfectly well known, that many memhers, in both Houses, voted against the bank, in 1611, who had no doubt at all of the constitutional power of Congress.— They were entirely governed by other reasons given at the time. I appeal, sir, to the honorable member from Maryland, (Gen. SMITH,) who was then a member of the Senate, and voted against the hank, whether he, and others, who were on the same side, did not give those votes on other well known grounds, and not at all on the constitutional ground. [Gen

SMITH

here rote and said, that he

voted agaiusl tbe Bank in 1811, hut not at all on constitutional grounds, and had no doubt such was the case with other members.]

We all know, sir, (continued Mr. VVKBSTEK,) the fact to be as the gentleman from Maryland has stated it. Every man who recollects, or who has read, the political occurrences of that day, knows it. Therefore, if the Message intends to say, that in 181If Congress denied the existence of any such constitutional power, the declaration is onwarranted—4s altogether at variance with tbe facts. If, on the other hand, it only intends to say, that Congress decided against the proposition then before it, ON tome other grounds, then it alleges that which is nothing at all to the purpose. The argument, then, cither assumes for truth that which is not true, or else, the whole statement is immaterial and futile. But, whatever value others may attach to this argument, the message think* so highly of it, that it proceeds to repeat it.

One Congress," it says, in

181&, decided against a bank, another, in 1316, decided in its favor. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if its anthority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor ef tbe act before s*." Now, sir, since it is known to the whole country, OK cannot bat wonder how it should remain unknown to the President, that Congress did not decide against a Bask in 1815. On the contrary, that very Congress passed a hill for creating a bank, by very larga majorities.

form, it it true, the bill foiled in the House of Representatives, but the vote was reconsi

deedt

the bill recommitted, and finally passed by a vote of one hundred and to thir-ty-nine* There is, therefore, not only no solid ground, but not even any plausible pretence for the assertion that Congess, in 1815, decided against the bank. That very Congress passed a bill to create a bank, and its decision, therefore, is precisely the other way, and. is a direct practical precedent in favor of the constitutional power. What are we to think of a constitutional argument, which deals in this way with historical facts? When the message declares, as it does declare, that there is nothing in precedent which ought to weigh in favor of the power, it sets at nought repeated acts of Congress affirming tbe power, and it also states other acts which were, in fact, and which are well known to have been directly the reverse, of what the message represents them. There is not, sir, the slightest reason to think that any Senate, or any Honse of Representatives, ever assembled under tbe Constitution, contained a majority that doubted ihe Constitutional existence of the power of Congress to establish a bank. Whenever the ques tion has arisen, and has been decided, it has been always decided one way. Tbe legislative^ precedents all assert and-maintain the power and these legislative precedents have bean the law of the land for almost forty years. »They settle the oonstructioti of the Constitution, and sanction tho exercise of the power in question so for as these ends can ever be accomplished by any legislative precedents whatever. But the President does not admit the authority of precedent. Sir, I have always found, that those who habitually deny most vehemently the general force of precedent, and assert most strongly the supremacy of private opinion, are yet, of all men, most tenacious of that very authority of precedent whenever it happens to be in their favor. I tfteg leave to ask, sir, upon what ground, except that of precedent, and precedent alone, the President's friends have placed his power of removal from office? No such power is given by the constitution, in •terms, or any where intimated, throughout the whole of it no paragraph or .clause of that instrument recognizes such a power.— To sny the least, it is as questionable, and has been ns often questioned, as t^e powej&of Congress to create a bank and, enlightened by what has passed under our own observation, we now see that it is, of all powers, the most capable of flagrant abuse. Now, sir, I ask again, what becomes of this power, if the authority of precedent be taken away? It has all along been denied to exist, it is no where found in the constitution, and its recent exercise, or, to call things by their right name*, its recent abuse, has, more than any other single cause, rendered good men either cool in their affections towards the government of their country, or doubtful of its long continuance. Yet this power has precedent, and the President exercises it. We know, sir, that, without the aid of that precedent, his acts could never have raceived the sanction of this body, even at a time when his voice was somewhat more potential here than it now is, or, as I trust, ever again will be.

Does the President, then, reject the authority of all precedent, except what is suitahle to his own purposes to use? And does he use without stint or measure, all precedents whiph may augment his own power, or gTatify his wishes? But, if the President thinks lightly of the authority of Congress, in construing the constitution, he thinks still more lightly of the authority of the Supreme Court. He asserts aright of individual judgment, on constitutional questions, which is totally inconsistent with any proper administration of the Government, or any regular execution of the laws. Social disorder, entire uncertainty in regard to individual rights and individual duties, the cessation of legal authority, confusion, the dissolution of frco Government—all these are tbe inevitable consequences of the principles adopted by the message, whenever they shall be carried to their full extent. Hitherto it has been thought, that the final decision of constitutional questions belonged to the supreme judicial tribunal. The very nature of free Government, it has been supposed, enjoins this and our constitution, moreover, has been understood so to provide, clearly and expressly. It is true that each branch of the Legislature has an undoubted right, in the exercise of its functions, to consider the constitutionality of a law proposed to be passed. This is naturally apart of its duty, and neither branch can be compelled to pass any law, or do any other act, which it deems to be beyond the reach of its constitutional power. The President has the same right when a bill is presented for his approval for he is, doubtless, bonnd to consider, in all cases, whether such bill be compatible with tbe constitution, and whether he can approve it consistently with his oath of office. But when a law has been passed by Congress, and approved by the President, it is now no longer in the power, either of the same President, or his successors, to say whether the law is constitutional or not. He is not at Wmtj tv disregard it be in not at liberty to feel or to affect constitutional scruples," and to sit in judgment himself on the validity of a statute of the Government, and to nullify it if he so chooses. After a law has passed through all the requisite forms after it has received the requisite legislative sanction and the executive approval, tbe question of its constitutionality then becomes a judicial question, and a judicial question alone. In the Courts, that question may be raised, argued, and adjudged it can be adjudged DO where else.

Tbe President is as much bound by tbe law as any private citizen, and cm DO more contest its validity than any private citizen. He may refuse to obey the law, and so may a private citizen bat both do it at their own fieril,aod neither of them can settle the question of its validity. Tbe President may «xy a law is unconstitutional, bat be is oot tbe judge. Who is to decide that que*, tion? The Judiciary, alone, possess this unquestionableand hitherto unquestioned right. The Judiciary is the constitutional tribunal of appeal, for the citizens, against both Congress and the Executive, regard to the coostitutioaality of laws. It has this jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it, and when it has decided tbe question, its judgment most, from tbe very nature of all jodgIn one newts that are inal„ and firan whtcb there

is no appeal, be%bnclusive. Hitherto, this opinion, and a correspondent practice, have prevailed in America, with all wiso and considerate men. If it were otherwise, there would be no government of laws bat we should all live under the government, the rale, the caprices of individuals. If we depart from the observance of these salutary principles, the executive power becomes at once purely despotic for tbe President, if the principle aqjfl the reasoning of the mes~ sage be sound, may either execute, or oot execnte,thelawsof tbe land, according to his sovereign pleasure. He may refuse to put into execution one law, pronounced valid by all tbe branches of the Government, and yet execute another, which may have been, by constitutional authority, pronounced void. On the argument of the message, the President of the United States holds, under anew pretence, a ditpetuiog power over tbe taws, as absolute as was claimed by James the Second of England, a month before he was compelled to fly the kingdom.— That which is oow claimed for the President is, in truth, nothing less, and nothing else, than tbe old dispensing power asserted by the Kings of England in tbe worst of times —tbe very climax, indeed, of all the prepos* terous pretensions of the Tudor and the Stuart races.

According to the doctrines put forth by the President, although Congress may have passed a law, and although tbe Supr^lne Court may bave pronounced it constitutional, yet is, nevertheless, no law at all, if he, in his good pleasure, sees fit to deny its effect in other words to repeal and annul it. Sir, no President, and no ptiblic man, ever before advanced such doctrines in the face of the nation. There never was before a moment in which any President would have been tolerated in asserting such a claim to despotic power. After Congress has passed the law, and the Supreme Court has pronounced its judgment, on the very point in controversy, the President has set up his own private judgment against its constitutional interpetration. It is to be remembered, sir, that it is the present law, it is the act of 1816, it is the present charter of tho Bank, which the President pronounces to be unconstitutional. It is no Bank to be created, it is no law proposed to be passed, which he denounces, it is the lave no to existing, pasted by Congress approved by President Madison, and sanctioned by a solemu judgment of the Supreme Court, which he now declares unconstitutional, and which, of course, so far as it may depend on him, cannot bo executed. If these opinions of the President be maintained, there is an end to all law and all judicial authority.— Statutes are but recommendations, judgments no more than opinions. Both ye equalJy destitute of binding force. Snch an universal power, as is now claimed for him, a power of judging over the laws, and over the decisions of the tribunal, is nothiDgelse than pure despotism. If conceded to bim, it makes Mm, at once, what Louis the Fourteenth proclaimed himself to be, when be said "I AM THE STATE."

The Supreme Court has anhnimomly declared and adjudged that the existing Bank is created by a Constitutional law of Congress. As has been before observed, this Bank, so far as the present question is concerned, is liko that which was established in 1797 by Washington, and sanctioned by the great men of that day. In every form, therefore, in which the question can be raised, it has been raised, and has been settled.— Every process, and every mode of trial kooriv to the constitution and laws, has been exhausted and always, and withput exception, the validity has been in favor of the law. But all this practice, all this precedent, all this public approbation, all this solemn adjudication directly on the point, is to be disregarded and rejected, and the constitutional power flatly denied. And, sir, if we are startled at this conclusion, our surprise will not be lessened when we examine tbe argument by which it is maintained.

By tbe constitution, Congress is authorized to pass all laws "necessary and proper" for carrying its own legislative powers into effect. Congress has deemed a Bank to be "necessary and proper" for these purposes, and it has therefore established a Baok.— But although the law has been passed, and the bank established, and the constitutional validity of its charter solemnly adjudged, yet the President pronounces it unconstitutional because some of tbe powers bestowed on the Bank are, in his opinion, not necessary or proper. It would appearthat powers, which, io 1791 and 1816, in the time of Washington, and in the time of Madison, were deemed "necessary and proper," aod are no longer to be so regarded, and therefore the Bank is unconstitutional. It has really come to this, that the constitutionality of a Bank is to depend upon the opinion which one particular

some of the clauses of dividual chooses to think that a particular power contained in the charter is not necessary to the proper constitution of the Bank, then the act is unconstitutional.

Hitherto it has always been sxpposed that the question was of a very different nature. It has been thought that the policy of granting a particular charter may be materially dependent on the structure, and organization, and powers of the proposed institution. But its general constitutionality has never before been understood to turn on such points. This would be making its constitutionality depend 00 subordinate questions, of expediency, aod questions of detail upon that wbicb one man may think necessary, and another may not. If the coostitiooal questioo were mad6 to hioge on matters of this kind, bow could it ever be dectdcd! All would depend on conjecture,

man may form of the utility or necessity of\ rigtit,iudecision may stand ifitdecide wrong its charter. If that in- [its decision is litigatory 4, whether its deci-

tbe com-

plexioned feeling, on tbe prejudices,

powera, direct ctf lncideatal, ttmflftfed OB ft particular bank, were batter calculated than ail otbers to give success to it* opera* tions. For if not, theu the charter would be unwarranted, according to this sort of reasoning, by the constitution. This mode of construing the constitution is certainly a novel discovery. Acoording to this rule of interpretation, if tbe President should be of opinion that the. capital of the Bank was larger, by a thousand dollars, than it ought to be or that the time for the coofcinuance. of the Charter was a year too long or that it was unnecessary to require it, under penalty, to pay specie or needless to provide for punishing, as forgery, tbe counterfeiting of its bills either of these reasons would be sufficient to render the charter, in his opinion, unconstitutional, invalid, aad ougatof ry. This is a legitimate conclusion from the argument.

Such

a view of the subject

has certainly never before been taken. This strain of reasoning has hitherto not been beard within the halls of Congress, nor has any one ventured upon it before tlie.tribut nais of justice. The first exhibition, its first

appearance, as an argument, is in a message of the President of the United States! According to that mode of construing tbe constitution, which was adopted by Congress ia 1791, and approved by Washington, aod which has been sanctioned by tbe judgment of the Supreme Court, and affirmed by. the practice of near forly years, the question upon the constitutionality of the Bank involves two inquiries: first whether a Bank,r I in its general character, an| with regerd to the general objects with which Banks are usually connected, be, in itself, a fit means, I a suitable instrument, to carry itito effect the powers granted to the Government? j/

If itgbe so, then the second, and thiNenlyl other question is, whether thq powers giveniL in a particular charter are expropriate Ar|p a Bank. If they are powers whi are op* propriate for a baok,powers which Congress^ may fairly consider to be usefbl to the Bank or the country, then Cbngress may confer theso powers because the discretion to be exercised in framing the constitution of the baok belongs to Congress. One man may4t think tbe granted powers not indispensable to the particular Bank another may supposo them injudicious, or injurious a third may imagine that other powers, if panted in their stead, would be more beneficial but all these are matters of expediency, about. which men may differ and the powerofdeciding upon them belongs to Congress. 1 again repeat, sir, that if, for reasons of this kind, the President sees fit to negative a bill, 't on the ground of its being inexpedient or tin-' politic, ne has aright to do so but remember, sir, that we are now on the constitutional question. Remember that tbe argument of tbe President is that because powers were given to the Bank by the charterof 1816, which he thinks not necessary, that% charier is unconstitutional. Now, sir, it will hardly be denied, or rather it was not-de-tiied or doubled before this message came to us, that, if there was to be a bank, the powers and duties of that bank must be prescribed in the law creating it. Nobody but Congress, it has been thought, could grant these powers and privileges, or prescribe their limitations. It is true, indeed, that the message pretty plainly intimates, that the President should have baenfirtt consulted, and that he should have had the framing of the bill but we are hot yet accustomed to that order of things, in enacting laws, nor do I known parallel to this claim, thus now brought forward, except that, iu some peculiar cases in England, highly affecting the toyal prerogatives, tbe assent of the monarch is necessary, before either the House of Peers or bis majesty's faithful Commons are permitted to act upon the subject or to entertain its consideration.

But supposing, sir, that our accustomed forms and our republican principles still to be followed, and that a I aw creajt- *,V, ing a Bank is, like all other laws, to origin-1 ate with Congress, and that the President has nothing- to do with it, till it is preseoted*' for bin apptoval, then it is clear, that the powers and duties of a proposed Bank, andjj£. all the terms and conditions annexed to it, must, in the first place, be settled by Congress. This power, if constitutional at all, is only constitutional in tjie hands of Congress. Any where else, its exercise would be plain usurpation. If, then, the authority to decide what powers ought to be granted to a Bank belong to Congress, and Congress shall have exercised that power, it would seem little belter than absurd to say that its act, nevertheless, would be unconstitutional and void, if, in tbe opinion ofj! a third prrty, it bad misjudged, on a question of expediency, in the arrangement of details. According to such a mode of reasoning, a mistake in the exercise of jurisdiction takes away jurisdiction. If Congress decide

nugatory

tbe

passions of individuals or more or less practical skill, or correct judgment, in regard to banking operations, among tbdse who should be the judges on the impulse of momentary interest, party objects, or personal purposes. Put the qoestion, in this manner, to a court of seven judges to decide whether a particular bank was constitutional, aad it might be doubtful whether they could come to any result, as they might welt botd very various opinions on tbe practical utility of many clauses of its charter.

Tbe question, in that case, would be, not whether tbe bank, in its general frame, character, and objects, was a proper instrument to carry into effect tbe powers of tbe Government bet whether the particelar

x- Jt

sion be right or wrong, another is to judge** although the original power of making the decision must be allowed to be exclusively in Congress. This is the.end to wbicb tbe argument of tbe message will conduct its fol* lowers. Sir, io considering tbe authority of Congress to invest the Bank wilh the" particular powers granted to it, the inquiry is not, and cannot be how appropriate these, powers are, but whether tbey be at all ao»,

propriate, whether they come within the range of a just and honest discretion whether Congress may fairly esteem them io be necessary. Tbe qoestion is not, are they m' tbe fittest means, the best means, or whethermi^ the Bank might oot be established without them but the qoestion is, are tbey sucb s* Congress bona fide, may have regarded aa appropriate to the end. If any other rule were to be adopted, nothing rouid ever be 1 settled. A law would be constitutional 1 to-day and unconstitutional to-morrow. Its constitutionality would altogether depend upon individual opinion. 00 a matter of mere

expediency. Indeed, such a case as that is now actually before us. Mr. Madison! deemed tbe powers given *0 tbe Bank,^! in its present charter, proper and neeesta-P''- *1 ry. He betd tbe Bank, therefore, to be constitutional. But the present President,r oot acknowledging that tbe power of de-P I* 'S ciding on these points rests which Congress, nor with Congress aad tbe then President,, bat, setting upon Iris own opinions as tbe staedsid, declares tbe law now in being unconstitutional because tbe powers granted Hy it are, in bis esticoatios, not necessary aad proper. 1 pray to be informed, air.