Vincennes Gazette, Volume 10, Number 41, Vincennes, Knox County, 20 March 1841 — Page 1

w . m. . ism tih;tii without fear. VOLUME X VLCEXES, INDIANA, SATURDAY MORXING, MARCH 'JO, 1811 NO. II.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS. R1ARCH 4th. 1311.

U jltal from a retirement which I had (opposed was lo continue for the residue of my life, to till the Chief Executive OWftca of this great free Natiuu, I appear INeforo you, feHjw-cu'uens, to take the oit?l9 which t!0 Co!iHBtio!i prescribes, as tvnaeasatwy r)iiaU5ott;on for the perform.inco of iu du:io3. And in 'obediCTICO V7th ! U9tO;T e03T.ll Willi our Government, rir.d wYitl believe to be your expectations, I proceed to present to you a summary of the principle-! which will govern me in the discharge of the duties which I shall be called on to perform. ttWns wie remark of a Roman Cons A. in an early period of that, eelebrai-rd liopublic, tint a most striking contrast wa observable in the conduct of candidates lor offices of power and trust, before and af:er obtaining them they seldom carrying out in the latter ease, the pledges and promises male in if I former. However much the world may have improved, in manv respect', in the lapse of upwards of two thousand vears, sine the remark was msilo by the virtuous :t:sd indigent Koman, 1 tear that .a strict exominnioti of the annals of pome of the modern elective governments would develope similar instances ot violated confidence. Although the fiat f the people ,u goue for t!i, proclaiming me the Chief Ma"istratc of this tr' i r i i Union, n Hh;;v n their pirt remaining t, be done, it may t.e thought toil ! i i : v . mac c x 1 I n keep up the i!eiuio'i under r! whieli I i i e v :iuv res e 0. to ; a v e acted in re.aopi uon-; and t:un lomv prteiple and i perhaps tl.pre may be s-ime m this assenih.y who have come here either prepared to con deam iho e I shad now deliver, or, appro ing them, to doubt itio sim enty w il'i w nii'ii i.; I . t r; (if a lev i i . i ;V are utieied. But the inomlis will confirm or dinel their P-ars. I'iie outline of nnneiI 'he outline of pri OK.-'s I o a JO, dliu Ult.nuivn j j- .wav-j i . . . . . . , and me iuies to be adopt r 1. hv a. 4 administration not yet began, wid mi h.- exchanged for immutable hisle. v, an I I shall stand, cither exonera'.ed bv my countrymen, or classed with the ma--' ot thn.-e w ho promised that they mih t d, v ,i vc. an 1 ll j'tiro 1 with the intention '.'i he'r v. 1 1 . wfv.T s;ro pui ( o -e t ' ! e.t! . iiM'iatmnous a' !t! it-.. " !!IV pr (xoecta-ions k.'h' 1 of a I eoiiii-liiig I't-opie. I too t .e ii.,irintios of hum m well un le I' in ll dure, and t; dau'e.-ons tern a' ion-- to the m g has bt en n.nit to which I nilu ic of dl !p the o' : isiii'e oi ihe I'cowie to to v tt cub. n it to id ce my chie eo; u - d-u.-e 1,1 ;. o.l ,,r th.it Aiii.!ity ' t w e r wh.i'h h hitherto prot-ted me. an! i nablt .1 me to bring to favorable iisues, oilier important, bat Mill greatly inferior tru.H, heretofore coh.lled to me by my countrymei't The' broad foundation uponuhicii o;'r Coiisttiutiou rojts. b ing tho I'eople a breath of theirs having made, as a breath can unmake, change, or modiiv it it can be a-siiined to none of the e-re.it divisions ol buver:)!ie"t but to tint ot lie-ao-racv. If such i its theory, those who are called upon to administer u must recognise, as its leading principle, th duty of shatdng tlieir measures so as i i to pro bice the greatest good to the great-: . . . i . . i. . . i, ... i .. i . ,t liumoer. rui, v. n;i tne.se uioa i .i missions, if we would compare the sovcrtign'.y acknowledged to exist in the mass of our People with the power claimed by other sovereignties, even by those; which have been considered most purely democratic we shall find a most essential difference. All others lay claim to power limited only by their own will. The ma-io-utv of our citizens, on the contrary. M--"eis a sovereignty with an amount of " " . . . .i . ... i t power precisely npial torn, wnieo ins been gr-mtei! to' then by the p .rues to the national compact, and nothiug beyond. We admit of" no government by Divine r ght believing that, so fir as power is concerned, tho beneficent Creator has made no distinction amongst men. that all are upon a;i equality, and that the ou'y legitimate right to govern, is an express grant of power from the go en.ied. The Constitution of the United States is the Ins rumcnt containing this grant ot pow er to the several departments composing the Government. On t-n examination oi that instrument it will be found to contain declarations of power granted, ana o power wit rbheld. The latter is also stis mihlfi of division, into s nower winch the majority had tho right to giant, but i. .i , ,l.,l not think nroper to enwnilll me voi. - - I ' . . . ... .u..:. nns -in 1 ihatwbicii thev trust lO men c"-'" , could not have granted, not being pos eessed by themselves. In other won..-rh-re arc cartain rights possessed by eac, , - i ..,a,;., n 1-U17P11. which, in indiVl- uai ai"'l" vs compact with the others, he has ne ' Jo,,,,!. Some of them, indeed unable to BurienJer. being, in the Ummage of our system, uualtenab.e. The boasted p. ivilege of a Roman cm- ' n was to him a shield only against a Pettv ruler, whilst the proud democrat of Vthens could console himselt under a sen- ' ..r J0,th w hich no one understood, . . was the subiect of m ckery of all. or of banishment from hTs home, his family and his country with or ni'hout an alleged cau?e; that it

W3s the act, not of a single tyrant, or ha

ted aristocracy, hut ol his assembled countrymen. Far different i the power of our sovereignty. It can interfere with no one's faith, prescribe forms of worship for no one's observance, indict no punishment but after well ascertained guilt, the result of investigation under rule i prescribed by the Constitution itself. These precious privileges, and those scarcely les3 important, of giving expression to his thoughts and opinions, either by writing or speaking, unrestrained but by the liability for injury to others, anil that a full participation in all the advantages which flow from the Government, the acknowledged property of all, the American citizen derives from no charter granted oy his fellow man,. He claims tbjni bec.oise he is himself a Man, fashioned by the same Almighty hand as the rest of hi species, and entitled to a full share of the blessings with which he has endowed them, Notwithstanding the limited sovereignty possessed by the people of the United Stales, and ihe restricted gran: of power to the government which they have adopted, enough has been given to accomplish all the objects for which it W3S created. It has been found powerful in war, and. hitherto, justice has been administered: an intimate union effected, domestie tranquility preserved, and personal liberty secured lo the citizen. As was to be expected, however, from the defect of I manage, and the necessarily sententious manner in whieli the Constitution is written, disputes have arisen as to the amount of power il has actually granted, or was intended to grant. This is- more particularly the case in relation to that put of the instrument which treats of the Legislative branch. And not only a regards the exercise of powers claimed nndvr a general clause, jiving that body the authority to pass all laws necessary to carry into etlVet the specified powers, but in relation to the latter also. It is, however, consolatory to reflect, that ni9st of the mst nee of alleged departure from the letter or spirit of ihe Constitution, have ultimately received the sanction of h majority of the people. And the fact, that many of ir statesmen, most distinguished for talent and patriotism, havebeen atone time or other of their political career, on both ;-ides id each of the mast disputed ouestious, forces upon us lite inference that the errors, it errors they were, are alM'lou :p)!o to the intrinsic ditiiculty, in i,i-a:iees. of ascertaining the inm any teuiions of tb.e fiamers of the Constitution, rather than the influence of any sinistrr or unpatriotic motives. ! :t the great dangers to o:r itistitn ions bes not appear to nic? to be in a usurpat;on, ov i.i oi i ruuicni, 'i ")u, uoi :i!it '.i ;v me People, but bv t! ' i ic iiCCUiinda'ion. in on ol the Departments, of ,t which asignea to otners. i . . ' i. : ,i. !... Limbeen t ite,is IfH l l !: .)Wei3 V ill lUc o r a i i t e 1, slid enough have been granteu to ,mhi!!m!u a ileiootism, if coiiceutrateil in one ot the der partments. i his danger is'tatlv heiiTtheiied, as it has always observable that men are less jealous! of encroachments of one department upon another, than upon their own reserved right. Vhen the Constitution ot me united tates ci'ine from the hands of the Con vention which formed it, many t the t:rnest republicans of the day were danued at the extent ot power which :ad bem granted to the Ucdcral dovern- , -' . : . . . 1 - -1 .. .!...? .,.a-. ment. and more par;icu:an i uou wliich had been assigned to the Ex ecutive brnich. There were in it features which appeared not lobe in harmony with their simple representative Democracy, or Republic. And knowing the tendency of power to increase useu, particularly when exercised by a single inlividual. predictions were undo t.iat, at rcnwitii tietlOil. trie Uiiveiiiuiem " i would terminate in virtual mnnai-'hiy. , i r. ',1 ,,,o bi :-o.nn to sav that the t'rs rf r!icsc iviirits have Iujcii already realizeil. Hiii, a I sincerely believe that ti liiioit.' i"' ; - - i - ,,,M.Oon. I . r '1. 111 ) 1 7 it J la no 1 in that direction, it is. I conceive, mih u, proper that I should take this occasion to n.m.-a the assurances l nave ueieto.o.c .riven of mv determination to arrest the nc-rees of that tendency, it it really e.xpr. it. .! restore the (iovernment la iH pristine heal t'.i and vigor, as lar as in. can be effected by any legitimate exercise of the power placed in my hands. I proceed to state, in as summary r manner as I can, my opinion of the sources of lite evils which havebeen m ex tensivelv complained of, and ihe correct ives which may be applied. Some of ihe former are unquestionably to be found in -.h . ,1-tV.Ms of t!i ? Constitution: others, in mv judgement, are attributable to a mis construction of some of it provisions. Of the: former is the eligddliry of the same individual to a second term of the Presidency. The sagacious mind ot Mr Jefferson early saw and lamented this ter ror, and attempts have been made, nun erto without success, to apply the amen datorv power of the States lo its corree t inn . As, however, one mode of corroc tion is in the nower of every President and consequently in mine, it would be use !-. and nerhaos inviduous, to enumerate the evils of uhich, in 'he opinion of ma

ny of our fellow-citizens, this error of ihe sages who framed the constitution may have been the source, and the bitter fruits which we are still to gather from it, if it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general remark, that republics can omit no greater error than to adopt or continue any feature in their systems of government which may be calculated to create or increase ihe love of power, in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges them to commit the management of their affairs. And. surely, nothing is more likely to produce such a state nf mind than the long continuance of an office of high trust. Nothing can be more corrupting, nothing more destructive of all those noble feelings which belong to the character of a devoted republican patriot. When this corrupting passion once takes possession of the human mind, like the love of gold, it becomes insatiable. It is the neverdying worm in his bosom, grows with his growth, and strengthens with the declining ye us of its victim. If this is true, it is the p:rt of wisdom for a republic to limit the service of that officer, at least, to whom she has entrusted the management of her foreign relation, the execution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies, to a period so short as to prevent his forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not the principal; the servant, not the master. Until an amendment of the Constitution be effected, public opinion may secure the desired object. I give my aid to it, by renewing ihe pledge heretofore given, that, under no circumstances, will 1 consent lo servo a second term. But if there is danger to public liberty ' from the aekrvo vledged defects ot the Constitution, in the want of limit to the continuance of the Executive power in the same hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less from a misconstruction of that instrument as it regards ihe powers actually given. I cannot conceive, that, by a fair misconstruction, any or either of its provisions would hi: found to constitute the President a part of the legislative power. It cannot be claimed from the power to recommend, since, although a duty enjoined upon him. it is a privilege which lie hold in common with every other cit:zn. And although there may be something more of ennti deuce in the propriety of the iii:;-i:res recommended in tho one ease thin in another, in the obligations -f ultimate decision there can be no difference. In tho language of the Constitution, "all the legislative powers" which it grant", 'hue vested in the Congress of the United States." It would be a solecism in language to say that a portion of these is not included in the whole. It mav he sold, indeed, tint the Con

stitution has given to the Hxecu'ivc the i i power to annul the a-ts ot the legislative body by refusing to them his assent. . , . . 1 . . ! . So a sun lar power l.a- necessarily imi 1 from that in-tru.iirn: to the he Judiciary; rid vet the Judiciary forms no put of the re. There is, it-is true, this dif ference between thoe glints ot power. he Executive ran put his negative upon he acts of the legislature for other cause than that ot want ol conlormity to me .-. . . i Constitution, whilst the Judiciary can on1 Jiosa which violate that istrtimeiit. Iut t'ie decision oi me judiciary is hual m such a case, wrirreain everv'i'istancc where the veto of the Ex ecutive is applied, it may be overcome by a vole of two-thirds ot both houses ot iu,rr... The negative upon the acts V.' O I ' v - . . I of the legislative, bv the Executive an horny, and that in the hands of an in dividual, would seem to be an incongruity in our system. Like some others ot a similar character, however, it appears to oa highly expedient; and if used only ttU r..rt,,.irowi. and in ihe spirit which was intended by its authors. V may be nroductive of great good, ami be fount !, !!',.. ,rn rils to the Union. At tlie period of the formation ot the uon ctimtion. the nrmcmle does nm appeal ui i.,.Q i,ivp,l much favor in the State I I tl ' I ? ......... - - J J . - II..". ..,,1 ( .overuments. It existed nui in -'o. in one of three there was a plural Executive. If we would search for the molives which operated upon the purelypatriotic and enlightened assemni) wnun framed the Constitution, tor the adoption of a provision so apparently repungnant to the leading democratsc principle, tint the majority tdiould govern, we must reicct the mdea mai iney .m"-i-T''1Ll' J . . i I- .-.f lo. it any benelit to tne oromaiy uomro ghlation. Thev knew too well the high decree ol intelligence wmun nmomr the People, and the enlightened characters of the State legislatures, not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by -them would be worthy representatives of such constituents, ar.d, of course, that they would require no aiu in conceiving and maturing the measures which the circumstances of the country mh'ht require. It is preposterous to suppoe dial a thought could have been for a moment entertained, that the President, placed at the Capitol, in the centre of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes of the people than their own immoral renresentat'i ves, who spend a ni r pvptv vear among them, living with them, often laboring with them, and bound to them by the triple of interest ,itv. anrl affection. To assist or control Congrres, then, in its ordinary legislation.

could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto power on the President. This arrangement requires additional force from the fact that of its never haver having been dsed by the first six Presidents and two of them were members of the convention, one presiding over its deliberations, and the other having a larger share in consummating the

flabors of that augist body than anv other person. Uut if bills were never returned lo congress bv either of the above Presidents referred to, upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as well adapted as they might be lo the wants of the People, the veto was applied upon that want of conformity to the Constitution or been com riy Med from a toO hastv enactment. There is another ground for the adoption of the Veto principle, which had probably more influence in recommending it to the convention than any other. I refer to the security which it gives tot -e just and equitable action of the Legislature upon all parts of the Union, it could not but have occurred to the convention that, in a country so extensive, embracing so great a variety of soil and climate, and, consequently, of products, and which, from the same causes, must ever exhibit a great difference in the amount of the population of its various sections, calling for a great diversity in the employments of the pooplo, that tho legislation of tho ma jority might not always justly regard the rights and interests ot tho minority. And that acts of this character might bo passed, under an express grant by tho words t tho Constitution, and, therefore, not within tlie compt'tencv of tho Judiciarv to let dare void. That however enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from Kist experience, tho members of congress night be, and however largely pai taking n general, of the liberal feelings of the eo;uo. it was impossible to expect that i- - i i ii ! lies so constitute.! suoum not somriniis be controlled bv local interests snd sec tional feelings. It was proper, therefore, to prov ide some umpire from whoso situation and mode of appointment moro indcendenee and freedom from such influence might be expected. Such a unn m offered by the Executive department, constunted by the Uonstituticm. -V person elected to that high office, having his con-stituent-s in e cry section, state ano suudivision of the Unim, must consider himedf bound by the most solemn sanctions, io gnarrf. p.otoor. ati-1 defend the rights nf all. and of every portion, greater small, rom the mjusi.ee and oppression ot the i . i - . E .-v rest. I consider trie veto power, mi-a-fore, iiiven by tho Constitution to the Ex ecutive of tho United Srates, solely as a ouserv:'tive power. To bo used only. 1st. to protect tho Constitution from vioiiiiion. 2:i liy. tho People from tii i-lieet-u' h;irtv iegislaiioti, whero their will has prolwiblv been disregardcl or not well understool; and. Udly. to prevent tho ef fects of combinations violative ot tne ri'ditt; of minorities. In reference to the seeo:i I of tin :cf I may and observe that, I consider it the rigut iv itege oi me People to de-ei' disputed points of tho Constitution, arism'' from the iren oral grant of power tu C-ongress to carry into effect tho powers expressly given. And I believe, w ith Mr. .Madison, "that repeated recognitions under varied cir cumstances, m acts oi legisiame, execu live a;:d judicial branches of the Covcrn in, .-if .-,i-i-omri;i nied bv indications in Uit1 i , , ferent inotles of the concurrence ol the general will of the nation, as affording to tho President sufficient authority for his consideritv such disputed points as setbd." Upwards of half a century ha elapsed since the adootion of our present form of Government. It would bo an object more h'r'hly desirable, than the gratification of tho curiosity of speculative, .statesmen if its precise situation could bo ascertained a fair exhibit made of tho opera tions of each of its d 'partments, of tne oower3 which they respectively Ciaitn ant occupy, of the collisions which have oc curred between ttiem, or toe i ween me ...!.. ',. Trav-fM-moenf .nnd those of the -tates. or either of them. We cotil then ooomare our actual condition, after f"ofT- vr..ir' fri.vl of on r system, with llll ' eui i - ---- what was in the commencement of its op orations, and ascertain what the predic I'lrinq oi' flume oat riots who opposed its adoption or tho confident hopes of its advo cates, havo been realized. The great dread of the former seems to have been that the reserved powers of tho states hed by those of tne t-edera ( overnmcnt. and a consolidated power es tablished, leaving to the states the shadow onlv. of thut independent action lor wnict they had so zealously contended, and on the observation ot wluoli they retien .i, no t ' it 1 ..St hone of libeutv. Without wiin-v" I ' - denying that the result to which they look ed with o much apprchonston 13 m tor way of being realized, it is obvious that ,f,.l a,,.? "clivii-h- fho mole of its accomplishment. The Cenortd Govern ment has seized upon none ot the reseved rights of the states. As far as any open .-rtV,re. mav have trone, the State author ities have amplv maintained their rights To a casual observer, our present system presents no appearaneeof discord between t'norlitrprent members which comix se it. l?,-pn rhff addition of monv new t nosh produeodno jarrin-. They move in their respoctivo orbiti in perfect harmony with the ccnfr.'d b''d. en-l ifh each "the-.

But lliero isstifl an under current at work, by w hich, if not seasonably checked, the worst apprehensions of our anti-federal patriots wilt bo realized. And not only will the State authorities be obershad-

owed by the great increase; of power iii tho Executive department ot tho General Government, but the character of that Government, if not its designation, bo essentially and radically changed. This stale of things has been in. part effected by causes inherent in the Constitution, and in part by the never-failing tendency of political power to increase itself. By making the President the sole distribntor of all tho patronage of the Government, the framers of the Constitution do not ap pear to have anticpated at how short a period it would become a formidable instrument to control tho free- operations of the State Governments. Of trifling importance at first, it had, early in .Mr. Jeffeson's administration, become so pow erful as to create great alarm in the mind of that pad iot, from the potent influence it might exert in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise. If such could have then been tiie effects of its influence, how much greater must be the danger at this time, quadrupled in amount, as it certainly is, and more completely under the control of the Executive will than tlieir construction of their powers allowed, or the forbearing characters of all the early Presidents permitted them to make. But it is not by the extent of its patronage alone that the Executive Department has become dangerous, but by tho use which it appears may e made ot the appointing power to bring under its control the whole revenues ot le country. The Constitution has de clared it to be the duty of the President to see that the laws are executed, and it makes him the Commander in-Chief of the rmies and Navy of the United States. f the opinion of the most approved wri ters upon that species of mixed Government, which in modern Europe, is termed Monarchy in contradistinction to Des potism, is correct, there was wanting i a I-.- c V a . - f . . - no Oilier auoiiimi iwc luncis oi oui Chief Magistrate to stamp a inonarehial character on our Government but ihe con trol of tho public finances. And to me it appears strange, indeed, that any one hould doubt, that the entire control which the President possessed over the officers who have the rustody of the pub ic tnwr.ey, t" tne power of removal, with or without cause, does, for all mis chievous purposes at least, virtually scbpet the treasure also to his disposal. I'he first Koman Emperor in his attempt to sptze the sabred treasure, silenced the opposition ot the ofucer to whose charge I h;ul been committed, by a signmeant llusion to his sword. Bv a selection ... ... of political instruments for the care of tho public money, a reierencc to tneir ommisions by a president, would be inite as effectual an argument as that of Ca-sar to the Roman Knight. I am not insensible of the great difuculty that exists in drawing a proper plan for the safe-keeping and disbursement of the public revenue, and I know the imlortanco which has been attached ty men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce, as it is called, of the Treasury rom the banking institution. It is not . . . j i the divorce which is complained ot out the unhallowed union of the Treaury with the Executive Department, which has created such extensive alarm, io this danger to our Republican institutions, and that created by tho influence given to the executive, through the instrumentality of the federal officers, I propose to apply all the remedies which may oe ai j . . ... my command. It was ceitaimy a great error in the framers of the constitution not to hava made the offner at ihe head of the Treasury Department entirely independent of the Executive. He should at least have been removaoie omy upon demand of the popular branch ot the Legislature. I have determined never to n - ai... '1'a.iollrr remove a oecreiarv m without communicating all the circumstances attending such removal to both Houses of Congress. The influence of the Executive, in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise Through the medium of the public officers, can be effectually checked by renewing the prohibition published by .Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their interference in elections further than giving their own votes, and their own independence secured bv an assurance of perfect immunity, in exercising this sacred privilege of freemen under the dictates of their own unbiassed judgement of the people, -m..,aiPil for his services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of Executive will. There is no part of the means placed in the hands of the executive which might be used with greater effect, for unhallowed purposes, than the control of the public press. The maxim which our ancestors derived from the mother country, that "the freedom of the press is the great bulwark of civil and religious liberty, is one of the most precious egac.es which they left us. We have learned, too, from our own, as well as the experience of other countries, that golden shackles, by whomsoever or by whatever pretence imposed, are as fatal to it as the iron bonds of despotism. I he presses in the necessary employment of the

Government should never be ued"to clear the guilty, or o varnish crime." A decent and manly examination of the acts of the Government should be not only tolerated but encouraged. . Upon another occasion I have given my opinion at some-length, upon the impropriety of Executive interference in the legislation of Congress! That the article in the constitution making it ihe duty of the President to communtealo information, and authorising him to recommend measures, was not intended to make him the source in legislation, and, in particular, thai he should never be looked to for schemes of finance. It would bo very strange indeed, that the Constitution should have strictly forbidden one branch of the legislature from interfering in th origination of such bills, and that i; should be considered proper that an altogether different department of Government should be permitted to do so Some of our best political maxims and

opinions have been drawn from our pa rent Isle. Theie are others however, which cannot be introduced in our system without singular incongruity and the production of much mischief. And this f conceive to be one. No matter in which. of the Houses of Parliament a bill mav originate, nor bv w hom introduced, a min ister or a member of the opposition, bv the fiction of law, or rather of Constitutional principle, the Sovereign is supposed to have prepared it agreeably to his will. and then submitted it to Parliament for their advice and consent. Now, the verv reverse is the case, not only w ith regard to the principle, but the forms prescribed by the Constitution. The principle certainly assigns to tho only body constituted by the Constitution (tho legislative body) tho power to make laws, and the forms even direct that tho enactment should be ascribed to them. The Senate, in relation to Revenue bills, have the right to propose amendments; and so has tint Executive, by the power given him to return them to the house of representatives, with bis objections. It n in his power, also, to propose amendments in the existing revenue laws, suggested by his observations upon their defective or injurious operation. But tho delicate ditty of deviling schemes of revenue should b lfi where the Constitution has plced it with the immediate representativ es of the People. 'r similar reasons, rhe mod of keeping tho public, treasure should b prescribed by them; and the farther removed it may bo from the control of th' Executive, the more wholesome hn rangemeti. rod the more in accordance with republican principle. Connected with this subject is tho character of the currency : The id. a of making it exclusively metallic, oweer well intended, appears to me to be fre tight with mor fatal consequence then any other scheme, having no relation to the person al rights of the citizens. thet has ever been devisei d. If anv single schmo could produce tne effect of arresting, at once, that mutilation of condition by which thousands of our most indigent fel-low-citizen, by their industry and enterprise, ."re raised to the ios-"saion of wealth, that is the one. If there s one measure better calculated than another to produce thet state of things so much deprecated by all true republicans, by which the rich are daily adding to their hoards, and the poor sinking deeper into penury.it is an exclusive metallic currency. Or if there is a process bv w hich the character of the country for generosity and nobleness of feeling mav be destroyed by tho great increase and necesarv toleration of usury, it is an exclusive metallic currency. Amongst the other duties of a delicate character which the President is called upon to perform, is the supervision of the Government of tho Territories of tho United Statf s. Those of them which are destined io become members of our great, political family aro compensated by their rapid growth from infancy to manhood, for the partial and temporary deprivation of their political rights. It is in this District onlv, where, American citizens aro to lo found, who, under a settled system rof policy, are deprived of many important political' privileges, without any inspiring hope as to the future. Their only consolation, under tho circumstances of such deprivation, is that of a devoted exterior guard of a camp that their suffering secure safety and tranquility within. Are there anv of their countrymen who would subject them to greater sacrifices, to any odier humiliations than those essentially necessary to the security of the object for which thev were separated from their fellow-citizens? Are their rights alone not to be guaranteed by the application of those principles, upon which r ll our constitutions aro found? Wo are told by the. .'i eatcst of British Orators and Statesmeif, that, at the commencement of the war of the Revolution, tho most stupid men in England spoke of "their American subjects." Are there, indeed, citizens of anv of our States who have dreamed of their subjects in the District of Columbia? Such dreumscan never hrt realized by any agency of mine. The peoploof the District of Columb.r. are not the subject of the people of thv Sutes, but free American cirizen'. Being in the latter condition when the CoistiTution was formed, no words used in that instrument could fo l"':'ie them of ipve ooen iu;r nuu that character. If

V