Vincennes Gazette, Volume 6, Number 30, Vincennes, Knox County, 24 December 1836 — Page 1

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XSJ XiJ VC-fsJ -n;ixii without n: VOL13IE VI. VLCi:;,AE,S, SATURDAY JUOUNLNCi, DECEMBER t i, 18J0. NUMBER 30

paESIOEKT'S MESSAGE.

On Tuesday, the Gth inst, the President of the United States lran m tttovl lit the two Houses of Congress the following MESSAG E. Catthir.cn rj" the St note hid of the House of Jtytrctr.-tttdtcii: Addressing to you the last annual mossr.ge I shall ever present to the Congress of the Unite. 1 Suites, it is a source of the most heartfelt satudaetion to bo able to congratulate vou on the high state ol prosperity which our beloved country lias attained; with no causes at hone or ahroa.l to lessen the confidence with which we look to tlic future for oominumg proof rf the capacity oi our iree institution : tO reduce ai !! the fruits ot good Government. the gciu ral condition of our affairs may w cll excite orr national pride. I eann t avoid congratulating you and mv country, particularly, on the success of the e .-fiorts ma.le during mv ailtninistr: turn hv the Executive and Legislature, in onfornihv with the sincere, constant and earnest ucm peace, and ( of the people to maintain aMi.-di cordial relations wit! ns with all foreign powers. ( )ur gratitude is due to t!ie Supreme Kuler of the Universe, and I invito you to unite with me in offeringto Uim ft rvent supplication, that his providential care may ever he extended to those who follow us, enabling them to avoid the dangers and the lienors of w ar, consistently with a just and indispensable regard to t!ie rights and honor of our country. But alth ough the present state of o ti- foreign affairs, standing. witliout important change, as they nid when von separated in July last, is flattering in the extreme, I regret to say, that manv questions of an interesting character at isv.e with 'die powers, are yet unadjusted. Amongst the most prom'mont of these is that of our Northeast Boumlarv. With an undiminished confidence i i the sincere desire of his 1 ritanie Majesty's Government to adjust that question, I am not vet in possession of the precise grounds upon which it proposes a s.-atisfnetorv n!iu tment. With Framv have heen ivs mees which U.ih (J.'i-nn: henedcud intc amicahle fo: lire. paired by th countries. W re.ations r eircum-o-iiion oi a mutual Ulil. at! 1 l: n. ills t tl pn serv" and feic a. Jfs W true ;er those interest ol' ;!ie two : Km sii. Austria, I russia, Naples-, Swecden and Denmark, tne l.est understanding exists, and our commercial intercourse is gradually expanding itself with thrin. It is encouraged in all these countries, except Naples, by their mutually advantageous and liberal treaty stipulations with us. The claims of or.r citizens on Portugal are admitted to be just, but provision for the payment of them lias been unfortunately delayed by frequent political changes in that kingdom. The blessings of peace have not been securedby Spain. Our connections with that country are on the best footing, with t!ie exception of the burdens still imposed upon our commerce with her possessions out of Europe. The claims of American citizens for losses sustained at the bombardment of Antwerp have been presented to the Governments of Holland and Belgium, and will be pressed, in due season to settlement. With. Brazil and all our neighbors of this continent, wc continue to maintain relations of amity and concord, extending our commerce with them as far the resources of the people and the policies of their (Jovernments will permit. The just and lontT-standimr claims of our citizens upon yotno of them, are yet sources of dissatisfaction ami complaint. No danger is nppiehended, however, that they will not be peaeeablv, though tardily acknowledged and paid' by all, unless the irritating e licet of her struggle with Texas should unlortunately make our immediate neighbor, Mexico, an exception. It is alreadv known to you, by the correspondence between the two governments, comnv.inicated at your last session, that our conduct in relation to that struggle is regulated bv the same principles that governed us in the dispute between Spain rmd Mexico herself, and I trust, that it will be found, on the most severe scrutiny, that our acts have strictly corresponded with our professions. That the inhalants of the United States should feel strong prepossessions fortlie one party, is not surprising. But this circumstance should, of itself, teach us great caution, lest it i,ri into the error of suffering public policy to be regulated by partiality or pre judice: ami there are considerations con nected with the possible result of thi: .,ici liotwec.i the two narties. ol so ..,,,1. deVicaev and importance to the Uni ted States, that our character requires that .,- c'lonld neither anticipate events, nor ..imni to control them. 'I he known dt ,llll-U'( ' irc of the. Texi ins to become a part o! our system, although its gratiucatioa tjepentb n'pon the reconcilement of various and con n:( l Intorpsts. neeessanlv a wor oi time. t riiin in itself, is calculated to ex;ii.i ... pose our conduct to misconstruction m the rvrs of the world. There are those who. ' i;r to nrincie e te.em-'eives. an prone to suspect the'want of it in others. I:,a rynUnr. Yon will perceive, bv th accompnnpinj doevtmen iiiat the extra-

ordinary mission lrom Mexico has been terminated, on the side grounds that the obligations of this government to itself anil to Mexiio, under treaty stipulations, havc( compelled me to trust a discretionary an-' thoritv to a high otlleer of our army to' advance into the territory of Texas, if necessary to protect our own or the neigh-'

boring frontier from Indian depredation. ! In tne o pinion of the Mexican functionary who has just left us, the honor of his conn . . . . ... - try will be wounded by American soldiers entering, with the most amicably avowed purpose.;, upon ground from which the followers of his government have been expelled, anil over which there is at presi nt i n certainty of a serious i ifort on its part being made to re-establish its dominion. The departure of this miusiter was die more singular, as he was apprised 'hat the deficiency of the cause assigned for the advance of our troops by the commanding (Jeneral and had been seriously doubted by me, and that there was every reason to suppose that the troops of the United States their commander having had time to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the information upon which they had bien marched to Nacogdoches would be j eidier there in perfect accordance with the principles admitted to the just in his con-: ferenee with the Secretary of State, by the j Mexican Minister himself, or were already j withdrawn in consequence of the impres-j . . ..... l v si. e warnings tiieir commanuing omcer had received from the Department of War. It is hoped and believed that his govern ment will tako a more dispassionate and j jii't view of this subject, and not bo ilis-j posed to constrain a measure of justifiable precaution, made necessary by its known J inability,- in execution of the stipulations of our treaty to act upon ilu frontier; into, an encouragement upon its rights, or a, stain upon its honor. In the mean time, the ancient complaints of injustice, male on behalf of our eiti-j zens, are disregarded aid new causes of j dissatisfaction have arisen, some of them j of a character requiring prompt remonstrance, and ample and immediate redress. J I trust however, bv tempering firmness with courtesy, ami acting with great for-j hear.mce nnon every incident t nat las oci . curred, or that may happen, to do and to ootatn justice, ami thus avoid tue neces sity ol agna bnngm j t! is dimject into the view of Congress. Is is my duty to remind you, that no provisions have been made to execute our treaty- with .Mexico for tracing tlic boun dary line between the two countries. Whatever may be the prospect of Mexico being soon able to execute the treaty on its part, it is proper that we should be, in anticipation, prepared at all tunes t perform our obligations, without regard to the probable condition of those with whom we have contracted them. The result of the confidential inquiries made into the condition and prospects of the newly declared Texian Oovemmcnt. will be communicated to you in the course ei ti 10 session. Commerteal treaties offering great ad vantages to our enterprising merchants ami , . r " I . .1. .1 navigators have neen lornieu viwi uicdistant (lovcrnments, of Muscat and Siam. The ratifications have been exchanged. but have not reached the department of State: copies of treaties will be transmitted to vou, if received before, or published il urived after, the close of the present session of Consress. Nothing has occurred to interrupt the good understanding that has long existed with Barbary powers, nor to check the good will which is gradually growing up with the dominions of the Covernment oi the distinguished Chiel ol tlie utoninn Empire. lnfoi mation have been received at the Department of State, that a treaty with the Emperor of Morocco has just been negotiated, which, I hope, will be received in time to be laid before the Senate previ ous to tuc close ot the session. You will perceive, from the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, that the financial means of the country continue to keep pace with its improvement in ail other Tlic receipts into the Treasury during the year, will amount to about $-"l7,6'.'f,S98; "those from customs being estimated at -;2,523. 1 5 1 ; those from lands at about S2 1 ,000,000, and the residue from the miscellaneous sources. The expenditures for all objects during the year, are estimated not to exceed '2,000,000, which will leave a balance in the Treasu ry, for public purposes, on tlic first day of January nct,? 1 1 .?2:i,0."'.). 1 his stun with the exception of five millions will be transferred to the several States, in accordance with the provisions of the act regulating the deposites of the publi 1 money. The unexpended balances of appropriation, on the first day of January next, arc nstmi.iteil nt SI 1. ti.it). Ut)"i. exceeding! by S'J.CsG.OOti, the amount which will be left in the deposite. banks, subject to the draft of the Treasury of the United States after contemplated transfers to the several States are made. If, not therefore, the future be sufficient to meet receipts sh.ou these out.standmg and ! future approoriations, there niav be soon a necessity to use a portion of the funds ; deposited wuti tne states. The consequence apprehended, w the deposite act of the last session receiv ed a reluc'ant ap; crablv realized. a!, have been mis-! Through tin

for the deposite of the surplus moneys, of the Uni'ed Stales in the State Treasuries, for safe keeping, until they maybe want-j ed for the survieeof the Central (Jovcrn-i incut, it has been extensively spoken of, as an act to give the money to the several: States, and they have been advised lo use ' it as a gift, without regard to the means of

refunding il when called for. Such : suggestion has doubtless been made with cut a ilue consideration of the obligation of the deposite act, and without a proper attention to the various principles and interest which are manifest that the cffeei'jd bv it. It 1S aw itself cannot sanction mi i a suggestion, and that as it now stands the States have no more authority to receive and use these deposites without intending to return them, than any deposite bank, or any individual temporally, charged with the safe keeping or appropriation of the public money, would have! for eoverting the same to their private use. witliout the consent and against the will! of the Covernment. But independently! of the violation of the public faith and mural obligation which are involved in this' suggestion, w hen examined in rell'ercnee !to the terms of the present deposite act. it is, believed that the considerations which should govern the future legislation of! Congress on this subject, will be equally, conclusive against the adoption of any measure recognizing the principles on which the suggestion lias been made. Considering the intimate connection ofi the subject with the financial interests of the country, and its great importance, in whatever aspect it can be viewed.; I have be stowed upon it the most anxious reduction, and feel it to be my duty to state to Congress such thoughts as have occurred to me, to aid their deliberation in the manner best calculated to conduce to the common good. The experience of o'her: admonished us to hasten the examination of the public debt. But it will be in vain that we have eongraulated each other upon the disappearance of this evil, if we do not guard against the equally great one of promoting the unnecessary accumulation or publie revenue. No political maxim is better established than that which tells us that an improvident expenditure of money is the parent of prolligacy, and that no people can hope to perpetuate their liberties who long aequiece in a policy which taxes them for objects not necessary to the legitimate and real wants of their Covcnmienl. flattering as is the condition of our country at the present period, because of its unexampled advance in all the steps of social am! political improvement, it cannot be disguised that there is a lurking ,1nger already apparent in the neglect of this warning truth, and that the time has arrived w lien the representatives of the people should bo employed in devising some more appropriate remedy than now exists, tii avert it. Under our present revenue system, there is every probability that there will continue to be a surplus beyond the wants of the Covernment; audit lias become our duty to decide whether such a rule be consistent with the true objects of our Covernment. Should a surplus be permitted to accumulate beyond the appropriations, it must be retained in the Treasury as it now is, or distributed among the people of the States. To retain it in the Treasury, unemployed in any way, is impracticable. It is, besides, against the genius of our free institutions to lock up in vaults the treasure of the nation. To take from the people the right of bearing arms, and put their weapons of defence in the hands ol a standing army, would be scarcely more dangerous to their liberties than to permit the Oovcrnmeiit to accumulate immense amonnt of treasure beyond the supplies necessary to its legitimate wants. Such a treasure would doubtless be employed, at some time, as it has been in othercountries, when opportunity tempted ambition. To collect it merely for distribution to the States, would seem to be highly impolitic, if not as dangerous as the preposition to retain it in the Treasury. The shortest reflection must satisfy eve ry one that to require the people to pay taxes to the Covernment merely that they maybe paid back again, is sporting with the substantial interests of the country, and no svstem which produces such a result can be expected to receive the public countenance. Nothing could be gained by it even if each individual who contributed a portion of the tax could receive back promptly the same portion. But itis apparent that no system of the kind can ever be enforced, which will not absorb a considerable portion of the money, lo be distributed in salaries and commissions to the agents employed in the process, and in the various losses, and depreciations which arise from other causes; and the pratical effect of such an attempt must ever be to burden the people with taxes, not for purposes beneficial to them, but to swell the profits of deposite banks, and support a band of useless public oiliecrs. A distribution to the people is impracticable and unjust in other respects. It would lie taKiug one mans j......i and giving it to another. Such would be the unavoidable result of a rule of cquality fand none others is spoken of, or would be Lkelv to he adopted) inasmuch as there i ; no niodo by which the amount of the

individual contributions of our citizens to the public revenue can be ascertained. We know that they contribute unequally, and a rule therefore that would distribute to them equally, would be liable to till the objections which apply to the principle of an equal division of property. To make the general government the instrument of carrying this odious principle into effect, would be at once to destroy the means of of its usefulness, and change the character designed for it by the fiamers of the constitution. But the more extended and injurious consequences likely to result from a. policy w hich collects a surplus revenue for the

purpose of distributing it, may be forcibly illustrated by the examination of the effects already produced by the present deposite act. This act. although certainly designed for the safe-keeping of public revenue, is not entirely free in its tendencies from many of the objections which apply to this principle of distribution. The Covernment had, without necessity, received from the people large supplies, which instead of being employed as heictore, and returned to them by mcana of public expenditure, was deposited w ith sundry banks. The banks proceeded to make loans upon this surplus, and thus converted into banking capital; ami in tips manner it has (ended to multiply bank charters, and had a great agency in producing a spirit of wild speculation. The possesion and use of the property out of which this surplus was created, belong to the people; but the ( lov ernmont has transferred its possession to incorporated banks whose interest and effort is to make large profits out of its use. This process need only be stated to show its injustice and bad policy. And the same observations apply to the iniluences which are produced by the steps necessary to collect as well as to distribute such a revenue. About three-fifths of ail the duties on imports are paid in the city of New York, but it is obvious that the means to pay these duties are drawn from every quarter of the Union. Every citizen in every Siate, who purchases and consumes an article w inch has paid a duty at that port, contributes to the accumulating mass. The surplus collected there must therefore, be made up of moneys or property withdrawn! from other points and other states. i bus the wealth and business of every region from which these surplus funds proceed, must be to some extenf injured, while that of ihe place where the funds are concentrated, and cm ployed in banking, are proportionably ex tended. But both m making the transfer, of the funds which are first necessary to pay the duties and collect the surplus and in making the re-transfer, which becomes necessary when the time arrrives for distributing that surplus there is a considerable period when the funds cannot he brought into use; and it is manifest that besides the loss inevitable from sued an operation, its tendency is to produce fluctuations in the business of the coun try, which are always productive of spec illation, and detrimental to the interest of regular trade. Argument can scarcely be necessary to show that a measure of this character ought not to receive further le gislative encouragement. B examining the practical operation of the ratio for distribution, adopted in the deposite bill of the last session, wc shall discover other features that appear equalv o ueetionab e. l,et it lie assumed, lor the sake of argument, that the surplus moneys to be deposited w i ill tlse Slates, have been collected, and belong to them, in the ratio of their federal representative population an assumption found upon the fact that any deficiencies in our future revenue from imports and public lands, must be made up by direct taxes collected from the States in that ratio. Itis proposed to distribute the surplus, say 830,(KIO.OOO, not according to the ratio in which it haSjbcen collected and belongs to the people of the States, but in that of their votes, in the colleges of electors of Pressident and Vice President. '1 he effect of a distribution upon that ratio is shown by the annexed table marked A. By an examination of that table, will be perceived that in the distribution of a surplus of 830,000,000, upon that basis, there is a great departure from the principle which regards representation as the true measure of taxation; and it will be found that tiie tendency of that departure will be to increase whatever inequalities have been supposed to attend the operation of fuir federal system in respect to its bearings upon tlic different interests of the Union In making the basis of representation the basis of taxation, the framers of the constitution intend to equalize the burdens which are necessary to support the Covernment; and the adoption of that ratio, while it accomplishes this object, was also the means of adjusting other great topics arising out of the conilicing views respecting the political equality of the various members of the confederacy. Whatever, therefore, disturbs the liberal spirit of the compromises which established a rule of taxation so just and equitable, and which experience has proved to be so well adapt-, ed to the genius and habits of our people, 1 should be received with the greatest can-, tion rmd distrust. A bare inspection, in the annexed table, of the differences produced by the ra'do used in the deposite act compared with the

results of a distribution according lo the ratio of direct taxation, must satisfy every unprejudiced mind that the former ratio contravenes the spirit of the constitution, and produces a degree of injustice in the operation of the 1'ederal Covernment which would be fatal to the hope of per

petuating it. By the ratio ol direct taxation, for example, the State of Delaware, in the collection of 830,000,000 of revenue, would pay into the Treasury 8188,710. and in a distribution of 830,000,000 she would receive back from the Oovernnicnt, according to the ratio of the dejio1 site bill, the sum of 8300,13-2; and similar results would follow the comparison between the small and the large States I throughout the Union; thus realizing to the small States an advantage which would be 'doubtless as unacceptable to them as a motive for incorporating the principle in any ' system which would produce it, as it would i bp inconsistent with the riidits and exnec- - - - - , tations of the large Stales. It was certainly the intention of that provision of the constitution which declares that "all duties, imposts and excises" shall "be uniform throughout the United States," to make the burdens of taxation fall equally upon the people, in whatever State of the Union they may reside. But what would be the value of such a uniform rule, if the j moneys raised by it could be immediately 'returned by a different one, which will !give to the people of some States much imore, and to those of others much less, 'than their fair proportions? Were the Federal Covernment to exempt, in express ' terms, the imports, products, rind mannfac- ! hires of some poitions of the country from 'all duties, while it imposed heavy ones on 'others, the injustice could not be greater. It w ould be easy to show how, by the opI i .. i ..... oration ol such a principle, trie large euau s of the Union would not only have to contribute their just share towards the support of the Federal Covernment, but also have to bear in some degree the taxes necessary lo support the Covcrnments of their smaller sisters but it is deemed unnecessary to state the details w here the general principle is so obvious. A svstem liable to such objections can nev er be supposed to have been sanctioned by the framers of the constitution, when they conferred on Congress the taxing power; and I feel persuaded that a mature examination of the subject will sali.-fv every one that there are insurmountable difficulties in the operation of any plan which can be devised, of collection revenue, for the purpose of distributing it. Congress is only authorised to levy taxes "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." There is no such provision as would authorize Congress to collect together the property of the country, under the name of revenue, for the purpose of dividing it equally or unequally among the Slates or the people. Indeed it is not probable that such tin idea ever occurred to the States when they adopted the constitution. But. however this may Re, the only safe rule for us, in interpreting the powers granted to the Federal Covernment, is to regard the absence of express authority to touch a subject so important and delicate as this is, as equivalent to a prohibition. Even if our powers were less doubtlul in this respect, as the constitution now stands, there are considerations allorded, bv recent experience, which would seem to make it our duty to avoid a resort to such a svstem All will admit that the simplicity and eeonomv of the State Oovernmcnts main Iv denend on the fact that money lias to be supplied to support them by the same men, or their agents, who von Jit away in aonromiations. Hence, when there are extravagant and wasteful appropriations, there must be a corresponding increase of nxes; and the people becoming awakened will necessarily scrntenize the character ol i leasures which thus increase their bur dens. By the watchful eve of self-inter est, the agents of the people in the State Covcrnments are repressed, and kept with in the limits of a inst economy. But if the necessity of levying the taxes beta ken from those who make the appropria tions, and thrown upon a more distant and less responsible set of public agents, who have power to approach the people by an indirect and stealthy taxation, there is reason to fear the prodigality will soon supercede those characteristics which have thus far made us look with so much pride and confidence to the State Covernmeiits a the ministry of our union and liberties. The Stato legislatures, instead of studying to restrict their State expenditures to the smallest possible sum. will claim credit for their profusion, and l.arrass the (Jeneral Covernment for increased supplies. Practically, there would soon be but one taxing power, and that vested in a body of men fir removed from the people, in which the farming and mechanic imprests would scarcely be represented. The States would gradually lose their purity as we'd as their independence; they would not dare to murmur at the proceedings of the Ceneral Covernment, lest they should lose their supplies; all would be merged in a practical consolidation, cemented by wide ad corrimtion. which could only be s o eradicated by one ot those moony revolutions which' occasionally overthrow the despotic systems of the old world. In all tlic other aspect? in which I have i

Tbcen able to look at the c licet of such a principle of distribution upon the best interest of the country, I can see nothing to 'compensate for the disadvantages to which 'I have adverted. If we consider the pro'teetive duties, which are. in n preat detrrec.

r , c 0 the source of the surplus revenue, beneliicial to one section of the Union and pre judicial to another, there is no corrective for the evil in such a plan of distribution. On the contrary, there is reason to fear that all the complaints which have sprung from this cause would be aggravated. Every one must bcjsensiblejtha't a distribution of surplus must beget a disposition to cherish the means which create it; and any system, therefore, into which it enters, must have a powerful tendency to increase rather than diminish the tariff. If it were even admitted that the advantages of such a svstem could be made equal to all the sections of the Union, the reasons already so urgently calling for a reduction of the revenue would, nevertheless, lose none of their force; for it will always be improbable that an intelligent and virtuous community can consent to'raise a surplus for the mere purpose of dividing it, diminished as it must inevitably be by the expenses of the various machinery necessary to the process. Tlic safest and simplest mode of obviating all the difficulties which huve been mentioned is, to collect only revenue cnough to meet the wants of the Covernment, and let the people keep the balance of their property in their own hands, to be used for their own profit. Each State will then support its own Covernment, and contribute its due share towards the support of the (Jeneral Covernment. There would be no surplus to cramp and lessen the resources of individual wealth and enterprise, and the banks woul J be left to their ordinary means. A hatever agitations and fluctuations inayjrise from our unfortunate paper system, they could ever be attributed, justly or unjustly, to the action of the Federal Covernment. There would be some guaranty that the spirit of wild speculation, which seeks to convert the surplus revenue into banking capital, would be effectually checked, and that the scenes of demoralization which are now so prevalent through the land would disappear. Without desiring to conceal that the experience and observation of the last two years bav e operated a partial change in my v iews upon this interesting subject, it is nevertheless regretted that the suggestion made by me, in my annual message of 182'J and 1N30, have been greatly misunderstood. At that time, the great struggle was begun against the latiludinarian construction of the Constitution which authorises the unlimited appropriation of the revenues of the Union to internal improvements within the States tending to invest in the hands, and place under the control of the Covernment all the principal roads and canals of the country, i l violation of State right, and in derogation of State authority. At the same time, the condition of the manufacturing interest was such as to create an apprehension that the duties on imports could not, without extensive mischief, be reduced i it season to prevent the accumulation of a considerable surplus after the payment of the national debt. In view of the dangers of such a surplus, and in preference to its application to internal improvements in derogation of the ri ght and powers of the state, the suggestion of an amendment of the Constitution to authorise its distribution was made. It was an alternative for what were deemed greater evils a temporary resort to relieve a burdened Treasury, until the Government could, without a sudden and destructive revulsion in the business of the country gradually return to the just principle of raising no more revenue from the people in taxes, than is necessary for its economical support. Even that alternative was not spoken of but in connexion with an amendment of the Constitution. No temporary inconvenience can justify the exercise of a prohibited power, or a power not granted by that instrument; and it was from a conviction that the power to distribute even a temporary surplus of revenue is of that character, that it was suggested only in connexion with an anneal to the sources of all legal power In the (Jeneral Government the States which have established it. No such appeal has been taken, and, in my opinion, a distri bution of the surplus revenue by Congress either to the States or the People, is to be considered among the prohibitions of the Constitution. As already intimated, my views have undergone a change, so far as to be convinced that no alteration of the Constitution m this respect is wise or expedient. The influence of an acenmulatnir surplus upon the legislation ol the (Jeneral Government and the States, its effect upon the credit system of the country. roducmg dangerous exertions and ruin ous contraction, uuctuations in me price of property, rash speculations, idleness, extravagance, and a deterioration of morals, have taught us the important lesson, that any transient mischief which may attend the reduction of our revenue to the wants of our Government is to be borne in preference to an overflowing Teasury. I beg leave to cad vour attention to nnother subject intimately associated with the preceding one the currency of the country. Itis apparent, from tlie whOiO cotiicxt o. the constitution, a well a thf history t:'