Vincennes Gazette, Volume 3, Number 40, Vincennes, Knox County, 8 March 1834 — Page 1

(BMM W 1 JTVMBER 40

TIIR VINC2NNES GAS3T7S,

u l,t!riihtd even Saturday, Terms - ;- 'f the year. i 00, if paid i;i ndvmo e. 00, if not paid during the year. $ 23, tor ?i mitli. Topers diront inued only at t lit option of the publisher while arrearage- rc dtie. y .Ivfrtis'ii; !it uiftkitij: on' squire or less will be inserted three tiaies for one dollar, and twetit -live cut for every s uhsei.pn nt insertion ; 1 mirer advertisements in the s.uiie ratio d verti.-iients sent wit lioit unli'rs will in nil c:i'.-s, be inserted until forbid, and charged accordingly. Such articles of produce, a are Jd m a family, will Ue received in payment for sa'o-cription--, at the market price, delivered in VintCIMHS. Mr. Webster made t!:e follow ing: KEPOitT OF TIIK COMMITTEE OS iT VANCE. Tbo Conmiittpe on Finance, to whom was referred the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, of the 3rd of December, IS3J on the removal of fhe public deposits from the Bank of tin- United States, and a resolution, eubtnitted to The Senate by an honorable member from Kentucky, dc lannc that the reaons as-isrned by the Secretary for the removal of the said "deportee, are unsatisfactory and insufficient, have agreed on the following: report : The act incorporating the Rank of the United State-, as is justly remarked by the Secretary, i- a contract, containing stipulations on 'he part of the corporation, entered into for iu'-l and adequate consideration The Government became party to this contract by granting the charter, and the stockholder by accepting it. ''In consideration." say 9 the charter, "of the ex lu sive privileges and benefits conferred v this act on the said hank, the president and directors thereof shall pa; to the U States, on' of the corporate tunds thereof, one million and five hundred thousand dollars, in three equal payments;11 and, in another section, it declares that "during the continuance of this a t, and whenever required by the Secretary of the Treasuiv. the said corporation sdiall give the necessary facilities lor transferring the public tunds fr- m place to place within the United States or the Terntoties thereof, and for distributing the same in payment of the public creditors, without charging cooimi-in, or claiming allowance on account of difference of exchange; and shall do and per lot m the several are; respective duties of the commissioners ot loans for the several States or any one or mote of then, whenever requited by law " The section immediately following this provision, is in thee words: ind be it further enactetf. That the deposites of the money of the United States, in places in which the said nank and brauches there of mav be established, shall be made in said bank or branches thereof, unless the Secretary of the Treasury -hall at any time otherwise order and direct, in which c;se the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately lay before Congress, if in bessioe, au I if not. immediately after the commencement of the n-xt s -sion, the reason8 ror smu uiuki oi uucmiuu, It is not to be denied or doubted that this custody of the public deposites waone of the ''benefits"1 conferred on the bank by the charter, in consideration of the money paid, and the services undertaken to be performed, by the buik to the Government ; and to this ustody the bank has a jist right, unless such causes, haie arisen as mav h ive justified the Secretary in giving an order and direction tor changing that custody Any order oi direction, therefore, i-sued under the pro visions of this law, necessarily involves a consideration of the just extent of the Secretary's power, and of the rights of the bank. But Congress, in making this provision, unquestionably had in view the safety of the public funds, and certain imoitant financial objects, as well a the miking of a just consideration to the bank tor the sum paid, and the services undertaken ly it: and with this view, also, it has expressed it will, that the deposites shall continue to be made in the. bank until good cau-e shall arise for ordering otherwise. Of this good cause, the Secretary of the Treasury, in the hist instance, and Congress, ultimately and conclusively, i constituted the judge Every order, there fore, of the Secretary for changing the deposites presents, for the examination of Congress, a question of general political propriety and expediency, as well as a question of right and obligation to the bank These questions may be considered together They are intimately connected; because the right ot the bank to retain the deposites, and to enjoy the advantages to be deiived therefrom, cannot be denied unlers a cae i shown to have arisen with in the just power of removal ve-ted in the Secietaiy, and which made it bis duty totxercise that power. The Secretary is only to remove the deposites lor rea sons." Of these reasons he i to give an account to Congress If they be insufficient to justify the removal, the bank has a right to a return of the deposites, and the Country has a right, also, to expect that, io that case, the public trea-ure will be restoied to 1 1 former place of s.Uety The 'secretary having removed the de poshes, and hav:ng reported Lis reasons'

to both House", the whole subject i now before Cot.glts by way of appeal from

hi-decision; and the question is, whether that opinion ought to stand, or ought to be reversed The power of the Secretary, under the law, is evidently hut provisional. It is a power iv Inch he may excrci-e in the fitst instance; hut the propriety of hi conduct, in every instance of it exercise, is ulti mutely rrterred to 'he vidoin of Congress, and h v Congress it must he judged He is authorized' to do the act, lu Congress is to examine it when done, and to confirm or reverse it. The Secretary may change the deposites; hut when changed. Congress is to decide on the cause? of such change, with authority ei'her to sanction the removal, or to restoie the deposites. according to its own judg ment ot right and expediency. In order to decide whether the act of ihe Secretary ought to be confirmed, it is requisite, in the first place, to form a just opinion of the true ex'ent of his power under the law; and. in the second place, t- consider the validity of the reasons which he has specially assigned for the exercise of that power in the present case. The opinion of th' Secretary is, thai his poer over the deposit??, so far a9 re spects the rights of the hank, is not limited to any particular contingencies, hut is absolute and unconditional . If it be absolute and unconditional so tar as respects Ihe rights of the bank, it musl be abso. lufe and unconditional in all respects; because it is obvious if there be any limitation, that limitation is imposed as much tor the benefit of the bank as for the security, of the country The bank has contracted for the keeping of the publir. moneys, and paid tor it, as for a privilege or benefir It ha agreed, at the same time, that the Secretary shall possess the power of ! removal; hut. then, it is also agreed, that j whenever this power is exercispd. the reasons therefor shall be reported to Con grees; Congress being thus constituted the , fiTal judge us well of the rights of the ! hank, in this particular, as of the good ot the country. So that if the Secretary V power be in truth absolute and uncon.

ti nal, it restrains Congress from judging . scribed his duties an'i the committee are whether the public good is it juied by the j of opinion, that the 'barter of the bank no removal, just as much as it restrains it, more intended to give Mich a w ide scope from judging whether the rights of thetothe Secrefan . in regard to the depos bank are injured by the removal; because ! itrs. than other laws intended to give him the limitation, if any, is equally for the j the same w ide scope , in respect to other security of thp lank and of the public I duties of his dhce No intimation d such If the b .nk be interested in retaining the ; intention is tout. d, either in the charter dtposjtes. then it is interestpd in the truth i itself, or iu any of the Legislative or falsity . in the sufficiency or in?uffi ten- bates winch touk pl.c inboih Hou-es cv.of the reason given for their removal, i when the bank was established or io the Especially is it so intere-ted, since these : discu-sions vvnich have been had on l lie reason? are to be rendered to a tribunal ; various occasions which have been more whi h is to judge over the Secretary, and i recently presented for calling forth the

may form a different opinion on the vah dity of these reasons, and may reverse his decision It clearly has an iiderest in retaining the deposites, and therefore is as clearly concerned io the reasons which the Sei retary may give for their removal, j And as he is bound to give reasons, this, very citcumstance shows that his aulho : nty is not absolute and unconditional Hecause, how ran n appeal 1 e eiven from the deciaion of an absolute power; and how can 'uch a power he callen on to give reasons for any instance of its exercise? If it be absolute , its only reason i is a reference to its own will The committee think, therefore, that no absolute and unconditional power was conferred on the Secretary ; that no authority was given him by which he could de priv e the bank of the custody of the public moneys vv ithout reason; and that, there fore, his opinion is not to be admitted ; that in no event can any order for removing the deposites impair the right secured to the bank by the chartei. If removed without good cause, the committee think the removal does impair the lights of the bank I). I the opinion of the Secretary as his own powers, is hardly more limited in respect to the Government and the country, than in regard to tfie rights ot the lank . His opinion is, that it is his duty, and within his authority, in this view, also to withdraw the deposites of the public moi ney from the bank, whenever such a change would, m any degree, promote the public interest. "The safety ot the depo sites," he says, "the ability of the bank to meet its engagements, its fidelity in the performance of its obligations, are only a patt of the considerations by which his judgment must be guided The general interest aud convenience of the peole must tegulate bis conduct " By the geneial interest and convenience ot the people, the Secretary can only mean, of coure, his own sense of that interest aud convenience; because they are not otherwise to be ascertained than by his own judgment. The Secreiary's construction of the law is, therefore, that be lias power to remove ihe deposites, whenever, tor any reason, he thinks the public good requites it. In this interpretation ot the design and obje t ot the law, and i his broad construe ti mi f ihe Secretary's power, the com mittee do not concur. Although ihe power of the Secretary is not restitcted by utii express words or terras, nor by any partt-.ul w occasions tor - its xeicise, especially aud expiessly :e signaled or prtccribed by the law, r t

is not to be admitted, as the committee think, that this power is lo be exercised capriciously, or in an arbitrary manner, or for loose or conjectural reasons, or on any idea I an unlimited discretion, vested id "the Secretary, to judge on the. general question of the public welfare; or, indeed, on any other grounds than those ot necessity, directly connected with Ihe subject over which the power exists. The keeping of the public money is not a matter which is left, or was intended to be left at the will of the Secretary, or any other officer of the government. The public money has a place fixed by law, and settled by contract; and this place is the bank of the U States. In this place it is to remain, until some event occur requiring its removal. To remove it. therefore, from this place, without the occurrence of

I just cause, is to Ihwnrt the end and design ot the law, defeat the will ot congress, and v iolate the contract into which the government has solemnly entered It is fit to be observed, that no other law confers on the Secretary such a wide discretion over the public interests, in regard to any subject, or gives him a power to act on the rights of others or on the rights of the public in part of his oiheial duties, with so unlimited authority as is here asserted. Every where else, he ap pears in the character ot a limited and restricted agent lie is the financial officer of the Government ; he is the head o the Department of the Treasury His duty is to report annually to Congress the state ot the finances, and to communicate to either House, when requested, any information respecting the Treasury; and he is to superintend the collection of the revenue But he has no authority over the circulating medium of the country , either metallic or paper, nor has he the control of the national currency It is no i a part ot bis duty either to contractor expand the circulation of hank paper, nor in any other way to exercise a general i superintendanre over Ihe motjey systeo ot j the country. These general interests of j the government and the people are not confided io hi hands hv any of the laws which created his office, and have pre-, seniiannt of Congress. In none ot these sources, is there to he louod any proo that the Legislature has delegated, or intended to delegate this extraordinary power ot judging ot the geneial interest ol the peopie. to the Secretary oi the Treasury. Such a power, did lie possess n, wount necessarily mke him the genetal super - mtendantot all the proceeding of the bank because u w uid enable bun to compel

the bank to conform all its operations to .astothe propriety of exercising that powhis pleasure, under pen ilty ot sutler nig a ' er ue has power to remove the depo removal of the pubbo moneys, 'l'ii is sites, and amide means are afforded htm

would belittle less thao placing all ih substantial power ot managing the bauk,

tn his hands But he is not by iavv its j tj,, f,IJrpose. it isv express9ly made the dut manager, nor one ol iia manage s - nor0f ,he hank to furnish him, so often a9 he has he any right, in any form, to t:tei fere ; 9,a rfqjre, if not oftener than once a in its management On the contrary, thefpp) vvlh a statement of the amount of very lar. guage of the charter rejects alt lMP cap,tal stock of the corporation, of the idea of -ue h general super i-m.. over usl,jPi,,a due to it, of the moneys deposited concerns bv him, or ..y om-i officer "I ,; it. of its notes in circulation, and specie

Government. That la gu .ge is, thaC 'for the management of the uff airs of the i corporation, tt. en sh .il tie i -veuiy-hve ui-J rectors annually chosen,"' ami, under toe ;

restrictions contained in ihecnaiier, uue!0f ,jie bank, and ot the safety of the puu -

directors are entrusted with the whole toigeneral business, of the hanK, subject, ot o urse, to all the provisions ol the char ter and by laws; subject, tio, always, to the inspection and examination ot tuner House of Congress; subject , always, to re gular inquiry and trial, and bou-oj always to communicate lo the head ol the Tieas ury Department, ofl ra que-t, siaieaients of its arnauntof stock, dents due, au.i in n - eysdeposited,ootes iu ciiculaiiou; auu apt cie on hand . Under the&e restrictions, the establish ment of its office-, and ihe appointme.it ot its officers, ihe amount ot its uisc unis a .u . .1 l.j,.,, j and ever v thins lesnecting those disconi.t, its purchases and sales ot exebaoge, and all other concerns of the iustuu ion, are to be conducted and managed by the di rectors There is nothing in the cuaiter, giving the slightest authority to the Sec retary to decide, as between the banli on the one hand, and the government or the people on the other, whether the general management of the directors is wise or unwise, or whether in regard to matttis not connected with the deposites, it has or has not violated the condition ot us charter The statement which the bank is bound to make to the Secretary, he may lay before Congress ; and he is doubtless hound by his official duly, to communicate to Congress any other information in his possession, tending, in his judgement, lo show that the band had disregarded its charter, or failed to fulfil all or any of its duties But here his authority, so .tar as il regards the general course and opera

tions of the bank. ends. It is then for

congress to act, if it see occasion, and to adopt the regular remedies, for any evils which it may suppose to exist. Hut ... t transcends the power of Congress itself . to pronounce the chat ter violated, without hearing, without trial, without judgement,

far less is any such power of pronouncing! power to direct a legal investigation into final judgment confined to the Secretary, jthe conduct of the bank; how ran it posHis power simply is, that in regard toisibly be maintained tbar a o-eneral ir.snec-

Mie ueposiies oi trie public money, he IS to lUdfire. in the first instance whether just cause has arisen for their removal. The Secretary seems to suppose, indeed the very basis of his argument assumes, that the law ha9 confided to him a gener al guardianship over the i welfare, so far as that welfare is in any way con nected w ith the bank or liable to be affected by its proceedings; and that be holds the power of the removing the deposites

as the means or instrument by which hejserved character. It would convert the is to enforce his own opinions respecting! power of removal, intended for remedy that welfare. The committee do not: and redress, into a mere instrument of adopt this opinion. They think that if ! punishment ; and it would author ize the such had been the design of the law, its , infliction n that punishment without hear provisions would' have been different ing, or trial, in the very case in which from those which it doos actually con j the law yet says, that if violation of duty

lain. If such general guardianship had been

intended to te conferred on the Secretary ;the duty of preferring this charge, and of it is reasonable to believe that he would prosecuting it to judgment, is given, not have been vested with powers more suit- to the Secretary, but to Congress and the able to guch a high trust If he had been j President made, or intended to be made, general. The contingent power given io the Seinspector or superintendent, other author i cretary to remove the deposites e idently it v . than that of removing the deposites, ;shows that Congress contemplated the

would have been given him tor this plain reason, that the Government and the coun try have interests of much magnitude connected with he bank, besides the deposites of the public moneys in its vaults, .-nd to which interests, if endangered, the removal of the deposites would bring no 'security. The Government is proprietor of seven millions of stock of ihe bank; and yet no authority is given to the Secretary to sell this stock under any circumstance, w hatever. or in any other way to interfere with it TIip bills and note" of tbp hank, too, are made receivable in all payments to the IJ. S until Congress shall olherw ise order; and no pow er is given to tfie Secretary to pjevent their being so received, either dining the sesio;, of Congiess, or in its reces. however the credit of these bills and notes might become deprecia;e l How is it posible to conceive that, if Congress intended to give to the Secre tirv a general right to judge of the oper ations and proceedings oTthe bank, and a power, of course, to declare when it had violated its duty, and was no longer trusiworthy, it should y et leave him under an absolute obligation to receive its bills and t,,es in all payments to the Treasury, though they might have lost all credit. an(j place no means in his hands to exe rutp high authority of superintendent, except the mere power of removal ; Wherever it is clear that Congress has gven the Secretary a power, it lias given , xlrQ ,j,P means of informing his judgment bv which he may learn, from time :o time, whether those depositee are safe. For on i,,,,,, and he has a right to inspecl the general accounts, in the books of the bank, reating to this statement . This euables mrn t) judge of the solvency and stability

lie money deposited in it Here, then,! ercise ot a power, the very exeruon oi is a power, and all appiopriate means giv-j which deranges the currency, interferes en for the just and enlightened exercise! with the industry of the people, and, of that power. Confined to the deposites,; under some circumstances, would hatho power is accompanied with all ration- ,zard the safety of the whole revenue? al aux.liaries and attendants. The committee think it cannot admit ot Hut for the depreciation of the bills of; rational doubt, that if Congress had intenthe bank, should th at happen, and for ded to give to the Secretary any power

other cases of maladministration, congress, Las nrovided just and appropriate reme -

dies to be applied by itself or others, in specially pointed out me cases, nut ic exclusion of the Secretary. For redress would also, most assuredly, have providoi these evils, no power is given to him. d remedy more suitable for each case. For the security of the public interest, The nature ot the remedy, therefore, he law reserves a right to either House which is prescribed, clearly shows ii . ' L n t 1 .t rt f r s4 i si r. Ln .refill k

nf f nntrrPia to innoirp at a 1 times. llllO I ot or'gre!iS io inquire, ai ui mur, me proceedings oi irie uui, .tuu .., (such inquiry, it appears in any respect to, have v iolated its charter, congress may

bring it lo trial and judgment. Power is era interest and convenience of the peogiven to the President also, to institute pe iS to acknowledge the existence, in i I : C I. 1. . 1 1 I , a . . . i i .J

judicious proceeamgs, u fuaii reason to believe that any sucn vioiauon Ins taken place. liut no such power is given to the secretary .

The proposition, then, cannot be main powers and capacities, perhaps its very tained,that congress has relied, for the existence, to his individual will. He is of security of the public interests, and the opinion that the law creating it is, m ma, preservation of the general welfare, so'ny of its provisions, unconstitutional; he far as it is connected with the bank, on a may not unnaturally, therefore, esteem it general discretion, reposed in the Secreta- to be his duty to restrain and obstruct, to ry; for two reasoos, first, becau-e it has, the utmost of his power, the operation of in 'those instances, either expressly reser- those provisions thus deemed by him lob ved those powers to itself, or expressly unconstitutional. He is of opinion lhat conferred them on the President. Uhe exigence of such a powerful moneyed If the Secretary cannot present the monopoly lsdangeious to the liberties ot notes of the bank from beiag received at Ihe people. It would result Iro n thin the cu-tom house, and thelauJ officer, that if, in the discharge of hi official du-

even after they should be discredited; if

he have no power to touch, in any way, the seven millions of stock belonging to the Government; if the power c.f exatmnation into the proceed ing of the bank be given, not to him, but to either house of Congress and the President, each has tion and guardianship over the public weliare, so lar as it is connected with the bank, is confided to him, and that his authority to remove the deposites. was given, not to protect the deposites themselves, .and secure their proper use. but to enable him to enforce upon the bank, under pen alty of their removal, such course of management, as his sense of the public interest, and the convenience of the people may require? Such a construction would give the law a strange and uodebe charged, the charge shall be heard and tried before judgment is pronounced, and pos-miniy ui iiik Happening in some hjo den evil for which either no other remedy was provided, or none which could be applied with sufficient promptitude ; and for which evil removal would be a just and appropriate remedy The remedy prescribed, then teaches us the naturpof the evils which were apprehended We cao readily understand that threatened danger to the funds was one, and probably the chief of those evils; because change into other hand is the ready and appropriate measure which would rationally suggest it self to all minds as the proper secuntv against such danger; and change is the rem edy actually prescribed. Neglect to transfer the deposits from one place to another, as the exigencies o( Government might re quire, and thereby to furnish those facili ties ot exchange which the charter demands of the bank without commission and without charge, is another evil for which should it happen, the remedy would naturally be the withdrawing of the funda and the placing of them in their former custody, so that they could be transferred or exchanged by the Treasury itself. Put who can see any connexion or relation, such as ordinarily exists between an evil apprehended and a remedy proposed between such an evil as a supposed over discount, for instance, by the bank at one time, or an under-rliscount at another, and the abrupt removal of all the public deposttps? And if no one can see the connexion, how can it be supposed that, in giving the power of removal as a rerjkedv. Congress had iu view auv such evil? A question may arise between the Gov. ernment and the bank respecting the right of the parties to the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, as in fhe case of the French bill It is a question on which different opinions may fie entertained, and which is, in its nature, fit for judicial decision. Does any man imagine that such a case as this was in the eye of Congress when they granted the power of withdrawing the j w hole public treasure from the bankx i Can it be for one moment maintained, that Congress intended that, in such a j case, the Secretary should compel the ,banK to adopt his own opinion, oy m- ex - . . c wnatever, not uuecuy lo...,.. n.c ..epo- ' sites themselves, not only would it have .. me cms luiruucu iu uc i ' i u iucu u. - ( & f0 admit that the Secretary's conduct to no control but his own sense of the grnhis hands, oi a discretion so nroao ano uu jmie(jt that its consequences can u-j no eg9 than to subject, not only all the oj eraitions ot the bank and its owe-, oui 113