Semi-Weekly Journal, Volume 3, Number 253, Indianapolis, Marion County, 11 September 1841 — Page 1

BY DOUGLASS & NOEL.

INDIANAPOLIS, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, ,1841,

VOL. 3. NO. 253.

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SPEECH OF Mr. WHITE, OF INDIANA, On the passage of the Bill "to incorporate tU subscribers to the Fiscal Bank of the United States," in Senate, July 23, 1941.

Mr. WHITE said: This bill having yesterday, on the motion of the Senator from Kentucky, (Mr. Clay,) undergone what in the estimation of some is a new aspect, it may not be inappropriate to accompany my vote with'a few words of explanation. The apparent necessity for such explanation is augmented by the fact, that I, in conjunction with a large majority of the Senate, opposed the amendment heretofore moved by the Senator from Virginia, (Mr. Rives,) making the location of the branches dependent on the will of the States, while I have felt it my duty to sustain the amendment proposed hv the Senator from Kentucky

in relation to the branching power. It is no pari of my purpose to vindicate my own consistency of conduct. That, in reference to so humble a member as myself, cau be a matter of but little consequence, and for the purity of my intentions I am willing to be judged by my constituents. But, as a component member of this high legislative tribunal, charged with the decision of one of the most important questions which can agitate our councils, it is due to the interests so deeply involved, and to the people for whose benefits they inure to maintain the integrity c.f that question, and to save from reproach or cavil in future times the power on which, and on which alone, it reposes. It is for the question then, and its consequences, that I desire, by way of caveat, to interpose a few remarks of contemporaneous exposition to the vote which I gave yesterday for the amendment of ithe Senator from Kentucky, and to that which I expect to give to-day in favor of the passage of the bill so amended. Under no circumstances, Mr. President, could I

(have consented willingly to have voted for the amendment of the Senator from Virginia. The bill, as you know, proposes the location of the parent bank in the District of Columbia. Scarcely one of the purposes for which the bank is incorporated could be subserved by an institution thus organized and thus located, without the aid of branches distributed through various parts of the Union. Such a bank could not be a "necessary," as it certainly would not be a "proper," means to enable Congress to carry into effect any of the granted powers named in the Constitution meaning of course for national purposes. Deprived of branches, the bank would be like Briareus without his arms; " for, like the fabled son of Titan, its entire etrenglh and capacity lie in those members. From which alone it would follow, that if Congress have power to create a National Bank in the District of Columbia, they have power to create branches, and the resulting consequence is equally plain, that if they have not powerto establish branches, they have no power to create a bank. This is the reasonable and common-sense interpretation of the Constitution; and whenever that instrument has conferred a power upon Congress, it has conferred it to be employed when and where the exigency may demand. Not more exclusive is the admiralty jurisdiction of this Government in 'matters occurring upon the high seas, than its domestic jurisdiction upon the theatre of any State as to all trusts committed to its peculiar care, one of which by a very general recognition (perhaps not. hv that of the Senator from Virginia) is the admin

istration of the public finances and the regu;ation of

the currency, through the instrumentality, it necessary, of a National Bank. To deny it the occupancy of a State, or, in legal phrase, the locus in quo, for the display of this faculty; is a deprivation of the faculty itself, anda most incomprehensible abstraction, if the faculty in any case is conceded. It is Arch imedf.s without his fulcrum.

Such a paralysis as I his would the amendment of

the Senator from Virginia, if adopted, nave miposeu upon the energies of this Government. The existence, the life of the bank would, in such case, have, been made to depend entirely upon the will of the States. The institution must have been deemed to "" spring from State authority as much as in the case, supposed by the same Senator, of the location within a State of a branch or agency of some transatlantic bank. You may imprison a bank within the District of Columbia, but its free energies depend upon the sovereign grace of the States to open the prison doors! Congress may shape the mass, but wtthout the incubation of the States it is to remain lifeless and inert! Why do you assume the appointment, wholly by Federal authority, of the officers who are to manage the institution? and why do you not. ask the States to ratify the penalsections of the bill!

This doctrine may suit gentlemen who deny to the Federal Government, within its proper sphere, the

attribute of sovereignty. It does not accord with my theory, believing that our national flag represents a sovereign People, and that a Government clothed with

the functions of war and peace, with the power of

taxation and of capital punishment, must, in its na

ture and within the circle prescribed for its action, be sovereign. My definition of sovereignty in a State is

not the possession of all power, but of the highest and paramount power within the sphere of its agency.

In voting against the amendment of the Senator from Virginia, I did not so much apprehend inconve

nience in the practical workings of the bank, as 1 dreaded voluntarily to inflict a wound upon our own

authority which might disable us hereafter from its

exercise when most required. It could not be supposed that many of the States would reject the offered branch. Upon the national theatre, politicians may

denounce the institution as dangerous to liberty, but

when it comes to the question of appropriating its ben

efits at home, few would be so hardy as to offer up their own people victims upon the altar of a pretend

ing patriotism. Although that amendment would

have changed the character of the institution trom a National to a State creation, I did not fear that even

thus constituted it would not answer the objects con

templated. Not, however, wiih the same certainty,

or to the same extent, or with the same authoritative

.guaranties. My chief objection was, that the Con

stitution had not so ordained, and that such a course

on such a question was a dangerous departure from the usages of the Federal Government, and a virtaal divesture of a faculty with which, by our organic

law, Congress, for great and needful purposes, had

undoubtedly been domed.

Upon this subject, for the purpose of being under stood, a little more particularity may be necessary. When it is said that (he proposed plan was a surrender by the General Government of its power over the subject, the appropriate idea is not conveyed. A surrender implies the relinquishment, of a trust, an authority, or an interest, to some adverse claimant, or to some superior power; generally, it is made to the power from whom the right was derived. Now, the States can, in no sense, be considered adverse claimants to the General Government. Neither did this Government derive any of its powers from the States. Many of those powers, once enjoyed by the States, it is true, now belong to the Federal Government, either exclusively or concurrently, but they were derived by a grant from the people of the States in general convention assembled, nnd not by investiture from the States in their distinct corporate capacity. And the self-same instrument which created the powers has prescribed the mode, and theon!y mode, in which thev mav be diminished, enlarged, or surrendered.

If, then, which I can by no means admit, I am mistaken in the theory of the Federal Constitution, I am at

least secure in the position that there is but one way in which the States can reclaim tbe powers which

they parted with at the date of the Constitution. No non-user of any of its functions by this Government; no conditional employment of those functions; not

even a direct concession in the ordinary rorms or law can, so far as the States or the constituency of the Federal Government are concerned, be deemed to impair any of its constitutional rights or obligations, or be regarded as a surrender of those powers which the Constitution, while it lasts, has made perpetual. Surely, to every lover of the Union, this theory of our Government must be more acceptable than its cold and foreign counterpart, which makes the States the antagonists of the Union, and the Union the selfish rival of the States, each watching for advantages from the other, and greedy to secure, with cormorant appetite and with hostile spirit, whatever it may have left unappropriated or undefended. This then was not the consequence to be apprehended from the motion of the Senator from Virginia. But, to any one acquainted with the working of our system, we need not go far to learn in what the real danger consisted. I come nearest to the expression of my views on this subject when I say, that' the adoption of that amendment would, on the part of the friends of a National Bank, have been a disclaimer of

our competency to create such an institution, and an

abandonment of ground which we shall by-and-by see there were tenants ready enough to occupy for a very different purpose. Although a generous harmony

prevails (and long may itlast!j between the btat.es ana the Federal Government, there exist in. the Mosaic

structure of both elements of adverse and hetrogeneous tendency. These are the two great parties that divide the country, each struggling for empire and ascendency, and yet the preservation of either dependent upon the integrity of our system and the inviolability of both the State and Federal Constitutions. The principles of action which control the respective

parties are of necessity opposite ana antagonisticai. Tho hnnds of one cannot be weakened without an in

crease of strength to the ofiier. What may have been in former times the distinctive points of controversy between them, it is needless to inquire. Suffice it

that now, and for some years past, a cardinal matter in issue has been the question of a National Bank. And it is apropes to mv argument to state, that this

question, stretching beyond the mere inquiry of policy or expediency, involves the discussion of constitu

tional doctrine. It is obvious tnen tnat tne party espousing the principle friendly to the existence of a bank, especially when it is in the ascendant and clothed with the responsibilities of power, by a voluntary concession of the inability of Congress to execute that particular measure, .does to a certain extent weaken its capacity to enforce that measure thereafter, if the capacity be not entirely destroyed. It is the same thing to annihilate a power as to place it in hands that will not employ it, and if we, who have the will and the conscience to employ an instrument of this kind in the administration of our finances, suffer a voluntary estoppel, the power tocharter a National Bank might as well be stricken from the Constitution as to be placed at the mercy of our- political adversaries, who will refuse its exercise or deny its existence. In a Government of opinion like ours, habitual usage is the chief exponent of the Constitution, and legislative construction is an important element of such usage. Upi'ithis foundation does the bank question now principally' repoe it has been so recognized by the Judiciary, and the people have confirmed the foundations which their Legislature have laid. It remains to inquire whether the amendment of the Senator from Virginia does not ap this foundation, and give ascendency to the opinions of that party which denies the existence of the banking power. ; That amendment makes the efficacy of the charter, or all that is valuable in it, to depend entirely and absolutely upon the ratification of the States. The act of Congress is a dead letter, unless it is adopted and re-enacted by the several State legislatures. We must not forget too that this is in a matter vital to the action of this Government, and, as I have upon a former occasion said, in a matter of high preroga

tive; for in all Governments the administration of

their finances, the disbursement ot their revenues, are as much matter of prerogative as the taxing power itself. And viewed in its other aspect, as a regulation of the commerce and currency of the country, it is surely entitled to this character. If there be any one subject upon which the Government would be supposed to rely upon its own inherent powers, this is the one. Its welfare, nay, its very existence may in the course of events depend upon the unobstructed exercise of that power. Now it is in vain to say that this is a mere partial exercise of an undisputed power; and that the Government only refrains to do all that it might do. The law has not that seeming, but by its very terms implies that Congress has exhausted all its capabilities in the premises. It is an act whose sanctions and authority aro conditional an act not for the benefit of the States as such, but which, being for tbe benefit of the common Union, waits upon the several States for their acceptance and seal. It is nugatory without such acceptance, and if refused, then, by the construction of those who contend that it is only a partial exercise of power the residue of which is withheld, Congress has done a vain thing. If this is not a waiver or disclaimer of the question, to be availed of by those who deny the right, I am at a loss to state a case which would amount to it. If it be not such, then precedent and usage have lost their virtue, and the parodox is proved that the sanctions of a written constitution are not impaired by any legislation, no matter how variable or incongruous, and that public opinion was ex

pressed in the representative body affords no rule of

construction. It an minds were one mind, tnere might be some philosophy in such a view, but while we differ in our construction of the Constitution, let

those of us who think we read it right be careful how we abolish the ancient landmarks. ... Having made this exposition of an amendment to my mind altogether disallowable, I have now only to review, as briefly as I can, the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky, Jwhich. was . adopted yesterday by the aid of my vote. That amendment is in . these words; ; "The directors of said corporation shall establish one Competent office of discount and deposite in any State in which two thousand shares shall have been subscribed or may be held, whenever, upon application of the Legislature of such State, Congress may by law require the same. And the said directors may also establish one or more competent o-ffices of discount and deposite in any Territory or district of the United States, and in any State, with the assentof such State; and, when established, the said office or offices shall be only withdrawn or removed by the said directors, prior to the expiration of this charter, with the previous assent of Congress: Provided, in respect to any State which shall not, at the first session of the Legislature thereof held after the passage of this act, by resolution or other usual legislative proceeding, unconditionally assent or dissent to the establishment of such office or offices within it, such assent of the said State shall be. thereafter presumed. JLnd provided nevertheless, That whenever it shall become necessary and proper, for carrvinff into execution anv of the powers eranted by the

Constitution, to establish an office or offices in any of the States whatever, and the establishment thereof shall be directed by law, it shall be the duty of the said directors to establish such office or offices accordingly." Applying to this provision the tests which I have already mentioned, it will not require much additional argument to show that while it saves the bank question, it also avoids to trench upon State rights, and meets the scruples of those who think that Congress upon this subject ought to await the happening of such a necessity as is contemplated in the Consti

tution. In a word, it is the true middle ground of

compromise, worthy of a generous and sacrificing party, who are alike tender of the Constitution, and at the same time careful to preserve the Union and all its benefits. Of course I do not expect to make it satisfactory to those who deny the right, under any circumstances, to create a bank by authority of Congress. If there be any such, against them am I defending. Upon this subject 1 recognize but two parties in the country the one I have iust character

ized; the other is the party favorable to a bank, either as an ordinary and necessary consequence of the Constitution, flowing at all times, (to which division I belong,) or which may spring into existence oijly upon the happening of some exigent necessity, to be made apparent by matter of fact. And here I must be allowed to dissent from the Senator from Virginia in the construction which he gives to the opinions of the late President (Gen. Harrison) and of his successor, the present Chief Magistrate, as published to the world during the recent canvass. When he claims that those distinguished citizens agree with bim that a bank cinnot be chartered with branches without bringing State authority to the aid of Congress, I deny thai they have furnished evidence of any such opinion. Putting their judgments upon the same platform, both refer to the banking power as an attribute of the Federal Government, without the least reference to the aids, of Slate legislation. And the ony difference between their theories and the current doctrine of the Whig party is, that while both regard the Federal Constitution as encompassing all tbe requisite authority, the citizens whoeo names I have introduced, with that guarded caution proper to save their opinions from misconstruction and abuse, have asserted the obligation on the part of Congress of a qualified exercise of the power. That is to say, that the power resides completely in the fundamental law, but it can only be called into use under a certain position of our public affairs. That a National Bank cannot be arbitrarily and at pleasure created, but must be the offspring of a well-defined necessity, and the executor of offices that could not be appropriately discharged by any other lawful agency. In this declarations' of opinions the present Executive in his Henrico letter, and General Harrison in his Dayton speech, are in perfect accordance with each other. And I submit as a necessary consequence from doctrines thus promulged, that Congress must be the judge of the existence of such necessity, and must, when the occasion arises, be invested with a power not limited by the will or concurrence of the States. The Senator from Virginia,, in the opinions he has proclaimed, has not come to this standard, and has no right, therefore, to mete out his own measure either to the present or the past Executive. Who does not see that the bill as now framed has refused rashly to obtrude this institution within the limits pf the States but, while it argues our first impressions of the arrival of the exigency which should give it birth, has called to our aid the judgments of the States to determine of that fact' Upon this point no higher evidence can be furnished than the consentaneous opinions, of the legislative departments pf both Governments, especially ' when aided by that other test laid down by General Harrison, the expressed will of the People. It is true that Congress has defined the mode, or rather the time, in which this expression i to be had from the States. But is it not reasonable both as to time and model Will the public service intended to be promoted, wail a more deliberate response? Or, if Congress can set no limits to this thing, will that public service wait forever? Is not the task before us a practical duty, to which efficiency is to be given, and which must in a reasonable timt he consummated? We consult with the States in a matter interesting to our common constituency, but in which it is our duty, not the States, to bestir ourselves. Surely it is no arrogance in us to fix the preliminaries of that consultation. '- This is the length and breadth of the enactment, and it is eminently deferential to the State authority. But suppose that, by the non-concurrence of the States or any other cause, the ends of our Constitution are likely to be defeated, that the public service should suffer great and irreparable disparagement, or that a casus faderis should arise making it proper for us to exert any of our extreme and legitimate energies, then by thedeclaritory proviso in yesterdays amendment we have kept ourselves in a position to do what the Constitution requires. And it is the union of this declaration with what may properly be termed the enactment of the hw, and this alone, that has reconciled me to this amendment. It is this union of a reserved principle (w hicb amounts to nothing unless it is already found in the Constitution) with a qualified enactment, that constitutes the true essense of the compromise before referred to, and enables all who are in any sense the friends of a bank to unite in this measure. We, who favor an unconditiona. law, submit to this qualified enactment in deference to the opinions of our more scrupulous friends; and to guard raint the disclaimer which I have before explained, equally injurious tons both, we ask only a reservation of rights in the words of the Constitution. For

all the purpose? of the law, either as; to its authority or its execution, it is the same with or without this , reservation. The proviso neither limits nor extends the future power of Congress, nor adds one feature to the present bill, but simply excludes a conclusion to be urged against us hereafter by political opponents' , quoting legislative precedent and the usages of a do"minant majority in Congress. I know of But one class of politicians who can object to this proviso. It is our watchful and unrelenting opponents, who by the' same arguments which they bring against a National Bank would overthrow the entire banking and credit system of the country, to give us a succedanewn, I know not what, but which,, from the exhibition they have heretofore made of financial skill, I would glad' ly be spared the labor of learning. , Although I do not hold myself responsible for the opinions cf those who, admitting the competency of Congress to charter a National Bank, do, neveethe- . less,' rest the constitutionality of the act upon the happening of such ntcessity as I have before described, yet I think I may safely undertake the gratuitous labor of defending those opinions against the raillery of the Senator from Virginia. That learned Senator scouts a theory which, deriving a power of Congress from a necessity that may exist to-day and cease tomorrow, bends the Constitution to every fluctuating purpose, the occasion for which may expire before that purpose is executed. He objects to stretching the Constitution like India rubber to meet each variable ephemeral exigency, but contends that we must look for every power in the permanent and durable provisions of our fundamental law, and as flowing plainly from the terms of the Constitution itself. It is enough for me, in refutation of this criticism, as it affects no doctrines of mine, to retort upon the Senator from Virginia principles recognized by the school to which he belongs. Gentlemen of that school are opposed to a protective tariff as a violation of that Constitution, Congress, they say, exceeds its powers when it raises one cent of revenue beyond what is needed for the service of the Government. The power to levy taxes and to lay duties and imposts is given in the Constitution without condition or qualification, yet Congress must measure its action by an inquiry into the necessities of the Government for revenue. This standard is perpetually subject to fluctuation, and the laws of to-day may raise an unconsti

tutional amount of revenue to-morrow. If, then, tne question of the mere quantum of revenue may determine the legality of the acts of Congress, how much greater show of reason have they who allow an apparent exigency and necessity to control them in the adoption of a specific measure for the administration of the public finances. In every department of life, and not less in governmental affairs,, the occasion determines the fitness and propriety of the act. It ft, indeed, the great arbiter of morality and right. Circumstances, ever-changing and fleeting as they are, control all human conduct. The ends of our action must be defined in the fundamental law. It is a rational object of inquiry whether the means we are about to adopt are appropriate to their accomplishment.The Fiscal Bank of the United States claims only to bean agent, and it is accredited by the Constitution, if the object for which it is created is clearly recognized in that instrument. . . .i I confess, Mr. President, that 1 would have preferred a bill in this respect after the ancient forms. The. bill as reported by the Committee on the Currency was much more acceptable to my taste than as it is now fashioned.' I Was late, very late, in getting my own consent to the amendment. I disliked it because of its complication, and because it was to . a certain extent incompatible, with the simplicity, with the conclusiveness, and, permit me to add, with the dignity which I think ought always to . characterize our acts of legislation But in this many-headed Government of ours, where free and conflicting opinions have to be brought together, we, cannot always speak in the nervous and direct language which royalty adopts. I am willing to sacrifice the shadow for the substance, and will not stickle upon forms and modes, to save so important a subject from utter loss and destruction. In this spirit of concession, and to accomplish so much good as this measure involves, I have relinquished personal preferences and gone to the verge of putting at hazard the ascendancy of the bank question whenitshall hereafter be disputed. ' In its present modified form, it will commend itself to the acceptance of all who are not irreconcilably inimical to a National Bank; and having placed it upon that basis, I have done my duty, and have cleared my skirts from reproach, if in the end, this cherished measure of the Whigs shall be destined to defeat. With this protestation I am now ready to vote for the passage of the bill. . : 1 The "Wakulla," one of the remarkable curiosities of Middle Florida, is described by a writer in the Knickerbocker. , After passing through marshes and wet hammocks, the visiting party at length reached the river, and embarked in a boat upon its waters. He then goes on to say: . ! , i "Picture to yourself a river leaping out of the earth at a single bound, and running off like mad in a current a quarter of a mile wide, and at tbe rate of four knots an hour! And although your imaginary painting will come far short of the real scene, yet it will excite in you something of the wonder with which one actually beholds the Wakulla.1 "Our first sensations, when we shot out from the reeds and bushes which skirt the margin, were those of great dizziness. The water is so pure and clear that we felt suspended in the sir, and clung1 to the boat very much as we may suppose an aeronaut finds himself clinging when in his sublimist flights. The air above you is scarcely more transparent thari the water below; the thin shadows of tbe cloud are thrown a hundred feet below you, and spread, out at the bottom of the spring; and the image of your boat is carried down with perfect fidelity, and, with its oars, and rudder, looks like some huge animal crawling with outstretched legs along the ground. The modest fishes have no sort of privacy; and what is worse for them, though better for the fishermen, they bare no 6afety. You can watch the hook as it sinks, and can accurately place the tempting bait within an inch 4 of the abstracted and innocent nose. The smallest silver coin is perceptible at the very bottom, and some say that the date of the com is descernible, but that did not see. "The aperture through which the river rises is about fifty feet in diameter, the sides being formed of rough and jagged edges of limestone. It is supposed that the water comes in under these rocks from the noith, and some think that it is the outlet of Lake Jackson, a large body of water that lies about twenty miles to the north. Nothing was certainly to be determined by an examination at superficial as was

ours, lhe shadows cast by the rocus were too deep

to be pierced by the eye, and all that we could make

of it was a well, about fifty feet in diameter and a

hundred and twenty in depth, pouring forth a flood of the purest water that ever blessed my eyes."