Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 34, Number 32, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 20 December 1901 — SCHLEY IS BLAMED. [ARTICLE]

SCHLEY IS BLAMED.

Dewey, However, Gives Him Credit for Great Victory. NA VALCOURT REPORT Censure Is for Vacillation, Dilatoriness, and Lack of Enterprise. Formal Finding in Inquiry Is Against the Rear Admiral on Practically Every Point - Cervera’s Fleet Destroyed by the Man on the Brooklyn, According to Declaration of Conqueror of Montejo—No Glory Is Given to Sampson. The findings of the Schley court of inquiry were made public at the Navy Department in Washington Friday evening. Rear Admiral Schley comes out of the affair convicted on almost every count of the precept by a majority of the court, but coupled with this sweeping condemnation is a remarkable and individual eulogy by Admiral George Dewey, in which the hero of Manila declares that Schley was in sole command at Santiago and that he is entitled to the glory of that splendid victory. Admiral Dewey, however, coincides with the court in the belief that in many things before the battle Schley was blamable, but he differs with the court on a number of points. Technically speaking, Schley is officially condemned by a court of his brother officers, but they themselves recommend that owing to the time which has elapsed there should be no further proceedings in the matter. There is no appeal from the finding of the court, and Rear Admiral Schley must be content to let it stand as it is so far as the Navy Department is concerned. Although the court’s findings are adverse to Admiral Schley, his friends take much comfort from the individual opinion expressed by Admiral Dewey. The court has reached the conclusion which most naval officers and careful students of the case had expected it to reach —namely, that while in independent command Commodore Schley’s conduct was disappointing to the government and to his superiors, but that in the battle of Santiago he gallantly improved the opportunity to atone for whatever mistakes he may previously have made. The findings of the court are in brief as follows: 1. That Commodore (now admiral) Schley should have proceeded with utmost dispatch to Cienfuegos. 2. That he should have made greater efforts to learn if the Spanish squadron was in that port. 3. That he should have proceeded with all dispatch to Santiago and made a more effective disposition of his vessels. 4. That he should not have delayed his squadron for the Eagle (gunboat). 5. That he should not have made the retrograde movement westward. 6. That he should have promptly obeyed the orders of the department to go to Santiago. 7. That the flying squadron had a large supply of coal, enough to blockade from five to six days, that to fill all the bunkers would have required 2,700 tons, that he had 4,500 tons in his colliers and that conditions of wind, sea and weather were favorable to coaling from a collier. 8. That Commodore Schley made no effort to ascertain if the Spanish squadron was in Santiago, and left that port entirely unguarded for twenty-three hours, and guarded only by scouts for twenty-five hours more. 9. That he did not do his utmost to destroy the Colon. 10. That the turn of the Brooklyn in the battle, though made to escape dangerous proximity to the enemy, did cause the Brooklyn to lose distance and position and did cause the Texas to stop and back to avoid collision. 11. That Admiral Schley*did injustice to -Lieutenant Commander Hodgson in not publishing all the correspondence between them. 12. That Commodore Schley’s conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign was characterized by “vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise.” 13. That his official reports “were inaccurate and misleading.” 14. That “his conduct in the battle was self-possessed, and he encouraged in his own person his subordinate officers and men to fight courageously.” Admiral Dewey, in his individual statement, says Commodore Schley did go from Key West to Cienfuegos with all possible dispatch, having in view the saving of coal; that he did maintain an effective blockade there, and later at Santiago; that he could not have made better speed to Santiago and kept his squadron as a unit; and finally, that he was in command in the battle and entitled to the credit of the victory.