Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 34, Number 20, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 8 November 1901 — THE CASE OF SCHLEY [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

THE CASE OF SCHLEY

Comprehensive Review of the Naval Inquiry.

DMIRAL Schley’s immediate cause for requesting the appointment of a court of inquiry tor investigate his actions in the Span-ish-American war was the publication during the last summer of the third volume of Edgar S. Maclay’s “History of the United States

Navy,” dealing with the events of the war of 1898. Maclay, himself an employe of the Navy Department, was understood to have had the sanction of some of the high naval officers in his work. His history contained various bitter attacks on Admiral Schley. These attacks led Schley to request of the Secretary of the Navy an investigation by a ffirial court of his conduct during the war. The request was granted, and Admiral Dewey, president; Admirals' Benham and Howison were named as the members of the court. When the court met, on Sept. 12, Admiral Schley challenged the competency of Admiral HowiBon on the ground that the admiral had shown prejudice against him. The challenge was allowed and the court adjourned. Admiral Ramsay was selected by the Navy Department to fill the vacancy and the court reassembled in Washington Sept. 20. Under the direction of Capt. Lemly, judge advocate general of the navy, the examination of witnesses was begun, with a view to establishing the,facts relative to ten points contained in a precept drawn up by the Navy Department. The first paragraph instructs the court to inquire generally into the conduct of Schley during the campaign. The second paragraph deals with the blockade of Cienfuegos and the third with the progress of the flying squadron to Santiago after it was discovered that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos. The fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs deal with the retrograde movement, the conditions for coaling and the question as to whether or not Schley disobeyed orders by starting away from Santiago to return to Key West. The seventh paragraph relates to Schley’s failure to destroy the Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon when it lay nt the mouth of Santiago harbor. The eighth paragraph relates to the allegation that Schley withdrew his squadron from in front of Santiago at night. The ninth paragraph deals with the celebrated loop made by the Brooklyn during the battle with Cervera’s fleet. The tenth paragraph relates to the alleged colloquy with Lieut. Hodgson about the Texas while the loop was being made. Judge Jere Wilson, leading counsel for Admiral Schley, died suddenly soon after the investigation began, since which time ex-Oongressmnn Rayner of Maryland has conducted his case. The testimony has shown that on May 19 Admiral Schley left Ivey West with the flying squadron for the Caribbean, with instructions to find the Spanish fleet, then supposed to be at Cienfuegos. On that day, however, the Spanish fleet entered Santiago harbor, where it remained until it emerged on July 3 and was at once attacked and destroyed. The flying squadron arrived at Cienfuegos at midnight, May 21. Forty miles from Cienfuegos guns were heard, and Admiral Schley believed these to be a salute in honor of the arrival of the Spanish fleet. So the flying squadron began a blockade of the harbor. Red signal lights were seen on shore, but no one in the fleet knew what they meant. However, Capt. McCalla of the Marblehead, who had established a system of signals with the Cuban insurgents, arrived from sLey West on May 24 and immediately communicated with the insurgents, learning that the Spanish fleet was not in the harbor. Before that time Schley had received various messages indicating that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago. This information came to Sampson from a telegraph operator at Havana who could communicate with the American authorities for a few minutes every evening about C o’clock. He had forwarded promptly the news of the arrival of Cervera’s fleet, so that this was known at Key West on the evening of May 20. However, on the same date Sampson wrote a letter to Schley in which he said, referring to a telegram from the Navy Department advising him to instruct Schley to proceed to Santiago:

"After duly considering this telegram I have decided to make no change In the present plans; that Is, thaterem should hold your squadron off Clenfuegos. If the Spanish ships have put Into Santiago they must come either to Havana or Clenfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use In Cuba. I am, therefore, of the opinion that our best chances of success In capturing their ships will be to hold the two /points, Clenfuegos and Havana, with all the force we can muster. If later It should develop that these vessels are at Santiago we could then assemble off that port the ships best suited for the purpose, and completely blockade it. Until we then receive more positive Information we shall continue to hold Havana and Santiago.” On the evening of May 24 Schley started for Santiago with his fleet. On the morning of May 23 he had received a communication from Admiral Sampson by the Hawk directing him "if satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos to proceed with all dispatch to Santiago.” Lieut. John Hood, commanding the Hawk, testified that when he delivered the message Schley Baid ho could not go to Santiago, as he was not satisfied that the Spaniards were not in Cienfuegos, and besides his ships needed coal. The fleet came into contact with the American scout ships abont twenty miles south of Santiago ou May 2*l. Much testimony was introduced in regard to the slowness of this trip and the state of the weather. That the weather was bad was generally agreed, though many witnesses declared, in opposition to other witnesses, that the ships might have been coaled. Schley said that he had taken a course ao far south of Santiago because it had

been expected that as soon as it was announced by the Spaniards that he had left Cienfuegos the Spanish fleet would leave the harbor at Santiago and try to slip past to the south and reach Cienfuegos. Therefore he had gone to the southward to secure a wide horizon. The scouts at Santiago had given him no information regarding the Spanish fleet, Capt. Sigsbee of the St. Paul having gone on board to tell him that nothing had been seen of the Spaniards. Capt. W. C. Wise of the Yale, who was the senior officer of the scout ships, had been informed by a dispatch from the Navy Department that the Spaniards were in the harbor of Santiago, but he had not given the information Jo Schley, though he did give it to Capt. Philip of the Texas. As there was no news for him there regarding the enemy, and as the weather, in his opinion, was too rough to coal at sea, Schley started back to Key West on the 26th, sending to the Navy Department this dispatch: -. “Received dispatch of May 26 by Harvard off Santiago de Cuba. Merrimac’s engine Is disabled and she is helpless; am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely unable to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen and Brooklyn from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West. Brooklyn is the only one In squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago In present state of coal, account of the squadron. Not possible to coal to leeward off Cape Cruz In summer, owing to southwest winds. Harvard Just reports to me she has only coal enough to reach Jamaica, and she will proceed to Port Royal; also reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole Haiti. Minneapolis has only coal enough to reach Key West, and same of Yale, which will tow Merrlmac. “It Is to be regretted that the department's orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West, via Yucatan channel, for coal. Can ascertain nothing concerning the enemy. Was obliged to send Eagle to Port Antonio, Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only twenty-seven tons of coal on board. Will leave St. Paul here. Will require 9,500 tons of coal at Key West.” “We had,” said Schicy in his testimony on this point, “ten ships in the squadron, seven of which were short of coal. These were the auxiliaries and the Texas.” That it was impossible to coal on account of tho weather on May 26 was his bplief. Sigsbee’s statement, together with the statement of a Cuban pilot, Edouard Nunez, to the effect that ships as large as those of Cervera's fleet could not get into Santiago harbor, and an apparent doubt on the part of the Navy Department as to the correctness of Its information, had led him to believe the enemy was not there. However, after going some miles westward, the weather moderated, the Texas was coaled and the fleet returned to Santiago on May 27, where tho Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon was seen lying outside of the harbor.

Then a blockade was established, the ships constantly moving. Much testimony was taken in regard to the effectiveness of this blockade, the testimony varying surprisingly. Capt. Higginson of the Massachusetts and others declared that the ships were closer by night than by day, and that there were picket boats, like the Marblehead and the Vixen, nearer to the harbor than the battleships. Others asserted that the ships were eight or nine miles out at night. In regard to the firing on the Colon May 31, the testimony showed that this was ineffective and at very long range, so that it did the Colon no harm. Some witnesses, like Capt. Folger of the New Orleans, which participated in the action, asserted that it was a successful reconnoissance, developing the strength of the land batteries. Others, like Admiral Evans, sneered at the whole movement. Lieutenant Commander Potts of the Massachusetts, to which Schley had transferred his flag temporarily, testified that Schley was laboring under great excitement and seemed to suffer fear, saying: “We are very conspicuous; let’s get out of this.”

On July 1 Admiral Sampson arrived and took command of the ships before Santiago. The investigation leaped from that date to July 3, when the battle occurred. A very large amount of testimony was taken on the battle. The loop of the Brooklyn and the colloquy with Hodgson about the Texas, when Schley is declared by Hodgson to have said “D—n the Texas,” were the points chiefly regarded. Schley denies that the Hodgson colloquy ever occurred. The loop was ordered by Capt. Cook of the Brooklyn and heartily approved by Schley. The purpose of it, according to Cook and Schley, was to get the Brooklyn quickly in position to pursue the Spanish ships while avoiding blanketing the fire of the American ships and ramming or torpedoing of the Brooklyn by the approaching Spaniards. Admiral Evans of the lowa and varioup officers on the Texas, particularly Lieutenant Commander L. C. Hellner, navigator of the latter ship, testified that the turn of the Brooklyn was extremely perilous to the Texas. That ship, according to Hellner, was within 150 yards of the Brooklyn and was saved by the promptness of Capt. Philip in stopping her and reversing her engines. This caused the Texas, says Heilner, to lose three miles in the chase nfter the Spaniards. Capt. Cook and others testified that the Texas was not in the slightest danger from the movement.

Many witnesses on the Brooklyn testified to the courage and alertness of Schley during the battle and to the high effectiveness of the Brooklyn in the fight. Capt. Clark of the Oregon and other officers of that vessel testified to the magnificent work of the Brooklyn, which received more shots ot the enemy than all the other ships combined and which inflicted 35 per cent of the hits on the Spanish ships. Indeed, one of the strik* ing results of the inquiry has been to bring out clearly that the Brooklyn and the Oregon were the ships that did 'most of the work of destroying the enemy’a fleet -