Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 34, Number 18, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 1 November 1901 — SCHLEY TELLS HIS STORY. [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

SCHLEY TELLS HIS STORY.

Rear Admiral Schley took the stand on the thirtieth day of the inquiry and told the story of the beginning of the Santiago campaign in a plain, simple, straightforward manner. He refrained from attempting to question the veracity of any officer who has testified against him, crediting their misstatements to a failure of recollection. Before flatly contradicting Captain Sigsbee regarding the information concerning the presence pf the Spaniards in Santiago Admiral "Schley said that Captain Sigsbee was not capable of uttering a falsehood, but that his recollection was at fault and not his veracity. “Captain Sigsbee,” said the rear admiral, “would not make a misstatement for his commission.” Rear Admiral Schley took up the specifications of the precept one by one, told of the formation of the flying squadron, and continued down to the beginning of the retrograde movement, when the court adjourned. The rear admiral disclaimed that he was guilty of disobedience of orders, as the order which i-eached him did not say the Spanish fleet was in Santiago, but directed Schley to find out if it was there, and not to permit it to leave “without a decisive action.” “That part of the order was fully executed,” remarked Admiral Schley, and there was a peal of laughter on the part of the spectators. Schley then told of the conference he had with Rear Admiral Sampson on board the New York at Key West, during which he had assured Sampson of his loyalty. Captain Chadwick, on this occasion, remarked that any one who knew Commodore Schley was sure of his loyalty to the commander-in-chief. During this conference it was developed that both Sampson and Schley agreed the objective point of Cervera’s fleet was either Havana or Cienfuegos, as-the latter port was connected with Havana by rail. Neither had any idea that the Spaniards would go to Santiago, which is in the end of the island, the lines of communication being absolutely controlled by the insurgents. Rear Admiral Schley said that the deday at Cienfuegos was due to the fapt that Captain McCalla had not communicated the code of signals arranged with the insurgents, and that Lieut. Southerland had not communicated information which he had been directed to give. Speaking of the difficulty of coaling in the open sea, the admiral said the Merrimac had several holes punched in its efforts to coal. He used every endeavor to coal, but the problem presented to him in this connection was one that had vexed the navies of the world for fifty years. He asserted that whenever it was possible to coal the ships he had done so, but there were times when he would not assume the responsibility, as the vessels of his squadron would have been placed in jeopardy in attempting to coal in the open sea.

According to Rear Admiral Schley’s testimony the flying squadron left Cienfuegos within four hours after he was certain the Spanish squadron was not in that harbor. He did not mask his movements, as it would have been to the liking of his men and himself to meet the Spanish squadron. Great stress has been laid upon the fact that Rear Admiral Schley did not mask his movements at night, but Rear Admiral Schley said experience had taught him that the signals of a ship could not be seen more than four miles during the day, arid that the ardois lights could not be seen at a greater distance than six and a half miles at night. When the flying squadron left Cienfucgos they were fourteen miles from the shore and it was impossible for the Spaniards to be advised of the movements of the Americans. Rear Admiral Schley described the formation of the squadron on its way to Santiago and referred to the importance of keeping his squadron formation intact. He said it would have been unwise and unmilitary to leave behind the auxiliary vessels and the collier which caused the delay of his movement, and said the smaller craft should not have been abandoned except ns a last and strict military necessity, which he did not consider existed. In explaining why he did not place confidence in the information sent by the Navy Department relative to the whereabouts of the Spanish fleet, Rear Admiral Schley snid he believed this was a ruse, inasmuch ns it bad come by way of Havana. He had not been informed that tho department had secret agents in Ilavanu, as he should have been. believed the dispatch from the department, saying its evidences* were that the Spaniards were in Santiago, was sent by the Spanish ofllciuls for the express purpose <rf drawing the flying squadron away from Cienfuegos, so ns to permit Cerveru to get iuto that harbor and communicate with Havana.

Explains the Retrograde Movement. In explanation of the retrograde movement Admiral Schley said this was determined upon after he had considered all the circumstances. He had taken the coal supply of the squadron into account and had calculated on the amount of fuel required under the most favorable and unfavorable circumstances. The steaming power of his fleet was only equal to that of the weakest ship. Seven of the ten vessels were short of coal. In addition to this he had taken into consideration that it might be necessary to chase the enemy, and he could not assume that the Spaniards would chase toward our base of supplies, but toward their own. Therefore any calculation relating to the coal supply would have to assume conditions less favorable to the American and most favorable to the Spaniards. The Merrimac’s machinery broke "down, and the collier signaled it would require two or three hours to repair it; but as a matter of fact it took exactly twentyfour hours. Rear Admiral Schley said it would be folly to send a ship alongside an unmanageable collier. The risk was too great and he would not take it. He was on the spot, watching the condition of the sea, and was charged with the responsibility which always makes one cautious.

SCHLEY CONTINUES STORY. Commander at the Battle of Santiago Tells of t£e Fight. Rear Admiral Schley continued his story of the Santiago campaign at the court of inquiry Friday. A positive denial of the “D—n the Texas” incident testified to by Lieut; Hodgson was one of the features of Schley’s statement. The rear admiral said he not only did not make the remark, but that the whole story of the colloquy as related by Hodgson was a fiction —that Hodgson was too good an officer to interfere, and that he (Schley) would not have permitted such a breach of the regulations. Rear Admiral Schley explained away many of the points of the precept and made it plain that he was in command during the battle, as upon hearing the cry that the enemy was coming out, he went upon the deck of the Brooklyn with a pair of long glasses in his hand, and even by the aid of these he could not see the New York, it having disappeared in the distance. Schley Takes Command. In the morning before the battle began Schley's orderly had reported that the signal, “Disregard signals from the flagship,” was flown from the halyards of the New York. In giving his reasons for being so positive of the absence of the New York Rear Admiral Schley said his first act after knowing the enemy was escaping was to look for the flagship so as to know how to govern himself, as he was second in command. A few moments after the battle began Schley signaled “Follow flag” from the Brooklyn. This was an order for the ships of the fleet to follow the Brooklyn, and the signal was given to the Oregon to be transmitted to the other vessels which could not see the flagship. Schley said the Oregon was already following the flagship Into the battle, and the signal was not intended for the battleship. Rear Admiral Schley testified that the Brooklyn did not cross the bow of the Texas, that the distance between the two ships was never closer than 600 yards, that there never was any danger of the two vessels colliding, and that the loop was absolutely necessary to prevent sacrificing the Brooklyn, as, if that ship had been turned toward the Spaniards instead of away from them, the Brooklyn would have been in dagerous proximity to the Spanish torpedo boats.

Turn Made to Save the Vessel.

Schley turned away from the Spaniards, he said, because it was useless to sacrifice the Brooklyn, because so much depended on that ship on the day of the battle, and, in turning away, he did what he believed was for the good of the country, sinking individual considerations on this occasion. There was a distinct movement on the part of the Maria Teresa and the Viscaya, he declared, to ram the Brooklyn, one of the Spanish ships being less than 1,100 yards from Schley’s flagship. So positive was Schley that the Spaniards were going to ram the Brooklyn that he called to Captain Cook, “Rook out, Cook, they are going to ram you.” Captain Cook was under the same impression, as he had already given the order to turn the helm to port. In making the turn which Schley said was absolutely necessary, he asserted that the Brooklyn was never more than GOO yards to seaward, and that during the turn the helm was always hard aport and was not eased, but the turn was made in the shortest possible time. Taking up the retrograde movement, Rear Admiral Schley explained that the Merrimac had broken down, was absolutely unmanageable, and was incapable of turning a propeller. They went f-ur-them westward than Schley intended, ns they had difficulty in making the Yale, which wa* towing the Merrimac, understand the ardois signal. The Merrimac and the Texas both sprung a leak, and this contributed to the difficulties. The physician on board the Texas recommended that coaling operations be suspended for awhile, as, owing to the intense heat, the men were becoming exhausted. The retrograde movement was made with a view to equalizing the coal of the ships of the fleet so as to be in a better position when they met the enemy. Schley had been given what was supposed to be authentic {formation that the Spnnish fleet was not in Santiago and he therefore thought the proper movement was to go west, and not to eastward, ns that would bring him nearer to the military base at Havana.

The mr admiral then took up the blockade and he said it had been demonstrated It was effective, as it was successful in preventing the entrance of any vessel as well as the escape of the enemy. It was always possible for him to see the shore line, and he said the distance east and west of the harbor was much nearer than has been testified to by officers, and that the same is true.regarding the distance from shore. The action of May 31 was a reconnolr. sance and was intended to develop the strength of the batteries, and in this wa6 successful. The primary reason for this action was not to destroy the Colon, but if that ship could have been injured by a shot or two he would have been glad to have sent a shot through the Spaniard. The information furnished by the Navy Department regarding the fortifications at Santiago was indeterminable and conflicting. The general impression was that the fortified ports of Cuba were strongly defended. The New Orleans had been signaled to engage the battery, and upon the conclusion of the engagement his impression was that the fortifications consisted of six and eight-inch guns, as the fire from the forts was heavy and as many as fifty shells passed over the fleet. The charts relating to the fortifications furnished by the Navy Department were dated 183 G and were useless. He had no intention of placing the ships of his fleet in jeopardy of the batteries, as the only order he had in this connection was that from the Navy Department directing him not to risk the loss of his ships. He did not propose to do this, and to do so before destroying the Spanish squadron would have been to invite an attack which might have resulted disastrously. Referring to the order of May 27 from Sampson which contained definite information that the Spanish squadron was in Santiago harbor Schley said he did not receive this until June 10. The judge advocate'objected to this-testimony, as went beyond the date on which Sampson arrived at Santiago. The court decided to admit the evidence, however. From this point he went on to the discovery of the Colon in the harbor, and said that Captain Sigsbee, when called aboard the Brooklyn shortly after the discovery was made, was much surprised to know the Spanish fleet was in Santiago after he had been so certain it was not there. Coaling a Serious Problem.

The rear admiral said his orders were to coal at every opportunity. He had inquired about Cape Cruz, which was 100 miles from Santiago, but he did not regard it as an available place; he was informed that some of the smaller ships had gone ashore at Manzauilla and he did not propose to lose any of his larger ships in attempting to coal at that point. He had information about Mole St. Nicholas, and Gonaives, these places being available for the small vessels. He did intend to use the smooth water outside the marine limit at these places for coaling. He did not wish to go in nearer, as he desired to avoid international complications growing out of a stronger nation taking advantage of a weaker one in using its ports for coaling purposes. He suggested to the Navy Department that Sampson be sent to relieve him so as to enable his ships to be coaled. Before reaching the story of the battle Rear Admiral Schley referred to the movement in the harbor on July 2 which indicated that the Spaniards intended to make a sortie. He was much impressed by this movement, and Sampson answered the message by notifying Schley to move in closer. Schley and Cook also had a conversation about coupling the engines, but owing to the excessive heat and the fact that the engineers would become exhausted if all the engines were started it was determined to trust to the engines already coupled. All Fire Centered on Flagship.

As the four Spanish ships and the forts centered their fire on the Brooklyn, he could see the jets of water made by the shells which missed his vessel and heard the roar of the projectiles, “which once heard,” said the rear admiral, “could never be forgotten.” He thought some of the Spanish ships would get away, and saiJ to Captain Cook: “We are alone with them. We must stay with thii crowd. If they could have shot as well as /our people the Spaniards would have gW us.”

Then the rear admiral saw the Oregon break through the smoke and come up near the Brooklyn, and give splendid assistance. Captain Cook was constantly by the side of Schley and was directed to keep the men below informed of the progress of the battle. These messages had the desii'ed effect, as they were answered by cheers which were heard through the ventilator. He then described the runniqg ashore of two other Spanish vessels and the chase of the Colon. During the chase Schley got occasional glimpses of the Indiana and Gloucester, but could not see what they were doing. Just before the Vizcaya went ashore it received a wound that listed it so much that Schley thought it would capsize. The signal halyards and speed cones of the Brooklyn were shot away, and one of these came near striking Schley, who stood on the bridge as it fell into the water.

As the Brooklyn gained on the Colon, Schley ordered extra ammunition, so that when his ship came in close quarters with the Spaniard it would be a matter of a few minutes to “knock it out,” as he put it. Before the Brooklyn had an opportunity to use its extra ammunition the Colon ran ashore, hauled down its flag, and surrendered. It was exactly 2:23 p. m. when the .New York arrived, which was one hour and eight minutes nfter the Colon had surrendered. The New York, with Sampson aboard, could be seen in the distance through long marine glasses and Schley signaled word, of the victory and added: “This is a glorious day for our country.” It was fully half an hour before the New York responded to this signal, which indicated that the vessel was so far away it was impossible;, for those on board even to see the signals of the Brooklyn.