Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 34, Number 14, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 18 October 1901 — SCHLEY COURT OF INQUIRY [ARTICLE]

SCHLEY COURT OF INQUIRY

Seventeenth Bar. Admiral Schley’s attorneys managed to establish the fact during the progress of the inquiry that the carefully prepared ■Chart purporting to be the unanimous declaration of several navigators of the correct positions of the vessels engaged In the Santiago sea fight during various intervals of the battle was in reality a jumble of compromises, satisfactory to none of the men engaged in preparing it. This evidence was brought out by Attorney Kayner while examining Commander Bichard Wainwright,, who was chairman of the board that prepared the chart and who commanded the famous little Gloucester during the battle. Commander Wninwright’s testimony was given without hesitation and was very positive in character. He concluded his statement by saying that not one of the navigating officers who signed the report adopting the chart believed that it was correct. The day’s proceedings brought out a great deal of technical matter, but the members of the court never lost their deep interest in all that was said. Lieut. C. W. Dyson of the bureau of steam engineering of the Navy Department was recalled early in the proceedings and continued his evidence concerning the steaming condition of the Brooklyn and her engines on the day of the engagement. Lieut. ,M. L. Bristol, who, as ensign, was watch and division officer on the Texas during the Spanish war, talked of the Santiago and Cienfuegos blockades in an entertaining manner, going into all the details of the watch kept and the patroling methods employed. He contradicted the evidence of Lieutenant Commander Hodgson concerning the distance of the Brooklyn from the nearest Spanish ships at the time the “loop” was made, and cast doubts on the accuracy of the stadimeter with which the commander had made his measurements. Lieut. Bristol’s testimony was enlivened by a tilt between the attorneys, Mr. Hayner and Mr. Hanna finding occasion to begin an interchange of sarcastic remarks which lasted most of the afternoon. Captain W. M. Folger, who was recalled for the purpose of correcting his testimony of the previous day, was asked further questions concerning tho blockade of Santiago. In reply to a question by Captain Lemly whether he had had any conversation with Commodore Schley during the blockade he said: “Toward evening of one of the days, the 30th, there was an extended", very severe rainstorm, so severe that I feared Cervera had gotten out, as it was sufficiently long to have permitted him to do so. I went on board the flagship the next day, thinking it my duty to tell the commodore what I had seen as to tho blockade as kept by the Japanese off the port of Wei-Hai-Wei, where similarly an enemy’s fleet was within a fortified harbor. I said to the commodore that the adoption of the tactics of the Japanese, ferrming a circle directly in front of the harbornjmouJA in my opinion, bo preferable, as nreu “ would be difficult for anything to get out.” The judge advocate then asked him: “Was there any reply by the commodore?” “I cannot testify exactly as to his reply,” said the witness. “I would prefer not to do so. He did not agree with me as to the necessity for’it.” Captain Folger also said that he had no recollection of a picket line on the inside of the American fleet.

At the request of Captain Parker of counsel for Admiral Schley, the witnets examined the log of the New Orleans for May 30 nnd 31, 1898, for the purpose of determining accurately the state of the weather on those days, but he declined to modify his statement of the previous day that the weather on those days was bad. Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, who was recalled for the purpose of correcttag errors in his testimony as printed in the official record, said that when he had called the editor of a New York paper a “liar and blackguard” he did not mean to convey the idea that he used this language on account of any inaccuracies in the report of the famous controversy on the Brooklyn on the morning of the sea fight, but because the puper had attempted to make it appear that Schley had done something cowardly and that he had shown fear of the Spanish ships. Commander Wainwright, who followed Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, was examined by Captain Lemly concerning his connection with the board that had prepared the official chart of the positions ct the American and Spanish ships at the time of the battle. ICightcenth Dax> “Admiral Schley’s bearing during the bombardment of the Colon was that of a man suffering under extreme excitement; one who had a disagreeable duty to perform, did it reluctautly, and'got through with It as soou as he could,” said Lieutenant Commander Templin M. Potts, navigating officer of the Massachusetts, who was the principal witness before the court of inquiry on this day. “We are conspicuous objects here in ■white, nnd I think w’c should get out of this,” Admiral Schley said during the bombardment, according to the testimony of this witness. 'These were fair samples of the testimony given by Lieutenant Commander Potts, nnd while it created something of a sensation, much of its strength is taken away when contrasted with the statements of Captain Hlgginson, who was present at the* time, nnd who said Schlfey’s conduct on this occasion was in keeping with that of a commanding officer under such circumstances. Potts’ statements are weakeued also by tho fact that Schley did not enter the conning tower on tho day in question, although he was standing nt the door of

that apartment when the remarks quoted are alleged to have been made. When Attorney Rayner cross-examines a witness, and during the critical points in the cross-examination Judge Advocate Lemly and his associate, Mr. Hanna, have lately made it their practice to interrupt the examination and break Its force by injecting arguments in suppqrt of objections, which invariably are overruled by the, court. So frequently has this been done that Schley’s counsol objected to it and appealed to the court. Admiral Dewey rather sharply directed the counsel for the Navy Department to refrain from such proceedings in the future, and, although he was called to order for this conduct, the judge advocate contended with the court that he had a right to protect the witnesses. Admiral Dewey directed the judge advocate to sit down, and this ended the interruptions for the day. Lieutenant Commander Potts admitted that.he himself was badly scared upon the occasion of the bombardment, although he testified that the shore batteries were so weak as not to be worth considering. The principal portion of his testimony was brought out by questions from the judge advocate, with a view of showing that the purpose of # the action of May 31 was to destroy the Colon and not to fire on the shore batteries, as has been testified to by previous witnesses. Then Potts endeavored to convict Schley of cowardice, using the language to which reference has been made. When asked on cross-examination upon what he based his impression that Schley was suffering under extreme excitement, Potts said it was because when the commodore first came upon the Massachusetts, the temporary flagship, he said was going in to destroy the Colon, but upon leaving the vessel Schley called the action a reconnoisance, and said he was entirely satisfied with it, as he had succeeded in drawing the fire of the shore batteries. Another reason Potts gave was what the commodore said about being attired in a white suit and presenting a conspicuous figure, and the apparent anxiety of Schley to use the conning tower. On this poilnt he was not cross-examined to any extent, Mr. Rayner apparently being satisfied with the statement that the commodore did not seek the protection of the conning tower during the action, and upon reading the testimony of Captain Higginson that the bearing of Schley was that of a commanding officer. Mr. Rayner attempted to have introduced as evidence at this time tlje order of the Navy Department directing tho commanding officers not to place the ships of the squadron in jeopardy of the shore batteries. This attempt was made with a view to having Potts modify his statement in x-eference to Schley’s bear-

ing. Judge Advocate Lemly objected to she admission of this order unless it was accompanied with a subsequent one from the department which left the matter of firing on the shore batteries to the discretion of the ranking officer. The judge advocate, who was extremely angry, made a heated argument, which was replied to by Mr. Rayner. The court retired for consultation, and, upon returning, overruled the objection of the judge advocate. Lieutenant Commander Potts then testified that he knew of no cause for the delay of the flying squadron on the way to Santiago. He was given the log of his vessel, however, and the entry showed that the squadron stopped on two different occasions to enable the Eagle and the Merrimac, which had fallen behind, to overtake the squadron. It has been testified by a dozen witnesses that there were absolutely no plans of battle arranged by Admiral Schley and that he had not signaled the vessels as to what action they should take if they met an enemy. However, in reading over the log of his ship Commander Potts came Across and reud some signals from the Brooklyn directing the Massachusetts what to do in the presence of the enemy. Nineteenth bay. Rear Admiral Schley won the most favorable point developed at the court of inquiry on this day, inasmuch as Lieut. Holden, the watch officer of the Scorpion, testified that the information that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos harbor on May 19 was not communicated to Rear Admiral Schley, although it was testified to by Lieut. Southerland. Judge Advocate Lemly thereupon ad mitted that he was unable by any evidence in his possession to show that the message had been delivered to Schley. The testimony of Lieut. Holden places Lieut. Southerland in a discredited position, inasmuch as Southerland, commanding the Engle, testified that he had communicated this information to tho commanding officer of the Scorpion with instructions to that officer, Commander Mnrix, to communicate it to Rear Admiral Schley. Lieut. Southerland related even to the minutest detail the megnphone message he delivered to Commander Marix, which was to the effect, substantially, that Cervera’s fleet was not in Cienfuegos. The delivery of this message placed Commander Marix either in the attitude of suppressing the information delivered .by Southerland or puts Rear Admiral Schley in the position of denying the receipt of this intelligence, and raised a question of veracity between Schley, Southerland and Marix, especially between the two latter. Lieut. Holden, who heard part of the megaphone message which Cdmmandcr Marix received from Lieut. Southerland, said there was nothing in it which conveyed the information that the Spaniards were not in Cienfuegos. Reading from the log of his vessel, the Scorpion, Lieut. Holden found an entry reading: “No news

from the Spaniards.” This entry corre* sponds exactly with the log of the Brooklyn and with the claims made by Rear Admiral Schley. v More hard blows were given the official chart plotting the positions of the Spanish and American vessels during the battle which were prepared by the Board of Navigators. Lieutenant Commander Schuetze, the navigator of the lowa and a member of the board, testified that he protested against signing the report accompanying the chart, as it was inaccurate. He said the chart wae a compromise' and thnt he had been persuaded to sign it by Commander Wainwright, the president of the board, who said it was the best the navigators could agree to if they sat until doomsday. Schuetze said he objected to the chart as it gave the lowa too much speed. According to the position of that vessel on the chart, the lowa would have been forced to steam at the rate of eighteen knots instead of nine, which was the speed the ship was making. He also objected to the chart because it placed the Brooklyn too near to the mouth of Santiago harbor. This’officer testified -.that the Spanish ships did not attempt to ram the Brooklyn when they left Santiago the morning of the battle. He also swore that the attack of May 31 was directed at the Colon and not at the shore batteries as has been contended. He said this action was not a reconnoisance, but an attempt to sink the Colon. Lieutenant Commander Grant, the watch officer of the Massachusetts, said he knew of no instructions from Admiral Schley as to what should be done in the event of meeting the enemy. The progress of the flying squadron from Cienfuegos to Santiago was slow, according to this witness. His distances relating to the blockade at Santiago were extreme. He said the fleet was between from six to ten miles distant from the mouth of the harbor during the day and night and that the vessels of the squadron steamed a distance of five and six miles east and west of the harbor. Although Lieutenant Commander Grant was sure that the action of May 31 was intended to sink the Colon, he testified that Admiral Schley upon leaving* tho Massachusetts had said: “The reconnoissance had developed the strength of the battery and that it was satisfactory.” Twentieth Day. Captain French E. Chadwick, commander of the New York in 1898, created somewhat of a sensation when he testified that he protested to Sampson against sending to Schley a message congratulating the latter upon the character of the blockade he had maintained, because, under the circumstances, such action was improper. Admiral Dewey himself then created quite a stir in the court room by exhibiting considerable temper in declining to permit Mr. Rayner to question Captain Chadwick relating to a conversation that officer had with Ilemey and Watson, in which Captain Chadwick is alleged to have approved the blockade. “We don’t want any conversations here. We want the facts, and you know that we want nothing else but the facts,” said Admiral Dewey impatiently to Mr. Rayner, who was directed to withdraw the question. Mr. Rayner contended that it was perfectly proper to admit the conversation in question, as it tended to show that Captain Chadwick had indorsed the blockade at one time and had at another protested against Schley being congratulated for the character of it.

Captain Chadwick told of the meeting of Schley, Sampson and himself on board the New York at Key West before the flying squadron sailed for Cuba. Schley on that occasion assured Sampson that he would be loyal to the commander of the North Atlantic squadron. Schley asserted, according to the witness, that he was pleased to serve under Sampson. Speaking of his knowledge of the code of signals arranged with the insurgents, Captain Chadwick said this code had been communicated to him by Commander McCalla, who did not care to have anything said about it, as he expected to go back to Cienfuegos the next day, May 20. Owing to the difficulty in getting supplies at Key West McCalla with the Marblehead did not leave for Cienfuegos until the following day. McCalla said he would communicate the code of signals to all the officers of the flying squadron, but he did not do so, according to his own testimony. Captain Chadwick said he had nt information that the Spanish squadron intended to leave Santiago harbor on July 3, the day on which the New York tailed for Siboney. Captain Chadwick nnd Lieut. Ma.*sh, Snmpsou’s flag lieutenant, were the two chief witnesses before the court of inquiry this day. Their testimony related exclusively to sending dispatches to Schley, including the McCalla memorandum relating to the code of signals arranged with the insurgents. Lieut. Marsh, after referring to the books of tho New York, swore that dispatches advising Schley of the presence of the Spanish fleet in Santiago had been sent at various times by the lowa, Dupont and Marblehead. These papers showed that the dispatches in question had been transmitted by these vessels, but it developed that there was nothing to show exactly by which vessel they were sent and the day on which they were sent, although Lieut. Marsh said ho was satisfied they had gone in the order shown by the New York papers, which would indicate that the dispatches had reached Schley nt Cienfuegos in time to enable him to arrive at Santiago before the flying squadron really reached that port. The testimony on this point is so involved it is almost impossible to follow it with "any degree of accuracy, and even the attorneys themselves and the witnesses were pretty badly jumbled.