Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 34, Number 13, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 15 October 1901 — SCHLEY COURT OF INQUIRY [ARTICLE]

SCHLEY COURT OF INQUIRY

, Eleventh Day. - Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, who commanded the battleship Maine when she was blown up in Havana harbor, and who during the war was in command of the scout St. Paul, was on the stand for upward of an hour. He said that in obedience to orders from Captain Wise, who was his commanding officer, he had proceeded to the vicinity of Santiago, arriving there on May 21. He told of taking aboard the Cuban pilot Nunez and said that he did not have much confidence in him. His instructions were to report to Commodore Schley that the Spanish squadron probably was in Santiago harbor. He fell in with the flying squadron on the evening of May 2G, the squadron then being twenty or twenty-five miles south of Santiago. He had reported to Commodore Schley that he “knew nothing .positively” about the Spanish fleet. He was then asked if he had expressed his belief to Commodore Schley that Cervera’s fleet was not in the harbor as reported later by Commodore Schley. The witness replied: v “I stated that we had seen nothing of the Spanish fleet. I may have stated that I knew nothing positively or absolutely about its movements, but I recited certain events to show that there was a probability of the fleet being in Santiago at that time.” In reply to a question as to the condition of the weather at the time he was at Santiago Captain Sigsbee said: “During May 24, 25 and 2G the weather was unsettled; trade conditions had been hindered. '<• There was more or less rain and moderately heavy sea on those three days. The sea on May 2G was heavy for boats, but it was moderating —that is to say, more moderate than it had been on two days before. I should say, however, it would have been a very difficult job to have coaled from ships alongside that night.” “Did you receive a dispatch from Secretary Long, dated May 29, stating ‘The Spanish fleet arrived at Santiago on May 19’?”

“I am not certain, but my recollection is that it stated it arrived on the 19th or 21st. I received the communication just as I have stated. It came from the Secretary of the Navy. It was signed ‘Long,’ but whether I got a copy of it from Captain Wise or got the original I cannot now recall. I think I got the original.” “Did you show this dispatch -to Commodore Schley on May 2G?” “I already said I cannot recollect the act of showing it to him. I presume I did, but that I informed him I remember.” Captain Sigsbee was then excused. Twjlfth Day. The proceedings of the court began with the usual recall of former witnesses for the correction of their testimony in the official record. Rear Admiral Evans took the stand with the purpose of effectually nailing the statement that he made a foolish boast as to what he did at the battle*of Santiago. Schley’s counsel asked him the other day if he did not tell Schley that he (Evans) destroyed the whole Spanish fleet. Evans at that time denied the report, which in a way placed him in the position of disputing Schley’s word, as the inference was plain that Schley asserted that Evans did play the braggart. “Fighting Bob” then came with documentary evidence that he was guiltless of blowing his own horu in so offensive a wav., “I have here a letter from Captain Cook of the Brooklyn,” said he, shaking it at the court, “denying that I made the boast. I would like to have this letter added to my testimony regarding the matter.” “We do not claim that you said that to Captain Cook,” asserted Attorney Rayner. “My question was: ‘Did you make thta remark to Commodore Schley?’ ” “Captain Cook was present during all my conversation with Commodore Schley,” answered Evans, “and here is his letter denying that I made so foolish a boast." Schley’s counsel objected to the letter being introduced as evidence, and Admiral Evans hobbled out of the room, not a little disgruntled. Lieutenant Commander Alexander Sharp, who commanded the Vixen during the Spanish-American war, gave Admiral Schley a jolt when he testified that while on the inner patrol line during the blockade he could not have discovered the Spanish fleet had it attempted to leave the harbor with no lights and with no noise. He said the shore line at night was discernible, hut the objects could not be distinguished. The story of Admiral Schley’s loop at Santiago was told In greater detail before the naval court of inquiry on this day than at any time before. It was Lieutenant Commander Jnmes J. Doyle, watch officer on the Brooklyn, under Schley, who told the story. Admiral Schley had intended to have him called in his own behalf, but Judge Advocate Lemly summoned him first, and the questions which he was required to answer came from the hostile camp. As on preceding days, changes in official reports were much under consideration, but this timo the changes were In the log of the Brooklyn itself. Lieut. Doyle was thoroughly interrogated as to why It was that the log of the Brooklyn had #rst been written up to show that the helm had been put to starboard, which would huve indicated a direct half-turn to the west, as would be natural in the pursuit, and then two days later had been changed so as to show that the helm had been put to port, and the turn made to the east. Witness insisted that the original entry was purely and simply an error on his part. No charges or insinuations of any kind against Admiral Schley for his action

were made by attorneys or witnesses, but the vital nature of the questions was uppermost in every thought, and when the lieutenant left 'the stand for the day it was evident that much more testimony on this line was to follow. The other new witness of the day was Lieutenant Commander A. M. Sharp, who commanded the Vixen during the blockade of Santiago. He also answered detailed questions about the loop as he saw it, but more time was given to trying to find out how it was that certain changes had been made in reports of the battle prepared on his ship, and whether those changes had been made on the Brooklyn or by him and his subordinate officers. Just before the adjournment for the day the court ruled that all questions concerning the blockade must refer to the time prior to Ju)y 1, when Commander in Chief Admiral Sampson arrived there. Thirteenth liny. Rear Admiral Schley made the famous loop during the battle off Santiago to prevent wlint seemed to be inevitable collision with the Spanish fleet, which was steaming toward the Brooklyn as it came out of the harbor. This fact was brought out in the naval, court of inquiry. The testimony was given by Lieut. Doyle of the Brooklyn in answer to questions from Judge Advocate Lemly and from the court itself. Lieut. Doyle testified that the Brooklyn was only 1,400 yards from the Spanish ships, that they were coming straight toward the flagship, and that the Brooklyn was compelled to maneuver to avoid a collision. Another material fact brought out during the day was that Rear Admiral Schley's reason for making the retrograde movement at the time of his first arrival off Santiago was that his coal supply was insufficient if his squadron had been called on to engage in a running fight with the Spaniards. If it had been necessary to pursue Cervera as far as Martinique under forced draft the flying squadron would not have had enough coal to reach a coaling base at Gonaives Channel or Key West. This was indicated by a statement made by Counsel Itayner, who objected to the admission as evidence of a series of charts showing the coaling history of the flying squadron from May 18 to June 1 unless it included a chart giving the amount of coal that would have been consumed under forced draft. The judge advocate agreed to furnish the chart if desired. Those submitted gave the amount of coal on board the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, lowa, Texas and Marblehead the day the flying squadron started to Key West to coal, the coal capacity of the fleet, the number of days it could have remained ou blockading duty with the amount on board May 26, .the amount that would have been consumed steaming at ten knots under favorable conditions.

Lieut. Doyle of the Brooklyn was under cross-examination during the greater portion of the day, but the judge advocate was unable to shake his testimony in the slightest, except to show that Lieut. Doyle was somewhat careless about making entries in the log of the Brooklyn, and that the vessel was not prepared to fire on a Spanish torpedo boat as it emerged from the harbor and returned in a few minutes. Aside from these two points the evidence and cross-examination of Doyle developed many points in favor of Rear Admiral Schley, and it was almost unanimously agreed that everything brought out was favorable to the applicant. Captain Dawson of the marine corps, who was the next witness, told the story of the turn of the Brooklyn, but upon cross-examination was so badly shaken as to distances his testimony was practically worthless, except to show that his memory was enveloped in a heavy mist. Commander Bush of the Hydrographic office took the stand and swore to the correctness of a number of charts showing the position of the flying squadron off Santiago, the shortest route from Cienfuegos to Santiago, the hour of sunset and sunrise, and n number of other technical matters which will have an important bearing on the case when the charts are used. Fourteenth Day. Mr. Rayner, chief of counsel for Admiral Schley, asked Judge Advocate Leraly to summon Admiral Sampson as a witness in the case. The request grew out of a difference in the construction of a sentence in Admiral Sampson’s letter to Commodore Schley when the flying squadron lay off Cienfuegos. This is known as the “Dear Schley” letter, and in it. as printed in the Navy Department documents supplied to the Senate, the admiral said, after expressing his opinion that notwithstanding the report that the Spanish squadron was in Santiago, it were better to continue to blockade Cienfuegos and Havana, “we shall continue to hold Havana and Santiago until we receive more positive information.” During the examination of Commander Raymond P. Rodgers this dispatch was under consideration. Mr. Rayner expressed the opinion that the word “Santiago” had been inadvertently used by the commander in chief, assuming that he mennt to use the vyot'd “Cienfuegos” ns better corresponding with the context. As the document was printed there was a parenthetical note, to which Admiral Schley’s initials were attached, saying that evidently the wrong city had been mentioned. Mr. Rayner asked Judge Advocate Lemly to make this concession, hut the latter declined to do so, saying he would produce the original of Admiral Srimpson’s dispatch to prove he had said Santiago. Then Mr. Itayner said: “I cannot take that woKf Santiago to

mean anything bat Cienfuegos. It is an imputation upon Commodore Schley and I cannot permit it to rest without aummoning the author of that dispatch,” to which Captain Lemly responded: “I have told you once before, you can summon anyone you please.” “Then,” retorted Mr. Raynor, “summon Admiral Sampson.” Lieut. Dyson, who was on the stand the previous day when the court adjourned, was recalled as the first witness. Mr. Rhyner brought out the information concerning the time the coal on each of the vessels of the flying squadron would have tasted 6 on forced draft, in chasing the enemy’s vessels, taking the amount of coal on each on May 2G, and leaving sufficient coal to return to Key West. Mr. Rayner read from Mr. Dyson’s tabulated statement, showing the lowa would have consumed 243 tons of coal a day, the Texas IGO tons a day and the Marblehead 77 tons. That estimate would, he said, give the Brooklyn 2.3 days’ chase, the lowa a chase of 1.2 days, the Texas a chase of three-fourths of a day and the Marblehead a chase of about one-third of a day. It was also shown that the Massachusetts could have chased the enemy for 1.8 days. Commander Rodgers, who was executive officer of the battleship lowa during the summer of 1898, was then casled, and examined at length concerning the coaling of the flying squadron. Lieutenant Commander Albon C. Hodgson, the navigator of the Brooklyn, who has become more or less famous as the result of a controversy as to whether or not Schley said “d ‘ the Texas, she must care for herself,” when the loop was made by the Brooklyn, was on the stand. He told a graphic story of the incident and the battle itself and swore under oath thnt Schley made the remarks attributed to him. Hodgson’s recital of the story of the battle was listened to by the court and spectators during an impressive silence. He saw smoke at the entrance of the harbor and ordered Quartermaster Anderson to take a glass to ascertain if it was the Spanish fleet. Anderson reported the Spaniards coming out, and Hodgson rang the general alarm. Lieut. Mason then ordered the ship cleared for action. Almost immediately Schley appeared on the bridge with Hodgson, who told the commodore “Nothing was doing,” and asked if the flying squadron should go steadily to see which way the Spaniards were going. “No; go for them,” replied Schley, after which the Brooklyn went into action. Cervera’s fleet was sailing directly toward the Brooklyn, when Schley said: “Look out, Cook, they propose to ram us.” Captain Cook said he would look out for the Spaniards. Then Hodgson heard Schley say, “Hard aport,” directing the Brooklyn to turn away from the Spaniards. Cook replied that the helm was aport. Hodgson then told Schley if they ported the helm—that is, turned away from the Spaniards—the Brooklyn would run into the Texas. “D the Texas, it must care for itself,” replied Schley, according to Hodgson. The commodore said he did not want to go closer on account of the torpedo boats, which were believed to be coming towards the Brooklyn. In order to give the Texas more room Hodgson said he suggested that the helm be turned to starboard, or towards the Spaniards. It was decided to turn away, however, and this was done. The helm was kept hard aport, and the Brooklyn swung 'around clear of the Texas. Hodgson said there was urgent need for quick action, as if the Brooklyn did not “take care of the Colon,” that vessel would have gotten away. During the turn Hodgson went on the bridge to watch the Texas. He admitted he was skittish, as he was afraid the Brooklyn would run into the Texas, and that the Brooklyn might get a shot from one of the big guns of the Texas. On cross-examination Hodgson testified that the Brooklyn would have made a quicker turn if the vessel had 1 timed towards the Spaniards, and he also said he was under the impression that the Spaniards would have rammed the Brooklyn if the latter had turned the other way. It developed that the Brooklyn was not only in the thick of the battle all the time, but that the guns of the ship actually inflicted 35 per cent of the damage done Cervera’s fleet. The Brooklyn was the only vessel in the fleet armed with five-inch guns. A commission was appointed to inspect the wrecks of the Spanish vessels to determine what injuries they had sustained. Captain Rodgers of the lowa was the president of the commission. It was found that two 12-inch, eleven 8-inch, twelve 5-inch and ten 4-inch shells, a total of thirty-five, pierced the hulls of the Spanish vessels. Aside from these there were many punctures, but it could not be determined whether they were made by four or six-inch shells. As the Brooklyn was the only vessel armed with 5-inch guns it was clear that the twelve 5-inch shells which pierced the Spaniards were fired from the guns of the Brooklyn. Thus twelve of the thirty-five shots were fired by Brooklyn, making a total percentage of nearly 35. The Brooklyn had 8-inch guns, and as eleven 8-inch shells took effect it is assumed that some of them were fired by the Brooklyn.