Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 34, Number 10, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 4 October 1901 — SCHLEY Court of Inquiry DON'T GET WET! [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

SCHLEY Court of Inquiry

DON'T GET WET!

Fifth Day. Captain W. C. Wise, who commanded the scout Yale during the Spanish war, admitted under oath that, notwithstanding positive orders from the Secretary of the Navy directing him to inform tlie “flying squadron” that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago harbor, he did.not do s 6. Captain Wise merely notified Captain Philip of the Texas, just as tlie flying squadron was startiug for Key West to coal, and, so far as was developed, this important fact was not communicated to Commodore Schley. Slowly but jsurely it is brought out that important papers have l.oen suppressed and that official charts and reports have been altered. A sensational development of the day was the introduction, as evidence, of the suppressed letter Avritten by Sampson to Scliley, directing the latter to remain off Cienfuegos. This and another dispatch relating to the belief that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago were the only dispatches received by Schley until May 31, When the flying squadron was off Santiago, The correct version of Schley's dispatch, in which he informed the Secretary of the Navy that it Avould he impossible to obey orders with regard to coaling the “flying squadron,” Avas introduced as evidence. It was shoAvn by this copy that a number, of changes had been made in Sehloy’s dispatch as it appears in the official records. Rear Admiral Cotton, who commanded the the Avar, upon direct examination, sjiid positively he had delivered dispatches to Commodore Scliley on May 27 from Secretary Long and Acting Admiral Sampson, informing Scliley that the Spanish llecty Avas in Santiago harbor. By referring to the official records and after refreshing the memory of Rear Admiral • Cotton, Attorney Kayner demonstrated that one of these dispatches, Avliich Cotton claimed to have delivered to Schley on tlie'.afternoon of May 27 Avas not sent from rtnt;i.JJia| day. It was Impossible, therefore, to deliver ims maniler-in-chief of the flying squadron at the time os first SAvorn to by Cotton, Bixth Day. Only one session was held Thursday, the court adjourning ut 1 o’clock out of respect to the lute Judge Wilson, whose funeral avqs held during the afternoon. Two neAV Avitnosses were exauiihed. Spencer S. Wood Avho commanded the torpedo boat Dupont during the Santiago .campaign told of delivering dispatches from Sampson to Schley nt Cienfuegos May 22 and informed the court that after reading them Scliley appeared to be laboring under, excitement. The other new Avitness was William C. Gray, an engineer of the Texasf Avho rather dismayed tho department counsel by saying the engines of that ship were reversed after she had passed the- Brooklyn, indicating that at that time nt least there Avas no danger of a collision on account of the tlagship’s loop. Gray Avas dropped in short order and uot asked for further testimony. The testimony of Captain Wise of the Yale revealed the fact that Schley contemplated cutering the harbor and engaging the Spanish fleet May 31, three days before the battle. Machinist Clnxton of the Texas was recalled and avus on the staud only long enough to state that his testimony ns printed was correct. Then Captain Wise of the Yule took the stand for cross-ex-amination by the Schley counsel. Wise had SAvorn that he had word from the Navy Department that the Spanish licet was at Santiago May 27 and the attorneys for the applicant AA’ere successful iu obtaining from him the admission that he did not communicate that information, to Commodore Schley. Tpe.witness said lie informed Captain Higsbec and he considered it certain the latter

would notify Schley. The cross-examina-tion revealed the fact that Wise exchanged a number of signals with Schley’s flagship afterward, but did not inform the commodore of the reported presence of the enemy. At the suggestion of Admiral Dewey, Judge Advocate Leruly asked the witness who was the senior officer at that time. Captain Wise said he himself was until Captain Cotton arrived. He also admitted that he did not direct Captain Sigsbee to communicate to Schley the information he had reecived about the Spanish fleet. Seventh Pay. Captain Bowman H. McCalla,. who the Marblehead during the war with Spain, was an important witness before the court of inquiry, and liis testimony, more than any heretofore presented, seemed to be unfavorable to tbe cause of Rear Admiral Schley. Captain McCalla testified that on the morning of May 24 lie delivered dispatches to Admiral Schley off Cienfnegos and told him of liis plans to communicate with the Cubaus by secret signals. lie had some supplies to deliver to the insurgents, and after visiting the shore he returned to the Bmpklyn and assured Schley the SpanislMeet was not at Cienfuegos. Admiral Schley, according to the witness, showed to-him the orders from Admiral Sampson and appeared deeply perplexed. He told Captain McCalla it would be impossible to coal the ships, but lie felt lie would be court-martialed if lie should return to Key West. The witness said he advised Admiral Scliley tfiat he believed it would be best to go at once to Santiago, even though lie might be unable to stay there. Friends of Schley show that whatever may have been the dcda.v lie did start for Santiago the evening following liis interview with Captain McCalla. Captain McCalla testified, as Captain Harbor and Captain Wise had previously testified, that the ships of the' Hying squadron could have been coaled off Santiago. In any event lie was quite certain that lie could have coaled the Marblehead. Captain McCalla was not at Santiago because liis ship, with the Massachusetts and others, happened at the time Cervern attempted to escape to be at Guantanamo taking coal. The conflicting orders which were causing Admiral Schley’s distress at the time of McCalla's visit to the Brooklyn were explained by au earlier witness, Lieut. John Hood, who commanded tile dispatch boat Ilawk and who delivered dispatches to Admiral Schley from Admiral Sampson off Cienfnegos op the morning of May 251. The written dispatches were the same that have already been discussed. The principal one was the so-called order No. 8, iu which Sampson said to Scliley that if he was satisfied the enemy was not in Cienfnegos to proceed to Saiftiago. The verbal orders translated by - Lieut. Ilood were of a wholly different character. According to the lieutenant Sampson expressed a conviction with great positiveness that Cervrrra was at Santiago, that lie wanted Seliiey to start for that port without delay after tlie arrival of the Hawk and that he would be grievously disappointed if the commodore failed to carry out his instructions. Lieut. Hood's conversation with Admiral Schley covered the entire scope of the difficulties that confronted the flying squadron, the short coal supply of the ships, their inability to take on coal from the collier and the prospect of having to conduct a blockade under conditions that were far from reassuring. Again the department’s attorney sought to make that mysterious point which has frequently been brought -tip about ” Admiral SV-hley’s conduct during that interview.' Licit; Hood promptly disposed of this sitbjce.by stating that the admiral sat in a ehnlMifr < ihe time lie was talking to him and that whfttJ>e was perplexed lie was very calm and dTgV.'&i'-L— — A feature of the day’s proceedings whs, tlie appearance of W. 11. Slayton of New York, who some time ago was retained by Admiral Sampson, Captain Chadwick and Admiral Crowuinshield to look after the interests of themselves and other officers of the department who might be assailed during tire court’s session. Admiral Dewey ruled that Mr. Stayton had no standing in court, liecause Admiral Sampson was in no manner a party to the proceedings. E ghth Day. The eighth day’s proceedings furnished cumulative- evidence that the naval campaign in the West India Islands was conducted in a very loose munuer. It was shown conclusively that an exceptional opportunity to place Rear Admiral Schley iu .possession of information that would have juadc him the master of the unfortunate situation at Cienfnegos the moment he reached that point wu4 either lost or neglected. It was shown, moreover, that Sampson was placed In possession of absolute information very early on May 20 that tlie Spanish fleet was not in Cienfqegos. This was communicated to tbe commander in chief of the North Atlantic fleet by Captain Bowman 11. McCalla who had just returned to Key West from Cienfnegos, where he had learned through personal communication with insurgents that the only Spanish ships ill the harbor were two- light--dratight aud comparatively harmless gunboats. With this information in liis possession

Sampson sent McCalla back to Cienfnegoa as the bearer of the celebrated “Dear Schley” letter and order No. 8, both of which, were calculated to convey to Schley Sampson’s belief that the Spanish fleet was in Cienfnegos and not in Santiago. Contain McCalla ascertained that the Spaniards were not iu Cienfnegos on May 17, when, in company with the converted yacht Eagle, successful in establishing a line of communication with the Cuban forces that held positions on each sidoof tlie harbor. It was on that occasion shat the captain obtained tbe insurgents’ secret code, which he subsequently delivered to Captain Chadwick of the New York.

It also developed during tlie day that Lieutenant Commander H. H. Southerland, who Avas iu command of the converted yaelit Eagle, delivered a message to the Scorpion, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Marix. which Captain McCalla had instructed him to give to Schley. The Marblehead and Eagle had fallen in Avitli the flying squadron on May 10. while the squadron Avas on its Avay from Key West to Cienfuegos. Captain McCalla did not know the port of destiuatibn of Schley and his ships. He said on the stand that if he had known he would haA'e delivered the insurgents’ code to Schley and also acquainted him with the details of the result of his own iiiAt-stigations around Cienfuegos. As it was he commanded Lieutenant Commander Southerland to report to Schley that they had learned from the insurgents that the only vessels inside the harbor AA'ere two gunboats and several eannonieros. . Lieutenant Commander Southerland testified that lie megaphoned this message to the Scorpion. The message Avas intended for Rear Admiral Schley. Gen. Raynor, in cross-examining Lieutenant Commander Southerland, produced the log books of the Scorpion—and Eagle and showed that neither book,contained the highly ’ important message which Southerland said he megaphoned to the Scorpion. The log book of the Scorpion contained au entry purporting to give the massage whieh was received from Southerland. It Avas a trivial message and differed' radically from that which the lieutenant commander said he had megaphoned, containing no reference to a landing place at Cienfuegos or the possibility of communicating with the into the fact that the Marblehead and Eagle had ascertained that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos on the night they left port. Lieutenant Commander Southerland met these omissions in the case of liis own log and that of the Scorpion by remarking that they did not alter the facts. ■

A very important feature of Lieutenant Commander Southerland’s testimony Avas his declaration that the weather and sea at Cienfuegos 011 the afternoon of the 24th were both distinctly favorable to the coaling of ships. He Avas certain of this because he had sent crews ashore in cockle-shell boats and they experienced no difficulty in going through the surf and landing. The purpose of this testimony was clearly to contradict Schley’s statement that rough Aveather and boisterous seas liad combined to prevent the ships of his squadron from taking aboard coal from the colliers before leaving Cienfuegos.

Ninth Das’. Captain James M.-Miller, wlis commanded the collier Merrimac off Santiago in May, 1898, gave testimony before the court calculated to tlirow light on the contention of Admiral Schley that he could not coal his ships in those waters the Aveek before the sen tight. Captain Miller was called by the department to show Avhether or not the state of the and Aveather compelled Scliley to leave Santiago to replenish the bunkers of his vessels. It was a vitally important point, and Captain Miller Avas kept on the stand an hour. First the judge advocate general obtained the information that in the opinion of the commander of the collier it Avas possible to coal ships at that time. Later the counsel from Schley hammered away at the Avitness and tried to extract from him the statement that it aa’iis dangerous to try to coal nt sea. Captain Miller held his ground manfully against the assaults of the legal lights on both sides and confined his story to the facts set forth in his log hook. This record slioAved that ships eoaleif both before and after the date when Admiral Schley sent the dispatch to the department that it Avas necessary to go to Key West to coal. When Captain Jewett, commander of the Minneapolis, took the stand he stated till/, be did uot give Schley the information as to the presence of the Spanish licet at Sau’cVLgo. The counsel on both sides became InvoYveJ iu another wrangle over the admission of <*w?. v ersations betAveeu naval men, and Solicitor ifilßtnr’tll the Navy Department, in addressing the court, declared it was apparent that all the officers did not consider it necessary to tell Schley, for the reason that they accepted as true the report of the department that Cevvcra avus hiding in the liarMr. Hanna took the ground that they had no reason to doubt the department’s information, and intimated that Schley was the only one who Avas skeptical 011 that point. Captain Miller told about loading 5,000 tons of'coal nt Hampton Itimils and arriving at Cienfuegos May 23, having made a speed of nine or ten knots. He ! had orders first to coal the loavu. By referring to the log of the Merrimac Captain Miller said he coaled the lowa, the Castillo and the- Dumont May 23. The following day, the 24th, he coaled the Massachusetts. On the way from Cien- * fuegos to Santiago the Merrimac'a eu- ' gines broke down tbe evening of the 20th, I nild she avus towed by the Yale. He eoal- • ed no ships May 20, but the next day he ' coaled the Texas, which came alongside, 1 and the evening of that day he coaled ' the Marblehead and Vixeu by boats. May 29 tlie Massachusetts coaled from the | Merrimac, the 30th the lowa and the 31st the Marblehead again.