Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 21, Number 21, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 5 December 1899 — PHILIPPINES [ARTICLE]

PHILIPPINES

(Professor Doan C. Worcester Lectures on the Report of the Commission. PROMISE WAS NEYER MADE Of Independent!* to Aguinaldo—The Rebel Chief* Proclamation and Hi* Appeal to Foreign Power* Contain Proof That Buoh an Agreeinent Never Existed Administration’* Policy Upheld—Those Who Favor Crushing Out of the Rebellion Should Btand Shoulder to Shonlder and Thws Save Thousands of Lives and Millions of Treasure. Professor Dean O. Worcester of the faculty of the University of Miohigan, a member of the Phillipine com mission, which has recently reported the results of its examination of the. situation in Luzon and neighboring islands, lectured in Central Mnsio hall, Chicago, nndex the auspices of the Hamilt on club. The lecturer was greeted by a large audience which showed itself to b e in sympathy with the admiuist ration and the conduct of the war.

Professor Worcester began his lecture by assuring his audience that, as a scientist, he was accustomed to dealing exclusively with facts, and that those who came in expectation of hearing a rhetorical discourse would be disappointed. He said that he believed Chicago and Chicago audiences were fond of facts in preference to poetry, and that he would offer his hearers nothing but facts, whioh were to be described as they appeared to him. At the outset he paid his resp ects ta “anti-imperialists,” declaring he had nothing to say to men “incapable of ascribing to others motives higher than those by. which they are themselves actuated. ” He believed they constituted the small minority and that the rest were striving for the truth. He deoried efforts to make the Philippines a party question, pointing out that its settlement on any other basis than its merits oould result only in national disaster. Anti-Imperialists Answered.

Concerning accusations brought by those who declaimed against the "socalled crime in the Philippines,” Professor Worcester said that to admit them would be a cons ession of transgression and it was his intention to scrutinize them closely and dispassionately. He referred to the statements he would discuss as "numerous, disconnected and in not a few cases contradictory,” and pleaded that as an excuse for not dealing with them in logical order. He said there had been a noteworthy exception in the case of a gentleman who recently spoke in Central Music hall and he would endeavor roughly to follow his sequence of thought. Continuing he ■aid: "First, then it has been presistently stated that either before or soon after his arrival at Manila, Aguinaldo was definitely promised independence for his people by one American official or another, and many who ,do not make this claim maintain that he was promised it by implication, if not in so many words. Consul Pratt and Admiral Dewey have often been named as the guilty men. What are the foots ? "There is nothing in the official record to show that Admiral Dewey ever made any such promise, either dlreotly or by implication, and whatever the political tricksters may think, or say, concerning his recent personal statement in regard to the matter, I know I am safe in believing that the American people will accept it as final. Aguinaldo ought to know as much about this matter as any onfe, so we will let him speak for himself.”

Aguinaldo’a Proclamation. Then the speaker quoted the insurgent ehieftain’s proclamation of May 24,1898, in which Aguinaldo spoke of American intervention as a manifestation of "protection’ ’ through the states’ belief that the Filipinos were endowed with "sufficient civilisation to govern by themselvea” Professor Worcester said the implication therein as to the granting of independence was of a very mild description and nothing was said of promises. The speaker declared Aguinaldo’s subsequent letter to President McKinley, called forth by reports that the United States contemplated selling the Philippines to a European power, had- not raised the question of promised independence, nor had later proclamations to the insurgent people. Professor Worcester laid stress upon the fact that five weeks after proclaiming independence to his people Aguinaldo made no claim that it was promised to him, but says that he camUrom Hong-Kong to prevent his people from aiding the Spaniards, adding that *he "expected the United States to look upon his government with greater benevolfenoe than any other nation.” Even when Aguinaldo called on foreign governments to recognize "the belligerency of the revolution and the independence of the Philippines,” the speaker said he was still silent about promises. General Anderson’s Letter*. Professor Worcester traced Againaldo’s co-operation with the American army by quoting correspondence between him and General Anderson, explaining that it appeared from the records that "our officers were neither seeking nor accepting the co-operation of Aguinaldo in military movements at the time Manila was taken.” He said, there was finally Agninaldo’sown statement covering this point, in his proclamation of Jan. C, 1899, at Malolos. He continued: “How what part did the insurgents take? Some interesting facts were testified to before the commission. It is believed that our wounded and killed by fire from the insurgents during the attack, and an offloer was ■ant to warn them that Jhey wen firing "

fijpsaish soldiers who were standing exposed on the walls, provoking a return fire whioh killed one of our men and wounded three. It is a well known fact that the insurgent army had been promised the loot of Manila. They attempted to enter the city and refused to retire when ordered to do so. It became necessary to drive them back practically at the bayonet point. So general was the idea that Manila would be looted that men, women and children streamed toward the city all day on Aug. 13 from the neighboring towns, carrying sacks whioh they expected to dll with plunder. “It should not be forgotten that Aguinaldo himself had formerly stated that he donbtod his ability to restrain his troops before we entered the sity, and had apparently been unable to do ■e. How would it have been if they had onoe gotten inside? As a matter of fact they constituted a menace rather than a help. “After the fall of the city Agninalde modestly demanded the royal palace for himself, and in addition the principal chnrohes a share in the pnblio funds, and moat important of all tne arms and ammunition surrendered by the Spanish troops, of which he had long planned to possess himself. It is needless to to add that his requests were refused." Was No Co-Operation. The speaker believed his citations had shown “there was no true co-operation between our land forces and the Filipinos.” Each, he said, had in his own way simply fonght a common foe. Then he traced how the feeling between Americans and insurgents had grown worse day by day, culminating in the insurgent attack on the American lines on the night of Feb. 4. He continued: “The account of the outbreak of hostilities given by the commission has been criticised on the ground that it does not agree in all details with the account of General MacArthor. I have to say in reply that if anyone will take the pains to compare the official account given by General Mao Arthur, General Otis and Admiral Dewey he will find that no one of them agrees in all of its details with any of the others. This does not, however, prove that all of these gen demon are liars. The account given by the commission was based on information obtained from persons present at the time, and I have no apology to make for it. “This matter aside, the commission is in possession of abundant proof that the insurgent leaders had planned a general attack to bs made at a date definitely fixed, but in the near future. Signals by means of oolored rockets had been agreed upon. Various Filpino testified before us that those signals were promptly shown after the filing began on the night of Feb. 4, and Admiral Dewey himself saw them from the bay. ” Then Professor Worohester spoke of the session of General Otis’ commission, declaring that the prime oanse of the failure of the peaceful negotiations lay in the fact that the Filipino commissioners were unable to formulate any definite statement of their own desires. He continued: “It is charged that we did not conquer the Philippines, but brought sovereignty over them from Spain, and that sovereignty has been likened to ‘a soup made by boiling the shadow of the breast-bone of pigeon that has been starved to death.’ ” The objector continues: “Now look at the circumstances under which that, cession was made. Spain hud lost the country except a few isolated and helpless garrisons, most of which were effectively blockaded by the Filipinos. The American forces occupied Cavite and the harbor and city ot Manila, and nothing more. The bulk of the country was occupied and possessed by the people thereof, over,whom Spain had, in point of fact, ceased to exercise any authority, the Spanish power having been driven out or destroyed by the Filipino insurrection. “The figure of speech is certainly very pretty, and the statements whioh follow it are very plausible, but suppose we examine the foot. 1 fix the date by the statement that the American foroes occupied Oavite and Manila, and nothing more: Had the Filipinos really accomplished all this at the time indicated? Did they ever at any subsequent time accomplish it? ”

Self Established Dictator. The close of Prof. Worcester’s address dwelt principally with "the character of Aguinaldo’s government,” which he characterized as headed by "a self-es-tablished dictator, aided by a congress named by himself.” He spoke of conditions prevailing in the provisoes of Batangas and’Gavite, which at the time he left Manila were under Aguinaldo’s sway, as "intolerable” and demonstrating the need of other control. He said statements of Filipinos antipathy to Americans were largely exaggerated; that a vastly improved state or feeling had been engendered and "in the faoe of almost insurmountable obstaole.” He declares that the Filipinos were "beginning in a hundred ways to trust us” and predicted that if America gave them good government the day soon would dawn when they would "fight to the death for us.” He urged that the maintenance of a great army in the islands was necessary because "we are waging the most humane war iu history” and because the United States was attempting to protect peaceable inhabitants from lawless depredations. Declaring that the American people could be trusted to see that the Filipinos were allowed selfgovernment, so far and so fast as they showed themselves fit, he concluded as follows: "Those who affect to believe that we are creating bloody disorder by our presence in the Philippine islands; that the natives would hate us even if we gave them good government; that they would be better off under a very bad government entirely their own than under a very good one administered in part by others, and that the only logical and honorable course open to us Is to withdraw our forces and leave the peaeeable and law-abiding natives at the mercy of Emelio Aguinaldo and his army, may be sincere in their convictions, but by freely giving voice to them they are encouraging the ambitious Tagalog leader to prolong a Struggle which, even if successful, would only bring years full of trouble and disorder to his people. The prolongation of this struggle is costing us millions of dolliurs. and, what is far worse, good red American blood. History will fix the responsibility for it. "Those of us who believe that the flag should stay in the oast, and that under its shadow we should patiently teach to our new wards the lessons they must laarn ere they can take their place la the great family of nations of foe ahd united people, should let the world know where We stand, and we should stand shoulder to shoulder. Let those seoff who will, there Is work for us to da. The future as 10,900,000 of human beings M tic