Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 20, Number 26, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 2 December 1898 — WORK OF OUR NAVY. [ARTICLE]

WORK OF OUR NAVY.

SECRETARY LONG'S ANNUAL RE--1 PORT MADE PUBLIC. Work of the Department la Reviewed from the Resinning of Hostilities— Correspondence Between Schley and Bampaon. The annual report of the Secretary of the Navy is much longer than the usual annual report. The first sentence explains this as follows: For the first time since its rehabilitation the navy has been put to the supreme test of war. Years of patient, persistent training and development had brought it to a point of high efficiency which resulted In the unparalleled victories at Manila and Santiago—victories which have given the names of our naval commanders world-wide fame and added an additional page to the glorious naval history of our country. The report describes in rapid order the steps that were taken to consolidate the squadrons and put the navy in readiness for hostilities. Sigcbee’s famous telegram asking a suspension of public opinion in connection with the blowing up of the Maine is quoted and the Secretary says: “This judicious telegram did much to secure in the public mind a dispassionate view of the disaster.” . The story of Dewey’s victory at Manila Is told, and of it the. Secretary says: Aside from the mere fact of having won without the loss of a single life such a brilliant and electrifying victory at the very outset of the war, with all the confidence which it infused throughout the country and Into the personnel of every branch of the service, it removed at once all apprehension for the Pacific coast. The indirect pecuniary advantage to the United States in the way of saving an incrense of insurance rates and In assuring the country of freedom from attack on yhat coast is incalculable. The Secretary tells how Cervera’s fleet, having sailed from Cape Verde Islands April 29, for an unknown destination, Sampson sailed east with a portion of his fleet for the purpose of observation. At Cape Haitien May 7, the department advised him that the Spanish squadron was reported at St. Thomas. The following statement explains officially why the bombardment of San Juan was not forced to an end: Instructions were also received that the vessels accompanying him were not to be riskefl or crippled in the bombardment of fortifications, us it was considered unwise to risk any of the vessels of our navy until the Spanish fleets had been met and destroyed. * * * The squadron did not arrive off San Juan until the morning of the 12th. A bombardment of that place followed for two hours and a half, but as there was no land force to hold it in case of Its surrender and as the Spanish fleet was not there, it was determined to return to Havana, where it was possible Cervera might have gone. Sampson and Schley. The report shows that the “flying squadron,” under Schley, was ordered to Cienfuegos upon notiete that Cervera’s squadron had been seen off Curacao. But on May 20 the department, having heard that Cervera was at Santiago, advised Sampson to order Schley to proceed off that port. On the 26th Sampson received from Schley a letter dated the 23d stating that he was not satisfied that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfuegos and that he would therefore remain off that point with his squadron. The next day Schley was informed that Cervera had been in Santiago from the 19th to the 25th, and he was directed to proceed with all dispatch to that port. At this time he telegraphed Sampson, under date of the 24th, that coaling off Cienfuegos was very uncertain: that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos; that he would go eastward on the 25th, but that on account of short coal supply he could not blockade if Cervera was in Santiago, but would go to Nicholas Mole to communicate. Upon receiving this information Sampson decided to go to Key \V( >st for coal at once, and, if authorized, to proceed to Santiago in person. Schley left Cienfuegos on the 24th and stopped on the following day twenty miles southeast of Santiago to repair the collier Merrimac. At 7:30 p. m. he signaled to the squadron: “Destination Key W est via south side of Cuba and A ucatan channel as soon as collier is ready; speed nine knots.” After steaming to the westward until 11:20 p. m., the squadron again •topped to make repairs to the Yale, lhe report then continues: On the morning of the 27th the Harvard, from Mole St. Nicholas, delivered to Commodore Schley the following dispatch: "Washington, I>. 0., May 20, 1898- Haryard, St. Nicholas Mole, Haytl: Proceed at once and inform Schley and also the senior officer present off Santiago us follows. All department's information indicates Spanish division Is still at Santiago. The department looks to you to ascertain facts and that the enemy If therein does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago say that there are lauding places five or six nautical miles west from the mouth of harbor and that there insurgents probably will be found ami not the Spanish. From the surroundlug heights you can see every vessel in port. As soon us ascertained notify the department whether the enemy is there. Could not squadron and also Harvard coal froai the Merrimac leeward off Cape Cruz, Ooualves channel, or Mole, Haiti'.' The department will send coal Immediately to Mole. Report without delay situation ut Santiago. LONG.’’ At 11 a. in., two hoars after receiving this dispatch from the department. Commodore gohlcy signaled to the squadron: "Can you fetch Into the port of Key West with coal remaining'* Report by signal.” At noon the Harvard left, carrying his reply to the department's dispatch, as follows: "Kingston, May 28, 1 sup.-Secretary Navy, Washington. l>. C. • • • Merrimac engines disabled; Is heavy: Am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, Brooklyn from collier, owing to very rough sen. Bad weather since leaving Key Wo*t. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient cool to proceed to Key West; cuunot remain off Santiago in present state squadron coal account. Impossible to coal leeward of Cape Crus lu the summer, all owing to southwesterly winds. • • • Much to be regretted, cannot obey orders of department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for eonl to Key West by way of Yunitnu passage. Cannot ascertain anything respecting enemy positive. • • • Vevv difficult to tow collier, to get cable to hold. SCHLEY.” Later lu tile day, the squadron meantime basing again moved westward, the signal "■bop'' vm made to the flying squadron, after which the Texas and Marblehead went alougs'de the Merrimac and coaled. The sqnndron was at that time dlatant about forty miles to the southward and westward of Santiago. linking of the Merrimac. On the 28th signal was made to return In the direction of Santiago and the squadron stopped for the night ten miles off nhnrr. with the Marblehead scouting two nMles' inside. On the next morning the Spanish squadron was sighted inside. On Jtinc 23 the Morritunc was sunk, and of this the Secretary says: 1 This attempt, although unsuccessful In Its object, was daringly executed. It Is now ode of the well-known' historic marvels of naval adventure and enterprise la whioh

Naval Constructor Hobson and hlsWen won undying fame. ' The report deals next with the seizure I of the harbor of Guantanamo and the gal-1 lant three days* fight of the marines; with ! the convoying of the Shatter expedition.| from Tampa to Santiago, and with the conferences that took place between Shatter and Sampson in the effort to secure co-operation of the army and navy in the reduction of Santiago. The story of the operations at this stage involves the recital of the destruction of the Spanish fleet, which is told, however, in the most concise official form. One fact disclosed by the history of the days before the surrender of Santiago is that Sampson asked to be represented in any conference held to arrange the terms of surrender of Santiago by virtue of the fact that he had engaged in the joint operations. Shatter replied that he should be glad to have Sampson represented, but the surrender took place before his rep-’ resentative could reach the camp. Admiral Sampson’s chief of staff did arrive before the final articles were signed, but Shafter declined to permit him to be one of the signatories. The most important chapter of the report is that relating to the increase of the navy, and under this head the Secretary transmits and indorses the report of the naval board of bureau chiefs looking to the increase of the navy by no less than fifteen ships, some of the most powerful 'Hfharaeter. The Secretary says: The navy should be increased: the development of its various branches should be homogeneous, and the increase in ships should be accompanied by a gradual increase in officers and men and In naval stations, coaling stations, repair plants, etc.