Rensselaer Semi-Weekly Republican, Volume 19, Number 63, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 15 April 1898 — TO STOP THE WAR. [ARTICLE]

TO STOP THE WAR.

President McKinley Aska Congress for Authority to Intervene. Full Text of His Message on the Subject of the Situation w . Unhappy (Juba. He Is Opposed to a Recognition oi the Government Established . by the Insurgents. Explosion of the Maine Cited as Evidence of Spain’s Inability to Protect Vessels in Cuban Waters. After an Exhaustive Review of Facta, He Commits the Question of Our Action to Congress Washington, April 12. The president Monday sent the following message tc the congress of the United States: Obedient to that precept of the constitution which commands the president to give froth time to time to eongress information of the state of the union, and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba. I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the state of out own union and the grave relation the course which it Is now Incumbent upon the nation to adopt must needs bear to the traditional policy of our government if It is to accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the republic and religiously observed by succeeding administrations to the present day. Uncivilised Warfare. The present revolution is but the successor of other similar Insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which during its progress has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in . enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to the American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance and disturbance among our citizens, and by the exercise of cruel, barbarous and uncivilized practices of warfare shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people. Ravaged by Fire and Sword. Since the present revolution began in February, 1895, this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged ’ by Are and sword in the course of a struggle unequaled In the history of the islands, and rarely paralleled as to the number of the combatantsand the bitterness of the contest by any revolution of modern times, where a dependent people, striving to be free, have been opposed by the power of the sovereign state. Our people have beheld a ohce prosperous community reduced to comparative want, Its commerce virtually paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills In ruins, and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves constrained, In the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin, and which the law of nations commands, to police our waters and watch our own seaports In prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans. Our trade has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance or our people has been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens, which has inevitably found its expression from time to time in the national legislature, so that Issues wholly externa] to our own body politic engross attention and stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes a self-contented commonwealth Whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has indeed aroused the utmost concern on the part of this government as well during my predecessor’s administration as my own. Efforts for Peace. In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban wai became so onerous that my predecessoi made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-gov-ernment for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed, through the refusal of the Spanish government then In power to consider any form of mediation or Indeed any plan of settlement which did with the actual submission ol the insurgents to the mother country, and only on such terms as Spain hersell might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of the Insurgents was In no wise diminished. New Horrors Added. The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by the audition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman phase happily unfirecedented in the modern historv of clvlized Christian peoples. The policy of devastation and concentration, Inaugurated by the captain-general's bando of October 21, 1896, In the province of I’lnar de) Rio, was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwellings in the open agricultural interior, were driven Into the garrison towns or isolated places held by the troops The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were Interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired mills destroyed ana, In short, everything that could desolate the land and render It unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties, and executed by all the powers at their disposal. Conditions a Year Ago. By the time the present administration took office a year ago, reconcentration—socalled—had been made effective over the better part of the four central and western provinces. Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. The agricultural population, to the estimated number of 800, 000 or more, was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad and exposed to the most unsanitary conditions As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became misery and starvation. J Month by month the death rate Increased In an alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the Jeconcentrados from starvation and the iseases thereto incident, exceeded 50 per centum of their total number. No practical relief was accorded to the destitute The overburdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could give no alts So-called zones of cultivation, established within the Immediate area of effective military control about the cities and fortified camps, proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The pnfortunates, being for the most part women and children with aged and helpless men. enfeebled by disease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil, without tools, seed or shelter, for their own support or for the supply of the cities Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to cut off the resources of the Insurgents, worked Its predestined result. As I said In my message of last DecemberTlt was not civilized warfare: It was extermination. The only peace It could beget was that of the wilder-’ ness nnd the grave. A Noticeable Change. Meanwhile the military situation in the

island had undergone a noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that characterized the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc-and destitution up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural country, without Immediate improvement of their productive situation. . Even thqs partially restricted the revolutionists held their own, and their submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset. ' . -Steps Taken for Relief. In this state of affairs my administration found itself confronted with the' grave problem of its duty. My message of last December reviewed the situation and detailed the steps taken with a view of relieving its acuteness and opening the way to'some form of honorable settlement. The assassination of the prime minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain. The fcfrmer administration pledged to subjugation without concession gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform, involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico. The overtures of this government, made through its new envoy, Gen. Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of the island, although not accepted to the extept of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct of hostilities. Incidentally with these declarations the new government of Spain continued and completed the policy already begun by its predecessor of testifying friendly regard for this nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that by the end of November not a single person entitled in any way to our national protection remained in a Spanish prison. An Appeal for While these negotiations were in prog/ ress, the increasing destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by the Judicious expenditure through the consular agencies of the money appropriated expressly far their suceer by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prempted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people Inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the Bth of January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York city, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community. The efforts of that committee have been untiring and accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba and co-operated with the consul-general and the local authorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly $200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers, and ffiore is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted dwty free, and transportation to the interior has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities, is how extended through most, if not all, of the towns where suffering exists. Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by the Spanish government. Within a few days past the orders of General Weyler have been revoked, the reconcentrados are. it is said, to be permitted to return to their homes and aided to resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace: public works have been ordered to give them employment, and a sum of $600,000 has been appropriated for their relief. Can See No End, The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermination a flnail military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a condition which in effect ended the ten years’ war by the truce of Zenjon. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and Injured as we are, deeply and Intimately, by its very existence. Asked for an Armistice. Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, i in a spirit of true friendliness, no less to l Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the I struggle, to seek to bring about an immeI diate termination of the war. To this end, I submitted, on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation and corre- : spondence, through the United States minister at Madrid, propositions to the SpanI ish government looking to an armistice until October 1 for the negotiation of peace with the good offices of the president. In addition I asked the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration, so as to permit the people to return to their farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, cooperating with the Spanish authorities so as to afford full relief. The Reply of Spain. The reply of the Spanish cabinet was received on the night of the 31st ult. It offers, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the insular department, Inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach a final result, it being, however, understood that the powers reserved the 4th of May next, the Spanish government are not lessened or diminished. As the Cuban parliament does not meet until the 4th of May next, the Spanish government would not object, for Its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities, if asked for by the Insurgents from the general in chief, to whom it would pertain, in such case, to determine the* duration and conditions of the armistice. The propositions submitted by Gen. Woodford and the reply of the Spanish government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are before me —and are substantially in the language above (given. The function of the Cuban parliament in the matter of “preparing” peace and the manner of its doing so are not expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but from Gen. Woodford’s explanatory reports of preliminary discussions preceding the final conference It is understood that the Spanish government stands ready to give the Insular congress full powers to settle the terms of peace with the insurgents, whether by direct negotiations or indirectly by means of legislation. does not appear. End of Diplomacy. With this lant overture In the direction of Immediate peace and its disappointing reception by Spain, the executive was brought to the end of his effort. In my annual message of December last I said: "Of the untried measures there remain: Recognition of the Insurgents as bellgercr.ts, recognition of the Independence of Cuba, neutral Intervention to end the war by Imposing a rational compromise between the contestants and the Intervention in favor of one or the other narty. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression." Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives, Ih the light of President Grant's measured words, uttered In 1875, when after seven years of sanguinary, destructive and cruel barbarities In Cuba he reached the conclusion that the recognition of the Independence of Cuba was impracticable and Indefensible; and that the. A cognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the Inconveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of belligerency which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our Influence or effective office* In the territory of hostilities. Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard, and I recognize ns fully now as then that the Issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerence Is published. coul<|, of Itself and unattended by other aqtion, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor, the Instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the Island. Precedents from History. Turning to the question of recognizing

at this time the Independence of the present Insurgent government in (Sub*, we find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson’s message to congress December 21, 1836, on the sublett of the recognition of the Independence of Texas. He said: “In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes relating to the crews of Portugal and Spain, out of the separation of. the American possessions of both from the European governments, and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion In Spanish America, so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the action of our government that we have, under the most critical circumstances, avoided -all censure, and encountered no other evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good will in those against whom we have been by force of evidence compelled to decide. Our Estalished Policy. "It was thus made known to the world that the uniform policy and practice of the United States ’is to avoid all interference In disputes which merely relate to the Internal government of other nations, and eventually to recognize the authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests and views or to the merits of the original controversy. “But on this, as on every other trying occasion, safety Is to be found in a rigid adherence to principle. “In the contest between Spain and the revolted colonies we stood aloof and waited, not only until the ability of the new states to protect themselves was fully established, but until the danger of their being again subjugated had entirely passed away. Then, and not until then, were they recognized. Such was our course in regard to Mexico herself. The Texas Case. “It is true that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its invading army defeated, thenkief of the republic himself captured, and all present power to control the newly-organized government of to-day annihilated within Hts confines. But on the other hand, there Is, in appearance at least, an immense disparity or physical force on the side of Texas. The Mexican republic under another executive is rallying its forces under a new leader, and menacing a fresh Invasion to recover Its lost dominion. "Upon the issue of this threatened Invasion, the Independence of Texas may be considered as suspended; and were there, nothing peculiar in the situation of the United States and Texas, our acknowledgment of Its Independence at such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions.” Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that there might be imputed to the United States of motives of selfish interests in view of the former claim on our part to the territory of Texas and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in seeking recognition of independence as an Incident to the Incorporation of Texas in the union, concluding thus: Word* of Jackson. “Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself, or one of the great foreign powers, shall recognize the Independence of the new government, at least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them. Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By pursuing It, we are but carrying out the long established policy of our government, a policy which has secured-to us respect and influence abroad and Inspired confidence at home.” Conditions for Recognition. These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson, Jljey ate evidence that the United States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as the condition of tile recognition of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted states shall “constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability,” and forming de facto, “if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state”), has Imposed for its own government in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolting dependency until the danger of its being subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away. This extreme test was in fact applied in the case of Texas. The congress to whom President Jackson referred the question as one “probably leading to war” and therefore a proper subject for "a previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be furnished,” left the matter of the recognition of Texas to the discretion of thaexecutive, providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when the president should be satisfied that the republic of Texas had become “an Independent state.” It was so recognized by President Van Buren, who commissioned a charge d'affaires March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to reconquer the Texan territory and when there was at the time no bona tide contest going on between the insurgent province and it* former sovereign. Should Not Recognize Cnbn. I said in my message of December last: “It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes x>f statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor.” The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive test can be applied to thi greater act than to the lesser, while on the other hand the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy of the recognizing state, which form important factors when the recognition of belligerency Is considered are secondary, if not rightly eiiminabl. factors, when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is not independent beyond peradventure. Nor from the standpoint of expedience do I think ft woulfc be wise or prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the Island. To commit this country’ now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation towards the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government; we would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to It the mere relations ota friendly ally. When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, and having as a matter of fact the proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized, and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted. Our Alternatives. mere remain tne alternative forms of Intervention to end the war. either as an Impartial neutral by Imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or as the active ally of the one party or th* other. As to the first, It 1* not to be forgotten that during the last few months the relation of tne United States has virtually been one of friendly Intervention In many ways, each not of Itself conclusive, but all Jendlng to the exertion of n potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result Just and honorable to all interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hl'herto has been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences between us and Spain ami unstained by the blood of American citizen*. Intervention Justifiable. The forcible intervention of the United States, as a neutral, to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity, and following many historical precedents where neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifice of 11fe by Internecine conflicts beyond their borders, Is justifiable on rational grounds It Involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest ns well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settlement. Cronnds for Intervention. The grounds for such Intervention may be briefly summarized ns follows: First—ln the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to tne conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitlgat”. It Is no answer to say this I* all In another country, belonging to another nation, ar.d Is therefore none of our business. It Is specially our duty, for It Is right at ofir door. Second—We owe It to our citizen* In Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and

to that end to terminate the condition* ‘ t£J. jPriye them of legal protection. 4 T ?. l l d 7'T he ri S ht to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our people and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the isdand. fourth—And which is of the utmost ImP°^J a P ce ; The present condition of affairs in Cuba Is a constant menace to our peace ana entails upon this government an enormous expense. With such a conflict Waged for years in an island eo near us end with which our people have such trade Sv J )us i n ess relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door, by warships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace. Destruction of the Maine. These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already transmitted to congress the report of the naval court of inquiry on the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night of the loth of February. The destruction of that noble vessel haa filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death —grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation. The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed. Proof of Spain’s Weakness. In any event the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is Intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure fety and Security to a vessel of the Am :an navy i the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there. Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, a dispatch from our minister to Spain, of the 26th ult., contained the statement that the Spanish minister for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice require In the matter of the Maine. The reply above referred to of the 31st ult. also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can arise in this matter which is sutfcequently explained by the note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the 10th Inst., as follows: A Note from Spain. "As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views between tne report of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the fact be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, which decision Spain accepts in advance.” To this I have made no reply. Grant Is Quoted. President Grant in 1875, after discussing the phases of the cor.test as it then apS eared, and its hopeless and apparently inefinite prolongation, said: "In such event, I am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the only remaining measures possible—mediation and Intervention. Owing perhaps to the large expanse of water separating the island from the peninsula, the contending parties appear to have within themselves no depository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and excitement have their sway and assume the part of peacemaker. In this view, in tne earlier days of the contest the good offices of the United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both parties, but were at the time declined by Spain with the declaration .nevertheless that at a future time they would be indispensable. "No intimation has been received that In the opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the United States and of other nations. Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the relations and Interests dependent on the existence of peace in the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment, and both have thus far failedNjf achieving any success whereby one party shall possess and control the Island to the exclusion of the other. Under the circumstances, the agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must, sooner or later, be Invoked for the termination of the strife.” Cleveland Is Qwoted. In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during the pending struggle, it was said: “When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject matter of the confbet, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.” In the Near Future. In my annual message to congress, December last, speaking to this question, I said: “The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately Involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not. the exigency of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of Indisputable right and duty. It will be facea, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this government owes to itself, to the people who have conconfided to ft the protection of their Interests and honor, and to humanity Will Act When the Time Comes. “Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and eipurlng If It shall hereafter appear to lie akduty Imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, It shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world." War Must Stop. The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may Inflame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but It has not been and It is plain that It cannot be extinguished by present method*. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which cannot longer be endured is the enforced paemcation or Cuba. In the name of humanity, In the name of civilization, In behalf of endangered American Interests, which give us the right and the duty to sj'enk and to act. the war In Cuba must atm Aska Authority to Act. In view of these facts and these considerations, I ask the congress to authorize and empower the president to take measures to secure a full termination of hostilities between the government of Hjiain and the people of Cuba, and to secure In the island tne establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing Its International obligations, Insuring peace ahd tranquillity ar-l the security of Its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United Htates ax may be necessary for these piirrmsvs. And in the Interest or humanity and to aid In preserving the lives of the starving people of the Island, I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of otir cltlzohs. Now with CMCNMi The Issue Is now with the congress. It Is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the Intolerable condition of affairs which Is at our doors. Prepared to execute evrrv obligation Imposed upon me by the constitution and the law. I a wait your action. K|iatn's Last Note. Yesterday, and since the preparation of

th? foregoing message; official Information was received by me that the latent decree of the queert regent of Spain directs Gen. Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me. This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, (have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peaceloving people will be realized. If it fails it will be only another justification for our contemplated action. WILLIAM M’KTNLET. Executive Mansion. April 11. 1898.