Rising Sun Times, Volume 4, Number 197, Rising Sun, Ohio County, 9 September 1837 — Page 2

bounded liberality to merchants in foreign countries; and all the means of acquiring and employing' credit were put in operation, and extended in their effects to every department of business, and to every quarter of the globe. The reaction was proportioned in its violence to the extraordinary character of events which preceded it. The commercial community of Great Britain were subjected to the greatest difficulties, and their debtors in this country were not only suddenly deprived of accustomed and expected credits, but called upon for payments, which, in the actual posture of things here, could only be made through a general pressure, and at the most ruinous sacrifices. Ia view of these facts, it would seem

impossible for sincere enquirers after truth

the creation of an institution to promote

such objects. On the contrary they justly excite among the community a more diligent inquiry into the character of these operations of trade, towards which it is desired to extend such peculiar favors. The various transactions which bear the name of domestic exchanges, differ essentially in their nature, operation, and utility. One class of them consists of bills of exchange, drawn for the purpose of transferring actual capital from one part of the country to another, or to anticipate the proceeds of property actually transmitted, j Bills of this description are highly useful in the movements of trade, and well deserve all the encouragement which can rightfully be uiven to them. Another

to resist the conviction, that ihr causes oflclaes is made no of bills ot exchange, not

the revulsion in both countries have been ! drawn M transfer actual capital, nor on the

substantially the same. Two nations, the I credit of property transmitted, but to ere

not interfere. They can never justify ican people, who suppose that they have

most commercial in the world, enjoying but recently the highest degree of apparent prosperity, and maintaining with each other the closest relations, arc suddenly, in a time of profound peace, and without any great national disaster, arrested in

their career, and plunged into a state ot

ate fictitious capital, partaking at once of

the character of notes discounted in bank, and of bank notes in circulation, and swelling the mass of paper credits to a vast extent in the most objectionable manner. These bills have formed, for the last few

years, a large proportion of what are term-

embarrassment and distress. In both conn-j ed the domestic exchanges of the country, tries we have witnessed the same ralun- j serving as the means of usurious profit.

da xy of paper monev, and other facili-j and constituting the most unsafe and pre

ties of credit; the same spirit of speculation; the same partial successes; the same difficulties and reverses; and, at length,

carious paper in circulation. This species

continued, oa slight or insufficient grounds,

their persevering opposition to such an institution; or that they can be induced by pecuniary pressure or by any other combination of circumstances, to surrender principles they have so long and so inflexibly maintained. My own views of the subject are unchanged. They have been repeatedly and unreservedly announced to my fellowcitizens; who, with full knowledge of them, conferred upon me the two highest offices of the Government. On the last of these occasions, I felt it due the people to apprise them distinctly, that in the event of my election, I would not be able to co-operate in the re-establishment of a National bank. To these sentiments I have now only to add the expression of an increased

conviction that the re-establish mcnt of such a bank, in any form, whilst it would

I not accomplish the beneficial purpose pro

mised by its advocates, would impair the rightful supremacy of the popular will; injure the character and diminish the influence of our political system; and bring once more into existence a concentrated moneyd, power, hostile to the spirit and threatening to the permanency of our republican institutions. Local banks have been employed for the

deposite and distribution of the revenue, at

of traffic, instead of being upheld, ought i all times partially, and on three different

to be discountenanced by the Government

nearly the same overwhelming catastro-! and the people

phe. The most material difference bc-j In transferring its funds, from place to tween the results in the two countries has j place, the Government is on the same tootonly been, that with us there has also oc- j ing with the private citizen, and may recurred an extensive derangement in the ! sort to the same leg tl means. It may do fiscal affairs of the Federal and State Go- j so through the medium of bills drawn by vernments, occasioned by the suspension i itself, or purchased from others: and in of specie payments by the banks. ! these operations it may, in a manner unThc history of these causes and effects, I doubtcdly constitutional and legitimate, in Great Britain and the United States, is I facilitate and assist exchanges of individ-

substantially the history of the revulsion

in all other ctmmercial countries.

uals founded on real transactions of trade

The extent to which this may be done, and

The present and visible effects of these j the best means of effecting it, arc entitled circumstances on the operation of the Go-j to the fullest consideration. This has vernment, and on the history of the peo- j been bestowed by the Secretary of the pie, point out the objects which call for '. Treasury, and his views will be submitted your immediate attention. to vou in his report. They are to regulate by law the safe B :t it was not designed by the Constikeeping, transfer, and disbursement, of the j tutioa that the Government should assume public moneys; to designate the funds to j the management of domestic or foreign be received and paid by the Government; exchange. It is indeed authorized to regto enable the Treasury to meet promptly ; ulate by law the commerce between the

every demand upon it; to prescribe the ; States, and to provide a general standard

occasions, exclusively, first, anterior to the

currency of the co- nti y, and in his own possession, pursues, w itiiout loss, the current of his business. The Government, placed in the situation of the former, is involved in embarrassments it could not have

suffered had it pursued the course of th latter. These embarrassments arc, moreover, augmented by those salutary and just laws which forbid it to use a depreciated currency, and, by so doing, take from the Government the ability which individuals have of accommodating their transactions to such a catastrophe. A system which can, in time of profound peace, when there is a large revenue laid by, thus suddenly prevent the application and the use of the money of the people, in the manner and for the objects they have directed, cannot be wise: but who can

I think, without painful reflection, that un

dent, the same unforsecn events might have befallen us in the midst of a war. and taken from us at the moment when most wanted, the use of those very means which were treasured up to promote the National welfare and guard our national rights? To such embarrassments and to such dangers will this Govcrrment be always exposed, whilst it takes the moneys raised for, and necessary to, the public service, out of the hands of its own officers, and converts them into a mere right of action against corporations entrusted with the possession of them. Nor can such results be effectually guarded against in

establishment of the first Bank of the U. j such a system, without investing the ExecStates; secondly, in the interval between utivc with a control over the banks themthe termination of that institution and its selves, whether State or Nation::!, that successor; and, thirdly, during the limited might with reason beoljected to. Ours period which has now so abruptly closed, is, probably, the only Government in The connection thus repeatedly attempted, in the world that is liable in the managcproved unsatisfactory on each successive mcnt of its fi-ca! concerns, to occurrences occasion, notwithstanding the various mea- j like these. Bat this imminent risk is not

respects is convenient to the Treasury, but it is not indispensable. A limitation of the expenses of the Government to its actual wants, and of the revenue to those

expenses, with convenient means lor us prompt application to the purposes for which it was raised, are the objects which we should seek to accomplish. The collection, safe-keeping, transfer and disbursement of the public money, can, it is believed, be well managed by officers of the Government. Its collection, and to a great extent, its disbursement also, have indeed been hitherto conducted solely by them; neither National nor State banks when employed, being required to do more than keep it safely while in their custody, und transfer and pay it in such portions and at such times as the Treasury shali direct.

Surely banks are not more able than the Government to secure the money in their possession against accident, violence

or traud. 1 he assertion that they arc so, must assume that the vault in a bank is stronger than a vault in the Treasury; and ihat directors, cashiers and clerks, not selected by the Government, nor under its control, are more worthy of confidence han officers selected from the people and responsible to the Government: officers bound by official oaths,. and bound for a faithful performance of their duties, and

constantly subject to the supervision ol Congress. The difficulties of transfer, and the aid

terms of indulgence, and the mode of set

tlement to bs adopted, as well in collecting from individuals the revenue that has -accrued, as in withdrawing it from former

depositories, and to devise and adopt such

of value, or medium of exchange in gold or silver; but it was not its province to aid individuals in the transfer of their funds, otherwise than through the facilities afford-

sures which were adopted to facilitate or

insure its success. On the last occasion, in the year 1S33, the employment of the Slate banks was guarded especially in every way which experience and caution could suggest. Personal security was required for the safe-keeping and promt payment of the moneys to be received, and full returns o'" their condition were, from time to time, to be made by the depositories. In the first stages the measure was emi

nently successful, notwithstanding the violent opposition of the Bank of the Uni cd States, and the unceasing efforts made to overthrow it. The selected banks performed with fidelity, and without embarrassment to themselves or to the community, their engagement to the Government, and the system promised to be permanently useful. B it when it became necessary, under the act of June, 1830, to withdraw

from them the public monev, tor the pur

the only danger attendant on t he surrender of the public money to the custody and control of local corporations, though the object is aid to the treasury, Us effect may be to introduce into the operations of the Government, influences the most subtle, founded on interests the most selfish. The use by the banks, for their own benefit, of the money deposited with thctii; his received the sanction of the Government irom the commencement of this connection. The money received from the people, instead of I eing kept till it is needed, for their own ue, is, in consequence of this authority, a fund on which discounts

master General, herewith com nunie ttcd, that the fiscal affairs ot' that Department have been successfully conducted since May last upon the principal of de iling n y in the legal currency of the United Si...ics, and that it needs no legislation to m.t.i tain its credit, and facilitate the management of its concerns; the existing laws being, in the opinion of that officer, ample lor those objects. Difficulties will doubtless be encountered for a season, and increased services required from the public functionaries; such are usually inciuent t.i the commencement of every system, but they will Le grciiy lessened in the progress of its operations. The power and influence supposed to I e connected with the custody and disbursement of the public money, are topics on

which the public mmd is naturally and, w i th great propriety, peculiarly sensitive. Much has I ecu said on them, in reference to the proposed separation of the Government from the banking institutions; and surely no one can object to any appeals or unim.adv ersfoiis on the subject, which are consistent with facts, and evince a proper respect lor the intelligence of the people. If a Chief Magistrate may be allowed to speak for himself, on such a point, 1 can truly say, that to me nothing would be mure acceptable, than the wiiliurawai from the Executive, to the greatest practicable extent, of all concern in the custody and (iisbm sctnent t the public revenue; not

i hat 1 would shrink from any resj.onsibili-

are made lor the proht of those who happen lobe owners of slock in the banks selected as depositories. The supposed and often exaggerated advantages of such a boon will always cause it to he sought fir with avidity. I will not stop to consider on whom the patronage incident toil is to be conferred; whether the selection and control be trusted to Congress or to the Executive, cither will be subjected to appeal made in every form which the sagacity of interest can suggest. The banks, under such a system, are stimulated to make the most of their fortunate acquisition; the deposites are treated as an increase of capital; loans and circulations arc rashly augmented, and, when the public exigencies require a return, it is attended with embarrassments not provided for, nor forsccn. Thus the banks tint thought themselves m )st fortunate when the public funds were received, find themselves most embarrassed when the season of payment suddenly arrives. Unfortunately, too, the evils of the system arc not limited to the banks. It stimulates a general rashness, of enterprise, and aggravates the fluctuations of commerce and the currency. This result was

strikingly exhibited during the operations of the late deposite system, and especially

in the purchases ol public lands. I he or

der which ultimately directed the payment of gold and silver in such purchases, great

ly checked but could not altogether nre-

vent the evil. Specie was, indeed, more

difficult to be procured than the notes which

the banks could themselves create at pleasure, but still, being obtained from them as

a loan, and returned as a eeuo-uie. which

they were again at liberty to use, it only passed round the circle with diminished "peed. This ope-;: lion could not have been perf u -use--!, h.ul ti-.e. n nr's of the Government g. ! ii'o T-casury, to be rcgula-iv uNour-L-i, ;:ud not into banks, to

i.e loaned out ilr their own profit, whilo

they wcv ; . ! i,ted to substitute for it a

credit ia a- :.t.

In cxurcss'iiif these sentiments, I desire not to meet alue the benefits off salutary

credit any branch of enterprise. The credit bestowed on probity and industry is

the just reward of merit, and an honorable incentive to further acquisition. None

oppose it who love their country and un-

nerstand its welfare. But when it is un

duly encouraged when it is made to in

flame the public, mind wi.h ihc temptations of sudden and unsubstantial wealth when it turns industry into paths that lead sooner or later todisappointmcnt and distress it becomes liable to censure, and needs correction. Far from helping probity and industry, the ruin to which it leads falis most severely on the great laboring classes, who are thrown sutldenly out of employment, and by the failure of magnificent schemes never intended to enrich them, ate deprived in a moment of their only resource. Abuses of credit and excesses in speculation will happen in de spite of the most salutary laws; no Government perhaps can aliogelher prevent them; but surely every Government can refrain from contributing the stimulus that calls them into life. Since, therefore, experience has shown, that to lend the public money to the local banks, is hazardous lo the operations of the Government, at least of doubtful benefit lo the institutions themselves; and productive of disastrous derangement in the business and currency of the country, is it the part of wisdom again to renew tho

connection I

ed by the Post Office Department. As

further measures, witkia the constitutional j j istly might it be called on to provide for competency of Congress, as will be best ; the transportation of their merchandise.

calculated to revive the enterprise and to j These are epcrations of trade. They pose of placing it in additional institutions, promote the prosperity ol the country. 'ought to be conducted by those who are or of transferring it to the States, they For the deposite, transfer, and disburse-j interested in them, in the same manner found it, in many cases, inconvenient to menf, of the revenue, national an 1 State i tint the incidental difficulties of other I comply with ihe demands of the Treasu-

banks have alvvay, with temporary and ; pursuits arc encountered by other classes i ry, and numerous and pressing applications

limited exceptions, been heretofore employed; but, although advocates of each

system are still to be found, it is apparent

of citizens, Such aid has not been deemed

necessary in other countries. Throughout

E.irt pc the domestic as well as the foreign

were made tor indulgence or relict. A; the instalments under the deposite law be

came payable, their own embarrassments,

that the events of the last few months have exchanges are carried on bv private hous- and the necessity under which they lay of

greatly augmented the desire, long exist- jes, often, if not generally, without the as-

mg among the people of the United States, i sistancc of banks. let they extend to scperate the fiscal operations of the ! throughout distinct sovereignties, and far Government from those of individuals or J exceed in amount the real exchanges of

corporations.

! the United States. There is no reason

T

i ; '):

Again to create a national bank, as a ; why our own may not be conducted in the

fiscal agent, would be to disregard the 1 same manner, with equal cheapness and popular will, twice so'emnly and uncc,ui-j safety. Certainly this might be accomocally expressed. On no question of do-! plished if it were favored by those most mestic policy is there stronger evidence ! deeply interested; and few can doubt that that the sentiments of a large majority are ; their own interest as well as the general deliberately fixed; and I cannot concur j welfare of the country, would be promowith those who think they see, in recent ! ted by leaving such a subject in the hands events, a proof that these sentiments arc, of th .se to whom it properly belongs. A or a reason that they should be, changed, j system founded on private interest, cnterEvents, similar in their origin and char-! prise and competition, without the aid of acter, have heretofore frequently occur-1 legislative grants or regulations by law,

red, without producing any such change; ! would rapiuly prosper; it would be free and the lessons of experience must be f r- f'" 'in the influence of political agitation, gotten, if we suppose that the present I and extend the same exemption to trade overthrow of credit would have been pre-j itself; and it would put an end to those vented by the existence of a national j comph.ints of neglect, partiality, injustice bank. Pronencss to excessive issues has i and oppression, which" are the unavoidable has evci been the vice of the hanking J results of interference by the Government,

system; a vice ; s prominent m N n ,i j in the proper concerns of individuals. AH

former attempts on the part of ihe Govern

ment, to carry its legislation, in this respect, further th.m was designed bv the Constitution, have in the end proved injurious, and have served only to convince the great body of the people, rn rc and more, of the certain dangers of blending private interests with the operations of public business, and there is no reason to suppose that a repetition of them now would be more successful. It cannot be concealed that there exists,

in our community, opinions and feelings on this subject in direct opposition to each other. A large portion of them, combi

ning great intelligence, activity, and in

fluence, are no doubt sincere in their be

lief that the operations of trade ought to

be assisted by such a connection; ihev

regard as necessary lor this purpose, and ihev arc disinclined to every measure that

does not tend, sooner or later, to the es

tablishment of such an institution. On the

other hand, a majority of the people are believed to be irreconcilably opposed to that measure; they consider such a concentration of K)wer dangerous to their liberties; and many of them regard it as a violation of the Constitution. This collision of opinion has, doubtless, caused much of the embarrassment to which the commercial transactions of ihe country have lately been exposed. Banking has become a political topic of the high st interest, and trade has sufi'ered in the conflict of parties. A speedy termination of this state of

things, however desirable, is scarcely to

be expected. We have seen for nearly half a century, that those who advocate a national bank, by whatever motive the may be influenced, constitute a portion of our community too numerous to allow us

to hope for an earlier abandonment of their

favorite plan. On the other bend, they

must indeed form an erroneous estimate of

tho intelligence, and temper of the Axncr

heretofore rendered by banks, have been j ty oast upon me by the duties of my office,

.ess than is usually supposed. The actual accounts show that by far the larger portions is made within short or convenient distances from the places of collection ; and the whole number of warrants issued at

die Treasury in 1831 a year, the res d s of which will, it is believed, afford a sale test for the future, feb short of fiv e thousand, or an average of less than one daily for each State; in the city of New York

they did not average more than two a day, aad at the city of Washington only four. The difficulties heretofore existing are, moreover, daily lessened by an increase in the cheapness and facility of, communication; and it may be asserted with confidence, that the necessary transfers, as well as the safe-keeping and disbursements of the public moneys, can be with safety and convenience accomplished through the a-

out because U is tnv firm behct, that its

capacity tor usefulness is in no degree promoted by the possession of any patronage not actually necessary to the performuiice of th jsc duties. B it timer our present form of Government, the intervention ot the Executive officers ia the custody and disbursement of the public money seeuirf to be unavoidable; r.nd before it can be admitted that the influence and power of the Executive would be increased by dispensing with the agency of banks, the nature of that intervention ia suUi an iigency must be carcfuiiy regard vu, and a comparison must be instituted between its e.vient in ihe two cases. The revenue can only be collected by officers appointed by the President, with the advise ar.d consent of the Senate.

fhc public moneys, in the first instance,

as m btate instil 1:1 n-

is as subservient to tii-i udvan. e::u.-.it ; private interests in the one ;.s in the -.he: ; and those who direct them both, leing principally guided by the same v iews, woi be equally ready to stimulate extravagance of enterprise by improvi lence of credii. How strikingly is this conclusion sustained by experience. The bank of the United States, with the vast powers conferred on it by Congress, did not or could nol prevent former and similar embarrass

ments; nor has the still greater strength it has been said to possess, under its present charter, enabled it, in the existing emergency, to check other institutions, or even to save itself. In Great B.-itian, where it has been seen, the same causes hav e been attended with the same effects, a national bank, possessing powers far greater than are asked for by the warmest advocates of such an instituti n here, has also proved unable to prevent an undue expansion of credit, and the evils that flow from it. Nor can I find any tenable ground for the ic-establishmcnt of a national bank, in the derangement alleged at present to exist in the domestic exchanges of the country, or in the facilities it may be capable of affording them. Although advantages of this sort were anticipated when the first Bank of the United States was created, ;hcy were regarded as an incidental accommodation; not one which the Federal Government was bound, or could be called upon, to furnish. This accommodation is now, indeed, after Ihe lapse of not many years, demanded from it as among its first duties; and an omission to aid and regulate commercial exchange, is treated as a ground of loud and serious complaint. Sjch results only serve to exemplify the constant desire amongsome of our citizens, to enlarge the powers of the Government, and to extend it control t subjects with which it should

curtailing their discounts and calling in

their debts, increased the general distress, and contributed, with other causes, to hasten the revulsion in which, they, at length, in common with the other banks, were fatally involved. Under these circumstances, it becomes our solemn duty to inquire whether there are not, in any connection between the

Government and banks of issue, evils of

great magnitude, inherent in its very nature, and against which no precautions can effectually guard. Unforeseen in the organization of the

Government, and forced on the Treasury by early necessities, the practice of employ ing "banks, was, in truth, from the be

ginning, more a measure of emergency, than of sound policy. When we started into existence as a nation, in addition to the burden of the new Government, we assumed all the large but honorable load of debt which was the price of our liberty; but we hesitated to weigh down the ini'.ni industry of ihe country bv resorting toadequate taxation for the necessary revenue. Toe feci lilies of banks, in return for the privileges they acquired, were promptly offered, and perhaps too readily received, by an embarrassed Treasury. During the long continuance of a national debt,nd the intervening difficulties of a foreign war, the connection was continued from motives of convenience; but these causes have long since passed awav. We have no emergencies that make banks necessary to aid the wants of the Treasury; we have no load of national debt to provide for, and we have on actual deposite a large suiplus. No public interest, therefore, now requires the renewal ofa connection that circumstances have dissolved. The complete organization of our Gov ernment, the abundance of our resources, the general harmony which prevails between the different States, and with foreign Powers, all enable us now to select the system most consistent with the Constitution, and most conducive to ihe public welfare. Should we, then, connect the treasury for a fourth time with the local banks it can only be under a conviction that past failures have arisen from accidental, not inherent defects. A danger, difficult, if not impossible, to be avoided in such an arrangement, is made strikingly evident in the very event by which it has now been defeated. A sudden act of the banks intrusted wkh the funds of the people, deprive the Treasury, without fault or agency of the Government, of the ability to pay its creditors in the

currency they have by law a right to de

mand. I his circumstance no fluctuation

of commerce could have produced, if the

public revenue had been collected in the1

legal currency, and kept in that form by

the officers ot the I reasnry. The citizen whose money was in bank receives it back, since the suspension, at a sacrifice in its

amount; whilst he who kept it in the legal J It is true that such an Bgency in many

gcncies of 'I reasnry officers. This onin- i must, therefore, in ad cases puss through

ion has been in some degree confirmed by hands selected by the Executive. Other actuai experience since the discontinuance I officers, appointed in ihe same way. or, as of the banks as fiscal agents, in May lnM;;Hi some eases, by the President alone, a period which from the embarrassments j must also be entrusted with them when in commercial intercourse, presented oh-! drawn lor the purpose of disbursement. It

as great as any that may hereafter: i thus seen that, even when banks arc

stacl

be apprehended.

The manner of keeping ihe public money since th.it period, is fully stated in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury. That officer also suggests the propriety of assuming by law, certain additional duties to existing establishments and offices, which, with the modifications and safeguards referred to by him, will he thinks enable t lie Department to continue to perforin this branch of the public serv ice without any material addition cither to their number or to the present expense. The extent of the business to be transacted has already been stated; and in respect to the amount of money with which the officers employed would be entrusted at any one lim , it appears that, assuming a balance

of five millions to be at all times kept in the Treasury, and the whole of it left in the hands of the collectors and receivers, the proportion of each would not exceed an average of thirty thousand dollars; but that, deducting luie million for the use of the mint, and assuming the remaining four millions to be in the hands of one-half the present number of officers a supposition deemed more likely to correspond wi;h the fact the sum in the hands of each

would still be less than the amount of most of the bonds now taken from the receivers of public money. Every apprehension, however, on the sol ject, cither in respect to the safety of the money, or the faithful discharge of these fiscal transactions, m ty, it appears to me, be effectually removed by adding to the present means f the Treasury, the establishment ly law, at a few important points, of offices for the deposite and disbursement of such portb ns of the public revenue as cannot, with obvious safety and convenience, be left in the possession of the collecting officers until paid over by them to the public creditors. Neither the amounts retained in their hinds, nor those deposited in the offices, would, in an ordinary oonaitb n of the rev enue, be bugcr in most cases than those often under the control of the disbursing officers of the Army and Navy, and might be made entirely safe, by r. quiring such securities, and exercising such controlling superv ision, as Congress may by law prescribe. The principal officers whose appointments would become necessary under this plan, taking the largest number suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, would not exceed ten; nor the additional expenses, at the same estimate, sixty thousand dollars a year. There can be no doubt of the obligation of those who are entrusted with the affairs of the Government, to conduct them with as little cost to the nation as is consistent with the public interest; and it is for Congress, and ultima tely for the people, to decide whether the benefits to be derived from keeping our fiscal concerns apart, Had severing the connection which has hitherto existed between the Government and banks, ofler sufficient advantages to j istify the necessary expenses. If the object to le accomplished is deemed important to, fhc tuture welfare of the country, I cannot allovy myself to believe that 'the addition to the public expenditure of comparatively so small an amount as w ill be necessary to effect it, will be objeclcd to by the poople. It will be r ecn by the report of the Post-

cmpioyed, the public funds must tw ice pass through the the hands of Executive officers. Besides this, the head of the Treasury Department, w iio also holds his office at the pleasure of the President, ami some other officers of the same department, must necessarily be invested with more or less power in the selection, contintian"c and supervision of the banks that mav'tTc em-" p o ed. The question is then r.ot uarrowed to the single point, whether, ia the intermediate stage between the collection and disbursement of the public monev, ihe agency of banks is necessary to avoid a dangerous extcusion of the patr. n::go inliucuce of the Executive? B., i-. c.ear that the connection of the Exeeoii - o with powerful moneyed instituti. ns, capable of ministering to the interests of men in points where they arc most accessible to corruption, is less liable to abuse, than his constitutional agency in the control , f the few public officers required by the reposed plan. Will the public monev, when in their hands, be necessarily exposed to ,ii3V improper interference on the part of .he Executive? May it not be hoped that a prudent fear of public jealousy and disapprobation, in a matter so peculiarly exposed to them, will deter him from any such interference, even if higher motives be found inoperative? Miv n t Congress so regulate, by law, the duty of th..c officers, and sulject it to such supervision and publicity, as to prevent the '.-ossi! i'itv of any iorious abuse on the p,rt of :he Executive? and is there eq ia! room f.r such

with banks, acting under the hhteid porate immunities, and conducted i v sons irresponsible lo the Government

the people? It is believed that a considerate and c.-n-did investigation of there question w i.i result in the conviction that the proposed plan is far less liable to oljec;i n, on the score of Executiv e patronage and control, than any b ulk agency that has leen, or can be, devised. With ihese views, I leave to Congress the measures necessary to regulate in the present emergency, the safe-keeping and transfer of the public moneys. In the performance of constitution il duty, I have stated to them, without .eservethe result of my own reflections. The subject is of great importance; undone en which we can scarcely expect tol c as united, in sentiment as we are in interest. It deserves a free and full discussion, and cannot fail to I e benefitted by a dispassionate comparison ol opinions. Well aware mvself ol '.he duty of reciprocal concession am nr the co-ordinate branches of the Goveri" men!, I can promise a reasonable spirit of co-operation, so far as it can be indulged in without the surrender of constitutional objections, which I believe to be well founded. Any system that may be adopted should I csuljcetcd to the fullest legal provision, sous to leave nothing to the Executive but what is necessary to the discharge of the duties imposed on him; and whatever plan may 1 e ultimately established, my ow n part shall be so discharged as to give to it a fair trial, and the best prospect of success. The character of the funds tube received; and disbursed in tha transactions of the Government, likewise demands vou, most careful consideration. '

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