Richmond Palladium (Daily), Volume 40, Number 156, 14 June 1915 — Page 7

PAGE SEVEN ftNavy l b iTlTtIP

THE RICHMOND. PALLADIUM AND . SUN-TELEGRAM,

TIN

Nel(cil(dl9

Congr

essman

the

Navy Daniels, and Demands That the

Truth About Inferiority of

By Augustus P. Gardner, Congressman fram 1 . n nn v'

RESIDENT GARFIELD, of Williams Col. lege, recently wrote to Secretary Daniels asking for material to "meet the state Bents made by Representative Gardner, ot Massachusetts." The good secretary answers in m lUUl-vuiuuiu - meeting a single one ot my statements. Instead he Instituted a very Ingenious com 'parlson between what was done tor the navy In the last two years ot the Tatt administration, and in the first two years ot the Wilson .4mini.)n fin rativ tn th advantage of the ! latter, from the point ot view ot wicked militarists. All very Interesting, no doubt, if the public cared a rap whether It was Roosevelt's administration, or Taffs administration, or .Wilson's administration that was responsible for our inadequate and ill-managed navy. . While the secretary was making his com parlson, by t:ie way. it might hare been just as well for hl.u to call attention to the lacs that during the last two years of the Taft administration, li.o period which he chose for nmnirlsoa. tho Durse-strlnga were held by a Democratic House of Representatives. President CarHeld wants to know what sort of a navy we have. The secretary answers, "A sight bettor one than under Republican administration." A 1IO JJUUtit V Hit eew " - Danilft la fit for his job. Tlae secretary re1 a-.- . v i. . r-,xA Hant flf tir than Mavpl" tuat w oww If we ask bow cur warship tonnage com- - .Uk V AAlen ttrtn th A RoprAt T?.tcu wiui ui u -. . . amm . t a tary replies inot we nave o tcddoi me lllaU UUOViClO nilU iwuvi - - - laid aside in cold storage, with half crews, skeleton crews, or no crews at all; but he doesn't answer our question. If wn agie wnetuer tne expert onicere oi ins ': Bsvy think we nave suniciem smps aim m , to make us safe, we are humorously told that v hnard of the BftW is COmDOBCd of Hftamen ." but we are told nothing of the fact that they reported to him that the -in-adequacy of our naval policy has placed us In . position of inferiority, as conipaied to foreign nations, and that this inferiority, is continually on the Increase. If we ask whether the navy is prepared '.a j?et a first-class enemy, we are triumphant1? told that last Spring it proved its prepatednesa to fight Huerta when the second Mexican war Lroke out. If t the sccietary to give tho numbers C' torpedoes and mines In possession of tho ' t'ay and the contract speed for its dirfgible fi ships, in order to cneck oft the secretary's ' cMuteiancc, the tecretary sayE. "HuU! Naval s.crels!" It w iav: th ?ecrotary to make good his void that, man for man, cir crew are still p to the standnrcl ot other tiavie?, the secretary tells us about theli scholastic accomplishments, but he refuses tr 9 records of their tar. get practise. .... J Some 'Torpedoes" V:$3IIZZZZZ3 for Daniel, to Answer- mm i Here are the counts In my indictment against th navy, to which out pr.!.vi triced makes no reply. Here us a round d rea of tsy torpedoes (which ho V.a Uwxtrously lodged: TORPEDO NO. 1 Admiral FisTto. chief of epe-attons t h f eet, testified that it would take ive years to fit .he navy to meet an eftl-cl-t rorcian too. The Secretary answers by call'ns attention tt the magniCeent exhibition aKalniit th Sou'hwert Wind off Vera Cruz. TORPEDO NO. The United States Office of Naval latelliser.ee, it its latest bulletin (July 1. 1914). declared that the United States bad fallen down to fourth place in warship tejftcage, built and buiMintf. Even France had pacsd us. As for Germany, her warship tonnage, built and building, had grown to over 1,300,000 tons. w!:lo ours was less than 900,000. Great Britain's warship tonnage, built and building, r.y the way, on July 1 last, was a half million toes greater than that of Germany and the United States combined. The Secretary, in his annual report, undertakes to meet ti t situation by expressing a hope that "WhM peace smiles upon this wartorn globe there may be reserved for America the covctd honor of Initiating a movement wh'c'u wiil make possible a reduction of fighting ..raft." TORPEDO NO. S The aforementioned latest bulletin of the United States Office ot Naval Intelligence declared that on July 1, last, Great Britain's areadnought and dreadnought cruisers, built and building, numbered forty-six, while Germany's numbered twenty-eight and Uncle tnxux't numbered twelve. The Secretary must C;a- overlooked this bulletin as well as this couit fit the Indictment which I brought against 'Ae i.-avy. At "11 events he makes no comment. 70SPT7DO NO. 4 Assistant Secretary Roosevelt te't'.2d that. it would take from three months tv a year to get into fighting trim any of the 101 "viela, 'which the Secretary tells us a. :aM tp In the various forms ot scrap heap, whloh he euphemistically describes as In reserve," "In ordinary" and "Uncommissioned." Ti reply to President Garfield says that these vessels would be available In time . A

m- vwifiijuh uf mo oir vompiDj, ureas jrn&inKJg-nta R

Gardner Aims Twelve Disquieting "Torpedoes" at

Our Inadequate Naval Policy and the Steadily Increasing Our Navy in a Real, Unhampered Congressional Investigation.

ot war. QUERY: Available when tne war begins, or when the war is overt TORPEDO No. 6 Commander Stirling, chlet of the Atlantic submarine flotilla, testified that Admiral Fletcher on November 1 last ordered him to mobilize all available submarines in the North Atlantlo (except the Canal Zone submarines). The commander stated that he succeeded in reporting at the rendezvous at Hampton Roads, with the modest command of one single submarine tit for manoeuvers at sea oft the coast. The secretary dismisses this trivial incident with the masterpiece ot understatement that "some of our submarines are not as perfect as they should be." TORPEDO No. 61 have publicly asserted that Secretary Daniels administered a stinging rebuke to Commander Stirling for respectfully calling the attention ot the Navy Department to its incredible neglect ot our submarines. The secretary, with his delicious sense of humor, observes that his professional training as a journalist has taught him to encourage free speech in officers. TORPEDO No. 7 Captain Bristol, chief ot the air service ot the navy, testified that at the beginning of the war, according to our best information, France had 22 dirigibles and 1,400 aeroplanes; that Germany had 40 dirigibles and 1,000 aeroplanes, and that the United States, army and navy combined, had no dirigibles and 23 aeroplanes. The general board ot the navy, composed of the very best officers, recommended this' year the appropriation ot $5,000,000 for aircraft. The secretary writes President Garfield that he has appointed a Board of Aviation and that Congress, on his earnest recommendation, has appropriated the extravagant sum of $1,000,000 for airships. By the way, an earnest search of the secretary's annual report and an earnest examination of his own estimates sent to Congress, fails to reveal any such earnest recommendation whatever. On he contrary. Representative Roberts, in the hearings on the naval bill, suggested the appropriation of $1,000,000 for a'rships. The secretary's earnest recommendation made at the time was this: An Apparent Contradictory Statement. "I should be very glad to have the $1,000,000, but I have not recommended it now." TORPEDO NO. 8 The United States Navy Book for 1914 shows that the German warship B'.uecher. which was sunk in the recent North Sea battle, was five nautical miles an hour slower than any other one of the nine big UkMIng ships enraged. The Bleucher could not keep up to her coasorts, so she fell a prey to the fast British dreadnought cruisers. Yet this same slow Bluecher, which was sunk because she could not keep up with her consorts, was faster than the fastest of the big fighting ships in the whole United States Navy. In the entire 3,500 words of the Secretary's letter to President Garfield. not a single allusion is made to the counts in my Indictment which relate to the slowness of our "capital" ships. TORPEDO NO. 9 Admiral Strauss declared In his last annual report (November, 1914) that all battleships constructed previously to the battleships Nevada and Oklahoma are "equipped with a short range torpedo, which may be considered obsolete for the battle fleet." Inasmuch as neither the Nevada nor the Oklahoma has yet been completed, this was the Admiral's gentlemanly way of calling attention to the fact that all our battleships available at the present time are equipped with obsolete torpedoes. Furthermore, last October, before lockjaw broke out in the Navy Department, Admiral Strauss told me that less than sixty long-range torpedoes had been completed up to that date, although provision had been made for the manufacture or purchase of from 600 to 600 more. The Secretary cheerfully informs President Garfield that the Administration is going forward in the mattci of torpedoes, but when I telegraphed to him 'asking whether the statement in Admiral Strauss's report as to the faulty torpedo equipment in our battleships still holdB good, the Secretary modestly draped himself again in the veil of. secrecy. -3 TORPEDO NO. 10 Admiral Knight, chief of the War College, testified that there is no cooperation between the War College and the fleet and that we have a complete lack of naval policy. Less than eighteen months ago the General Board of the navy called Secretary Daniels's attention to this same lack of naval policy and declared that it was resulting in the Increasing inferiority of our navy. The Sa. rotary is silent as to my indictment based n Admiral Knight's letter. This is strange, for Admiral Knight's letter was written in response to Secretary Daniels's own telegram. The telegram was sent at the time that the Secretary was trying to substantiate his assertion that Commander Yarnell's gold medal essay, entitled "The Greatest Need of the Atlantic Fleet," w"as wrong in indicating that there was no team-play in the management ot the navy. By the way, one of the pregnant sentences In Commander Yarnell's essay is worth quoting. Here it is: Copyright,

"To the question, 'Are we ready to go to war to-morrow with a first-class power?" it win require a radical optimist to answer tn the affirmative." t Secretary Redfleld is obviously not the only radical optimist In the Cabinet. TORPEDO NO. 11 Admiral Fletcher, commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet, testified that there is an "alarming shortage" of over 5,000 men on the twenty-one battleships under . his command, without reckoning the shortages in the rest of the fleet, or the shortages in other fleets, or la the crews of vessels laid up in "cold storage." The Secretary's logical mind finds an answer to Fletcher in calling attention to the fact that there are 5,824 more men in the navy than on March 1, 1814. It I were a politician instead ot being a statesman, I might use that incautious admission by way ot a frost for Secretary Redfield'a ever-flowering prosperity plants which continually bud, but never bloom. I might go bo tar as to surmise that lack of other employment might have some bearing on the Increase. TORPEDO NO. 12 (the biggest torpedo ot all) In 1903 the General Board of the navy, under orders from President Roosevelt and Secretary Moody, investigated the building programmes and the naval and the political conditions of all principal foreign countries. , The General Board also looked over the whole field of the International relations of the United States, and likewise it considered the military situations which might possibly develop in time ot war. In its report the board recommended a building programme for our navy, a programme which, In the board's estimation, would be the minimum sufficient for our safety. Our safety against whatf Our safety against the navy of any nation upon earth, perhaps you think. By no means. The board's plan contemplated a navy sufficient to make us safe against the navy of any nation ' except Great Britain. A modest enough programme every sensible man must admit! Personally I confess to a hankering, for a navy that does not leave us at the mercy of the friendliness of any maritime nation upon earth, Including Great Britain. Of course, the membership of the General Board of the navy has changed every year since 1903. Yet, with unimportant alterations, they stick to their guns and still insist that we must have forty-eight battleships less than twenty years old if we wish to be safe against Germany. Futhermore, this building programme of the board contemplates 192 destroyers, a large number of cruisers and various other type. The number ot submarines has x.ot yet been fixed upon. Admiral Vreeland testifed that wa ought to have 100 submarines tor harbor defense alone. Remember that this programme of fortyeight battleships was laid down twelve years ago, and then consider this sentence from the most recent report of the General Board of the Navy: "This shows that we are now deficient tea battleships, built, building and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 programme." Ten battleships is a terrific shortage from a minimum of forty-eight. To be sure, since this report was penned. Congress has authorized two battleships. But they will not be completed until 1919. Meanwhile the battleship Iowa will have passed the fatal twenty-year mark, while the battleships Kearsarge, Kentucky and Alabama will be nineteen years old, reckoning from the age of completion. ' In the matter of destroyers our shortage is still more extraordinary. In lieu of the 192 destroyers recommended, we have only seventyfour destroyerB. built, building or even authorized. The General Board originally recom. mended forty-eight fast scout cruisers to act , as the messengers and eyes of our fleet. Probably such a large number is unnecessary In vie v of the development of other craft. Few people, however, could consider twenty fast scout cruisers excessive. In lieu ot the recommendations of the General Board, Congress, in its wisdom, has built just three fast scout cruisers, and they are only fast in a lady-like sea. As to the submarines, if you count the F-4 at the bottom of the sea and all the submarines which are in the scrap heap, or ought to be in the scrap heap, and all the submarines that are now building, we have just fifty-nine of them, and a sorry mass of misfits many Of them are. This year Congress adopted the advice of the General Board of the Navy and provided for sixteen additional coast submarines and two ocean-going submarines. No thanks, however, to that sad sea-dog, our optimistic Secretary of the Navy. He cut the General Board's submarine recommendation in two before he sent his estimate to Congress. - Congress, however, firmly, but kindly. Ignored the Secretary's estimate, but we had an awful row before the peace professors were beaten. In view ot the fact' that ft is a matter ot record that Secretary Daniels, in both his annual estimates, has cut in two the building recommendations of the General Board, to those of us who know tht. truth It is profoundly diverting to observe the Secretary arrayed in the

1918, by the Star Company. Great Britain-Rights

American Public

CONGRESSMAN GARDNER. Who Insistently .Demands An , Adequate Navy.

war-paint and feathers of a promoter of an increased navy. The Secretary has with egllity eluded this twelfth torpedo. Furthermore, I venture to say that no one who reads the letter to President Garfield would for a moment suspect that such an advisory council exists as the General Board of the Navy, or that its views differ radically from those of the Secretary. I find little allusion to the board in the whole four newspaper columns which comprise the reply to President Garfield. Oh. Mr., General PeMio. isn't It perfectly clear to you that there ought to be an impartial investigation to see whether the Secretary Is telling you the truth or whether I am telling you the truth? Do you think you can learn the whole truth from the evidence at the hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs? Do you realize that the officers summoned before that committee are practically never the junior officers, but are almost always the heads of departments la close touch with Secretary Daniels? t Do you know that Admiral Ficke was not sent to testify by the Naval Department, buc

C. K. Chesterton Would Meaningless

i: T By G. K. Chesterton, The Distinguished English Essayist. IF the Socialists desire, as many of them do most sincerely desire, to cure some of the cruel unfairness of our social chaos, I beg them, I embrace their knees and implore them, not to be such prigs. The war in which they ought to be engaged is a war about bread and blood and sleep and 6eath a war of monosyllables. There will not be a crust more bread In a poor man's house, or a penny more in a poor man's bank, or another vote given independently, or another blow struck for freedom so long as Socialists use expressions like "The International solidarity ot the class-conscious proletariat." A literary style like that would have sent the stormers of the Bastlle to sleep standing at their guns, and turned every cap of liberty Into a nightcap. Nor does the expression express even awkwardly any reality of this earth. It is a cheap pretense of science; but there is not even science Inside it. Men who work with their hands hate each other, or love each other, or fear each other. rity each other, or are Indifferent to each oAer. But standing still in the middle of the street and feeling internationally solid is a sensation as Inconceivable to a workman as it in to me. I do not mean that the workmen of one. country could not applaud or even assist 1 he workmen of another in some battle against oppression. I think it is very probable that they might, if these frost-bitten professors of polysyllablsm would only put the thine the right way. rved.

Secretary of

Be Told the from Photo. Copyright kr CUaedlnat WublagtMh Btfe was summoned only after Captain Hobson, a member of the committee, had insisted that both sides should be heard? Do you know that Commander Stirling was not sent by the Navy Department, but came la response to an imperative call after Congressman Roberts had taken up the newspaper charges made against our submarine fleet? Do you know that Captain Hobson asked for the summons of Admiral Knight and yet was peremptorily refused? Do you know that the Committee on Naval Affairs absolutely turned down my demand that they should hear Admiral Walnwright. Admiral Brownson and Admiral Winslow? If you want to know the truth, tell your Representative in Congress that you want a RE At. INVESTIGATION: that you insist upon know. Ing what the junior officers have to say and what the enlisted men have to say; that you will not take any more sterilized evidence: THAT YOU INSIST THAT BOTH SIDES SHALL BE HEARD and that both sides shall have the right to cross-examine in public. Above all, tell your Congressman that yoa insist that while the inquiry is on Secretary Daniels must absolutely keep his hands off. Revise Socialism's Speech If the' poor of one country thought about the poor of another they would think of them as people of that country. The international sympathy would be a national sympathy, and. therefore, not a cosmopolitan one. An English laborer would not say: "The proletarian problem is very acute in Poland." He would say:' "I think it's a great shame the way those poor Poles are treated." lie would not say: "The proletarian programme is hopeful in the department of the Seine." He wonld say: "I hope those French strikers will win." He would not say: "The proletarian victory under the Prussian electoral system is somewhat unexpected." He would say: "Golly; there's something in those German sausages, after alL" The working man thinks in terms of nationality, being a healthy man. To prefer one's own habits, home, tastes and memories te widely different ones; to be surprised, agree ably or otherwise, at the sight of widely different ones; to prefer the familiar, even If yotl admire the unfamiliar this Is as much one ot the Rights of Man as bread itself. You will never get any strong or simple men anywhere to see that a man is a voter before they see that he is a Chinaman; or to recognize a maa as a delegate before they recognize him as Is nigger. You will never persuade men close te -such a reality as manual labor to think only -of the ticket in a man's pocket, and never ot the hat on his head, or the boots on his feet, or the hair on his. face, or the tongue In his mouth. You certainly cannot do it by using one material metaphor which is manifestly contrary to the facts, and talking about "solidarity'' as It we were all bora stuck together wita glue. . ,

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