Rensselaer Union, Volume 8, Number 48, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 17 August 1876 — Col. Reno’s Report. [ARTICLE]

Col. Reno’s Report.

The Army and Nary Journal contains ■'CoL Reno’s complete official report—as \tbe senior surviving commander of theSev•cath cavalry—of the battle of the Little Big Horn, in which Gen. Cuater lost his life. The report, dated July 5, sheds light ‘ apoa certain jxtinta hitherto obscure. FolC«wiog is the important portion: As we approached a deserted village, in which was standing one tepee, about eleven a. m., Custer motioned me to cross to kin, which I did, and .moved nearer to his <Se*eufn, until about 12:30a. m., when Lieut, drake, adjutant, came to me and said the ■wiltage waa only two miles ahead, and the Medians running away. To “ move for•■rard Mas rapid a gait as I thought prudent, and to charge afterward, and that uttaa whole outfit would support me;” I >think those were his exact words. I at •once took a fast trot, and moved down iabout two miles, when I came to a ford of Ike river. I crossed immediately and Sed about ten minutes or less, to gather battalion, sending word to Custer that I had everything in front of ine, and that lhey were strong. I deployed, and, with <he scouts on my left, charged down rthe valley, driving the Indians with great •«aae for about two and a half miles. I, however, soon saw that I was being drawn ..into some trap, as they certainly would *fight harder, and especially as we were .twearingtheir village, which was still standing; besides, I could not see Custer, or any other support, and at the same time the very earth seemed to grow Indians, and they were running toward me in swarms’ and from all directions. I saw I mu* defend myself and give up the atrtack mounted. This I did, taking pos- . session of a point of woods, and which Jnrnished, near its edge, a shelter for the ■horses; dismounted and fought them on foot, making headway through the wood. I soon found myself in the near vicinity ■of the village, saw that I was fighting odds of at least five to one, and that my only hope was to get out of the woods, where I would soon have been surrounded, and gain some high ground. I moved to the summit of the highest bluff, but seeing and hearing nothing of Custer, sent eCapt. Weir, with his company, to open communications with the other command, fie soon sent back word by Lieut. Hare that he could go no further, and the Indians were getting around him; at this <time he was keeping up a heavy fire from his skirmish line. lat once turned everything back to the first position I had taken ■on the bluff, and which seemed the best. I dismounted the men, had the horses and mules of the pack-train driven together in iadepression, put the men on the crests of the hills making the* depression, and had kardly done so when I was furiously attacked; this was about six p. m.; we held ■onr ground with the loss of eighteen •enlisted men killed and forty-six wounded until the attack ceased, about nine p.“ m. As I knew by this (time their overwhelming numbers, and had given up any support from the por- < tion of the regiment with Custer, I had the men dig rifle-pits; barricaded with dead homes, mules and boxes of hard bread, the •opening of the depression toward the In•dians, in which the animals were herded, and made every exertion to be ready for what I saw would be a terrific assault the next day. All this night the men were finwy, and the Indians holding a scalpdtaace underneath us in the bottom in our hearing. On the morning of the 26th, I felt confident that I could hold mv own, and was ready as far as could be, when at daylight, about 2:30 a. m., I heard the crack of two rifles. This was the signal for the beginning of a fire which I have .never seen equaled. Every rifle was hand&ted by an expert and skilled marksman, ;andwithu range that exceeded our car- : bane, and it was simply impossible to •show aay part of the body before it was struck. We could see, as the day bright»ened, counties hordes of them pouring up < the valley from out of the village, and scampering over the high points toward i the places designated for them by their * chiefs, and which entirely surrounded our { position. They had sufficient numbers to • xoqtßfetely encircle us, and men were -atruck on opposite sides of the lines from where the-rftota were fired. I think we were flighting allthe Sioux nation, and also all and the Arkansaw and east of tffito Rocky Mountains. They must have dealt 2,500 warriors. The

Are did not slacken until about 9:90 a. m., and then we discovered that they were making a last desperate attempt, and which was directed against the lines held by Companies H. and M. In tills attack they charged close enough to use tljeir bows and arrows, and one man lying dead within our lines was touched by the "coup stick" of one of the foremost Indians. When I my the stick was only about ten or twelve feet long, some idea of the desperate and reckless fighting of these people may be understood. About two p. m. the grass in the bottom was act on fire and followed up by Indians, who encouraged Its burning, and it was evident it was done for a purpose—which purpose I discovered later on to lie the creation of a dense dond of smoke, behind which they were packing and preparing to move their tepees. It was between six and seven &m., that the village came out from bend the clouds of smoke and dust. We had a close and good view of them as they filed away in the direction of Big Horn Mountains, moving in almost perfect military order; the length of the column was fully equal to that of a large division of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, as I have seen it on its inarch.

After following over his trail, it is evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving further down the stream and attacking the village in flank; that he found the distance greater to the ford than he anticipated; that he did not charge, but bis march had taken so long, although his trail shows that he moved rapidly, that they were ready for him; that companies C and I,WM perhaps part of company E, crossed to the village or attempted it at the charge, and were met by a staggering fire, and that they fell back to secure a position from which to defend themselves; but they were followed too closely by the Indians to permit him to form any kind of a line. I think had the regiment gone in as a body, and, from the woods in which I fought, advanced on the village, that its destruction was certain ; but he was fully confident they were running, or he would not have turned from me. I think (aftxy, the great number of Indiana there were in tlie village) that the following reason obtained for the misfortune: His rapid marching for two days and one night before the fight, attacking in the daytime at twelve m., and when they were on the qui trite, instead of early in the morning, and, lastly, his unfortunate division of the regiment into three commands.