Rensselaer Union, Volume 5, Number 10, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 28 November 1872 — Political Leaders. [ARTICLE]

Political Leaders.

The late election suggests several, thoughts upon political leadership in this country. The Democratic politicians who managed the State Convention of their party in New York after the Cincinnati nomination were resolved to securd the adoption of the Cincinnati candidate at Baltimore, because they were sure that the Republican secession would swell the Democratic vote into a vast majority. They reasoned that if such men as Senators Sumner, Trumbull, and Schurz, were willing to lead their party, they must necessarily lead an army of followers with them ; and that if politicians like Mr. Fenton, Mr. Hutchings,- Mr. McClure, and Mr. Cochrane were ready to co-operate with Democrats, it was because they were sure of the disintegration of the party. We were constantly told that General Grant was the only man who would divide the Republicans, and the only one who could not be elected. Doubtless the gentlemen whom we have named believed much of what was said. Mr. Sumner thought that Massa--chhsetts, the gr.eat Republican State, would follow him, Mr. Trumbull supposed that he could divert Illinois, and Mr. Schurz imagined that he could control the German Vote. On the other hand, the Democrats made the same mistake. If the Cincinnati candidate were “regularly” nominated, and if the men who are called tiie leaders of the party— Mr. Hendricks, Mr. Seymour, Mr. Thurman, Mr. Bayard—openly supported him, the whole party would follow, and the result was certain. All these gentlemen have [been "undeceived, and it has been made evident that in the old English sense there are ho party leaders in this country. In English history, when a few great Whigs or Tories lmd been secured, the vote was virtually polled. .Rut this is not the fact in this country, and it is curious that shrewd politicians do not learn it, Mr. -Webster thought General Taylor’s nomination “not fit'to be made,” but he found himself march-, ing alone. Mr. Seward turned to Andrew Johnson, and prophesied forty thousand majority for him in New York, but New York ga-v.e thirty thousand majority against him, and Mr. Seward was politically dead. Mr. Chase said the war was over, and toyed with Tammany—and Mr. Chase disappeared. Despite all these familiar instances the Democratic managers insisted upon suppoping that the defection of Mr. Sumner and the others meant a dissolution of the Republican party. But they were doubly mistaken. First, in supposing that many" Republicans would follow the seceders into the Democratic fines, and second, in supposing that the Democrats would follow them in supporting a life-long enemy of the Democratic party. In the familiar phrase, a party may be sold, but it cannot be delivered. All these calculators forgot that an intelligent people decides for itself. Party ties With us are strong, but they are not invincible. It is because we USe parties as means and not as ends that we prove our capacity to govern ourselves. Wo honor rfien who maintain ably principles that we approve. But we do not therefore adopt all the measures that they recommend. The Republican party ,acknowledged, for instance, tho great service of Mr. Surhner in the long anti-slavery debate of the last twenty years ; but it was not therefore willing to commit the cause of equal rights to exrebels and"' Copperheads because he advised it. And bad be accepted the Democratic nomination for Governor of Massachusetts, although thejitate was probably prouder of him than of any of her living sons, she would have defeated him by seyenty thousand majority. _ . The Democratic managers wli<s" saw certain conspicuous leaders leave the Republican lines, did not see that for every one of them hundreds of thousands of Republicans, just as sincere and intelligent as they, but not prominent nor known, clung all the more closely to the party, and strove ail the more zealously to defeat the cause which the seceders espoused. The Liberal orators were constantly vociferating that it was the soldiers, and not General Grant, who suppressed the rebellion; but they never thought of applying their argument to the political situation, and reasoning that it was the Republican rank and file, not a General here and there, who were really important. This same disposition to regard persons more than tendencies and principles was evident throughout the campaign. The coklition insisted always , on a personal argument. Mr. Stunner's letter to the colored voters was devoted to proving that Mr. Greeley was a better Republican than General Grant, until, perceiving that such an argument was useless, he added that tlib Denioerats were now as good Republicans gs the Republicans themselves. The coalition tried to make an issue between Grant and Greeley. The country knew that the contest was one of~ principles and' probabilities. Henceforth the number of votes alienated by “leaders” will not be reckoned in proportion to the ability of those leaders or their conspicuous service. It will probably be hereafter remembered that the most trusted “leader,” who, miscalculating the situation, w'ould withstand the party instinct and imperil the party principle and purpose, will be promptly discarded by his associates. For they are associates, and not followers. The great mass of the Republicans refused to accompany “ Messrs. Sumner, Trumbull and Schurz, and the best part of the Democrats spurned the “leadershfp” that, attempted the coalition.— Harper's Weekly.''