Rensselaer Republican, Volume 22, Number 7, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 24 October 1889 — MATTERS OF LAW. [ARTICLE]

MATTERS OF LAW.

Recent Decisions of the Indian 3 Supreme Court. I ’ (1) Section 2,097, R. S., 1881, creates and fully defines the offense of keeping a disorderly liquor shop, and an indictment Charging the offense is sufficient if it follows the language of the statute. (2) Under said statute i 1 is an offense to keep a disorderly liqour shop “to the annoyance or injury of any part of the citizens of the State.” In this case persons claiming to have been disturbed by the manner in which appellant's saloon was kept testified that they resided in the town where the saloon was and near .

the satloea. hat none iestitfed in direct terms that they were citizens of the State. Held: That the jury were authorized to infer that they were ‘ -citir zens” within the meaning of the statute, (3) The appellant had a right to show, after laying the proper foundation, that a witness for the prosecution had told a person that “ail the i rest of us are going to swear” to a cer-ni ■ tain state of things, “and you just : stqp up there and say the same, slate of things.” I The appellant was tried before a Justice of the Peace and convicted on a charge of being found in a public place in a state of intoxication. He appealed, to the Circuit Court and there filed an answer alleging that he 1 was tried twice before the Justice on said’ charge, prior to his third trial and conviction; that upon each trial the cause was , submitted to a jury: that each time the Justice, without his consent, discharged the jury after they had been deliberating less than three hours, and that there was no physical reason for their discharge. The Justice’s record recites that he had become satisfied that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would agree upon a verdict. Field: That no abuse of discretion on the part of the Justice is shown, and that the Circuit Court erred in holding the mswer good. (1) The appellee, who was indebted to one Archer upon a promissory note, was summoned as garnishee in an attachment proceeding brought by appellants against Archer. Archer had assigned the note before the attachment proceeding was commenced, but appellee did not know the fact. Judgment was rendered against appellee, but it is alleged that it was void for want of jurisdiction. Appellants promised the appellee that if he would pay the judgment they would repay him in case the note had been, iissigncd, and he had to pay it again,'ArppelleFSlH not have to pay the note t<> the holder by assignment. Held;. The.t appellants are liable to him for the_ amount received—from him. (2) The erroneous admission of harmless, evidence is not available for the re-’ versal of the judgment. The appellant was indicted for assault and battery with intent to commit murder. The charging part of the indictment is as follows: That one George Jenkins, late of said county, on the 3d day of February, 1889, at said county and State aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully, in a rude, insolent and angry manner, touch Charles Wells, with the intent then and there him, the said Charles Wells, feloniously, wilfully [willfully], purposely and' with premeditated malice, to kill and murder, contrary,” etc. On motion of the defendant, the Court quashed all that part of the indictment relating to the felonious intent charged. Held: That the Court erred. The indictment is good. It was not necessary that the word ‘‘thereby ” or some word equivalent thereto, should have followed the word “touch.” (I.) Where real estate is sold under the order of a court having no jurisdiction, the sale is void, and if the purchasers take possession their possession is wrongful, and they may be ejected by. the persons having title, if a proceeding is brought for that purpose within twenty years; but if possession is held adversely under said purchase for twenty years, title is acquired and an action for possession, is barred. (2) Where a complaint for partition puts the title to the real estate in issue, the judgment rendered in that proceeding is binding upon the parries thereto and is conclusive as to ■ the interests and titles of the parties. | Under section 41 of the descents act-, as amended by the act of April 13. 1885, an-election by a widow not to Ikt ©under the will of her deceased husband, but to t;V e under the la w. is of no effect units., made in writing ■ within one year, as in said statute provided. The facts that the widow ' was ignorant of the stnttitory provision, and had made an election in fact by taking possession of tho share she would be entitled to receive under the Maw, make no difference unless she ' was prevented by fraud or contrivance ' from making a statutory electron. 1 (1) Tho office of a description is net ■ to identify the land, but to furnish the -means-of iderrtilieat-um- uiui Ahxa daifo. in a mortgage, the deserfption is not. void, for IBSt which can’ be foade <■<■.'- tain is certain. (2) In a suit by the -fjftttaty Auditor as a relator to fqreteloso a eehool fund mortgage, he is not a party in interest within the meaning of the statute prohibiting parties from testifying as witnesses where heirs or administrators are parties. A party who sues in tho Circuit or S :uc;- -> for a moncy-denrand on contract add recovers less than SSO is liable for costs unless the judgment hasliebn. reIacITBiSTSW SSO by a setoff or counter claim. ——