Rensselaer Republican, Volume 16, Number 8, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 1 November 1883 — THE CIVIL RIGHT'S DECISION. [ARTICLE]

THE CIVIL RIGHT'S DECISION.

The Opinion of Justice Bradley Voicing the Findings of the Supreme 1 Court. No Authority for the Law itt the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. Negroes Must Seek Redress in State Courts as Citizens Without Special Legal Guardianship. / i ~

- The following are the main points in the decision of the Supreme Court in the civilrights cases. After quotipg the first two sections of the act, Justice Bradley, Who delivered the opinion, says; Has Congress constitutional power to make such a law? Of course, no one will contend that the power to pass It was contained in tne constitution before the adoption of the last three amendments. Power is sought first in the Fourteenth amendment. The first section (which is the one relied on), after declaring who shall be citizens of the United States and the several States, is prohibitory in its character (and prohibitory ujxm the States.) It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion or individual rights is not tfie subject matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullities and makes void aU State legislation and State action of every kind which impairs the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or prosperity without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal -protection of the laws. It not only does this, but,in order that the national will thus declared may not be mere brutum futmen, the last section of the amendment invests Congress with the power to enforce it with appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce prohibition. To auopt appropriate legislation tor correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of It. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upoll subjects whiyh are within the domain of State legislation, but to provide modes of relief against State legislation or State action of the kind referred to. Until some State law has been passed or some State action through i-ts officers or agents, been taken adverse to the rights ot citizens sought.to bmprotected by the Fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment nor anv proceeding under such legislation can be c died into activity, for the prohibitions of the amen - ments - are against State Taws and acts dCne under State authority. An inspection of the law here in question shows that ii applies equally to cases arising in the Stares which have ihe justest laws r spectir;g the personal rights of citizens, and wnose autln rides are ever r. ady to- nfoi ee such laws, as to tie,sc wlileh arise in btaces that may hav'e_ 'vfiJiatedTHeProlitbttivir :-:n n Imeir. ni ether word-', it ste s into the domain ot local jurisprudence and Taysniown ruiesTor theTxmdUctcfindividuals in so< isty . oward eicti other, and Imposes sanct oes for the enfore, inent ot those ruks without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or its authorities. If this legislation is appropria.e for en orcing the prohibition amendment it is difficult to see where it is to stop. Why may not Congress, with ..an equal show of authority, enact a code of laws for the enforcement ami vindication of all rights of lit--, liberty and property? If it is not supposable that States may deprlvtvpersons of life, liber; y, and property without due process of law (and the amendment itself docs not suppose this),_ why shnuid not Congress proceed a' once to prescribe a due process ot law for the protection ot every one of these fundamental rights in every possible case, as well as to prescribe equal privileges in inns, public conveyances and theaters? -—. ■ , /

Judge Bradiey refers to the Civil Rights bill of April 4, 1866, and shows it “ is dearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings and customs having the torce of law which sanction .the. wrongful acts specified.” In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights such as arc guaranteed by the constitution against State aggression cannot be impaired by tne wrongful acts of individuals tmsuppoited by State authority, in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. wrongful act ot an iiniivi dual unsupported by any such authority is simply a private wrong or crime of that individual—an invasion ot the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his pe.son, his proper-, ty or his reputation; but, it not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under its authority, his rights retn?in in full force and mav presumably be vindicated by resorts to the'laws-of the State for redress. Au individual cannot deprive a man of bis right to vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in thecourts, or to be a witness or juror. He may, by force or Iran 1, interfere with tne enjoyment of a right in a particular case. He may commit assault against a person, or commit murder, or use ruffianly violence at the polls or slander the, good name of a felldvr-jcitlaeH;TmtrunTSSs protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right. He will only render himself amenable to satisfaction or punishment, and amenable therefore to the laws of the State where the wrongful acts are committed. It the principles of interpretation we have laid down are correct, as we deem them to be, it ia clear the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of iegisla ive power made to Congress by the Fourteen h amendment. But the power of Conzress to adopt and direct primary as distinguished from corrective legislation on the subject in hand Is sought In the second place from the Thirteenth amendment, which abolishes slavery and gives Congress power to enforce the amendment by appropriatc legislation. This amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-execu-t-jrv witlioul any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing stove ot circumstanees. By its own unaided torce and effort it abolished slavery and established uniy versal freedom. Still legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and eireumstanci s affected by it and to prescribe proper mode- ot redress for its violation in letter or spirit, and such legislation may be primary and aireet in its character, for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary airvitude shall not exist in any parrot the United States. Now, conceding for the sake of argument that admission to an inn, ■ public convevance, or place ot public amusement on equid terms with all oih'-r cl izens is the r ghc of every man and all classes of men, is it any more than one of those rights which the States bv tse Fourteenth amendment are lorbidden to denv tc any person, and is the constitution violated until tue denial ot right has some’Stftte sanction or authority ? Can the acct a mere individual, the owner of an inn, public convevance, or place of amusem-nt in refusing accommodation lie justly regarded as imposing anv i adge ot slavery or servitude upon the . ||f wliliVi 8n htdinary civil injurv propeny cogmiiif State and presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary appears? After giving to these quest-ons all she consideration which tnclr inwortanee demands, we are to. ced to the conclusion that such an act of retusai lias nothing to do with slavery or involuntary’ servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of a party, his redress is to be sought under the law ot the State, <jr, if those aws are adverse t > his rights and do not protect him, his remedv will be found in tile corrective legislation w .ith Congress has adoptei'or may adopt tor counteracting the effect ot the' State laws or State action prohibited by the Fourteenth amendment. It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to makeit apply to every act ot dF'crimination which a person may see tit as to a guest i e will entertain or asto the people he will take into his coach, or cab, er car, or ad idt to his concert or theater, or deal within oth:r matters of Intercourse or business. Innkeepers and public carriers by law in oil States, so far as we are aware, are bound to the ex lent of their facilities to furnish proper accomodation to all unobjectionable persons who, in good faith, apply f r them. If the laws themselves make anv unjust discrimination amenable to the prohibitions of the Fonrt tenth amendment, (o igress lias full power to afford a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with It.

When a man has emerged from slavery and by the aid ot legislate n has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there mnst besome stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the ran t of a mere Citizen and ceases to be* a special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen or man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected. There were thousands -of free colored pe plo in this country, before the abolition Of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and pronerty the same as white citizens; yet no*one at that time thought it was any invasion of

their personal status as free men because thev were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by wfyite citizens, or because they were subjected to discriminations in the enjoyments of the accommodations of Inns, public convey an es and places of amusement; mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as a badge of slavery. It since that time the enjoyment of equal rights in all these respe-'ts has become established by constitutional enactment, it is not by force of the Thirteenth amendment (which merely abolishes slavery), but by force of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. On the whole, we are of opinion that no countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth amen ’ments to the Constitution, and, no other ground of author ty for its pas age toeing suggested, iff- must necessarily be declared void, at least so far as ite operation in the several States is concerned.