Rensselaer Journal, Volume 11, Number 25, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 28 November 1901 — CANAL COMMISSION REPORT [ARTICLE]

CANAL COMMISSION REPORT

Nicaragua Route Is’ the Best and Cheapest. COST ABOUT $189,864,062. By the Panama Koate the Cost Is Estimated at 5253,374,838, and in Addition Urn Canal Concession Would Cost the United States •100,141,000. i_» The Interoeeanic Canal Commission's report Is in favor of the Nicaragua route and it will be submitted to Congress before the holiddays. Here is the report in full: The investigations of this commission have shown that the selection of “the most feasible and practicable route" for an isthmian canal must be made between the Nicaragua and Panama locations. Furthermore, the complete problem involves both the sea level plan of canal and that with locks. The Panama route alone Is feasible for a sea level canal, although both are entirely practicable and feasible for a canal with locks. The time required to complete a sea level canal on the Panama route, probably more than twice that needed to build a canal with locks, excludes it from favorable consideration, aside from other serious features of its construction. It is the conclusion of this commission, therefore, that, a plan of canal with locks should be adopted. A comparison of the principal physical features, both natural and artificial, of the two » routes, reveals some points of similarity. Both routes cross the continental divide less than ten miles from the Pacific Ocean, the Panama summit being about double the.height of that in Nicaragua. Both Routes Require Costly Dams. For more than half its length the location of each route on the Atlantic side is governed by the course of a river, the flow from whose drainage basin Is the only source of water supply for the proposed canal; and the summit levels, differing about twenty feet in elevation— Panama being the lower—are formed by lakes, natural in the one case and artificial in the other, requiring costly dams and water ways for their regulation and for the impounding of surplus waters tt> reduce the effect of floods and meet operating demands during low water seasons. The Investigations made in connexion with the regulations of Lake Nicaragua have demonstrated that the lake affords an inexhaustible water supply for the canal by that route. The initial proposition, on the other hand, for the Panama route, is to form Lake Bohio so as to yield a water supply for a traffic of 10,000,000 tons, which can be supplemented when needed by an amount sufficient for more than four times that traffic by means of the Alhajuela reservoir. For all practical purposes this may be considered an unlimited supply for the Panama route. So far as the practical operation of a ship canal is concerned, therefore, the water supply features on both lines are satisfactory. The difficulties disclosed and likely to be encountered in the construction of the dams are less at Conchuda, on the Nicaragua line, than at Bohio, on the Panama route. Both dams, however, are practicable, but the cost of that at Bohio is one-half more than that at Conchuda. Commission Desires a Perfect Structure. A less expensive dam at Bohio has been proposed, but through a portion of its length it would be underlaid by a deposit of sand and gravel, pervious to water. The seepage might not prove dangerous, but the security of the canal is directly dependent upon this dam, and the policy of the commission has been to select the more perfect structure, even at a somewhat greater cost. The waterways at both locations present no serious difficulties. The advantages in the design and construction of the dams are in favor of the Nicaragua route. The system of regulation at Lake Bohio consists of the discharge of water over the crest of a weir, as the lake level rises tinder the Influence *©f floods in the Cluvtgres River. The plan of regulating the level of Lake Nicaragua is less simple, though perfectly practicable. It involves the operation of movable gates at such times and to such extent as the rainfall on the lake basin may require. The experience and judgment of the operator are essential elements to effective regulation of this lake. The regulation of Lake Bohio is automatic. The only means of transportation now found on tlie Nicaragua route are the narrow gauge Silico Lake Railroad, about six miles in length, and the limited navigation of San Juan River and lake; but the Nicaraguan Government is now building a railroad along the beach from Greytown to Monkey Point, about forty-five miles to the northward, where It proposes to establish a commercial port. By means of a pier in the area protected by the point goods and material for canal purposes ean readily be landed and transported by rail to Qreytown. Such piers are in constant use on our Pacific coast. This railroad and port would be of great value during the period of preparation and harbor construction. and should materially shorten that period. Panama Has Railroad in Operation. A well equipped railroad is In operation along the entire length of the Panama route, and existing conditions there afford Immediate accommodation for a large force of laborers. The Nicaragua route has no natural harbor at either end. At. both the Atlantic and Pacific terminal, however, satisfactory harbors may be created by the removal of material At' low prices and by the construction of protective works of well established design. An excellent roadstead, protected by islands, already exists at Panama, and no work need be done there for either harbor construction or maintenance. At Colon, the Atlantic terminus of the Panama route, a serviceable harbor already exists. It has afforded harbor accommodations for many years, hut is open to northers, which a few times in each year are liable to damage ships or force them to put to sea. Considerable work must be done there to create a suitable harbor at the entrance of the canal, which can be easily entered and will give complete protection to shipping lying within. Excavation Work Compared. The completion of the harbors, as planned for both routes, would yield hut little advantage to either, hut the balance of advantages, including those of maintenance and operation, is probably in favor of the Panama route. The existence of a harbor at each terminus of the Panama route and a line of railroad across tlie isthmus will make It practicable td commence work there, after the concessions are acquired, as soon as the necessary plant can be collected and put In place and the working force organized. This period of preparation is estimated at one year. In Nicaragua this period is estimated at two years, so as to include also the construction of working harbors and terminal and railroad facilities. The work of excavation on the Nicaragua route is distributed: it is heaviest near Conchuda, at Tamberoito and ih the divide west of the lake. On the Panama route it is largely concentrated in the Culebra and EmperadOr cuts, which are

practically one. As a rule, distributed work. affords a greater, number of available potrtts of attack, contributing a quicker completion, but in either of these cases such' difficulties as may exist can be successfully met with suitable organisation and efficient appliances.

labor Scarce There. The time required for constructing the Nicaragua Canal will depend largely on the promptness with which the requisite force of laborers can be brought to Nicaragua, housed and organised with the locations of heaviest work along the route. Tlie cut through the divide west of the lake probably will require the longest time of any single feature of construction. It contains 18,000,000 cubic yards of earth and rock execration, or a little less than 10 per cent of the total work of ail classes included. With adequate force and plant this commission estimates that it can be completed in four years. This indicates, under reasonable allowance for ordinary delays, if- force and plant enough were obtainable, to secure a practically concurrent execution of ail portions of work on the route the completion of the entire work might be executed within six years after its being started, exclusive of the two years estimated for the period of preparation. The securing and organizing of the great force of laborers needed, largely foreigners, so as to adjust the execution of the various portions of the work to such a definite program of close fitting parts In a practically unpopulated tropical country involves unusual difficulties and would prolong the time required for completion. The greatest single feature of work on the Panama route Is the excavation In the Culebra section, amounting to about 43,000,000 cubic yards of hard clay, much of which Is classed as soft rock, nearly 45 per cent of all classes of material to be removed. Right lean Required. It is estimated that this cut can be completed in eight years, with allowance for ordinary delays, but exclusive of a two-year period for preparation and for unforeseen delays, and that the remainder of the work can be finished within the same period. The great concentration of work on this route and its less amount will require a smaller force of laborers than on the Nicaragua route. Hence the difficulties and delays involved in securing th?m will be correspondingly diminished. The total length of the Nicaragua route, from sea to sea. Is 183.06 miles, while the total length of the Panama route Is 49.09 miles. The length in standard canal section, and on the harbors and entrances, is 73.78 miles for she Nicaragua route and 36.41 miles for the Panama route. The length of sailing line In Lake Nicaragua is 70.51 miles, while that In Lake Bohio is 12.68 miles. That portion of the Nicaragua route In the canalised San Juan is 39.37 miles. The preceding physical features of the two lines measure the magnitude of the work to be done in the construction of waterways along the two routes. The estimated cost of constructing the canal on the Nicaragua route is $46,630,704 more than that of completing the Panama Canal, omitting the cost of acquiring the latter property. This sum measures the difference in the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome in the actual construction of the two canals and covers all physical considerations, such as the greater or less height of dams, the greater or less depth of cuts, the presence or absence of natural harbors, the presence or absence of a railroad, and the amount of work remaining to be done. The estimated annual cost of maintaining and operating tne Nicaragua Canal is $1,350,000 greater than the corresponding charges for the Panama Canal. Panama Route Shorter. The Panama route would be 134.57 miles shorter, from sea to sea, than the Nicaragua route. It would have less summit elevation, fewer locks, and 66.44 miles less curvature. The estimated time for a deep draft vessel to pass through is about twelve hours for Panama and thir-ty-three hours for Nicaragua. These periods are practically the measure of the relative advantages of the two canals as water ways connecting the two oceans, but not entirely, because the risks to vessels and the dangers of delay are greater in a canal than in the open sea. Except for the items of risk and delays the time required to pass through the canals need be taken into account only as an element in the time required by vessels to make their voyage between terminal ports. Compared on this basis, the Nicaragua route is the more advantageous for all transisthmian commerce except that originating or ending on the west coast of South America. For the commerce in which the United States is most interested, that between our Pacific ports and Atlantic ports, European and American, the Nicaraguan route is shorter by one day. The same advantage exists between our Atlantic ports and the Orient. For our gulf ports the advantage of the Nicaragua route is nearly two days. For commerce between North Atlantic ports and the west coast of South America the Panama route is shorter by about two days. Between gulf ports and the west coast of South America the saving Is about one day. The Nicaraguan route would be the more favorable one for sailing vessels, because of the uncertain winds In the Bay of Panama. This Is not, however, a material matter, as sailing ships are rapidly being displaced by steamships. A canal by the Panama route will be simply- a means of communication between tlie two oceans. The route has been a highway of commerce for more than 300 years, and a railroad has been In operation there for nearly fifty years; but this has affected Industrial changes but little, and the natural features of the country through which the route passes are such that no considerable development Is likely to occur as a result of the construction and operation of a canal. In addition to Its use as a means of communication between the two oceans, a canal by the Nicaragua route would bring Nicaragua and a large portion of Costa Rica and other Central American states Into close and easy communication with the United Slates and with Europe. The Intimate business relations that would be established with the people of the United States during the period of construction by the expenditure of vast sums of money In these states, and the use of American products and manufactures would be likely to continue after the completion of the work, to the benefit of our manufacturing, agricultural and other Interests. Nicaragua the Healthier. The Nicaragua route lies in a region of sparse population and not In a pathway of much trade or movement of people. Conditions productive of much sickness do not exist. On the other hand, a considerable population has long existed on the Panama route and It lies on a pathway of comparatively large trade, along which currents of moving people from Infected places sometimes converge, thus creating conditions favorable to epidemics. Existing conditions Indicate hygienic advantages for the Nicaragua route, although it Is probable that no less effective sanitary measures must be taken during construction In the one case than in the other. The cost of constructing a canal by the Nicaragua route and of completing the Panama Canal, without including the cost of acquiring the concessions from the different governments, is estimated as follows: Nicaragua. *180.864,002 Panama .... 144,233,358 For a proper comparison there must be added to the latter the cost of acquiring the rights and property of the New Panama Canal Company. This commission has estimated the value of these In the project recommended by It at 340,000.000. In order to exercise the rights

Decenary Iwr the construction off the canal and for Its management after completion the United States should acquire control of a strip of territory from sea to Sea sufficient in area for the convenient and efficient accomplishment of these purposes. Measures must also be taken to protect the line from unlawful acts of all kinds to Insure sanitary control and to render police jurisdiction effective. The strip should be not less than live miles wide on each side of the center line of the canal, or ten miles In total width., No treaties now exist with any of the states within whose territory the two routes lie authorizing the United States to occupy Its territory for the construction and operation of a canal. When it has been determined to undertake the work and the route has been selected, the consent of Colombia, or of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, for such occupation must be obtained before the inauguration of the enterprise, and one or more contentions must be entered Into by the United States to secure the necessary privileges and authority. The republics of Nicaragua and Costa Rica are untrammeled by any existing concessions or treaty obligations, and are free to grant to the United States the rights necessary for the attainment of these ends, and in December, 1900, demonstrated their willingness to have their territory so occupied by the United States by executing protocols by which It was agreed that they would enter into negotiations to settle In detail the ■ plan and agreements necessary to accomplish the construction and provide for the ownership of the proposed canal whenever the President of the United States is authorized by law to acquire tlt'e necessary control and authority. Colombia Not Free. The government of Colombia, on the contrary, In whose territory the Panama route lies, has granted concessions which belong to. or are controlled by the New Panama Canal Company, and have many years to run. These concessions, limited In time and defective In other ways, would not be adequate authority for the purposes of the "United States, but while they exist Colombia Is not free to treat with this government. If the Panama route is selected these concessions must be removed in order that the republlos may enter Into a treaty to enable the United States to acquire the control upon the isthmus that will be necessary and to fix the consideration. An agreement with the New Panama Canal Company to surrender or transfer Its concessions must include a sale of Its canal property and unfinished work, and the commission undertook, soon after Its organization, to ascertain upon what terms this could be accomplished. Much correspondence and many conferences followed, but- no proposition naming a price was presented until the middle of October, 1901, and after prolonged discussion it was submitted to the commission in a modified form on the 4th of November, to be Included In Its report to the President. The itemized statements appear in an earlier chapter of the report. The total amount for which the company offers to sell and transfer Its canal property to the United States Is 3109,141,500. This, added to the cost of completing the work, makes the whole e.ost of a canal by the Panama route 3253,374,858, while the cost by the Nicaragua route Is 3189,884,062, a difference of 363.510,796 in favor of the Nicaragua route. States Mint Be Compensated. In each case there must be added the cost of obtaining the use of the territory to be occupied and such other privileges as may be necessary for the construction and operation of the canal In perpetuity. The compensation that the different states will nsk for granting these privileges is now unknown. There are certain physical advantages such as a shorter canal line, a more complete knowledge of the country through which it passes and lower cost of maintenance and operation. In favor of the Panama route, but the prlc'e fixed by the Panama Canal Company for a sole of its property and franchises is so unreasonable that Its acceptance cannot be recommended by this commission. After considering all the facts developed by the investigations made by the commission, the actual situation as It now stands, and having In view the terms offered by the New Panama Canal Company, this commission Is of the opinion that “the most practicable and feasible foute” for an isthmian canal to be “under the control. management and ownership of the United States” is that known as the Nicaragua route. THE MINORITY REPORT. George Morrison of the Canal Commission Favors Panama Route. Following is a summary of the minority report of George S. Morrison of the Nicaragua Canal Commission: While concurring in the excellence of the greater part of the majority report, I was unable to accept the conclusions at which my colleagues have arrived. I accept the location for the Nicaraguan Canal as one to which I can suggest no Improvements. I consider that the estimate does not make enough provision for unknown conditions and contingencies. The cost of the work on both the Nicaragua and the Panama routes has been estimated at the same unit prices and with the addition of the same percentage to cover “Engineering, Police, Sanitation and General Contingencies.” The excavation of the Panama Canal has been opened for nearly its entire length, and the character of the material to be removed can be examined in position. On the Nicaragua route' the character of material has been determined by borings which, though unusually complete, do not give the definite information that is visible at Panama. At Panama there are fair harbors at both ends of the canal that are fully adequate for all demands during construction and connected by a railroad In high condition, the country is settled and many of the necessary accommodations for a largo working force are there. Before the eastern section of the Nicaragua Canal can be begun a harbor must be created at Greytown, convenient lines of transportation which do not now exist must be provided, as must also the means of housing and caring for a large laboring population, nearly all of which must be Imported. The preliminary engineering has been done at Panama and the general contingencies have been reduced to a minimum. Comparing modified estimates, the cost of completing the Panama Canal would be 367,000,000 less than the cost of building the Nicaragua Canal.' On the Panama route two concessions must b? extinguished before such rights can be acquired. They are the contract of 1867, by which the Panama railroad holds its present rights, and the Wyse concessions, under which the French canal companies have been operating. The settlement with the French must be simply an extinguishment of their rights: the authority to build the canal must be derived from a new treaty with the republic of Colombia. The Panama route has advantages over the Nicaragua route In coat of construction, in cost of operation and In convenience when done, while Its use Is less likely to lead to local International complications. If the United States government is to build an Isthmian canal the Panama route is the best. The French rights must first be extinguished, and whatever this government may pay for such extinguishment will be salvage to the French. If these rights cannot be extinguished the Nicaragua route is available. GEORGE S. MORRISON.