Rensselaer Journal, Volume 11, Number 17, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 3 October 1901 — AT BATTLE SANŢIAGE [ARTICLE]

AT BATTLE SANŢIAGE

McCalla Concludes His Testimony at the Inquiry. TELLS OF OFFICERS’ PUNS. Commander Southerland of the Bagla Testifies That Schley Gave Him Orders When Near Santiago to Oo to Fort Antonio for Coal. Captain McCalla, who had commanded the Marblehead during the Spanish war, In his testimony before the Schley board of inquiry in Washington said that he had been present during a conference of commanding officers on the Brooklyn while the fleet was off Santiago on May 29. Describing what took place, he said: “The commanding officers were ordered on board the Brooklyn on May 29. It was with regard to the work of blockade. I can only remember one specific thing which took place at the close, and that was that Captain Evans asked Commodore Schley If the Spanish ships (came out If he was going in for them. He said, ‘Certainly,’ and then arranged for a subdivision of fire from the ships under his command on the Spanish ships should they come out." Mr. Hanna—Prior to that conference on May 29 had you at any time received definite instructions respecting tho order of battle or the mode of procedure which the fleet should follow in case the Spanish vessels should appear?” "I do not remember.” “Did you have any further conversation with Commodore Schley?” "I had a conversation with him In his cabin after the battle of Santiago, about July 5, In Guantanamo bay. I went on board, making an official call to pay my respects, and during the visit Commodore Schley read me what I understood to be a part of his official report of the battle. After he had finished I said: ‘Commodore, you remember that after the battle of Lake Erie there was an unfortunate controversy and I hope that there will he none after the battle of Santiago, because there was glory enough for everybody.’ ” Captain McCalla said that when the flying squadron encountered the scoutships to the BOuth of Santiago on May 26 they were east of a direct line south. “If they had continued as they were then going could they have arrived at Santiago?” he was asked, and replied: “Certainly not.” “Where would they have arrived?” "If they continued as they were going they would have struck the coast of Hayti.” On cross-examination by Mr. Raynor the witness said he had failed to execute an order from Admiral Remey delivered while he was in command off Clenfuegos and directing that all except the smallest vessels be withdrawn. He had, he said, failed to leave the small vessels there. “Did you do that on your own responsibility?” "On my own responsibility.” Referring to the fact that he had Informed Captain Chadwick, Admiral Sampson’s chief of staff, of the code of signals arranged for communication with the insurgent Cubans, he said that he did not In any way communicate with the commander in chief. Mr. Raynor then asked: “According to : the regular custom and regulations observed in cases of that sort, was It not your purpose that this communication Bhould go to the commander la chief through his chief of staff?” "Certainly,” was the reply, i Lieutenant Commander W. H. H. (Southerland, who commanded the concerted yacht Eagle during the Spanish war, followed Captain McCalla on the (witness stand. He said he had first fallen in with the flying squadron on (May 19, when the squadron was steaming toward Clenfuegos and Captain McCalla’s sub-squadron was on Its (way from Clenfuegos to Key West He (had then, under Captain McCalla’s orders, undertaken to communicate to Commodore Schley his information concerning the situation at Clenfuegos, ,and had given this information to the ■Scorpion for the commodore, his message being as follows: “We left Clenfuegos on the night of the 16th, at which time, as we learned from Insurgents, the only vessels inside the harbor were two gunboats and several cannonieros.” Describing the cruise from Cienfuegos to Santiago, Commander Southerland said that from midnight of May 24 to the afternoon of the 25th the Eagle had made very bad weather. This was due to the fact that the sea had a “long roll” which was very tcylng to the yacht, as the vessel was ■then one-third full of water. Describing the c-. cAg ,u i CEat “A little after 1 o’clock of the 26th, when about twenty-five miles from :Santtago,” he said, “I was called alongside the flagship and the commodore directed me to go to Port Antonio for coal and to report rough weather south of Cuba. My answer substantially was that I already had three days’ coal, as much as the Marblehead,

meaning as much In proportion. The commodore told me that I had not coal enough (or Ms purpose and directed me to carry out his orders. I then asked him again very earnestly to let the Eagle remain with the fleet and coal from the collier. He very courteously replied to me that he either very much regretted or else was very sorry he could not let me do so, the ESagle had not coal enough for his purpose, and again directed me to proceed, which I did after communicating with the division commander.”