People's Pilot, Volume 6, Number 2, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 2 July 1896 — Free Coinage or Bankruptcy. [ARTICLE]
Free Coinage or Bankruptcy.
Following in the wake Of the President, Mr. Whitney has assumed the role of warning the democratic party, as it will soon be represented by'its chosen delegates in national convention assembled, against declaring for tlje restoration of silver to its place as money—against upholding the financial and industrial as well as political in dependence of our people. Subserviency in matteis of financial and industrial policy to the dictation of the money cliques of Great Britain has been the keynote of Mr. Cleveland’s utterances. So, also. iMr. Whitney declares that we must remain subservient to Great Britain; that we must not think of restoring bimetallism until the British government, controlled by the creditor classes, expresses willingness to cooperate with us to that end. No steps must we take to restore bimetallism. until we have the consent and approval of those who, prompted by selfish motives and by the hope of enrichment apd self-aggrandizement at the expense of the producing classes, have advocated the gold standard with the avowed purpose of doubling the burden of ail debts. Such is the advice of Mr. Whitney and others of this type of international bimetallists who, whHe professing friendlines to bimetallism, refuse to take any steps to bring it about. The demonetization of silver was conceived and carried out by the creditor classes intent on increasing the purchasing power of gold and thereby increasing the value of all debts. Just as gold has appreciated and prices have fallen, an unjust tribute has been 'aid on all debtors, and this tribute the creditor classes have enjoyed. The discarding of silver as a money metal, leading to the appreciation of gold and consequent fall of prices has doubled the Quantity of produce that we must export in payment of interest charges to our foreign creditors. We are lequired to give our foreign creditors two bushels of wheat and two pounds of cotton where justice requires but one. The labor cost of producing Cotton and wheat has not fallen with the fall in price. It takes as much expenditure of labor and energy io raise the bushel of wheat and bale of cotton to-day as twenty years ago, yet the debt-paying power of wheat and cotton, as of commodities in general, has been cut in half by the fall in prices, a fall due to the cheapening of production, not to any natural increase of competition, but to the appre ciation of gold. And this appreciation of gold has been engineered by the creditor classes with the purpose of depressing prices, and thus doubling the sacrifice of labor, and the products of labor, which their debtors must surrender to them in satisfaction of their debts.
Thus, when their debtors have remained solvent the creditor classes have been benefitted by the fall in prices. And in great Britain the money lenders of London, or rather the traffickers in credit, are all powerful. To the creditor classes of great Britain the whole world is in debt to an amount estimated by none at not less than ten billion dollars and by some as high as twenty billion dollars. Some idea of the immensity of the indebtedness of the rest of the world to England can be formed by a study of the trade statistics of Great Britain. As we had occasion to state last week, Great Britain’s purchases of commodities for the year 1895 exceeded her exports to the value of £130,547,693. This
much more she bought than she sold, yet she was not called upon •to export any gold in payment. On the contrary, she imported gold to an amount of £14,736,715 in excess of her imports. And why? Simply because the world’s indebtedness to London on account of interest payments and freights owned by British ship-owners from foreigners, and* representing interest on British capital invested in ships and placed at the service of others, more than offset the immense adverse balance of £130,547,698 incurred on account of purcbascs ssade by Great Bri tian
in excess of her sales. So instead of England being called upon to export gold in payment for her tremendous imports of merchandise in excess <> f exports the United States and other debtor nations, failing to export commodities to a sufficent volume to meet their indebtedness in entirety, were obliged to send het gold for rhe balance. Here, then, we have a tribute of the debtor nations of the world to the creditor classes of Great Britain of over $700,000,000 of annual tribute will buy and the greater to debtor nations will be the burden of this tribute. The appreciation of gold which has cut prices in half has in effect practically doubled this tribute. When our foreign creditors are ready to voluntarily diminish this tribute by aiding in the restoration of bimetallism with a view to checking the fall in prices, then Mr. Whitney ttells us. it will be time enough for us think of restoring bimetallism.
But when may we expect the British government, controlled as it is by the creditor classes to co operate in the res toration of bimetallism? When will these creditor classes voluntarily abandon a policy that so long as their debtors remain solvent enriches them? Surely it is folly to wait for those who benefit from an appreciating dollar to co-operate with us in restoring bimetallism. It is true that in the long run, the immoral is often the expedient, and that gold monometallism, if persisted in, will end in the inability of debtors to pay either interest or principal. But the creditor classes of Great Britian will never advocate bimetallism until ;hey have succeeded in confiscating the property of their debtors. Then, as owners of property, their interests will be in restoring’ bimetallism and raising prices; but not If we wait upon Great Britain, we will wait until property of our industrial classes has been confisqated by /foreign money-lenders; until&ur producing classes have been bankrupted and reduced to poverty, misery and despair; apd until the foreign bondholder, who now lays tribute upon us, has given place to a foreign landlord ready to lay tribute upon us in Lis new role. Yet Mr. Whitney tells us that any move on our part to lift the yoke of vassalage to Great Britain and free our producing classes from the onerous tribute that now rests upon them must end in disaster, Mr. Whitney tells us in effect that it is sound money or disaster; that any attempt on our part to do away with the two hundred cent dollar that is sapping our vitality must end in disaster. The truth is disaster can only be averted by doing away with this two-hundred-cent dollar. The alternatives that confront us are not sound money or disaster but free coinage or bankruptcy. Unless we open our mints to silver, check the appreciation of gold and free our producing classes from the onerous tribute to the creditor classes of Great Britian which the appreciating gold standard lays upon them, bankruptcy is inevitable.
Mr. Whitney tells us free coinage would mean silver monometallism. On the contrary, Lee coinage would force bimetallism. Why the opening of our mints to silver could not fail to re establish bimetallism and the parity between gold and silver we have pointed out in another editorial. Mr. Whitney tells us our international exchanges must be paid in gold, and he tells us the interest and principal of the obligations we have given to our foreign credi-tors-mortgages, railroads bonds, etc. —are quite generally made payable specifically in gold. But it is with commodities not gold, that we pay our foreign creditors. It is not a question of the number of grains of gold called for. in our bonds and mortgages, but of the sacrifice of labor and the expenditure of energy we must make to obtain those precious grains of gold. Our creditors do not want gold for gold’s sake. They have no use fpr gold save to spend it, and they will spend it where It Will buy the most. So, if it will buy more in America than else-
where, they will spend it in America, taking our commodities in payment in place of gold.' When prices are high then gold is cheap and our foreign charges payable in gold are not onerous; but. just as prices fall gold becomes dear and the burden of our foreign debt become s harder to bear. We say the interest on our for eign debt to our British creditors by exports of commodities sold in England. The higher the prices we get. the lighter will be the burden of our indebtedness; and the opening of our mints to silver will enable our producers to get higher prices. How? Simply because the increased demand for silver caused by opening pur mints to silver and the decreasedfdemand for gold due to the throwing upon silver, equally with gold the burden of effecting our ex changes and supporting our credit fabric, would cause the gold-price of silver to rise until the parity between gold and silver at the old ratio would be restored. And. just as silver rose the cost to all gold-using people buying in silver-using countries and paying with silver, would rise with the gold-price in silver or silver exchange which they have to buy and send in settlement for purchases made in. such countries.
So just as silver rose, the Brit ish trader would turn to us to make the purchases of cotton and wheat and other produce he has bought, since the demonetization of silver, in ever enlarging volume, from countries in which gold is at a premium as measured in their currencies. Consequently, the price our producers could demand for their products would increase, and just as the prices received for our exports, rose, the burden of our indebted ness would be lightened. Thus, by opening our mints to silver we can escape bankruptcy, which if we adhere to the con-stantly-appreciating gold standard, is inevitable;
