People's Pilot, Volume 3, Number 43, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 13 April 1894 — IT MUST STAND. [ARTICLE]

IT MUST STAND.

Judge Jenkins Refuses to Change Wia Famous Decision. It Ii Modified In a Minor Particular, But Ba Remain* Firm Regarding It* Main Features—Strike* Are Bitterly Condemned. SYNOPSIS OF THE DECISION. Milwaukee, April 9. —If labor organizations achieved a in Omaha Thursday at the hands of Judge Caldwell they were given a black eye by Judge Jenkins Friday when he decided the motion to amend hi* strike order and sustained his original order in every particular except that he struck out the clause which reads: “And from ordering, recommending, approving and advising others to quit the service of the receivers of the Northern Pacific January 1, 1894, or any other time.” In all its essential features the original order is sustained. He takes an exactly contrary view to that of Judge Caldwell. The judge’s review of the case is complete and exhaustive and carefully covers everypoint raised in the argument It is a sweeping victory for the receivers. The judge was nearly two ho«rs in delivering the decision.

Labor Organization* Denounced. The decision is made noticeable by the pronounced stand taken by the judge on what is generally known as the “labor question.” The vehemence of the language used, coupled with the general denunciation of labor organizations and their methods, will cause the order to be discussed in every section of the country. The decision contains fully 12,000 words, a large portion, however, being made up of opinions quoted from, various decisions of other judges. After reviewing the case the judge says in his decision: Combined Capital and Combined Labor. “In the ahcussion of the important and interesting questions presented by this motion it is not within the province of the court to assume part in the contest between capital and labor which, it is asserted, is here involved. It may be that the aggregated power of combined capital is fraught with danger to the republic. It may be that the aggregated power of combined labor is perilous to the peace of society and to the rights of property. It doubtless is true that in the contest the rights of both have been invaded, and that each has wrongs to be re? dressed. If danger to the state exists from the combination of either capital or labor, requiring additional restraint or modiHcation of existing laws, it is within the peculiar province of the legislature to determine the necessary remedy, and to declare the general policy of the state touching the relations between capital and labor. W ith that the judicial power of the government Is not concerned. But it is the duty of the courts to restrain those warring factions so far as their action may infringe the declared law of the land, that society may not be disrupted or its peace Invaded and that individual and coiporate rights may not be infringed. Injunction the Proper Remedy.

“If the combination and conspiracy alleged and the acts threatened to be done in pursuance thereof are unlawful, It cannot, I think, be successfully denied that restraint by injunction is the appropriate remedy. It may be true that a right of action at law would arise upon consummation of the threatened Injury, but manifestly such remedy would be inadequate. The threatened interference with the operations of the railway, if carried into effect, would result in paralysis of its business, ■topping the commerce ebbing and flowing through seven states of the union, working incalculable injury to the property and causing great public privation. Pecuniary compensation would be wholly inadequate. The injury would be Irreparable. Compensation could be obtained only through a multiplicity of suits •gainst 12,000 men scattered along the line of this railway for a distance of 4,400 miles. It Is the peculiar function of equity in such cases, where the injury would result not alone in severe private but in great public wrong, to restrain the commission of the threatened ac ts and not to send a party to seek uncertain and inadequate remedy at law. “That jurisdiction rests upon settled and unassailable ground. It Is no longer open to controversy that a court of equity may restrain threatened trespass Involving the immediate or ultimate destruction of property, working irreparable injury, and for which there would be no adequate compensation at law. it will in extreme cases, where the peril is imminent and the danger great, issue mandatory injunctions requiring a particular service to be performed, or a particular direction to be given, or a particular order to be revoked, in prevention of a threatened trespass upon property or upon public rights. “I need not enlarge upon the subject The jurisdiction Is beyond question; Is plenary and comprehensive.' ’ Punishment for Contempt Not Enough. .The judge then cited several authorities and continued: “It would be anomalous Indeed if the court, holding this property in possession in trust, could not protect it from Injury and could not restrain interference which would render abortive all efforts to perform the public duties charged upon this railway. ' “It was suggested by counsel that as improper interference with this property during its possession by the court is a contempt, punishment therefor would furnish ample remedy, and that therefore an injunction would not He, This is clearly an erroneous view. Punishment lor contempt is not compensation for an •tajury. The pecuniary penalty for contumacy does not go to the owner of the property injured. Such contempt Is deemed a public wrong and the fine inures to the government The injunction goes in prevention of wrong to property and injury to the public welfare; the fine, in punishment of contumacy. The writ reaches the inchoate conspiracy to injure and prevents the contemplated wrong. The proceedings in contempt is ex post facto, punishing for a wrong effected." So Right to Quit When He Pleases. The judge then reviews the conditions that gave rise to the issuance of the writ. Continuing he says: “There would seem to exist in some minds a lamentable misrepresentation of the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘right’ It would seem by some to be supposed that In this land one has the constitutional right to do as one may please, and that any restraint upon the will is an infringement upon freedom of action. Rights are not absolute, but are relative. Rights grow out of duty and are limited by duty. One has not the right arbitrarily to quit service without regard to the aeeessities of that service. His right of abandonment is limited by the assumption of that service, and the conditions and exigencies attaching thereto “Ordinarily the abandonment of service by an individual Is accompanied with so little of inconvenience, and with such slight resulting loss, that ft Is a matter of but little moment when or how he may quit the service. But for all that the principle remains, recognized by every just mind, that the quitting must be timely and decent, in view of existing conditions. • • • If what I have stated be correct as to individual action the principle applies with greater force to the case of a combination of a large number of employes to abandon service suddenly and without reasonable notice, with the result of crippling the operation of the railway and injuring the public. The effect in this particular Instance would have proven disastrous. The labor organizations are said to represent threo-fourths of all the employes upon the railways within the United States—an army •< many hundred thousands of men. The •killed Mbw aeeeasary to the safe operation • ralU

way could not be readily supplied along 4,000 miles of railway. Could Not Fill Their Places. “The difficulty of obtaining substitutes in the place of those who should leave the service would be intensified by the fact asserted and conceded at the argument that no member of these large organizations would dare to accept service in the place of those who should leave, because such acceptance would be followed by expulsion from their order and by social ostracism by their fellows If this conspiracy had proven effective by failure on the part of the court to issue its preventive writ, this vast pro]> erty would have been paralyzed in its operation, the wheels of an active commerce would have ceased to revolve, many portions of seven states would have been shut off in the midst of winter from the necessary supply of clothing, food and fuel, the malls of the United States would have been stopped, and the general business of seven states and the commerce of the whole country passing over this railway would have been suspended for an indefinite time. All these hardships and inconvenlences It is said must be submitted to that certain of these men, discontented with the conditions of their service, may combine and conspire with the object and intent of crippling the property, to suddenly cease the performance of their duties. It Is said that to restrain them from so doing is abridgment of liberty and Infringement of constitutional right Ido not so apprehend the law. I freely concede the right of the individual to abandon service at a proper time and in a decent manner. I concede the right of ail the employes of this road, acting in concert, to abandon their service at a proper time and in a decent manner, but Ido not concede their right to abandon such service suddenly without reasonable notice. Strikers Bitterly Condemned. “The second branch of the action has reference to the writ of injunction issued upon thesupplemental petition of the receivers re straining any combination or conspiracy from having for its purpose the inagu ration of a strike upon the lines of the railway operated by the receivers and from ordering, advising or approving by communication or instruction or otherwise the employes of the receivers to join In a strike. This part of the motion presents the issue whether a strike is lawful. The answer must largely depend upon the proper definition of the term.” The judge then cited the various definitions of the word strike and dwelt upon strikes in general. He said he knew of no peaceful strike, and that no strike was ever heard of that was or could be successful unaccompanied by intimidation or violence. He continued: "A strike without violence would equal the representation of the tragedy of Hamlet, with the part of Hamlet omitted. The moment that violence becomes an essential part of a scheme, or a necessary means of effecting the purpose of a combination, that moment the combination otherwise legal becomes illegal. All combinations to interfere with perfect freedom In the proper management and control of one's lawful business, to dictate the terms upon which such business shall be conducted, by means of threats or by interference with property or traffic, or with the lawful employment of others, are within the condemnation of the law.” Makes a Slight Modification. Judge Jenkins then, referring to the clause in the supplemental injunction, which enjoins any one from ordering, recommending, approving or advising others to quit the service of the Northern Pacific railway, and which has been characterized as wholly unwarranted, said the clause w-as inserted out of abundant caution, that the meaning of the court might be clear, that there would be no unwarrantable interference with the property, no intimidation, no violence, no strike. Since this language of the writ in this respect had been misconstrued and the restraint in tended was in hi* judgment comprehended within the other provisions of the writ, the motion in that respect would be granted and the clause stricken from the writ. In all other respects the motion would be denied.