Jasper County Democrat, Volume 9, Number 18, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 4 August 1906 — “COLO STORAGE” AND THE LAW. [ARTICLE]

“COLO STORAGE” AND THE LAW.

Remington Attorney Gives Valuable Information Regarding Liquor Remonstrance Laws. Mr. Editor:—l notice that in your article, in last week’s issue of your paper, in relation to the acts of the Anti-Saloon League of Remington against O’Connor, you seem to express some doubt as to whether the requirements of our state liquor laws apply to a place run as a wholesale liquor house, under a license or permit from the United States only. The cases of State vs. Mathis, 18 Ind. App. 608; State vs. Matbiß, 20 Ind. App. 699; Atkinson vs. State, 33 Ind. App. 8; Cahill vs. State, 76 Northeastern 182, and State vs. Kiley, 76 Northeastern 184, remove all doubts in relation to the application of section 7283 k, of statute 1901, which provides that “All the provisions of this act shall apply to persons, places and sales of spiritous, vinous, malt and other intoxicating liquors whether conducted under the law of the State of Indiana licensing, regulating and restricting the sales of such liquors to be used as a beverage, or by virtue of any laws of the United States; except as to the provisions for obtaining, revoking and remonstrating against license, which apply only to proceedings under the laws of the State of Indiana.” By these decisions the section above quoted is declaredi to apply to all places where liquors are sold whether under license from the County Board or from the United States, and that all the requirements of section 7283 b, in relation to devices, partitions or other business; the provisions of seotion 72880, against allowing one in room on prohibited days and hours, and the provisions of section 7283 d, in relation to location of room on public street, as to glass doors and windows and blinds or screens, apply to rooms where liquors are sold unSer a license from the United States as well as to places licensed by the County Board. Under these decisions a “Cold Storage” or goverment saloon cannot be conducted on a back lot, off of a publio street, in a bam or ice house, but must be on a public street; and all the requirements as tojwindows, doors, partitions, devises, persons therein, and screens or blinds must be as strictly observed as in a saloon operated under a retail license from the County Board. In State vs. Riley, in 76 Northeastern 184, the coart holds that

the proviso to section 7283 which provides “that none of the provisions of this act shall apply to any person engaged in business as a wholesale dealer, who does not sell in less quantities than five gallons at a time,” applies only to the liquor law passed iu 1875 and does not apply to the acts of 1895; that the requirements as to location, devices, partition, persons and blinds or screens are creatures of the law of 1895 and not of 1875, and are in addition to the requirements of the acts of 1875, and apply as well to wholesale as to retail saloons. The court holds that the proviso to section 7283 of acts of 1875 is the same as the exception 7283 k, and covers the same matter, and therefore therefore there is no conflict between the two sections. By this construction all the provisions as to obtaining, revoking and remonstrating againt license apply alone to dealers who sell less than five gallons at a time, and that the provisions as to location, devices, partitions, blinds, etc., apply to all places, whether-run under a retail license or a government permit. Another point in favor of the temperance cause is that under oar present laws the citizens, aided by the town and city boards, can, by proper remonstrances and ordinances, completely prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in such towns and cities. All townships, towns and cities now have the undisputable right to oppose the granting of a county license by three separate and distinot remonstrances all filed at same time and against the same applicant, viz: 1. A blanket remonstrance against the particular applicant. 2. A blanket remonstrance against the liquor traffic, and 3rd a remonstrance for cause against the particular applicant, and the County Board or Court, on appeal, must hear and consider all three remonstrances, and if either is found sufficient to disqualify the applicant a license must be denied. (See Ardery vs. Smith, 35 Ind. App. 94.) By these methods the voters have the right, with or without cause, to prevent a County License being issued to any one. As soon as the voters have thus prevented a County License, town and city boards have the power, by proper ordinances, to prevent sales of liquor without a town or city license, to fix the fee for license at SIOO per year, to make the penalty SIOO per day for selling without such license, and as a pre-requisite to the granting of each town or city license that said applicant first procure a county license. In Wagner vs. Town of Garrett, 118 Ind. 114, the court holds that no one should be entrusted witli the sale of intoxicating liquors unless he be shown to be a fit and proper person so to do, and that the County Board is the only tribunal that is vested with power j to inquire into the fitness of hh applicant, that towns and cities have no power to make such inquiry, that no one has the right to demand a town or city license until he has proven his fitness and obtained the necessary County License. (For authority warranting the above statements see 118 Ind. 103; 118 Ind. 114; 152 Ind. 107; Acts 1905. page 230, sectiou 7; Acts 1905, page 253, section 40; and Thornton’s Municipal Law, pages 38 and 116. From the authorities cited in this letter it is plain that the voters may defeat any afpplicant before the County Board and that town and city boards may refuse a license to any one who does not have a County License and may fine a dealer SIOO per day for selling without suoh town or city license. Your citizens have defeated a County License and it is now up to your city counoil to prevent a cold storage or government saloou. Respectfully,

J ASPER GUY.