Jasper County Democrat, Volume 4, Number 26, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 5 October 1901 — SCHLEY Court of Inquiry [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

SCHLEY Court of Inquiry

Seventh Day. Captain Bowman 11. McCalla, who commanded the Marblehead during the war with Spain, was an important witness before the court of inquiry, and his testimony, more than any heretofore presented, seemed to be unfavorable to the cause of Rear Admiral Schley. Captain McCalla testified that on the morning of May 24 he delivered dispatches to Admiral Schley off Cienfuegos and told him of his plans to communicate with the Cubans by secret signals, He had some supplies to deliver to the insurgents, and after visiting the shore he returned to the Brooklyn and assured Schley the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos. Admiral Schley, according to the witness, showed to him the orders from Admiral Sampson and appeared deeply perplexed. He told Captain McCalla it would be impossible to coal the ships, but he felt he would be court-martialed if he should return to Key West. The witness said he advised Admiral Schley that he believed it would be best to go at once to Santiago, even though he might be unable to stay there. Friends of Schley show that whatever may have been the delay he did start for Santiago the evening following his interview with Captain McCalla. Captain McCalla testified, as Captain Harber and Captain Wise had previously testified, that the ships of the flying squadron could have been coaled off Santiago. In any event he was quite certain that he could have coaled the Marblehead. Captain McCalla was not at Santiago because his ship, with the Massachusetts and others, happened at tb.time Cervera attempted to escape to be at Guantanamo taking coal. A feature of the day's proceedings was the appearance of W. 11. Stayton of New York, who some time ago was retained by Admiral Sampson, Captain Chadwick and Admiral Crown inshield to look after the interests of themselves and other officers of the department who might be assailed during the court’s session. Admiral Dewey ruled that Mr. Stayton had no standing in court, because Admiral Sampson was in no manner a party to the proceedings. Eighth Day. The eighth day’s pioceedings furnished cumulative evidence that the naval campaign in the West India Islands was conducted in a very loose manner. It was shown conclusively that an exceptional opportunity to place Rear Admiral Schley in possession of iuformation that would have made him the mastar of the unfortunate situation at Cienfuegos the moment he reached that point was either lost or neglected. It was shown, moreover, that Sampson was placed in possession of absolute information very early on May 20 that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos. This was communicated to the commander in chief of the North Atlantic fleet by Captain Bowman H. McCalla who had just returned to Key West from Cienfuegos, where he had learned through personal communication with Insurgents that the only Spanish ships in the harbor were two light-draught and comparatively harmless gunbeats. With this information in his possession Sampson sent McCalla back to Cienfuegos as the bearer of the celebrated “Dear Schley” letter and order No. 8, both of which were calculated to convey to Schley Sampson's belief that the Spanish fleet was in Cienfuegos nnd not in Santiago. Captain MeCalla ascertained that the Spaniards were not in Cienfuegos on May IT, when, in company with the converted yacht Eagle, ho was successful in establishing u line of communication with the Cuban forces that held positions on each side of the harbor. It was on that occasion that the captain obtained the insurgents’ secret code, which he subse-

quently delivered to Captain Chadwick of the New York. It also developed during the day that Lieutenant Commander H. H. Southerland, who was in command of the converted yacht Eagle, delivered a message to the Scorpion, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Marix. which Captain McCalla had instructed him to give to Schley. The Marblehead and Eagle had fallen in with the flying squadron on May 19. while the squadron was on its way from Key West to Cienfuegos. Captain McCalla did not know the port of destination of Schley and his ships. He said on the stand that if he had known he would have delivered the insurgents’ code to Schley nnd also acquainted him with the details of the result of his own investigations around Cienfuegos. As it was he commanded Lieutenant Commander Southerland to report to Schley that they had learned from the insurgents that the only vessels inside the harbor were two gunboats and several cannonieros. Lieutenant Commander Southerland testified that he megaphoned this message to the Scorpion. The message was intended for Rear Admiral Schley. A very important feature of Lieutenant Commander Southerland’s testimony was his declaration that the weather and sea at Cienfuegos on the afternoon of the 24th were both distinctly favorable to the coaling of ships. He was certain of this because he had sent crews ashore in cockle-shell boats and they experienced no difficulty in going through the surf and landing. The purpose of this testimony was clearly to contradict Schley’s statement that rough weather and boisterous seas had combined to prevent the ships of his squadron from taking aboard coal from the colliers before leaving Cienfuegos. Ninth Day. Captain James M. Miller, who commanded the collier Merrimac off Santiago in May, 1898, gave testimony before the court calculated to throw light on the contention of Admiral Schley that he could not coal his ships in those waters the week before the sea fight. Captain Miller was called by the department to show whether or not the state of the and weather compelled Schley to leave Santiago to replenish the bunkers of his vessels. It was a vitally important point, and Captain Miller was kept on the stand an hour. First the judge advocate general obtained the information that in the opinion of the commander of the collier it was possible to coal ships at that time. Later the counsel from Schley hammered away

at the witness and tried to extract from him the statement thnt it was dangerous to try to coal at sea. Captain Miller held his ground manfully against the assaults of the legal lights on both sides and confined his story to the facts set forth in his log book. This record showed that ships coaled both before aud after the date when Admiral Schley sent the dispatch to the department that it was necessary to go to Key West to coal. When Captain Jewett, commander of the Minneapolis, took the stand he stated that he did not give Schley the iuformation as to the presence ot the Spanish fleet nt Santiago. The counsel on both sides became involved in another wrangle over the admission of conversations between naval men, aud Solicitor Hanna of the Navy Department, in addressing the court, declared It was apparent that all the officers did not consider it necessary to tell Schley, for the reason that they accepted as true the report of the department that Cervera was hiding in the harbor. Mr. Hanna took the ground that they had no reason to doubt the department’s information, and intimated that Schley was the only oue who was skepI tical on that point. c-»tb Day. I Rear Admiral Evans told of the famous loop made by the commander of the flying squadron and explained why he bad not given the secret code to the eomino--1 dore. During the cross-examination Evans’ book. “A Sailor's Ix>g," figured to ' a certain extent, and the rear admiral was several times badly mixed by the attorney, but the controversy thus caused was disposed of by Admiral Dewey di--1 rectina the witness and counsel to con fine themselves to answers nnd questions. I Rear Admiral Evans' story of the loop made by the Brooklyn varied eontridera--1 bly from that told by other officers who

have related their views about this faun ous movement. He gave the distance between the Texas and Brooklyn as 100 yards, and contended that the lowa as well as the Texas was endangered by the Brooklyn’s turn. He asserted that the Oregon passed the Texas after the lowa had slowed, because the Texas came to a sudden halt to avoid the Brooklyn. The three ships were in such close proximity, according to Rear Admiral Evans’ testimony, that it seems incredible that all did not go to the bottom. Admiral Evans was cross-examined by Rayner. “Did you say to Admiral Schley on July 4: ‘Did you know that Jack Philip started to run away at the beginning of the battle?’ and Admiral Schley replied: 'You are mistaken. It was the Brooklyn that made that turn and you must see the tactical necessity of it?’ ” “I don’t think I saw Schley on July 4; and that I ever said then or any other time that Jack Philip ran away is preposterous on the face of it.” “Did you ever say: ‘I shot the bow off the Pluton and the stern off the Furor, then put my helm to starboard, knocked out the Theresa and raked the Viscaya?’ Did you say that?” “I did not.” “Was there a conference of captains aboard the Brooklyn, May 29?” “Yes.”

Eleventh Dav. Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, who commanded the battleship Maine when she was blown up in Havana harbor, and who during the war was in command of the scout St. Paul, was on the stand for upward of an hour. He said that in obedience to orders from Captain Wise, who was his commanding officer, he had proceeded to the vicinity of Santiago, arriving there on May 21. He told of taking aboard the Cuban pilot Nunez and said that he did not have much confidence in him. His instructions were to report to Commodore Schley that the Spanish squadron probably was in Santiago harbor. He fell in with the flying squadron on the evening of May 26, the squadron then being twenty or twenty.-five miles south of Santiago. He had reported to Commodore Schley that he “knew nothing positively” about the Spanish fleet. He was then asked if he had expressed his belief to Commodore ■ Schley that Cervera's fleet was not in the harbor as reported later by Commodore Schley. The witness replied: “I stated that we had seen nothing of the Spanish fleet. I may have stated that I knew nothing positively or absolutely about its movements, but I recited certain events to show that there was a probability of the fleet being in Santiago at that time.’’ In reply to a question ns to the condition of the weather at the time he was at Santiago Captain Sigsbee said: “During May 24, 25 and 26 the weather was unsettled; trade conditions had been hindered. There was more or less rain and moderately heavy sea on those three days. The sea on May 26 was heavy for boats, but It ws moderating —that is to say, more moderate than it hnd been on two days before. I should say, however, it would have been a very difficult job to have coaled from ships alongside that night.” “Did you receive a dispatch from Secretary Long, dated May 29, stating 'The Spanish fleet arrived at Santiago on Mav 19’?” “I am not certain, but my recollection is that it stated it arrived on the 19th or 21st. I received the communication just as I have stated. It came from the Secretary of the Navy. It was signed ‘Long,’ but whether I got a copy of it from Captain Wise or got the original I cannot now recall. I think I got the original.” "Did you show this dispatch to Commodore Schley on May 26?” “I already said I cannot recollect the act of showing it to him. I presume I did, but that I informed him I remember.”

Twelfth Day. 1 The proceedings of the court began with the usual recall of former witnesses for the correction of their testimony in the official record. Rear Admiral Evans took the stand with the purpose of effectually nailing the statement that he made a foolish boast as to what he did at the battle of Santiago. Schley's counsel asked him the other day if he did not tell Schley that he (Evans) destroyed the whole Spanish fleet. Evans at that time denied the report, which in a way placed him in the position of disputing Schley's word, as the Inference was plain that Schley asserted that Evans did play the braggart. “Fighting Bob” then came with documentary evidence that he was guiltless of blowing his own horn in so offensive a wav. “I have here a letter from Captain Cook of the Brooklyn,” said he, shaking it nt the court, “denying that I made the boast. I would like to have this letter added to my testimony regarding the mutter.” “We do not claim that you said that to Captain Cook,” asserted Attorney Rayner. “My qnestion was: ‘Did you make thta remark to Commodore Schley?’ ” “Captain Cook was present during all my conversation with Commodore Schley,” answered Evans, “and here Is his letter denying that I made so foolish a boast.” Schley’s counsel objected to the letter being introduced as evidence, and Admiral Evans hobbled out of the room, not a little disgruntled. Lieutenant Commander Alexander Sharp, who commanded the Vixen during the Spanish-American war, gave Admiral Schley a Jolt when he testified thnt while on the inner patrol line during the blockade he could not have discovered the Spanish fleet had It attempted to leave the hnrbor with no lights and with no noise. He said the shore line at night was discernible, but the objects could not be distinguished.

Uncle Sam—Now, then, make a good job of it and clean up the whole muss.