Indiana State Sentinel, Volume 23, Number 35, Indianapolis, Marion County, 1 February 1864 — Page 2

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WEEKLY SENTINEL.

MONDAY FKB: 1.The v lig-lbllltr Question. ' The Constitution provides for the election of Oovernor only once in four "years?" In case of the resignation, death, or other disability ol the Governor t perf rra the duties of the office, it also provides for a succession without the neceseiij of au elecüou by the people. . If the elected. Governor is from 115 cause unable to di-ichsrge the duties of the position, the Constitution siya the office shall devolve upon the LieutenantGovernor, and in case of his disability it shall then devolve npon such officer of Stite, elected by the people, as the Legislature msy elect. Bv law tlie Legislature has provided that in case of the disability of the Governor ami Lieuten-ant-Governor to discharge the executive power of the Sure th it it hall be vestel in the Secretary of State. Even in th cane of the incompetency of the Lieutenant Governor and the Secretary of Stjte, from any cau.e. to discharge the duties of Governor, if the executive power of the Stite should Lappen to devolve upon either, the Constitution provides that the Legislature ehill then declare what officer shall act as Govrnor; and such officer shall act accordingly, uotil the disability be removed: or a Governor be elected. The Constitution does not provide for the election of Governor but once in four years, and at the same time it declares that "the executive power of the State shall be vested in a Governor." It provides, however, for a successor or incumbent, in ease of the disability of the person elected by the people without the necessity of an election, or an expression of the populat will. Thefrarnert of the Constitution provided for CTerj contingency that they anticipated might occur in the discharge ot the executive power of the State without the necessity of an election by the peonl except once in j no provision made for the elect'on of a Governor by the people if the duties of the office should devolve upon the Lieutenant Governor, and none even if both the elected Governor and Lieutenant Governor should become disable I to discharge the executive ower of the State. I it not clear then, as any proposition cm be, that whoevt r the Cotistitu tion designates shall be vested with the execu tive power of the State, if the Governor elected by tlte people should be disqualified, or the Legislature should select for that position under the provisions of the orgtntc law 1 the 3ae, is just as much Governor as though he w.-is elect, e-l by the people as such ? It seems tu ulhat there cannot be the i-h.idow if a doubt a to the correctness of this proposition. If this conclusion he admitted, and it cannot be successfully denied, then it follows that Outer P. Mobt'x has been vested with the executive power of the State since the 17 h day of January, 15G1. The Constitution say the Governor "shall ltoM his office during four yeirs, and thill mot be eligible more th tu four rears in any period of eight years " We m:ke no petsonal war upon Governor Mobtox. It makes to the Democracy hut little difference who the Republican candidate for Governor may be. But if the people uf the State propose to adhere to the Constitution and respect its provisions as the organic law of the State, there cm be no doubt but Governor iloaro. is itie legible for an election to the office of Governor, which he now holds and has held since t?.e 17th day of Jann try, 1661, at the ensuing October election. For the State Sentinel. . .Horton Eligibility. The Constitution provides that the Governor "hill hold his office during four yetrs, and shall l ot be eligible more than four rears in any period of eight years" It also provides that "in case ot the removal of the Governor from office, or of hi death, resignation, or inability to rtisharee the duties of the office, the same shall devolve on the Lieutenant Governor." At the last election Lane was elected Oorernor and Morton Lieutenant Governor Suppo that Line was serving out his full term uf office as Governor, and Morton his full term as Lieutenant G rernor, Line would not of eoure be eligible to election as Governor at the next election, hut he wonll be eligible to election as L'euteuint Governor; and suppose that at the next elw.-tion they would be 0 elected M rion Governor .ni l Line L'eotenint Governor; and suppose that after such election Morton should resign; upon whom would devolve the duties of the oRkce of Governor? Of course upon Line, the Lieuenant Governor '.he person designated by the Constitution to discharge the duties of the office in such a case. S j that it seems plain that though Line, in consequence of havinsr been' elected Governor at the la-t election, would not be eligible fo re election at the next-election, jet that ht milo. after having served during the last four yers by rirtue of his election, tie yet the proper person to discharge the duties of the offi re during the next succeeding four yc.irs, by virtue of the constitutional provision devolving the liutie upon him in case of the resignation of the Governor .' A peraon. though not eligible to bold the office of Governor by rirtae of election f.r no re than lour rears out of any period of eicht tears, mv yet the proner person to discharge t!ie duties of the oftL't for more than four years out of any period of eight years. J. T. M. The foregoin g was written by "a prominent Republican and we give it by request, as making a strong case iu favor of the eligibility of Mobtox to hold the office of Governor eight consecutive years or two consecutive terms. The contingency which our correspondent states baa not occurred, or is it likely to occur, hence its discussion bas ho Tactical value. . There is no doubt thai a person who b is held the office of Governor for four years, is not eligible to election as Lieutenant Governor for a succeeding terra by reason of constitutional disability. The Constitution provides that the Governor "pha.ll not be eligible more than fourycars in any period of eight years," hence a person who bas belli the oßL-eof Governor for four year would be disabled from discharging th duties which the organic law of the State devolves npon the Lieutenant Governor, and that would disqualify him for the position. If an election should occur, as stated by our correspondent, and the offi er so elected should be inaugurated, .the Constitution provides the remedy in case of the. reriuaiioti or other dis bility of the Govcruor. Art. 5. Sec. 10 contains the following provUiou: "The Getier .il Assembly shall, by Liw. provide for the case of removal from office, death, resignation or inability both of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, declaring what officer aball then act accordingly, until the debility be removed, or a Governor can be elected." . .7 be :OutructWu that J. T. M places upon the Constitution ia untenable. If a person, after having held the office of Governor for four ye irs, should be elected Lieutenant Governor for the succeeding term, and then, by the resignation of the Governor elected to discharge the executive power of the "Stat should assume iu duties, be eoald by tbe same r.-oeee hold the office for several terms, and thus defeat the plain intent of tbe Constitution, which is. that the Governor "shall not be eligible more tban four years ia anyperiod of eight years." And this prohibition of the Constitution U eviJently intend I to apply to those who hold the office, whether it his de vol red upon thm by election or succession. A WisDraLL roa TatsitT School. It Is said thit Trinitv School, a well known Trot-e-uarrt Eyivopal Educational Institution in New York, h is, through tbe fortunate termination of a lawsuit, come into the possesion of property, real estate and funded, to the value of 3,r)0),OOOv The suit baa been a long contested one, extending through a period of some thirty years,

The Fugitive Slave Iw. We h ive been furnisheJ, by member of the echool, with the1 following lecture, delivered, by Judge PtRtiss, to the l iw c!jm of our Univcr-

sity. in the spring of lfc'6'). before the election of . Mr LiNcoL.f and the commencement of the war. with a request that a e publish it. Ai it h pu!lic pröpeitv we" suppose weh ve a right to com ply with the request; and, as it was delivered be fore the war broke out, it may be supposed to present the question, aa it then stood, between the North and -the South, on this point, with reasonable accuracy: liCTUB BT JIDGE riHIISS TJ THE LAW CLASS Of THI NOBTU WF-9TKBX CIIB.18TIA I'NIVERSITT, OH THE ITOITIV SLAVE LAW. IIABCH. 1 fc63. Ii is my gcttlel practice to avoid introducing into my lectures, as fir as possible, topics having a political beirine. This should be the course pursued hj all our public educators, as well a by our public religious teachers. The truth ot this proposition is easily demonstrated it may le saij to be almost, If not qui'e self evident. Hence. I have abstained, thus far in our course. from remarking upon the fugitive Uve law; but in so doing 1 am satisfied, upon irflection, that I bave fined to discharge my clutv to von; lor the question arising upon that law is a conslil atioaul. not a political question. I nave acted upon an erroneous assumDtion of fact A question aked bv one of yon, a day or two ago, led me to undeceive myself on this point. The question was. whether the .ugitire slave liw had ever been decided to be contitution.il. It would have been a lasting reproatii to roe to bave permitieJ you to graduate at this law school, ignorant of the correct mnwer to that inquiry And I avail myself of this, the last meeting of the class before jour commencement examination, to set joii right on tins uisturoing and much mystified subject; jet one, the right Understanding of wbitb is of vital necessity to the proper discharge of your duties as citizens of this great republic. Mr. Gardner, in his Institutes, observes that "it is a little remarkable that the Africiti republic of Liberia has introduced into its Constitution the same principle which belongs to theConstitu tion of the Uni'ed btates, only in rererje lorm. Our Constitution re.-ts the doctrine that was made by free w.h5V" . ..;.?, and that th 01 uieinseives ana ie l.iucasiau race of Ame.k-aii? are the governing pttwer. That of the African republic vests Liberian citizenship in j the African r.ite exclusively, and disqualifies any but Libetian African republicans from holding real estate in the African commonwealth. The wisdom of e ich Constitution is appareut." Gard Inst . p 473. That you may not be misled by this extract from Mr. Gardner, it is proper fur me to observe that our Feder! Constitution' does not contain an express provision excluding negroes from citizenship. The proposition asserted by Mr. Gardner mainly rests upon two f ic's, viz: that the only clauses iu the Cons'.itutton which point directlr to the African race treat it as composed of persons who may be enslave J, and the hUtoiictl deduction that the Constitution was formed by, and to create a government belonging to, the white race; tint the negroes, not being regarded as citizens when it was formed, were intended never to be m nie such. The piivileges and immuuities of citizenship were uot, at its f.;rm 'tion, and were intended never to be con feired hi them. The exclusion of the negro, therefore, from equality of rights and the promiscuous holding of offices with tiio white, in our Ooveriimei.1, depends upon the people keeplug the Government in the Inn Is of men who will adhere to its. intent and spirit, historically dedii-ed, rather than npo.i utiv expression con tained in the Constitution. Dut notwithstanding our Government is based upon ttieju-t principle of ihc separation of incon gruous races, and was lot me I to be o uiicipated in by the white race exclusively; still, before, and at its formation, there were, in the territory over which its jurisdiction was to ex'etid, a large number of individuals of the blick or Africin race, most of vh ini were owned as property and held as t-Iaves by the whites. This slave populitton lud, mjstlv sectional location. It was mainly found iu the Southern Colonics. African slavery may properly be called their peculiar iinututioc. But it was an institution, however, repugn ant to the moral sense ot the North it might be, which thev hid a political right, as against all otbur governments, to m lintiiu and perpetuate, on becoming sovereign States, as they did upn the acknowledgement of their and our wide pendence bv Great Britain, whose c d nies all had been. This is an established doctrine of international law. Even the trade iu Africans, as slaves, is recognized as legal by that law. Savs Chancellor Kent (Coram vol. l.p. 10'J,); "It the Afric-m slave trade is, therefore, not a criminal traf.1 by the law of nations; and every nation, independent of treaty, retained a legal right to carry it on 2it one nation had a right to force the way to the liberation of Africa, by trampling on the independence of other States; or to procure eminent good bv means tint were utitawlul; or to press forward to a great principle, by breaking through other gre it principles that stool in the wiv." So, Chief Justice Marshall, in the coje of the Antelope 10 Wheat 06. Al ter the colonies had, by a voluntary concert of action during the Revolutionary war, achieved their several in dependence, they became sev erally independent, sovereign nations, each with its own peculiar institutions, mid milit hive so rem lined independent infl ns to this diy, had it been their choice to do si. See the Federalist. 2 El., p. 6 But wi.'e men among them pro po-e 1 that t!i ise nations should form a Union on such ternn ns they should be able to agree upon lor ilieir common defense and their general we!fare;- and a meeting, a coiiv.iitin was held lor the pcrp;se; an I then came no the question, what üh.ill te the terms of our Union coup ict? We have severally, they said, different insiitu lions now, and we are sovereign States, a:id have severally the jwer to protect our pecuti r institutions which we wish to iniinltin; whit security ah.itl we h ive that they will not be de troyei r in'erlered with, if we relinguish a pirt of our sovereign pocr by enteriug into the pro posed Union? The States having a large slave population akcd this question. The answer was given, in the provisions of the Constitution that was trtmel. It was agreed uu inimously by all the St ite, that if the Union should be formed, each State should be secured in its uu disturbed possession and enjoyment of its peculiar institutions by articles inserted into the compact of Union, and it was done.' "One of the articles inserted in the compact for the pro.ection of the si ive holding States, being the la-t clause of the second section of the lourth article was this: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping Into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from sucb ser vice or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the prty to whom such service or labor may be doc." Toaitisfy vou that I am not mistaken as to the object of section, I quote from the opin ions of Judges Story and McLean in the great case of Prige vs. Pennsrlvania, 1 6 Peter, Sa pretue Court, Itep 539; a cae lint outfit to be published in pamphlet, and placed in the hands of every citizen of the United States. Judge McLean sai.i: "At an eirly period of our history, slavery existed in nil the colonies; and fugitive from IhIkh- were claimed and delivered up under a spirit of comity or conventional law among the colonies. The articles of confwdefation con'aiued no provision o i the subject, nnd there can be no doubt that the provision introduced into the Constitution was the result of ex perienre and mini fest necessity. A matter so delicate, important, and exciting was very properly introduced into the organic I iw." He says the provision "was designed to protect the rights of the master. "Under the Confederation, the master li id no legtl means of enforcing his rights in a Slate opposed to slavery. A disregard of rights thus asserted waj deeply felt iu the South. It produced great excitement, and would hare led to results destructive to the Union. To avoid this, the constitu'ional guarantee was essential." Thns far from Judge McLean. Judre Story said: "Historic-lly, it ia well known, that the object of this clause, was to secure t the citizens of the slave hoes' ing St if es the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, as pro;erty, in every Stale in the Union into which they might escape from the State where they were held in servitude. The full roinirioti of this riglu and title was indispensable to the security oi this aperies of prpertyin all the shire-holding Si ties; and, indeed, was so vit tl to the preservation of their domestic intere ta and institutions, that it cannot be doubled that it constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union would not have been formed. Its true design was to guard aint the dociiitse d principles prevalent in the noti shareholding States, by preventing them frr. m intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the rights of the owners of slaves." Here, then, we find the real sustantial fugitive slave law. It is a provtsion of the Constitution of the Confederacy io which we lire. I repeat, the real fugitive slave law is a provision

of tbe Constitution of -our Government. It Is a t perraiticnt. perpetual law, one enduring as that Constitution, perhaps as this glorious Union of who?e organic laws it forma a prt. And it is

an cfncieut fug'tive slave law., It is capable of Uing executed without the aid of any legislation - . 1 -. t - 1 - 1 nr . This has been solemnly decided. We quote again from the opinion of the Court, in the case aLore cited; aauetivered by. Judge Story, one of. the purest men an I most learned and able Judges that ever grnced tbe Bench a J ew Jnglander, Massachusetts man tie proceeds: "We have säid that the clause fin 'the Const! tutionl contains a positive and unqualified recog nition f the rights of the owner in the slave, unaffected by anv State law or regulation what soever, because theie is no qualification or restriction of it to be found tbsrein; and we have no right to insert any which is not expressed, and cannot be i'airlv implied. Especi illy are we Stoppel from so doing, alien the clause nuts the right to the service pr Islxir upon the same ground and to the same extent in every other Slate as in the State from which the slave escaped, and in which he was held to the service or labor. If this be iu, then all the incidents to that right attach also. "The owner must, therefore hire the rijrrt to seize nd rep nes tha slave, which the local laws of his own State confer upoo him as property; and we all know that this right of seizure and recaptuie is universal!? acknowledged in all the slaveholdiuj States. L:deed, this ia no more than a mere affirmance of the common law ap plicable to this very Autjecl. Mr Justice Black ; stoue (3 Kl. Com. 4) lays it down as unquetion able doctrine. Recapture or reprisal (siys be) is another species of remedy by the mere act of the prity injured.. This happens when any oneh-uh deprived another of his profierty in goods or chatties personal, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child or servant, in whicU case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent or master, may lawfully claim and retake them wherever he happens to find them,o it be not in a riouous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace. Upon this ground we have not the slightest hesitation in holding that, endea and in virtue of the Con stitution, the owner of a slave is cl theJ with en tire authority, iu every State in the Union, to seize nnd recapture his slave whenever he can do it without any breach of the peace, or any illegal violence. In this eise, an 1 to this extent., th clau.eof th P !-.: j uioperl.T be 8lid io execute itself, and to require no aid from Legis! aiion. State or National." The return of fugitive slaves bti:ng thus ac complished in virtue of the Constitution, it fol lows that lie who obstructs su -h return violates lite Constitution and iin:im the wisdom and patriotism of its fr ainers It is but right that I should here slate to you that the point decide I in the above quotation, from the opinion of Judge Story, was not necessir.lv involved in the case then before the conrt; but s'ill .th de rision Ins the force of. law. It is the usu tl practire with most appellate courts to decide points presented in a cause, though not necessarily involved, in order that the people, by an early kuoa ledge of the law, may be relieved of further difficulty on account of its uncertainty. The C institution of Indiana expressly requires this course to be pursued by the Supreme C urt of this State. Chief Justice Marshall ctrrie l the usage to an extreme length in Marb iry vs. M idison 1st, Cra iuh 137, and in other c tses; Ju le S:ory, as we h ive seen above, adopted the same course and the custom irr line of practice was followed by Chief Justice Taney in th U.ed Stt case Thit I am right in saying th it the projiosition laid down by Julge Story, which I hive incorporated into this lectme, is settled law, I refer ion l N"rri vs. Ne vton.5. MoLcm Ken o 92. Judge McLean there ues this langu ice: "By the ileci-i ot in the eise of P.igg vs Penn-vlva-nia. the master has a right to se'ze his slave in any S'ate where he m iv be loond, if he can do so without a breach of the peace; au I, wi hont any exhibition of claim or "authority, take him back ' iothe!":ite trim waeice h aic n is I." And he savs th it by th it decision he (Jud:e McLean) is "ftillv boun'l " If such is the right of the master under the Constitution, you in iy well ask. whit need of any statutory fugitive !ave law? If a m.'n's property strays away from him, he does not ordinarily need a special law to enable him, on finding it, to take it back; nor does he if it is stolen from him. Then why does the master need such alaw to enable him to reclaim his clave, who may have run away or been stolen from himf It is because the people in the States into which slaves may escape, or be Carrie 1 bv those who may entice them away, will not let them be taken back in obedience to the - Constitution of the, country; but will, by violence and riotous proceedings, ende i vor to prevent their return A statute law is demanded, therefore, prescribing and regulating the mode nnd manner in which, and designating the officers by which, the constitutional provision shall be executed. Such a law is likewise demanded as a security lb free negroes against being kidnapped into slavery. The propriety and constitution n'ity of such a law, no jurist r matt of intelligence, who respected the constitution r his country und was willing to conform o it, ever doubted. The only point of difficulty his been, among those whose opinions are entitle I to respect, whe'her the fugitive slave law should be enacted by the State gov ernments severally, or by the Government of the United StUes. But it i now settled beyond fur titer controversy, th it it is the right and duty of the Federal Government to provide the ways and means for the enforcement of this provision of the federal compict, and the securing of the rights of the people of the States under it; and tii-ft the fugitive slave law last enacted by Congress, and now in force, is constitutional in every pirticilar. See Prigg t. Pennsylvania, tuprä; Miller r. McQueney, 5 McLean's Ren ,' 4H'J; Nortis v. Cracker, 13 II w ird's Rep., i'2 1; Able man v. Booth, 21, Id. 5D6; Weistier v Sloan. 6 McLean. 259. It should be observed that "3'steu liiay, also, nnder their laws, puni-h the h irb ring ol olives Moore t. Illinois. ID Howard 1.1 It will naturally occur to your mind at this point, that it would be a most injudicious act to tepeal the fugitive slave law. as its repeaK would at once i emit the 1 aveholders back to their individual right? of executing the cons itu'i m il provisions, nttended, as it would be, by riots, and expose every citizen who Interfered and prevented the taki'ig hick of their slave by tl: m, o a suit and ju lament for the value of those rescued. Iu conclusion. I am pained to be com elled to ad I th it theclanse in the Cousiiru'io i, which we hive been considering, has. of lateyerst been hibitinlly violated; 'disregarded by the Northern States and people A p rtion of our citizens have habitually libelled and vili fied the institutions and public men of the S in'hern States, thereby, by their meddlesome interference, irritating their feelings, anil 'disturbing their qniet They have sent among them incendiary docu ment, inciting sedition. They have stolen from them tbeir slaves, and have prevented or ob structed the return of such as escaped; they have not sent back Onesimus; nnd, finally they have, under John Brown, invade 1 their territory, six! sought to overturn their institutions by civil and scrvi'e war. Had any Ira ty between this and any foreign government been half so wantonly and frequently broken as h is been our constitutional compact with the South, the civilized world would prom unce '.hat go v eminent that did riot vindicate her honor by war. no other means of redress being left her. on account of suth breach of faith, n too pusillanimous to be treated otherwise than with contempt.- But the peicefu! remedies afforded by our constitution render a resort to war unnecessary and uijn-iifi.ible, though thev do not for'oid complaint. Yet. if the South, under these continual tmnts and constitutional wronzs. dares to hint that she may be compelled to attempt to withdraw from the Uuion (which the North has violated.) preserve bet institutions and self respect, she is denounce 1 as disloyal; but, let me a-k, if a wife should letve the house of her husbind, and sue for and obtain a divorce on account of his ill tieatment. who would in law be held responsible for the dissolution of the matrimonial onion? I do not wish, in this lecture, to overlook the fact, and I ought not to omit a notice of it, that African slavery is repugnant to the feelings of the people of the North; but this fact will not excuse them in refusing, to fulfill constiiutional obligations. On this point, I prefer, in place of anything I could originate, to quote to you the l.mgu ige of Judge McLean, in the case of Jones v. Vanzmdt, 2 McLean's Reports, commencing on pae 6IS. lie says: "I was not prepared to hear, in a Court of Justice, the broad ground assumed, as ws assumed in this case t-efore the jury, that a man, io the exercise of what he conceives to be a conscientious duty, may violate the laws of the land That no human laws can justly restrain the acta of men, who are impelled by a sense of duty to God and their fellow creature V are ot here to deal with ttstractions. We c mnot theorize upon the rri'icipies of our Government, or of slavery. Tbe liw ia our only guido Ifrnnvictions, honest convictions they may be, of what is right or wrong, are to be substituted as a rule of action in disregard of the law, we shall soon be withont law and wiihoit protection. The pretext for violating the rights of those who m iy become obnoxious to censure, can easily be as sutneJ and main timed. And the same plea of the right of conscience, nnd the tigh motive of duty, will be asserted, however absurd, every where, in justification of wrongs. What one man,

or association or men, may assume aa the basis of action, may be assumed by all others.. And

in this way society tnaj resolve into original elemeutsand then the covcrning principle must be force Every -approximation to this state is at war with the social compact If the law be wrouu in principle, or oppressive in its exactions. it should be chanced in a constitutional mode. If. the Organization of our Government bees sentially wrong, in any oi its great principles, chance, it. .Chance it -in the mode pro vile J But the law, until changed or abrogated, shoo Id be respected and obeved. Any departure from this inflicts a deep wound on society, ami is ex tremely demoralizing- in its effects. Wo good man, exercise of his sober judgment, can either feel or act in violation ol this rule It is idle, it is sheer hypocrisy in us to pretend to be friends uf the Union, while we tvibitualiy violate the compact of Union: and it would be far more manly in us to avow, at once, that it a a compact which we would not fulfill, tri that the South mipht act accorJinclv. It weare. in heart, the real friends of the Union, we most evince the fact bv livinsr un to the letter snd spirit of it: bv strictlv maintaining to each see lion its guaranteed rights: by raiilitully rulhlltng. in short, til the requirements ol tue constitution which, upon admission to the bar, you will be, as I have been, solemnly sworn to support. The War Power of the President ol the I'nlted Sitiatea Aim Important De eisten by the uprm court of In diana. Griffin t. Appeal from the Marion C. P. Wilcox.) Pkhkins, J. The following general order was issued: "nKADOXAKTERS DlSTHICT OF IxDIAXA ) and MicniQAir, Indianapolis, Jnce 8, 1863. ) Cajtt. Wibor, Provost Marshal, Indianapolis: Cafta : You. will at once issue an order prohibit inr the Fale of liquor, by any partv, to enlisted men. This order must be rigidly en forced. Any one Tiolating it will be severely puuühcd 1 have noticed, with surprise," many intoxic' oldkrs iu our streets. This evil shonld and mast be stopped. Very respectfully, Yonr ob't servant, G. Collins Lrox, Major, and Chief Provost Marshal, District of Indiana and Michigan Capt Wilcox thereupon issued the following notice: "Offick of Pnovo3T Marshal, Indianapolis, Juno 8, 1863 ( All persons engaged in tho traffic and sale of spirituon? and intoxicating liquors within this city art notiucd that thev arc strictlr prohibited. from arvl after tnis date, from selling the same to any cnl.tel soldier. A violation of this order, by any person whomsoever, will be vLdted with screrc tuiushnKnt. By order of Trank Wilcox, Captain, and Provost Marshal. Joseph GriSin was arrested and imprisoned by Uapt. Wilcox lor an alleged violation of the foregoing military order and notice. After bis release he commenced this suit in the Marion Common Picas, against the Captain for false imprisonment, unnin was licensed to retail to everybody xcept minors,, intoxicated persons, tec., both bvthe ötate and federal government. Capt. Wilcox answered the complaint of Grifhn bv mstifving Ins arrest and lmDivonmcnt under the order and notice above set out ; and the court hell the justification sullicicnt, and a barto GriiHn's suit tor damages. GritKn appealed to this conrt. Legal authority is a justification to a person in making an arrest. Authority appearing on its face to bo illegal, is not a justification, and will b3 no protection for making an arrest. This case, it may ba remarked, doc not in voire the question ol the right, in anv ierson, or body of mca, to suspend the writ of hitbeas cor pus. Griilin did not apply for that writ in order to 'effect las discharge trom imprisonment. 11c submitted to that, and then sued for damages for the imprisonment. And, it may be here ob.scrr ed, that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not legalize a wrongful arrest and imprison ment; it o:ily deprives, tho party thus arrested of the means of procuring his lib-rty, but docs not exemot the person making tlip illegal arrest from liability to dam:iges, in a civil suit, for such arrest, nor from punishment in a criminal prose cution. The real question, lyinj at the bottom of this case, involves tho war iwcer of the Trcsi dent of tho Lmt(?d btatcs, that is, Lis power to act upon martial law withont its having been first declared bv the sovereign power of the state an authority claimed bv some to be a "mvsterir ons power, undefined by law, unknown to the subject; which we must not approach wi:hout awe, nor speak of wLhout reverence ; which no man mav question, and to which all men must snbmit bnt a power which we think cxit? only within limits capable of being denned with rea sonable certainty. The question is one that we would gladly havo avoided deriding; but from which, when Icgullv brought before us, we bave no right to shrink. It is one,' too, the importance of which demands for it a careful examina tion before it is derided. And it may be further observed, in passing, that when martial law supersedes the civil, or is exercised concurrently with it, the civil being permitted by mere mm tary suflerance, or as a matter of convenience, where it docs not iutcrferc with, or is subservient to the war power, the military assume the government of the citizens to just the extent they filcxse.. Tho assuming to prohibit tho sale of iquor to soldiers in Indianapolis was upon this theory. So were the military orders prohibiting the sale of arms anl ammunition to citizens in contravention of their constitutional right to procure and keep them. So weie tho arbitrary arrests for pretended disloyal opinions, in violation of tho constitutional right of freedom of tkonght and opinion. . The -c, and other acts in disregard of constitutional an I legal rights all rest upon the same principle. If the military could legally arrest and punish Griffin for selling a glass of liquor to a soldier, they could legally arrest and punish him for expressing what thev might assame to style a disloyal opinion. If they could not legally punish him for the one, they could not for tho other. Could they do cither? Istha question. This question we propose fully and fairly to examine, simply for tho purpose of ascertaining the law. If wc can com : to the conclusion that tho military possess this power, wc will promptly concede it to them. We would not rob them of an iota that they possess, and thev will not seek an iota that is not theirs. Knowing, as we do, personally, Capt. Wilcox, we feel warranted in saying that ho lias no wish, in the premises, but to legally discharge ins duty GrilBti wa.s not arrested and immisoncd under the civil law of this State, nor of the United States, for he had violated no such law. There Is no act of Congress, nor of the S.ate Legislature, prohibiting the sale of liquor to au en listed soldier. I he only law in this :a!e, con taining such prohibition, when Griffin madv his sale to a soldier, was that enacted by the military order of Major Lyon. Griffin was arrested, then, bv military authority. Could he be legally arrested, lor the cause alleged for bis arrest, by that authority, in, the place, and at the time it was so made f Griifin was not connected with the military or public service, was not a spy from tho enemy, and was not within military lines. He was a citizen of the State, pursuing, lawfully, his lawful avocation, in the civil walks of life. Had he been a soldier, in tho service, he would have been subject to the well defined code of military law, which requires obedience by soldiers to the orders of their officers and subjects them to punishment, by such officers, in prescribed modes, for disobedience to theso orders. In this case, had Major Lyon addressed bis order to the soldiers subject to his command, forbidding them to drink intoxicating liquor, or to leave the dines to co where it could bo obtained, and the soldiers, - . . x i . ..ir..! i.j -:...! .1 v: subject tox his Jurisdiction, had disobeved his order, he mL'ht; perhaps; though the point is not now before usl for decision, have caused them to be punished by military law. Military men, in the service, are subject to the codo of military law? ouacted for their covcrnmoin, and to be cnmentaria. the law ffoverninjr legislatures. It is a special law for such botlies. Bnt, as a general proposition, the citizen, in the civil walks of life, w not subiect to militarv orders, nor to the Irr parliamrntaria, nor to punishment bv militarv or parliamentary law. lie isgovernea oy me w of the land, administered in the courts if justice, lie mav, sometimes, no- SUOject to mantai lair, axcrutcd bv militarv officers, as the agents of the kimr. resident, or irovenior. as the case mav 1. When the citizen is covcrned by the military power. he is not governed bv tho soldier's code of military law, bnt he is said to be governed by tnartuil lac: and this law is perfectly distinct anil entirely different from military law to which oldicrs are subject. When tho military com - mander, as the agent of the king, president, or governor, governs tho citizens, ne aoes not rule them by the codo of military law, enacted for the

soldiers, as has been said, and - for disobedience to which they-are punished, but he governs the

citizens by arbitrary will. See tna "Articles of War' for the government of soldiers, enacted by Congress, in Brightly' Dig. p. 73. We may farther illustrate the distinction between govern mg and punishing those subject to the military rode by military tribunals, and j governing the cUzcn by martial law, which is, in fact, no law, but arbitrary will, bv extracting a couple of sections from the act of Congress of March 3, 1863. Section 30, of that act, reads thus : "lhat in times of war, insurrection, or re bellion; murder, assault and battery with intent to kill, manslanHiter, mayhem, wonndinjr bv otin?, or stabbing with an intent to commit murder, robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault and battery with intent to commit a rape and larceny, shall be punishable by the sentence of a general court-martial or military commission, when committed by persons tcho are in the military service of the United Slates, and subject to Hit Article of War; and the punishments for which offenses shall never be less than those inflicted by the laws of the State, Territory or District in which thev mar have been committed. Soction 38, of the same act, is as follows : " That all persons who, iu time of war or of rebellion against the supreme authority of the uniteu States, shall be found larking or acting as spies in or about any of the fortifications, posts, qnartertt, or encampments of any of the armies of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried by a general coart-martial, or military commission, and shall, upon conviction, sufle'r death." Such Is military fair. What is called martial law, wc again repeat, is applied to the citizen, by subjecting him to the government of the military, in certain exigencies. "Martial law is tho law of war, that depends on the just but arbitrary pow er and pleasure of the king, for, though lie doth not make any laws but by the common consent in parliament, yet in time of war, bv reason of the necessity of it, so guard against dangers that often arise, he useth absolute power ; so that his word is law. However opposed to other authorities, this expresses what is distinctly meant, both in England and in this country, by martial law." New Am. Cyclop., tit. Martial. Law. The question now arises, when and where cau tho citizen lo subjected to martial law? lie cannot, certainlv. without an act of tongrcss, be subjected to that law except upon necessity -occasioned by force, actually existing or immediately threatened, at the time and place wn"Te martial law is exercised." hetner, bv act of Congress, martial law conld be declared throughout the United States, we need not in quire. Sec Pe Hart, Mil. L., p. 17. Martial law ls the law of force, and is employ ed under two general conditions : 1. In a part, or the whole, of a foreign coun try, when, being at war with such country, our army may invade it, and expel the governing power from a part or the whole of it. 2. hen force may expel the civil anthontv nom a part or tue wnole ot our own territory; or, pe'iiaps, it mav be said, martial law is exercised in our country, the military being orthe jnt to .xecute it, where no civil authority exists. Uut where the civil authority exists, the Constitution is imperative that it shall bo paramount to the military, llie right to govern bv martial law does not grow out of the mere fact that we have an army; for we have that at all times, in peace as well as in war. llic n- lit to irovern Indianap olis bv martial law does not arise upon the mere fact that soldiers arc stationed in the city, or arc often marched through it; for soldiers "arc stationed at different points, and marched from place to place in the country at nil times, in peace as well as in war. Vct.'in crdinarv time:', urcly the oflicers commanding t'acm do not claim to govern the citizens, not connoctcd with the army, by martial law. The right, in the military oflicer, to govern by martial law, as we have said, arises upon the fact of existing, or immediately impending force, at a given place, and time, against legal authority, which tho civil auihority is incompetent to overcome; and it is exercised preci-ely upon the principleon which self-defense justifies the -use of force by individuals. Kobhers and burglars, and, in some cases, rioters may be resisted and even slain, in clf-defene, by private individuals. That is, there are ca-es where force mu-t be re sisted by force, instead rf waiting for the civil authorities, lias is the doctrine of Ilathcrforth, in his Institutes of Natural Law. Sec Book 1, chap. 19; Book 2, chap. 9. This is the doctrine expressed by the maxim, "inter ar ma silent lejes." This maxim was ririt applied under such circumstances. It was lirst laid down by Cicero, so far as wc have leen able to ascertain, in his ora;ion for Milo. Tho farts of that case are thus stated : Milo was on bis way to Lanuvium. Clodius met him on the road. Milo was in Ids carriage with his wife, and was accompanied by a numerous retinae, among whom were some gladiators. Clodius was on horseback, with about thirty arm'id men. Tae followers of each began to litrht, and when the tumult bail become general, Clodius was slain, probably by Milo himself. Milo was prosecuted for murder. Cicero prepared an oration in his defense, in which he asserts that the right of self-defense, when we are attacked by force, is a principle and necessity of nature that we cannot, in such caes, incur the hazard of wailing for the law to protect 'ms that in such circumstances it may be laid down as a maxim, "inter arma silent Icye f that is, that in the midst of actual force, for anna is used as meaning force, the law is silent. Rutherforth uses the word force as signifying arms. He savs contention by force, whether by individuals or governments, is war. Six ul4 Sni-a. But bocause Milo had a right to defend himself when and where he was attacked, without invoking law ; in short, becau-e the laws were silent for an hour in the nmLst of the combat between Milo and Clodius, it wa not contended that all law was sus nended throughout the Roman Empire during the pleasure of the Executive power: luis corresponds with Lord Coke s idea of Cicero s maxim, lie savs " When the courts of justice be open, and the judges ami ministers of tho ame mav bv law protect men from wrong and violence, and dis tribute justice to all, it is said to be time of peace. So when by invasion, insurrection, rebellion or such like, the icaeeablo course of jus tice i disturbed and stopped, o as tho courts ho as ii were shut a,, 1 1 silent inter leqrs arma, then it is said to b tim of war." Coke upon Little ton, as quoted in bmr. W heat. Int. Law, p. 525 lhere is another niTxira sometimes quoted in connection with the above from Cicero, which deserves a moment's notice. Sains itointli - premn lex :hc good of the individual must xicul to that of the public. I ins maxim, also, is acted upon onlv locally an I tern rarilv. Broom savs of it: "Hence tlierc are raanv cases in which in dividuals sustaiu au injury for which the law gives no action: as when privato hou-es are pulled down, or bulwarks raised on private prop erty, for the preservation and defense of the king dom against the kinir's enemies. The civil law writcr in(Icc(1 y tliat tIl0f Wu0 gufler hTe right to resort to the public for a satisfaction, but no one ever thought that the common law gave an action against the individual who pulled down the house or raised the bulwark, and tho reason is that a man may justify committing tbe private injury for the public good, as for instance, the pulling down of a house, if necessary, in order to arrest tho progress of a Sre." Broom's Maxims, p. 1. v See the subject of this maxim well dis cussed in 2 Kent, 338, et seq. , These two maxims, and their application, illustrate and define martial law, under absolute governments ; and, for the rmrjioscs of the case at bar, wo shall concede tbe riirht to exercise that law, as thus defined and appliedj under our government, limited, as all its departments are, by a constitution, it Ls the law of force, applied to govern jicrsons and places where the civil law is expelled : its officers rendered unable to exe cute it, by forcible resistance. This right, tins temporarily and locally to exercise martial law, in case of necessity, is the war power of the lovernor of a State and of the President of the United States, and it is ell the war power that either possesses by virtue of which he can assume to govern indcjendeiitly of the civil law; and this war power, each executive uuallv exerts I through his subordinate military officers, I This mav be further illustrated by examples. .During the administration of Governor Wright, as the Executive of this State, it was alleged that a rebellion existed in Clay county that the officers of the civil law wore overpowered bv force. Uovernor w right, as commanucr-in-cincf f tho military power of the State, sent a military force to the -county, the commander of which, I as the representative of the Executive, would, if necessary, govern that locality by the war power, till the civil law could resume its sway; but because there was forcible resistance to law in Clav counir, uw m iaii uumuruo uurcruwr mijui to overthrow the civil authorities in the whole i Diarc, and assume uiuiumi m iuujut povrcr, to be exercised through military officers" Dnrinjr the administration of Washington, as President of the United States, a rebellion occurred in Western Pennsylvania, on account of I tho excise law; the civil power was overcome. In that portion of the State. .General Washington sent thither a military force, and, within the lim1 its of the territory from which the rebels had expelled the civil power, and for just the time necessary to restore me ascendancy oi mat power, l Washington, by his uenerals, mignt have found

it necessary to govern by the war power. So

Washington understood tins question, ana ne instructed his officers accordingly. His instructions to them were: . "That cverr officer and soldier will constantly bear in mind that he comes to support the laws, and that it would be" peculiarly unbecoming in bim to be. in any war. the infractor of them: that the essential principles of a five government confine the province of the military, when called forth on such occasions, to two objects: first, to combat and subdue all who mav be found in arms in opposition- to the national will and authority; secondly, to aid and support the civil magistrates ui bnnirinir offenders U justice. - 1 lie lisponsation of this justice belongs to the civil magis trates; and let u ever be our pride and our glory to leave the sacred deposite there inviolate." Irving's Life of Washington, vol. 5, ch. 25. Rhode Island presents a different example, but strictly within the same principle; an example where the rebellion was not local, but throughout the entire State, and called into exercise the war power of a Governor of the State. lUiode Island is a very small State. Its territory does not exceed that of the three largest conm'ic? in Indiana. It was governed upon a royal charter granted by King Charles the Second, under which onlv freeholders to a certain amount and their eldest sons were entitled to vote. The people petitioned for a convention to form a new and more democratic constitution. The legisla ture, year after year, denied the petition. The people finally took the subject into their own hands, called a convention, formed a new con stitution, and were proceeding, a great majority of the people cnjraginir in the nudcrtaking, in 1842, to overthrow, entirely to extinguish the old government and put the new one into opera tion in its place, t orce was resorted to on both sides. The contest was not local, but extended to everv foot of territory in the State. The leg islature of the old government passed an act aunzmji the uovcrnor of that government to enforce martial law; be thereupon announced it by proclamation, and then exercised it to the ex tent of forcible resistance to the oli government. which was throughout the whule State. New Am. Cyclop., tit. Dorr; Bntke and Causin's lie ports to House Kep. in tonsress m 1844: Luther v. Borden, 7 How. ( U. S.) Itep 1. The charter Governor, King, also called on the President of the United States for aid to put down the rebellion; the I'rcsident tendered it, and the people of Rhode Island were crushed by military power. llie right, then, of the Jrrcsident to temporarily govern localities, through his military officers, he derives solelv from the fact that he is the com mander-in-chief of the army, and is to sec that the laws are executed; and he can exercise it to just the extent that, and no further than, by the laws of war, a commanding general in the army of tha United States could do it. Where the laws are, or may be, executed without the interference of the President, by Lis military, he has no nht thus to interfere. 1 he I'rcsident docs not derive his war power from his oath to support, protect and defend the Constitution, lhat simplv obliges him to obey the Constitution himself, and to use the power which that instrument confers upon lum, and none else, to cause others to obev it. He does not derive his war power from the right to sus1end the writ of habeas corpus We do not think ie possesses that right, under the Constitution. We tuink that is an act of legislative power, which can only be performed by Ccngrcss; and, even when rightly suspended, it does not justify an exercise of the war power beyond the necessities of the case, but simply takes awav the means of oltaining liberty when illegally deprived of it. Simply because the habeas corpus is snspcndcd.is it right to destroy every man s liberty and property! The ruht, in a case of emergency, to exercise the war power, temporarily and locally, supposing that power to exist at'all, under the Consti tution, does not depend upon the fact of the habeas corpus being suspended, or not suspended U he war power of the I'rcsident, then, mav be stated thus: He has a right to govern, throuirfi ms military officers, by martial law when and where tho civil power of the United States is Mispended bv force. In all other times and places the civil excludes martial lawexcludes government by t'aa war power. Where force prevails, martial law may be exercised, lint in all parts of the conntrv where the courts arc open and the civil power is not expelled bv force the Coustitutiou and laws rulo, the President is but President, and no citizen, not connected with. the army, can be punished by the military power of the United States, nor is he amenable to militarv orders. See Skeen v. Monkmier, at this term. II, in such pails of the country, men commit crimes denned bv law. thev must be imn ished, according to the Constitution and the law, in the civil courts. If, in such parts of the country, men have not perpetrated acts 'consti tutinj;, in law, crimes, their arrest, trial, ana punishment by mi'Jt.iry courts is but a mode of ap plying Lvncli law; is, in short, mob violence 1 his is so, unless the old r.nglish tory doctrine of government is secretly included in our tjon stitution. That doctrine, as expressed by Filmcr, is that a man is lound to obev the king s command against law: nav.in some cases, against divine laws. May s Const. Ilist., vol. 2, p. 21 note. ' Having ascertained the principle bv which tho legality of cases of mihtarv arrest and i uniU mcnt i to le tested, we are now prepared to proceed to tbe application of the principle to" tho case at bar. The existinz rebellion in the United States vast as is its extent, is not ccncral, but local. It is confined to the Southern States. It is sectional rebellion. The theatre of force where the civil tribunals arc closed is sectional, liounded bv teoCTaphic lines. It is limited to the slave States. 1 his has been nnanimouslr decided bv the Sunrcme Court of the United States in the Prize cases. 2 Black's Rep., p. C33. There are those bv whom it is thonght that great provocations bave been given to the people of the Northern States, or jmrtions of them, calculated to irritate them into joining in the rebellion; but, under all persecutions and grievances, the people of the Northern States, thanks to their patriotism, have remained true and devoted to the Government of the United States. Tiie rebellion itself did not originate in an at tempt, a-s wc have read it history, to overthrow the Government of the United States, and is not now ostensibly prosccntcd for that purpose. The rebellion consists in an attempt, if we have read aright, to withdraw a certain portion of jcople and territory from under the jurisdiction of the Uovernment of the L nited btafes to dtrtdethe Union, leaving tho North under fhe existing gov ernment," and placing the South under a newly created government. It is tine that the rebel armies would, if they could, invade the territory of tho Northern States, in order to relieve the rebel States from the desolation of war, without changing the object for which the war is prosecuted on their side, viz: their independence of tho Union, or, perhaps, guarantees for rights in it. And, it our arniv was withdrawn, or greatly weakened before terms of peace were agreed on, the rebels would seize u;hoi their independence,' if thev did not invade us. Hence, the imperative necessity, felt by all, of continuing to keep up the armv, to prevent this greatest of evils, what ever ultimate purpose the administration may indirectly seek to accomplish by it, which could not ba approved. No one of the Northern States, constitutin'r as they together do, a decided majority of all the State-, desires to overthrow the Constitution of the United States, or to withdraw from under its operation; nor do any considerable joruon, perhaps not any, ol tue people oi sncn states manifest any desire to resist the legal execution of the Constitution and laws. Ijcsistance to illegal arrests and mob violence is not necessarily resistance to the government. The courts, in all the Northern States, are and have been open. But the Southern States are attempting, by violence, tojscver the Union, and the Government of the United States and the people of tbe Northern States arc attempting, as they assert, to prevent the severance of the Lmon of these heretofore united States. Such is the object, on both side, of the war; not to maintain or overthrow the old leual Government of the Lnited States, but, on one side, to continue the existence of, and on the other to sever, tho territorial unity of the nation. And the opposition to the Administration, (not the Government,) in the quiet, law-abiding States of tho North is not forcible, but a peaceful difference, and conflict of opinion and argument as to the cause of the rebellion, and - the measures which should bo pursued as best calculated to restore territorial unitv, under the government of our fathers, with the least destruction i f property, the least sacrifice of lifo and consti- . ' 1 l" . 1 . 1 A..t...'kl. tttn. lutionai iineny, ami iu tue nhiiipi jjwnuio uiue. And the question now is, does snch peaceful conflict of opinion and argument justify the Administration in subjecting those who differ with it to the military power! For the case at bar, though perhaps not of that description in its facts, yet rests entirely upon the principle, as we remarked at the outset, ' Of governing by martial law as it would not be pretended that the roilitary conld make sncn arrest oi tne citizen as mat involved in this case, ia rime of tcacc. We have found no legal principle that will justify such a course. Ire know oj no precmem jot sncn an extrcise. of the war poweras that above propounded, rii: of subjecting opponents, simply in political opinions, to martial law for expressing those opinions;

for such opinions are not force, nor is the expressing of them force, nor is it a crime by any law of the laudThere Is one precedent npon this question to which we think it instructive to refer. When.'in 1776, the American Colonies retailed against Great Britain, not to overthrow the British Gov

ernment that still stands bat to sever the Briii&h Union, to take the colonies oat from an der the jurisdiction of the British Govenment, King George the Third determined to po to great lengths ia attempting to consolidate British public sentiment in tujiport of bis particular policy against the colonies. He laid down the two propositions, that tbe British Union sboald never be dissolved, and that the colonies should be subjugated by the sword to the sovereign will, uninfluenced by any reasonable or fair terms to be offered to invite submission. He went great lengths in attempting to nnitc tho IjJjrli.-di people at heme npon the idea of enforcing his platfoi m bv war alone. He used the ratronare of tbe covemment.in the sbai of contracts and appointments. to corrupt; he spent enormous amounts in actual bribery, and resorted to various means of intimi-. dation to pn-duce a united English tcntimtnt corresponding with bis own. May's Const. iiist., vol. 1, pp. 30, 48; 2 ib., 31. On page 52 of volume one are extracts of letters from tbe King to Lord North. On the 4th of February, 1779, be wrote: "Yon may sound Lord Howe; but before I name him to preside at the Admiralty Board, I must expect an explicit declaration that he will zealously concur in prosecuting the war in all quarters of the globe." Again, on the 22d of June, 1779, he wrote: "Before I will hear of any man s readiness to come into office, I will expect to see it signed under his own Land and seal, that he has resolved to keep the empire entire, and that no troops shall consequently be drawn from thence, Ii. e. America. 1 nor inde pendence ever alloned." But the King could not produce unitv of sen timent in bis exclusive war policy. Chatham, Fox, Burke, Barre and other true Britons, farseeing statesmen and illustrious patriots, were for compromise, -conciliation along with war; tbey warned the King that bis policy was less humane, less Christian than theirs, and was calculated to prolong and increase the expenses of the war; that it involved the overthrow of liberty t?i i..tf i ! i iu .ciigiiuiii libcu, auu migtu even suoject uun, at last, in the dispensations of Providence, to the loss of the brightest jewel of his crown. These sentiments were boldly and earnestly uttered; they were read by the army and the rebel colonists; and, though it was attempted by a few narrow-minded bigots to throw discredit npon the patriotism of those great statesmen, we bave never learned that the King, even claimed that their conrse gave bim a right to arrest them bv virtue of martial law. See Buckle's IEst. Civ., p. 355. If the speakers thought King George and his ministers advocated erroneous doctrines, the intelligence of the soldiers rendered the armv capable of discerning it and avoiding lieing rnflnenced by them; or, at all events, the fact did not jus tify the violation of the conFtitutional rights of the citizen to suppress them. And the proposition would certainlv be a mom-trous one, that all ctrances of opinion mav bo prohibited for fear an erroneous one might be expressed; and we bave in this country no legal censor, outride of the law, who bas a right to set up bis own opinions as a test bv which tbe correctness of all others is to be determined. Tbe foreiroinp is the prece dent from Great Britain. We should be reluctant to seek others in Spain, Austria. Russia; Turkey, Naples, Mexico, or the so-called Confederate States. We feci constrained, then, to come to the con clusion that the war owcr of the President is limited to the simple right of exercising martial law, simply as a military chief, locally and temporarily, where actual or immediately impending force renders it a military necessity. No other doctrine can be reconciled wiih the Constitution of the United States, or is compatible with the liberties of the people. The next question that ari&es is, how is the existence of the fact that the civil power is superseded by illegal, forcible resistance, to bo ascertained' Is it a fact to be proved On the trial, or decided by the Court upon judicial knowledge If the former, there is no averment in the answer of the existence of such fact, and it was bad for that reason. If the latter, we are able to state, with a feeling of complete assurance, that there has at no time been any forcible resistance on the part of the people to tbe civil power, in the ciry ot Indianapolis, which the officers of the law were not easily able to overcome, when disposed to do their duty. The courts have at all times been open, and there are a sufficiency of them here, including those of the City, State'and United States, to meet the public necessities. And, extending our observation from the city to all parts of our commonwealth, " we are proud and happv in beinjr . able to say, in honor of the people and State of Indiana, that all the citizens of the State, with scarcely an exception, if indeed there is one, are, and always have been, eminently true ami patriotic, and remarkably patient. Judge Leavitt, in the Vallandigham case, we regret to say, assuming to speak by judicial knowledge, but beyond question upon false and slanderous information, of the people of this State, charges that a portion of them are afiected with the rankest disloyalty. Our judicial knowledge is thorough to the contrary. The- people of Indiana are all for the Constitution, the Union as formed by it, and - the laws enacted pursuant to it- No one is opposed to the Government, (using that word in its proper sense, and not as meaning the Administration,) but only where opposition is expressed to any proceeding, to acts believed to le illegal and tyrannical, as perpetrated by individuals. Tbe people of the State, in the lan guage of an illustrious statesman now no more, are for Libertt and Uxiox,oirand inseparable, now and forever. They are, as we said above, and again repeat, devoted to the ( 'onrtitution, the ' Union, and the Itm, and with one accord, unite iu the invocation Stnto pcrjwtua-. Tho jndgment Mow is reversed with costs, remanded, &c. A Hilitnrf Ilepublic. The frequency and errtetnss with which Mr. Welister discussed lite probabilities of a war between the N'Hh and South, suggests that none of our statesmen bd a more correct apprehension of the future th in he His readiness to compromise, alien the sections tit solidly opposed to each other, and the solemnity with which helmprvsed constitutional cbligations, seem to bare been prompted by (enrol such a con tot as is now convulsin? the nation. In his oration delirerfd June 17, 1&4.1, upon the completion of the Bunker Hill Monnmeiit,be said: "A military republic, n govenirceiit founded on mock elections, and supported only by tbe sword, is a mot emept, indeed, but a retrograde and disastrous movement, from tbe regular and old fashioned monarchical system. If men would enjoy the tdes sings of republican government, they must govern themselres by reason, by mutual counsel and consultation, br a sense nd feeling of gener.il interest, and by the acqui-" esteoce of the minority in the will of the majority properly expressed; and above all the military must be kept, sci orüing to the langusge of our bill of rights, in -ttict suboniinntion to the civil authority. Wherever this lesson is not both lesrned snd practiced, there can be no political ' freedom. Absurd, preposterous is it a scoff and a satire on free forms of constitutional liberty, for forms of government to be preacribed by military leaders, and the riiihf of suffrftge to be exercised at the point nf the sword." ' If he was alive to day bis successor ia tbe Senate of the United Stites would request an order for Ins banish nienl or imrrisournent, and the President would jrrant the request. Such an Intellectual piant as I e, advocating such general ' principles of duly and policy as be ever sustained, t would frighten the Administration aa an earthquake al irms the inhabitants beneath whom it rolls Chicago Time. Tlie !Mew York Ledger Lincoln Tbe New York Ledger, speaking of the movement now on loot to place Asa ab ax Liscoim again on the course as candidate for tbe Presidency, says! It is generally understood that Abraham Lincoln is quite anxious to serve another term io the White House, and that his friends are working late and exrly to ecure him the nomination of bis party. We hope he won't get it. We have nothing against 31 r. Lincoln personally, but a -President who can quietly sit and crack bis jokes , in ihe White House while he permits an old fossil like Secretary Welles to msn.ige tbe Nary Department, ia uot the sort of a man we admire. -The mere fact lhat Mr. Lincoln hs kept old Mr. Welles in ofüce while our commerce is being ruined by rebel privalers, will cost bim thousands of votes if be ever comes before the people again as a candidate for tbe Presidency. The Washington correspordent of the Cincinnati Eiio.uirer savs : It is stated lhat the Republicans of tht ladiana dclegatiou lately wailed upon Mr. Stanton, to ask that the grent Milroy should have command In the field, and they were flatly refused. Upoa this an application was made to the Preaiaent to remove tbe Secretary, but be objected, . saying Stanton will not steal. ? -

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