Indiana Republican, Volume 3, Number 125, Madison, Jefferson County, 1 May 1819 — Page 1

ANo A 1 V V "WHERE LIBERTY DWELLS, THERE IS MY COUNTRY." MADISON, (INDIAN A)- SATURDAY, MAY i, 1819. Nb. VOL. III. 125

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rUBLISHEO BY LODGE Si ARION, t VERY SATURDAY.

CONDITIONS. rh "REPUBLIC AX' will v a ilverod at the o'lice for two V.-"lr per annum, paid i ac" vrW ; if piid within two months a?vr subscribing, it will be consigned in advance ; two dollars and MiV cents if paid within twelve cu-nths ; and three dollars if not riU until the vear expires. X.-) Pl por will be discontinued vniil aU arrearages are p.v.d. In a: I caes a subscriber must ve n.uice punctually at the end of fv cir of his intention to discontinue, r he will be held responsive t' r another rears subscripticn. A -ertisements not exceeding a svlire nil! be inserted three times fjr a dollar: loader ones in pro--?rrion, a vd if the number of insrtivis d sired, are not specified, x;y will be continued at the exP'ic of the advertiser until orderci o-.t. j'p All letters to the Editors m.:5t !v pot paid. TKEN IT' Bv Etenor Taylor, in Saluda Township, a sorrel horse 14 ini -:4th hands high, three years" old, no brands. Appraised before me to 30 dollars th;s :S'h dav of Nov. 1818. SAMUEL M'KINLEY, J. p. April 2 j.. 12 . J 4 TAKEN UP By James M'Kinley, in Saluda Township, a small sorrel mare, blind ot the left eye, small biize and snip, off hind foot white, five years old. Appraised before me to 14 dollars, this 1 6th day of February 1819. SAMUEL M'KINLEY, j. r. April 24. 124 TAILED UP Ty Luther Shcc in Saluda Township, a small brown mare, t yan.i a half hands hiirh, small S'ar, 7 years old next spring. Appraised before me to 20 dollars, this 25th day of February 1 S 19. SAMUEL M 'KIN LEY, J. p. April 24. 124 TAKEN UI: 3 By William Monroe, jr. in Sahda Township, a sorrel mare, ab:mt fourteen and x half h ind iis 110 brands. Appraised " before me to thirty dollars, jjjthis 5th dav April iS 19. - SAMUEL M'KINLEY, j. p. -dnril ? . i r - 124 TAKEN UP Richard Hopkins, in Saluda ; Township, a sorrel marc, afcout 14 and a half hands high, ;;tout live years old, blazed faCe. ricrllt hlMrt frn. T!ir ! Vppraised before me to 32. cents, uus loinciay :f April 1819. , SAMFTKT. TTfMT FV r lllfppril 24. 124 blank: UhEDS For sale at tb" Onr. s

Bank of the United States. Xi the Supreme Court cf the Lrmted States. McCulloch, - Writ of error from m. the Court of ApThe State of C peals of MaryMaryland J land. Opinion of the Court concluded. That the power of taxing it by the States may be exercised so as to destrov it, is too obvious to be denied. But taxation is said to be an absolute power which acknowledges no other limits than those expressly prescribed in the constitution, and like sovereign power of every other description, is trusted to the discretion of those who use it. But the very terms of this argument admit that the sovereignty of the state, in the article of taxation itself, is subordinate to, and may be controlled by, the constitution of the United States. How far it has been controlled by that instrument must be a question of construction. In making this construction, no principle not declared, can be admissable, which would defeat the legitimate operations of a supreme government. It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify even power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence. This elfect need not be stated in terms. It is so involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the expression of it could not make it more ceitain. We must, therefore, keep it in view while construing the constitution. The argument on the part of the State of Maryland is not that the. states may directly resist a law of Congress, but that they may exercise their acknowledged powers upon it, and that the constitution leaves them thi right in the confidence that they will not abuse it. Before we proceed to examine this argument, and to subject it to the test of the constitution, we must be permitted to bestow a few considerations on the nature and extent of this original right of taxation, which is acknowledged to remain with the states. It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which the government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this power, is found in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon itself and upon its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The people of a state, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the axigencies of government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the inttrest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard them against its abuse. But the means employed by the government of the union have no such security, nor is the right of a state to tax them sustained by the same theory. Those means are not given by the people of a particular state, not given by the constituents of the legislature w hich claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the states. They are given by all, for the benefit of all and upon theory, should be subjected to that government only which belongs to all. It may be objected to this definition that the power of taxation is not confined to the people and propetty of a state. It may be exer

cised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction. This is true. But to what source do we trace this right ? It is obvious that it is an incident of sovereignty, and is co-extensive to that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends are objects of taxation, but those over which it does not extend, arc, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be pronounced pclfevident. . The sovereignty of a state extends to every thing which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission, but does it extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the U. States I We think it demonstrable that it does not. Those powers are not given by the people of a single state. They are given by the people of the United States to a government whose laws made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be supreme consequently, the people of a single state cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over them. If we measure the power of taxation residing in a state, by the extent of sovereignty which the people of a single state possess, and can confer on its government, we have an intelligible standard applicable to every case to which the 0 power may be applied. Wc have a principle which leaves the power of taxing the people and property of a state unimpaired : which leaves to a state the command of all its resources ; and w hich places beyond its reach, all those powers which are conferred by the people of the United States on the government of the Union, and all those means which are riven for the purpose ot tarrying those powers into execution. We have a principle which Is safe for the states, and safe for the Union. We are relieved; as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty, from infringing powers : from a repugnancy between a right in one government to pull down, what there is an acknowledged right in another to preserve. We arc not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the use of the power. The attempt to use it on the means employed by the governments of the Union, in pursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single state cannot give. We find then, on just theory, a total failure of this original right to tax the means employed by the government of the Union for the execution of its powers. The right never existed, and the question whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise. But, wav ing this theory for the present, let us resume the inquiry whether this power can be exercised by the respective states, consistently with a fair construction of the constitution ? That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create ; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the "control, are propositions not to be denied. But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the magic word confidence. Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess of destruction, would be an abuse, to presume which would banish that confidence which is essential to alX

government. But is this a case of confidence ? Would the people of any one state trust those of another power to control the most insignificant operations of their state gov eminent? Wc know they would not. Why then should we suppose that the people of any one state should be willing to trust those of another with a power to control the operations of a government to which they have confided their most important and most valuable interests ? In the legislature of the Union alone, arc all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, there fote, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a case of confidence, and we must consider it as it really is. If we apply the principle for which the state of Maryland contends, to the constitution generally, wc shall find it capable of changing totally the character of that instrument. We shall find it capable of arresting .ill the measures of the government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the states. The American people have declared their constitution, and laws made in pursuance thereof, to be supreme but this principle wTould transfer the supremacy in fact to the states. If the states may tax one instrument employed by the government in the execution of it3 powers ; they may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail, they may tax the mint, they may tax patent rights, they may tax the papers of the custom-house, they may tax judicial process, they may tax all the means employed by the government, to an excess w hich would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on the states. Gentlemen say, they do not claim the rurht to extend state taxations to these objects. They limit their pretentions to property. Butou what principle is this distinction made ? Those who make it have furnished no reason for it, and the principle for which thev contend denies it. They contend that the power of taxation has no other limit than is found in the iOth section of the ist article of the constitution ; that, with respect to every thing else, the power of the state is supreme, and admits of no control. If this be true, the distinction between property and other subjects o which the power of taxation is applicable, is merely arbitrary, and can never be sustained. This is not all. If the controlling power of the states be established, if their supremacy a', to taxation be acknowledged, w hat is to restrain their exercising this control in any shape they may please to give it ? Their sovereignty is not confined to taxation. That is not the only mode in which it might be displayed. The question is, in truth, a question of supremacy ; and if the right of the states to tax the means employed by the general government be conceded, the declaration that the constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, is empty and unmeaning declamation. In the course of the argument, the Federalist has been quoted, and the opinions expressed by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to be entitled to great respect in expounding the constitution. No tribute can be paid to their worth which exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions to the cass which may arise in the progress of our government, aright to judge of their correctness must be retained ; and, to understand the arguments we must examine the proposition it maintains and the objections against tvhkh it is directed. The rubject

of those numbers, from which passages have been cited, is the unlimited power of taxation which is vested in the general government. The objection to this unlimited power which the argument sseks to remove, is stated w ith fullness and clearness. It is, "that an indefinite power of taxation in the latter .(the government of the LTnion) might, and probably would, in time, deprive the former (the governments of the states) of the means of providing for their own necessities ; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature. As the law of the LTnion are to become the supreme laws of the land ; as it is to pass all laws that may be necessary for carrying into execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it ; the national government miht at any time abolish the taxes imposed for state objects, upon the pretence of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity for deinr this, iu order to give efficacy to the national revenues ; and thus rd! the resources of taxntion might, by decrees become the subjects of fetleral monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the state governments.' The objections to the constitution which are noticed in thcc numbers, were to the undefined power of thu government to tax. not to the incidental nrivilcj; of exempting its own mcasurnnn state taxation. The conse apprehended from this u'V power, were : that it woulfc? all the objects of taxation, exclusion and destruction

state governments.-' Th ments of the Federalist, tended to prove the fallacy

apprehensions; net to provx, c the government was incapable of executing any of its powers without exposing the means it employed to the embarrassment of state taxation. Arguments urged against these objections, and these apprehensions are to be understood as relating to the points they mean to prove. Had the authors of those excellent essays been asked, w hether they contended for that construction of the constitution, which would place within the reach of the states those measures wIik" the government might adopt for the e.Yt cution of its powers, no man, who has read their instructive pages, will hesitate to admit, tint there answer must irtve been in the negative. It has alfo been insisted, th; as the power of taxation in the general antl state governments is acknowledged to be concurrent, even argument which would sustain the right of the general government to ta.v banks chartered bystates, will equally sustain the right of the states, to ta.v banks chartered by the general government. - But the two cases are not on the same reason. The people of all the states have created the general government, and have conferred upon it the general pewer sf ta.vaticn. The people cf all the states, and the states themselves, are represented in Ccngress, and by their representatives twercise this pewer. When they taY the chartered institutions of the states, they Vjl their constituents, and these taxes must be uniform. But when a state taxes the operations of ihes government ot the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claims no control. It acts upon the im-a-sures of a government created by ethers, as well as themselves, htr the benefit cf others in comrifr with themselves. The dim reiiftjfV is that which nlways exists, anL always mut cist, between thel, fs action cf a y hr.e cr a part, and the fV? ' acti?F4 of a prt and the whflc i J

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