Indianapolis Times, Indianapolis, Marion County, 5 May 1951 — Page 3

ad , . ew : : : SATURDAY, MAY 5, 1951. iL eT kak dy ’ . a , ; ’ : . a — — THE INDIANAPOLIS TIMES i z PAGE 3. sor | Highlights Of MacArthur's Testimony, OK'd By U. S. Censor : n )ad any indica~- Continued 7 L : : . : Y, Y . » a int Chiefs of ued from age 2 . : Vie ; ’ : : eir judgment, report, was the report Be d is whether there is a reasonable you were a voluntary witness; retary of “State Dean Acheson this report in Tokyo. ‘I did not than merely killing the men that rategically im- to you for comments? opportunity to stop our lossesthat we were mutually trying to primarily responsible for his dis- need to read the report; I was we are killing and wounding at Gen. MacArthur—No, sir. I have * rather than to vastly increase discover what are some of the charge; it~ was -learned today. present at the conference. Iithe presen: time, in China. only seen those portions of th them.... truths underlying the greatest However, persons who have knew completely what had oc-| Gen. MacArthur—There is no Position Wedemeyer “report which w e Sought . Doug's Opinion problems that have ever con- taliggd with the General recently curred there. : {weapon of war, in my opinion, h Mi : made public. were Se . fronted us... * j state he has neither the wish nor What happened to the five re- that is quite as efficacious as a ne : ‘ —On Aid to Yugoslavia Gen. MacArthyrwl, am very the intention of putting the finger ports that reached my headquar- blockade. If you put on a block_None. Quite Doubts Siberia Stores 3 Fubright 8 Bt 4 i Slad to accept the invitation of on Mr. Acheson when He testifies ters, T don't know. I suppose ade, and it is successful, you are ator. I think Suffici f a on a Te ’ des 0 get the committee, but I am not try-| before the Senate investigators they went into the normal files. apt to kill them by the millions. e"yoint Cirlefs icient tor Long War en. i a oy s x RN 3 re- ing to force anything, and the last tomorrow.” Sen. Gillette — And a reputed| Sen. Long—With regard to very’ closely Sen. Ralph Flandefs (R. Vt.) Sen : 4s A en ng a impression that I would want to] General, would it surprise you report of the conversation and a Formosa, I agree that it is in our v : The question still remains aa to iid re) Bm Sr gi give Is that I pose as an expert on to know that the Secretary of conference between the President interest that the Red Chinese do a '> whether your proposal ; o familiar iH the bill Sd would world affairs. |State in fact opposed your recall of the United States and you and |not have‘it. . . . However, I have Now, Genera bring the Soviet op sals would 2x a w t io an y ‘Sen. Fulbright—Well, I do not vigorously in discussions at: the other high officials would have not to this date seen the real proposal made nto Aor government itself not attempt o "pass any SUPET- think you are posing as one, but highest level? no interest to you at all? strategic importance of Formosa. ns bys 1 think, BIS 2EU0n ois 80 SOU have ii ficial judgment” "00 Of us regard you as an - Gen. MacArthur—I want tosay| Gen. MacArthur—I didn't say| How do you believe the Chinese Eastérn and hi i at the Soviet govern- Sen. Fulbright—It seems to nie expert whether you pose as one I have never met the Secretary that, Senator. ~~ ~~ 7 [could make great usé of Formosa howers,” a pro- eh Jeg ho have, reserves of to be a very simple question. It or not. .. of State. I have never attributed G Whit D i in the face of the sea and air on ron nab mt EE I ations s Wao es I a s L 3 —It js my firm y cons . at 1s, sen. fg ./decision of the President to re- tant . viso that five belief that the-Saviet fovernment Bradley appeared befor our com- Hee ot ee Place me. I haven't-the faintest mentioning Wastebasket Syrategic Import down together = has not stockpiled in Siberia" suf- mittee.” Gen. Collins, I believe, 20 allout effort to end it by idea of whether he had any part Sem. Gillette—Well, it had “of F HE . od terms. ThoE® € fietently to maintain a major ag- also, and said this was militarily (106 of arms in the Orient lor whether he did not haxe any little oh 1 0, : al ormosa Explain gthe~-Soviet— mere POS HVC CAM PRATT AT IR er i B...ustified. ‘because, .of.. the thir a pe mahi Th... RAL ew Sune]. 4 ve. =. eh: MacArthur—] sa nee y,... M eis Tn lito "odd divisions tt the PA MIX trescaiicd EO oT Atul Salolubaled h Ro fot Féaa Tt TH™ order to ve" Tul ae. MacArthur Be. a i

China, Great dq States and sr, I believe ... ask, whether ffder that type ee nations out y indicating a nit Red China yrmosa to the ists, whether ndication of an 1? —The position

real period of time. I can only give it 4s my best opinion— Sen. Flanders—Yes. (2 Lines deleted). . Sen. Flanders—That answers my ... question. Sen. Flanders—. . . (Would) an active prosecution of the Korean campaign by the means you suggest . . . bring the Soviet government into action in Europe . .. ? Gen. MacArthur—My belief is that the basic plan of the Soviets

had. Gen. MacArthur — If you have such good assurances, why ask me?-... . The entire matter ot the cefense of Europe, the entire economics of Europe, the “degree of communism, it you can put it that way, that exists in Serbia and Yugoslavia, the entire atmecsphere, (are) a conglomeration of things that you have been stuaying and the authorities here for

y negotiated Sonal

not seem to me thi peace, for example, {Ss necessarily appeasement. Do you think so? Gen. MacArthur—. . . I have my own definition of appeasement that might disagree with yours. I. believe when you enter into war, you should use sufficient force to impose your will upon the enemy ... I believe that we do have the power to do so without sacrificing any of our other interests...

|whatsoever. As far as this state-

ment is concerned, it has abso-

lutely no basis of fact. Sen. Harry P. Cain (R. Wash.) --Have you any observation to make as to why, without prejudice of any kind, our Allied friends throughout the world have been so very reluctant in the last 10 months to take part in the Korean conflict . . .?

Feels Rest of Allies

acquainted with what had” oc-|for the Russian submarine fleets,

curred. . . . Gen. Whitney has asked me to state, Senator, that he said nothing whatsoever about any wastebasket. He said distinctly, as he recalls, that these reports had gone to our files in the nor-| mal administrative process. Sen. Gillette—Would you favor going ahead on our own in China, leven if that brought about the loss of all support from our Atif that led

troduction of the marine, terdict all of the supply lines of the Western Pacific. . . . :

and the Russian air fleets. . .

You could probably, by the inRussian subbased in Formosa, in-

You have breached our’ line

completely when you take For mosa . . changed the strategic complexion of the Pacific.

. you have completely

‘Sen. Russell—Would you mind

developing that? That is disturb-

he Joint Chiefs is pitched upon a much broader Sen. Fulbright—I understood at : . lantic Allies, even ae tallest basis than an incident which month, sng as ears Tone time you were willing to have Should Join Fight eo the ‘Oreskup of the AtTanlienr. OPME all worle ao 13 Gen. MacArthur—I will

y March as I le terms of an se-fire should jude the recogating of Red ed Nations or turning over

tand, in those isapproved by Defense, who hat those two be considered the peace con-

might occur in Korea or even in Asia itself . ..

We Should Increase Our Armed Strength

Sen. Fullbright—. . .I wonder If you could elaborate a little . . what is it you think might determine the Soviet choice... 7. Gen. MacArthur—My own belief|politics, and I am not. I believe Is that from the strategic military that is as much of a political quespoint of view, the relativity of |tidn as it is anything else.

the strengths on the two sides would be of the greatest possible Factors of Government

influence in dictating the Soviet Influence Joint Chiefs

as the great symbol ag

"| believe that to the average Asiatic Chiang Kai-shek stands out

minutes to give an authoritative statement. I must have the facts , . . Sen. Fulbright—You said in answer to a question by the Senai ” tor from Connecticut that the enemy .. . is communism. Gen. MacArthur—That is correct. Sen. Fulbright—What is your supply the food for an aggressive| concept of communism? I mean army that way, they will have to|jg this the communism of Marx cease utilizing that aggressive| ng Engel’s, or is it the commuarmy, nism as practiced by the Kremlin, Sen. Fullbright—I understood pr just what do you mean by they do not have that power now, that?

ainst communism .. ."

a cease fire in Korea, that is say, short of an all-out victory, weren't/ Senator, I think it was one of the you? (greatest mistakes that the various

. . ~ . {members of the United Nations Believes in Cease-Fire

have ever made in not fully supOn Honorable Terms

[porting the effort in Korea. Why : [they did not I cannot underGen. MacArthur—I would beistand . . . be glad to have a cease fire in| Sen. Cain—It is my impression, Korea on honorable terms at any|Sir, that you did not address or time. I have had no other thought bid farewell to your. troops or and hopé in the last 10 months to the Japanese people, your than fo bring it to an honorable friends, before leaving the Far

end with the least bloodshed that East . .. would you give me your reasons . ..?

is possible . . . { He is the aggressor without! Gen. MacArthur—It was a mat-

cause or reason. He is the oneler of great grief and regret to

| Alliance, defending our eastern shores; even if that meant the loss of the right we now have to {use the territory of those Allies lin Europe, North Africa, and the Mediterranean for air and sea bases for our strategic air force land naval forces? Gen. MacArthur—S8enator, the plan that I propose, I believe, 'would be followed by the great majority of the United Nations— perhaps, by all of them. | Sen. John C. Stennis (D. Mass.) |—Do you consider (the blockade lof China) very important and very vital then and now?

why it cannot be breached from continental China, and it only 90 miles away. eR Gen. MacArthur—Because the existing fields that would be available in continental China are so distributed that we could mass a superior air force in our own concentrated island littoral chain to overpower them. If you should put on Formosa the jet plane that the Russian has, its area of operation would be brought so much closer to our bases that our bases in Okinawa and Japan and the Philipines

rmosd, action. General; ‘these things come from| i tenable, Th eit - ’ Gen. MacArthur— Communism | would be made untenable, ere UN Another point would be whetver| Sen. Russell./y/ou)l you) De Russia. They do not have power hag many various factors. The that sprung that foul blow on us,/me that I did not regard it as Gen. MacArthur—I do indeed,|is no such condition exists from they were succeeding politically °°P ation ot t1€ to make big guns or any kind of great threats in what is called It's to stop that-that we fight, appropriate to address the com- Senator. The lack of industrialithe Chinese mainland. :

-Do I under1ibsequent date ral agreement hiefs’ position s believed the rmosa and the

insJoint Chiefs of Staff as to, the size of the military establishment and the military budget? Gen. MacArthur—I have great confidence in the professional

opinion of the Joint Chiefs of

and by the present methods achieving the aggressive intent, the expansion which is so evidently being attempted by them. « Those are two of the fundamental reasons that I believe they

guns, maybe, other than pistols, present communism is the imperido they? : alistic tendency or the lust of Gen. MacArthur—They have the power beyond power to make what equipment graphical confines . . . they are using, Senator | Now, when you help one Comwhich we are not able to over- munist nation against another

their own geo-

‘mand which I no longer posthing that does| ger Dp and I say that anything tha |sessed. The order of my relief

not tend to stop that is in my| : lexicon, appeasement. (Yas 2 Summary one . .. Sen. Fulbright—Well, I think] as no longer in command,

land I did not think it was api | ig pate, 2 Shue et PTOpFiate for me to encroach ii any way upon the prerogatives

capacity of China makes her peiculiarly dependent upon the im-

Sen. Russell—Why is Formosa, which is only 90 miles from the ports that she receives. mainland, so vitally important? | Sen. Stennis—It seems to me [gn't it as vulnerable to Okinawa {that we are just facing a decision and the other islands that we {here between extending our mili- hold as they would be from Foritary forces in Korea along yourimgsa, and why does the mere

: i ; Staff, and if the opinion that they i i : munist China would take into consideration - 2% come with our forces in Korea. Communist nation, you, of course, before; 1 mean that the only way! | Nations could such judgments as they might Fengered ay : strictly profession They live only a couple of jumps accept certain =~ definite risks. would be in effect unconditional OF the COMMBNIEE In chiSy at i oF Blong some affirmative matter of 90 miles make so much red as a basis render. ne, without any currents of jheaq of starvation. In other ma- What those risks are depends up- surrender . . . YS Feil, gway . . .lines and pulling out of Korea. |djfference? obligation, or pressure from any- I would not have thought of Gen. MacArthur — You could] Gen. MacArthur — Because it

a cease-fire? —That is core mendations of

Sen. Fulbright—Then is it fair to say that you feel that an expansion of our armed forces should take place rather than a

thing else, I would be very glad to subscribe to what they did. There are many questions, how-

terials, they are almost as bad . . . on the facts of the case. I haven't They are peculiarly vulneraole got those facts . . . to the process of blockade, and, Sen. Fulbright—I had not . . the process of internal disruption thought of our enemy as being

-' surrender,”

| Gen. MacArthur—I don’t know 4... : : ; : “ | g it without obtaining the {what-you mean by unconditional ye mission of Gen. Ridgway . . .

Senator. The only!" gen Cain—Th thing that the United Nations and tne TY he ae A

evacuate Korea, or you could con- gives them another bastion, Sena{tinue the indecisive campaign, OF tor. ... You take their submarines \you could pursue it to a vic-|(which) will go out here and cut

Staff went to = rer, that come out and are passed 2 , { |torious conclusion, which was the f ication Defense. The reduction at this time? ever by bombing. communism; I thought of it as the United States as its agent a) these lines of commun : nse forwarded Gen. MacArthur—I most as- apon by them Sant gre influenced “The minute you apply those primarily being Russia . . . ® ‘has ever demanded is a liberated fioyed Any Delo Jou Yele Jo nroposal 1 of there. You have .increased the ations. as 1 suredly believe we should place y various factprs of government. factors, it becomes logistically] Gen. MacArthur—In that con- ypified Korea . . . tary of the Army gave you rea- Questione About Jengy a ony po Boi Ties

e Secretary of ed with them

Did it (the » prior to the went from the

ment to the 2

My under-

.pardness which means

Sen. Russell—I do not think there is any question about that ... . there is no doubt in my mind

ourselves in a condition of prean in-

crease in our armed strength.

more difficult, probably impossi-| cept, Senator, I disagree with you ble, for them to maintain a for- completely. eign army on the march. It is! Sen. Fulbright—Do you think

(Gen. MacArthur then said his gon to believe that within the

efforts toward peace had Deen course of the next few hours you met by demands of the enemy for were to be relieved of ali your

Sen. Fulbright—One of the most that decisions are made in the De- as different from the problem of that there is no chance what- recognition of Red China and the commands”

te partment of Defense that are iny fluenced, if not changed, by the +, views of the Department of State. Things that the Department

fnfluential “men of the Sena made a statement the other da to this effect. I wonder if you would comment on it: * «_. .. The cost of maintain-

Japan as day is from night... . lever that . . . China can ever And you must understand . . .be disassociated from control of that the Japanese forces were not the Kremlin? ’ concentrated entirely on China. Gen. MacArthur—I have never

turning over of Formosa-—-points| Gen. which he said fit’ his definition of think Secretary Pace knew any-

appeasement.) thing about it. Every impression

Sen. Fulbright—Well, do You | had was that it was as great a

of State might do might affect They were engaged in the battle said the Chinese were under the feel our government has accepted surprise to him as it was to me

MacArthur—I _ do. not. Stood you to say that you believe

tioh here which is an entirely different thing when you haye got this coastal area of defense. You can mass here on For= ‘mosa, you can probably mass be=tween two and three thousand, planes in a highly protected position, which would increase the

Worldwide Defense

! Sen. Stennis — Gen. MacArthur, this morning I _under-|

jwe can defend every place from |communism. Can we defend:every {place, world-wide, from communism with no better co-operation

the size of the military establish- ith the control of the Kremlin. h i 1 capacity by just that much. the Secreta taining an’ armed force of 35 . with the United States, w e . those principles that you have 5 than we are getting now from the he Hm rine men indefinitely could ment, but in the last analysis, British and with all our Allies. | Sen. Fulbright—You don’t be- just mentioned? Wake Transcript |other free nations? you could put SUDMSNIG bases in there on several oO -

ose provisions ncluded in a 1ent. The Secreférred the to the Joint

10. made these

> him. those recomeSecretary of oint Chiefs of 1e papers back

mobilization budget.”

to nomy. He the size of the military establish-, bi The A ie a half ment is the responsibility of the a million in the United States’ Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . armed forces objective and a,

te American $20 billion cut in studies were turned out. I was

tg were hot-consulted-.in.any..way,. shape. Taft, or form. | Sen. Fullbright—I notice, Genafe eral, you are careful to say that {you have confidence in the profes|sional skill of the Joint Chiefs of

(Note: These statemien made by Sen. Robert: A.

R. 0.) Do you think that is a s

doctrine to follow?

MacArthur—I have no slight-| ” lest information as to how those [Pear] Harbor?

Senator Fulbright—Well , . . lieve they are?

they concentrated solely on China, didn't they.. . . before

Kremlin.

Before Pearl Harbor MuacArthur—They were

{lematical. Gen.

Senator. They were largely pre-|

Sen. Fulbright—Well, would you ceptable even for discussion. using a part of their force only, | consider that the authorities in| {China ‘could make a peace with

Gen. MacArthur—No, sir.

Gen. MacArthur—I believe there Those are the demands of the COMES Up Again is an interlocking of interests be- enemy, and as I said today, the tween Communist China and the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the Now I want to refer to this so- of the world that was threatened|: * . The degree of control! month have re¢commended -that|called compilation of.geports Used Only Partial Force and influence that the Kremlin jn the discussion of cease fire notes made at the Wake Island may have in China is quite prob- terms, that neither of those ap- conference on Oct. 15, : peasement policies should be a¢-[And fm the-ietter-of submittal to;mum. of our capacly without debo A the statement was made, “Five stroying ourselves. Ruling Island Is. Called yi

Sen. Guy M. Gillette (D. Ia.)—

: and by attack or

What the attitude of our gov-|copies of this report were for-| ernment is, I don’t know, but I warded to Gen. MacArthur on the shows its face, we should attempt paring for what took place in the YOU without the approval of the would doubt very much that it'19th of October and a receipt for to meet it. I believe that it has

| Gen. MacArthur — I did not {mean to convey that the United States should defend every mile

bors which would introduce them [right into the middle of our line

might

enst as ax bastion would be but that we should - i “youy Mine of awy

1950. that would resist it to the maxi-|%0rt -

I believe where the aggression Indispensable Now

Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (R. Mass.)—General, do you think

. it is just as vital to our de- \

' State, agree- R ied 'K lin? | | ~ efuses to Criticize ‘Staff. Does that mean you do not suture . . . it is quite possible Kremlin? would consider such terms. {them signed by Gen. MacArthur's very defliitely shown its face in lopment of atomic wag S t b Taft have confidence in their personal that if it had been left alone, Gen: MacArthur—A peace with Does Not Believe War aides on Oct. 29.” Korea. That is where the main he Sevelopine result that Vhat happened tatemen y integrity? China and Japan, that Japan ’ | If I understood you, General, fighting is going on, and that they can hit a much larger area, know. Gen. MacArthur— .T cer- Gen. MacArthur—Not at all. might have made a success of it Urges Plan as Best With Russ Inevitable yesterday, you said in effect, if therefore we should meet it there.\yoyld in any way diminish’ the ...Ican not tainly would not attempt Supers Sen. Fulbright—Wel, do youl. i ‘not in words, that you had never, If it should spring up in some aye of Formosa? onclusion ficially to criticize any comment have confidence in the Integrity Sen. Fulbright—Well, I think Hope to End War Sen. Fulbright—General, would reaq this purported compilation Other area, the military possibil-| Gen, MacArthur—I think that ‘yo. of Gen. Bradley? you care to say whether or 0tl and knew ities of that area would deter- the entire strategic concepts of

hen leave our , cease-fire in position it was Nations repreLake Success cease-fire prostated specifi11d consider in 2 turning over imunist China of Communist ited Nations. —That is core

rd B. Russell I understand Formosa, you 0 the security that we would ed in using the ations against 1t cause it to 3 of any Red

> See

t Formosa — I am not th the United you directly lcitly tifat the aken by the ernment that fall into Red

Would you be our judgment not the stra- » Republic of self was jeopvisions of the hich gave the oehold if not

I am not very Yalta confer. of that sort, ion in the Far » gravest mismade was to 0 come down rthur, Dairen, that sort. No, sir. Gen. Marshall the Far East sador for the ‘ork with the 1a relative to 8. Could I ask he consulted tters pertaint prior to his

(en. Marshall yo on his way vas my guest 1iscussed (the ay, shape or

.. Gen. Wedet to the Far A and Korea, making a reat...

budget.”

that anv Senator may have made on the floor of his House. Sen. Fulbright—This was not made on the floor of the Senate «..] think . .. that (when) that very question must be determined bv the Senate and the Congress, . . . your opinion should be very| luential . . . Ie MacArthur—T he actual details of our preparedness plan, what the strength of the forces are, the cost and all those ques-| tions I haven't gone into at all,| Senator. I am not able to pass | judgment on the question that you| me, PY Fulbright—I do not want | you to say 20 billions rather than 19 is the right figure. What 1 mean is a substantial reduction] in appropriation .. . is that war-| ranted in view of the Present) world conditions? Sen. MacArthur—I can only repeat, Senator, 1 believe we should place ourselves in the condition of te preparedness . . . eerie et don’t wish to be too personal about it, with the! other senators, but Senator Taft {s, of course, an acknowledged | leader . . . : Gen. MacArthur—Was statement by Sen. Taft? Sen. Fulbright— I was reading from a special article to the New York Times . . . he (Sen. Taft) made a speech to the Chamber of | Commerce on Apr. 30, which is just a few days ago, and it is ‘no secret. . . Sen. Taft, as. you Know, has been one of your most enthusiastic supporters—that is, from the point of view of this proposal for a policy in the Far East. Now, he is an extremely influential man. I simply 4m unable to, follow his meaning when he

this a

says, on the one hand—and he.

did this in this same speech—I will read the other paragraph: «Sen. Taft said the United! States should at least try the plan of State might do might affect the size of the military establishment, but in the last analysis, the size o the military establishof General of the Army Douglas, MacArthur; use Chinese Nationalist troops, bomb Chinese Commu-| nist bases in Manchuria and blockade Communist China.” The very next paragraph says: “At the same time, the Ohio Senator declared that the cost of maintaining an armed force of 3.5 million men indefinitely could wreck the American economy. He

called! for a reduction of a half a

million in the United States armed

Gen. MacArthur—Completely. Sen. Fulbright—Of Gen. Vandenberg? Gen. MacArthur—Completely.

Sen. Fulbright—And, Admiral’

Sherman? Gen. MacArthur—Completely. Sen. Fulbright—You are aware of the fact that the same gentleman I just mentioned, Sen. Taft, says he has no confidence in Gen. Bradley? Gen. MacArthur—Senator, I guess this is a free country. Every fellow can have his own opinion. j Sen. Fulbright—You have confidence in Gen. Collins? Gen. MacArthur — Completely. Sen. Fulbright—Both his personal integrity— Gen. MacArthur—Complete. Sen. Fulbright—Do you thinkthat Gen. Bradley would lend himself to’ an arrangement by which he states things in public in which he did not believe? Gen. MacArthur—I would not bedeve it under any considera-| tion. Seh. Fulbright—I would not

|either . . . but to me it is a shock-

ing thing that men of the responsibility of those I have mentioned could be suspect of such a ining. c..... = Sen, Fulbright noted that Gen., MacArthur praised Japan's “magnificent army” in his speech to Congress and asked why, in view of its difficulty in “subduing the Chinese” the General believed he could make them come to terms with a few more troops and air power.

Japanese Aim in China

Differs From Ours Gen. MacArthur—The objective of the Japanese in China was to seize and exploit the entire country—a very large order. Our objective in the Korean campaign is a very limited one, indeed. It merely is to put sufficient pressure on the Chinese that they

iwould withdraw their troops and

cease their depredations in the area of North Korea. It is only a small fraction of what the Japanese empire was attempting to do in China. Sen. Fulbright--Well, I can understand that, but the Chinese have .proved themselves to be a very stubborn people . . . it would seem to me, as long as the whole country is not subdued, as 'ong as there is a Communist grdup somewhere in China that is not

forces objective and a $20 billionwfubdued, they will still be able to

cut in the American mobilization

. + » Those

I wasn't going to be

furnish some opposition to-you. .. Gen. MacArthur —_, You only

two statements seem have to destroy, Semator, their to be absolutely contradictory . .. potentiality to maintain an army times ’ Gen.” MacArthur—I said when/on foreign soil in North Korea. futufe. I addressed this august body that When you destroy their power. to drawn into|build the guns, the munitions, to balance off , ;, fhe point at issue

really bothers us.

that is possible, but it would seem to me to be a very major undertaking, and I think that point is one that bothers some of us

Sen. Fulbright—Well, with the United Nations or with the United States. Gen. MacArthur—I believe that

Tam a little more worried about

Russia not coming in than I am of it ..... I believe that the plan

: - : that I have put forward offers of her coming in in China . .. if the only hope that I know of to we become committed there, it stop that insensate slaughter ia seems to me she really is given a pro00 give Korea and its nafree hand in Europe and in the tion a chance to survive rest of the world ... that is what Sen. Fulbright—Well, General, with all due deference, I think our Gen. MacArthur—The alterna- first and continuing responsibility tive, Senator, is to sacrifice thou- is to this country, rather than sands and thousands and thou- Korea ...I would not jeopardize sands of American boys month this country . . . after month after month | Gen. MacArthur—I agree with Not only that, but you will have you in that, too, Senator; but I sacrificed, if you keep on indefi- pelieve that they are parallel . . . nitely, the entire Korean nation (Gen. MacArthur then made a and people . .. She is pretty well lengthy re-statement of his views destroyed now. of carrying the war to the ComThis question of stopping half- ‘munists.) way, of completely destroying the, Sen. Fulbright—I hope I intervene in Korea, completely ignoring the enormous bloodshed which goes on there month after month—that very concept shocks me, old soldier as I am. If these risks that you speak of were so real and so compelling, why did CHITA we intervene in Korea? , ym There is. nothing that has happened that has changed those risks or increased those risks. The whole moral tone of the

TRANS SIEERTAN KR p —————————————————————————

[TRANS SIBERIAN RR NOW TAXED TO LIMIT, COULDN'T MOVE MORE TROOPS EASTWARD

you feel that war with Russia is inevitable? Gen. MacArthur—No, sir, I do not feel that war is inevitable. I

there would be great possibilitiesipelieve that the great masses of

the world, what you might call the ordinary men of the world, are invincibly against war. I believe that is so anmng the Russian masses, just as it is among our own people . . .

Didn't Blame Acheson, MacArthur Declares

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D. as the report on the Battle of pnist nation, should attack its Ark.)—General, in the Washing- Bunker Hill. Would you care to neighbor, and that the Russian

ton Daily News of May 2 was an articlé by the United Press ‘con-

and I wondered if you would care to either confirm or deny or not comment—any way you choose.

“Gen.

[Fo FORCES IN

world resounded when in its nobility the United States—and the United Nations following them—intervened to save Korea. At one stroke you would abandon that—at one stroke. You don’t pay the slightest conception to those 30 million of people in Korea . . . our own boys by the thousands and thousands. I've been here two days now, and I have heard no proposition yet, outside of the ones that the joint chiefs “made and myself, which would offer any hope for a successful . conclusion of the Korean struggle . . . Sen. Fulbright—General, I realize that it takes a great deal of patience on your part to listen

U THEY ARE DEPENDENT

ARTHU So

I think there is room for honest difference of opinion in matters of- this kind . . . It seems to me that the matter is sad and is terrible, this loss of life which is going on today; that it is perfectly proper to consider that a mistake in the present circumstances might result in a ten greater loss within the near

CHINA

MANCHURIA

OVERBURDENED SOVIET SUPPLY “LINE ACROSS SIBERIA.

FEW ADDITIONAL GROUND TROOPS COULD END KOREAN WAR IF US. AIR FORCE AND NAVY GIVEN FREE HAND.

ARBIN

"ON

LARGELY DEFENSIVE |}

[KREMLIN NOT IN POSITION TO “LAUNCH ANY PREDA. TORY ATTACK FROM THE

VLADIVOSTOK ===

very little about it, excepting the facts that had been called to your attention here. Is that correct? | Gen. MacArthur—That is cor(rect, sir. { Sen. Gilette—Your aide, Gen.

{ | Whitney, was quoted as saying

{these copies had been received but they were probably consigned |to the wastebasket; that they

| were not interested in Tokyo in

matters of this kind.

i. You were also quoted as saying!

they would have as little interest

jcomment on that? .

: | Gen. MacArthur—Senator, the woud veto the action, what would cerning you which caught my eye,'comment that the report had little y,, suggest that we do in that

to was with reference to the release of The first sentence starts out, the report here, which had taken Douglas MacArthur has place in the moral tone which caused us to haven't offended you. I thought informed confidants he holds Sec- had no reference to the receipt of |

bearing, and its. comparison the report on Bunker Hill

last 72 hours. It

“SIBERIA ARE

pa)

bribe

ASIATIC CONTINENT” ———tn

——

ING” ATTACK ON JAPAN, BUT U S| AIR’ AND SEAPOWER WOULD PRE VENT ITS CAPTURE

COULD LAUNCH “PUNISH

to a lot of people who are wholly NINN unfamiliar with this type of thing " : . . . you said there had been no oN Sune’. RUSSIANS change in Korea. I had under- ° Fried hy ‘stood ‘all along the intervention | Fmnrniny KO of China changed the situation, PEIPING jot Bong - changed the risk, that it came as ® w/o a surprise to you and to all of us. wa JATTLELINI

That is what we are trying to

[ : : ne -—

LINES OF THOUGHT—limesmap gives highlights of Gen.

v i

» alent cay

MacArthur's early tesggnony.

mine what we could do in the way of assistance... . Sen. Russell B. Long (D. La.)—

For us to say that we would not;

defend, and to make clear to the Soviets that we would not defend certain points bordering their nation, is merely to invite them to take those places. | Gen. MacArthur—That would !be my opinion. Sen. Long—What would your recommendation be, if the Russians should move into—well, let us say if any nation, any Com-|

member of the Security Council

eventuality?

the world will unquestionably from a military standpoint be subject te modifications as the atomic weapon increases in range, in caliber and power. At the prés~

ent time I would say that For- -

mosa is indispensable. I will say that within our generation I amusure there is no development that will change the strategic value of Formosa. Sen. Russell—-Now what {is wrong with a policy or what would have been wrong with a policy that had been adopted as soon as it was evident that Red China was intervening in mass, which would have directed the evacuation of our land forces from Korea and laying siege to Red China by sea and by air until

Doug Feels UN Veto |

Power Is a Mistake

Gen. MacArthur—I have per|sonally felt, Senator, that the veto, power, as exercised in the Unite Nations, was a very grave mistake. I do not see how it is going to continue to function unless

some remedial action along that

line were taken. Sen. Long—Now, it occurred to me that if this nation . 50 old destroyers to the Chinese, and if we could let them

each destroyer, to show them how to operate them, do you think there might be any prospect of the Chinese Nationalists maintaining an effective blockade? Gen. MacArthur—I do not believe that the Chinese Nationalists, and their naval forces, any reasonable period of time, could maintain an efficient blockade of the Chinese coast, especially if it was opposed by any of the really great nations of the world. Sen. Long—Now, suppose we assisted Chiang Kai-shek .and he felt that he could make a landing of substantial size, successfully, on the Chinese mainland; and if it did appear that there was some prospect of success in that, do you think it would be a good idea, under those circumstances, to permit the use of our landing craft, with our personnel, to put them ashore?

Gen. MacArthur—I believe that, we should render every possible assistance to him that is within

our power, if he attempts such a strategy. . - Sen. Long—Now, if you are going to use our landing craft, you might as well give the

a gave

have about three or four officers and eight or 10 enlisted men with|

in|

|say that it was the very lof the concept of the |Nations . . .

they did withdraw from their predatory attacks upon Korea? That appealed to me tree mendously even before the event, and as I see this matter being

4/drawn out as it is with all the

anguish and suffering attendant thereto, it appeals to me more as

{a rank amateur in the stratérfy

of war. MacArthur — The great difficulty in accepting that formu la, Senator, for Korea itself, is that you would abandon Korea to the enemy. It would result probably in .the destruction of the Korean people I am sure that if .we should |withdraw from Korea, that it (would be regarded in the Com-

|munist world not only as the

|greatest victory of modern time, {but would invite them to aggres{sion elsewhere. n | Sen. Russell—You place it then lon political considerations rather than military grounds?

Moral Reasons for Fighting in Korea

| Gen. MacArthur—I would ‘go higher than the term “political consideration.” I would say’ they were moral. And spiritual -con|siderations. I would say they !were the very essence of what we |did when we entered Korea. I |would say that they are the very essence of what we are trying to do all over the world; I would essence United

I believe we should try the plan that I have. If we do apply that plan; the attack on our troops, I am convinced the day we announced the ultimatum, if you wish to use that term, to Communist China, the day we announce that, that the attack of

benefit of our naval bom ard- their ground troops will slack off,

ment, had you not? - Gen. MacArthur—Correct. Sen. Long—What we could do to her economically with a block-

ade would be a far greater injugy

. v RORY

hie * : i ER

is ri in Lut gh NE LR SETS

I believe that the mere pro-

‘nouncement of what "we were

going to do, will go a long ways toward effectuating the end of

the ground fighting in Kogea « ¥ ne a .l 2 iy - midi r 43% MI

LSP i a