Indianapolis Times, Indianapolis, Marion County, 15 January 1946 — Page 5
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IRAN MAY ASK - HELP OF UNO
Problem of Assembly. (Continued From Page One) difficulties” in Iran were of a na-
He referred to the autonomous movement in Azerbaijan province on the Russian border, which the Iranians charge was provoked by the He sald Iran refrained “rather reluctanitly at the last moment” before the UNO opened from request-
agenda. He said that Iran restrained her-
all the ways and means of reaching a satisfactory settlement were not exhausted.” ‘It Is My Duty’ “Nevertheless,” he added, “I feel it my duty to call the attention of the assembly to the fact that we must reserve the right to bring the question of the difficulties which our country is experiencing before it, and to request that they be considered by you, in case no early solution be reached.” ' He did not indicate whether by “early” he-meant during this first assembly meeting. “We wish that, like many other fellow members, we were attending this assembly free from major anxieties,” he said.
Cites Dangers
“But we. can hardly refrain from referring to a very disturbing situation prevailing in Iran. Iran is now confronted with certain great difficulties of an international character and is passing throligh a most anxious time” .
He said the Iranian situation was one that certainly could be brought before the assembly under the charter provisiom that it can deal with situations “likely to: impair friendly relations among nations.” Iran, he said, still is not despair ing of a solution which “would not impair our vital rights and would not be incompatible with the terri. torial integrity and sovereign rights of our old and Peace loving ‘coun-
Meanwhile, Russia strongly supported a demand of the newly formed world federation of trade unions to become the 19th member of the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council, with the right to vote with the member nations. The Soviet position on the trade union membership was revealed in the assembly's general committee meeting. It was supported by the
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(Continued From Page One)
Then he sat down, adjusted a.pair of dark-rimmed glasses: and began Jy swiftly in a strong voice. Adm, Kimmel told the committee:
, FIRST. The navy department in
Japanese messages, had information prior to Dec. 7, 1041, which “pointed to an attack by Japan upon ships in Pearl Harbor” and gave some indication .of when the attack might SECOND. He did not get the intercepts or. their contents at Pearl Harbor although he had requested all vital information and was led to believe he was getting it. THIRD. The information he did get from Washington regarding possible Japanese actions was misleading. FOURTH. Knowledge of the information which Washington with. held would have “radically changed" his estimate of the situation.If he had possessed that information, the ships which Japanese planes found bottled up and almost helpless in Pear] Harbor that morning would have been at séa in an effort to intercept and repel the attack, Kimmel testified,
Strikes at Criticism
Kimmel did not put blame on any individual or group within the navy department for failure to give him the information to which he feels he was entitled. He did, however, lash back at criticisms of his conduct made in reports of previous investigations during the last four years, He said
|the Roberts commission report in
1942 apparently was based on mis-
cepted messages. He accused Set retary of Navy James V. Forrestal of setting aside the verdict of a naval court of inquiry in 1944. Forrestal ruled last August, after the naval court's inquiry, and - a subsequent private investigation by Adm, H. K. Hewitt, that Kimmel never again should hold a position in the navy which required exercise of superior judgment. Kimmel has been retired, with the rank of rear admiral, since shortly after he was relieved of his Pacific fleet command Dec. 16, 1941. Confident About History
“History, with the perspective of a long tomorrow, will enter the final
.{direetive in my case,” he co
“I am confident of that verdict.” Kimmel’s statement was a fighting document. He told his story in four parts. He preceded it with the declaration that part three would: “Describe how the Pacific fleet was deprived of a fighting chance to avert the disaster of Dec. 7, 1941, because the navy department withheld information which indicated the probability of an attack at Pearl Harbor at the time it came.” To support that charge Kimmel testimony and documents] placed before the congressional committee and evidence adduced in previous investigations. Kimmel cited seven intercepts,
for the attack on Pearl Harbor. None of them, he said, was forwarded to him in Hawaii. Messages and Dates The messages, their ‘contents and the dates on which they were available in decoded form in Washington he listed as follows: ONE. Tokyo to Honolulu Sept. 24, 1941 — Dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas for reports on ship moorings—Oct. 9, 1941."
20—Establishing a system of sym-
locations in the harbor—Oct. 10. THREE. Tokyo to Honolulu Nov.
FOUR. Tokyo to Honolulu Nov. 18—Ordering a special report on ships anchored in Pearl Harbor and
the (adjacent areas—Dec. 5.
FIVE. Honolulu to Tokyo Nov. 18 —Reporting on ships in harbor and a| describing course taken by destroyers entering the harbor, their speed and distances apart—Dec. 6. SIX. Tokyo to Honolulu Nov. 20 —Ordering an investigation of fleet bases near the Hawaiian military reservation—Dec. 4 SEVEN. Tokyo to Honolulu Nov
there aré no movements”--Dec. 5. Members of the navy high command in Washington have told the committee they considered those intercepts, along with hundreds of others, merely a part of Japanese efforts to keep track of U. 8S. fleet movements.
Details on Moorings seven he cited
from the others.”
sub-
Harbor,”
Washington; through intercepted]
information that he had the inter-|
all decoded before Dec. 7, which he said revealed Japanese plans
TWO. Honolulu te Tokyo Sept]
bols to be used in designating ships’
15—Ordering “ships in harbor” re-| iports at the rate of two a week— Dec. 3.
29 — Ordering reports “even when
Kimmel argued, however, that the “stand out, ' apart
He said none of the other messages divided any other harbor. into areas, went into detail as.to moorings, or called for reports even when there were no ship move- ‘| ments, “These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl he said, “The information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail, had no other
Adm. Husband E. Kimmel] conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint.” Kimmel said that knowledge of those intercepts would have changed entirely his estimate of the situation in the Pacific. “Knowledge of a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor afforded an opportunity to ambush the Japanese striking force as it ventured to Hawaii,” he added. Diplomatic Intercepts
“It would have suggested the wis-
to that end, rather than conserving them for the Marshall expedition.” The Marshall expedition, he explained, was the first task assigned to the Pacific fleet in the event of war with Japan. As for Washington's information on when ‘the attack might be expected, Kimmel called attention to so-called. “diplomatic intercepts” and developments during the same period. He pointed out that through these intercepts Washington knew: ONE. Japan had set Nov. 25, 1941, as the deadline for reaching a diplomatic agreement with the United States and then extended it to Nov. 29, telling its ambassadors that “after that things are automatically going to happen.” TWO. Japan considered a 10point proposal made by former Secretary of State Cordell Hull on Nov. 26 an unacceptable “ultimatum.” | THREE. Japan told its ambassa~ [dors at Washington on Nov. 28 that when Tokyo's reply came through negotiations would be “de facto ruptured” but cautioned them not to give the United States any such impression. “The intercepted Japatass diplomatic messages show that on and after Nov. 29, a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect,” Kimmel said.
Apparent to Student He said they also showed that “the 4plan was of such importance that it involved the fate of the empire;
navy witnesses had testified that of-
of a Japanese move to the south. “It must have been apparent to a
messages,” Kimmel asserted, “that Japan on a deadline date of Nov. 29 had put into effect an operation
time interval before its results were apparent to this government, and which appeared susceptible of effec{tive concealment in its initial | phases.
Deprived of Chance “The message as to the berthings of ships in Pearl harbor would then have given the reader of these intercepted dispatches an insight as to one of the probable directions of the plan which went into effect au-
Japan was so anxious to conceal. “All these dispatches taken together would have pointed to Pearl harbor as & probable objective of this plan.” Kimmel said that because he did not get the intercepts he was “deprived of the opportunity to make this deduction, which the dispatches as a whole would warrant, if not compel.” Kimmel also accepted as fact that the navy in ‘Washington actually received the so-called “winds execute” message which has been the subject of much past controversy in {the hearings. Message Lost
casts,
break or war with the United States.
broadcast. 3
court findings- that the navy re-
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the navy department.”
Dec. ‘Not a Word Sent’
The first 13 parts of Japan's re-
ply to the Hull note were intercepted
the night of Dec. 6. The 14th part, together with Tokyo instructions that it be delivered to Hull at 1 p. m, Washington time, was intercepted the morning of Dec. 7. None of that information reached
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dom of’ concentrating our resources |said
and that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan.” Kimmel said this plan of action certainly could not have been merely a southward drive into the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. Other army and
ficlals here were primarily fearful
careful student of the intercepted
which was to consume a substantial
tomatically on Nov, 29, and which
Evidence before the committee shows that Japan set up a code system, to be used in short-wave newsin which the phrase “east wind rain” would mean a diplomatic
Previous navy witnesses have testified they knew of the code and watched for it to be used but never saw evidence of an implementing
Kimmel quoted from the navy ceived the “winds execute” message on Dec. 4. He also noted that “this message cannot now be located in Kimmel turned to the
events in Washington on the eve-| ning of Dec. 6 and the morning of | 9
Kimmel before the attack, which
THE INDIANAPOLIS TIMES .
‘Fleet Didn’ ' Get 5 Fighting Chance at Pearl Harbor, Kimmel Tells Probers
started at 7:58 a. m. Hawailan time; (1:25 p.‘'m. Washington time), “The 13 parts and the pilot message instructing the Japanese envoys that a specific hour was later to be fixed for its delivery could mean only one thing, that war with the United States was imminent,” Kimmel said: : “Not a word of thesé* supremely critical developments of Saturday, Dec. 6, was sent tome . . . “The dispatch fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the United States as 1 p. m. Washington time was intercepted and decoded by the navy department by 7:00 on the morning of Dee. 7 AAA 1:30 a. m. Hawaiian time—nearly six and a half hours before the attack. : Present Conviction * “The translation of this short message from the Japanese was a two-minute job, Not later than 10:30 a. m. the chief of naval operations was informed of it. This information was not supplied to me prior to the attack.” Kimmel acknowledged that his
whether it would have made any difference if he had received all the information he listed. “No man can now state as a fact “that he would have taken a certain course of action four years ago had he known facts “which were then unknown to him,” he said. “All he can give is his present conviction on the subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, and re-creat~ ing the atmosphere of the past and
him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.” What He Would Have Done Kimmel said that if he had pos-
sessed all the information available in Washington on Nov. 28, be would have rejected navy department orders which sent two carriers to Wake and Midway islands. He also would have called a third carrier back from the west coast, he sald. “I would have gone to sea with the fleet and endeavored to keep it in an intercepting position at sea,” Kimmel told the committee. Assuming that he got all the information on Dec. 5, he said he would have gone to sea with the fleet elements still at Pearl Harbor, arranged a rendezvous with a task force already out, “and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack.” Analyzed Actions
If the information came to him as late as Dec. 6, he said, he would
Harbor to sea, arranged a rendezvous with absent task forces, and “been ready to intercept the Japanese force by the time fixed for the outbreak of war.” Even on the morning of Dec. 7, four or five hours before the attack, - Kimmel said that if he had the information “my light forces could have moved out of Pearl Harbor, all ships in the harbor would
argument raised the question of |
the factors which then influenced |:
have "ordered fleet units in Pearl]
Kim mel Highlights
all the vital information ocontained in Japanese Smmonpts, - »
If he had known what was
have been at sea trying to intercept and repel the attacking forces. en The Roberts commission investigation in 1942 apparently got the erroncous impression that he had the Japanese messages inter--cepted by Washington. ” w ”
The fleet was not ready for war when he took command, Feb. 1, 1041, and the decision to base the fleet at Pearl harbor was “an his torical fact.”
”. . . It was not advisable to keep the fleet at sea unless an attack on Pearl Harbor was known to be immineént, because the number of navy personnel and the oll supply were inadequate. » » » He was concerned about security of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor and did everything in his power to strengthen defenses. He reorganized the fleet ta prepare for war within the limits of available supplies and men. History will write the final decision and “I am confident of that verdict.”
which Stark sent on Nov. 27 to the Pacific and Asiatic fleets and the Panama canal. War Warning Phrase “The so-called war warning dispatch of Nov. 27 did not warn the Pacific fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area,” he said. “It did not state expressly or. by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. “It did not repeal or modify the advice previously given me by the navy department that no move against Pearl Harbor was imminent or planned by Japan, “The phrase ‘war warning’ cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies -hindsight..may...suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dis+patch contained.” nn - Falsély Reassured Kimmel said the dispatch warned of war alright. But it warned of war in the Far East with the statement: “The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates| — an amphibious expedition against
peninsula or possibly Borneo.” Kimmel recalled that he received information Nov. 24 that diplo-
have been at general quarters, and all resources of the fleet in instant readiness to repel an attack” “It is my conviction,” Kimmel concluded, “that action by the navy department at any one of these significant dates in furnishing me the information from the intercepted messages would have altered the events of Dec. 7, 1941.” Kimmel analyzed for the committee the information he did receive from Washington and the actions he took as a result.
Issue With Stark
He took sharp issue with the testimony of Adm. Harold R, Stark, former chief of naval operations, and Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, former chief of navy war plans, that the information sent Kimmel was clear and adequate. Kimmel quoted from dispatches and letters he received throughout 1941 to show that they pointed toward a Japanese attack on-Russia or a drive southward rather than tc a raid on Pearl Harbor. “It is one thing to warn commanders at a particular base of the probable outbreak of war in theaters thousands of miles away,” he commented. “It is quite another thing to warn commanders at a particular base of an attack to be expected in their own locality.” Kimmel was particularly critical of the “war warning” message
34,700 HOMES ARE NEEDED IN STATE
(Continued From Page One)
The day-long session will start at 9:15 a. m. and the public has been invited to * ‘speak up” at the meeting on all housing problems. Added to the list of speakers today were Earl B. Teckemeyer, Marion County Residential Builders and Indianapolis Real Estate. board, and Harry H. Steidle, national manager of the Prefabricated Home Manufacturers Institute, Washington, D. C. Predicting a growing need for new housing units, Mr. Schellie said 73,160 additional war veterans are expected to return to civilian life in Indiana within the next six months.’ At present, 18,755 families are critically in need of housing and half of these are veterans’ families. The survey also revealed * that only 931 units are under construction and only 818 dwellings are available through conversion of existing structures. Second class. cities reported the greatest housing ‘need with a total of 15,200. Others were, third class, 2700; fourth, 4900; and fifth, 8300. Second class. cities also led in families critically in need of housing with 6820,
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matic negotiations might fail and Japan might try a. cautpEise attack on the Philippines or Guam. He said the Nov. 27 message ines to him the navy department obtained later information “on the basis of which it could specify both probable and possible Japanese obJectives.” He said two other dispatches he received Nov. 27 “were affifmative evidence that the war and navy departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable.” Ordered Away Yorer One of them was a dispatch proposing that he send 25 army pursuit planes by aircraft carrier to
other proposed the reinforcement of marine defense battalions on Wake and Midway with army troops. He said he did not think Washington authorities would ' propose
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either the Philippines, Thal, or Kra
Wake and Midway islands, The]:
partments suggested that we sénd
time of the attack, Kimmel recited a chain of events and circumstances in explanation. Task Forces at Sea He said he had dispatched his only two available carriers—the Enterprise and the Lexington—with task forces to deliver the requested pursuit planes to Wake and Midway. A third task force went to Johnston island to conduct landing exercises. “Thus, by Dec. 5, there were at three task forces of the fleet, deployed in a different area,”
continued. The Lexington and Enterprise both conducted air search over the areas they traveled. In addition, Kimmel! had regular patrol squadrons moving from Midway to Wake, Pearl ‘Harbor to Johnston, Johnston to Midway, and Midway to Pear! Harbor, “They brought under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of ocean area,” he
sald. Misleading Information Kimmel added that submarines were on War patrols from Midway and -Wake-- - 00M He said it would have taken a pool of 250 planes to conduct complete air reconnaissance of the Hawalian area. At Oahu before the attack he had only 40 in flying condition, and some of them were hampered by shake-down diffi-] culties common to new planes, he said. Kimmel also asserted that WPL-
sen each he
tinued when the patrol planes and crews gave out.” Kimmel said he did take precautions against a submarine attack and had destroyers patrolling the waters around the harbor entrance daily. He recalled that:one of his destroyers reported contacting a Japanese submarine the morning! of Dec. 7. He was waiting for veri~ fication when the aerial attack came,
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