Indianapolis Times, Indianapolis, Marion County, 30 October 1945 — Page 11
ingle national
ime today as { forces, made ie joint chiefs : ripps-Howard «l°
in its studies,
nean, findings are Ig the project. ing - testimony : Is MacArthur Me « Nimitz and
itude of the 8 ascribed to ’ trary to that Forrestal and e the senate
5 were Gene eorge C. Ken- My Narney, Carl rs whose views epartment ine Hewitt, T. ©, Wu r and Cmdr,
B. Geiger and ne corps also
. complete ine field and that . fF} duplisations, rstandings. sary not only an enemy in to make more y wer and ma-~ . is umderstood ially all com-
derstood, that * | certain speown organiwer would be n the overall ordinate with .
vith the navy, 1at a civilian , serve at the re be a U. 8, * strategy and
ust owe allege oid « jealousies, t members of ow capabilities
by Lt. Gen, ‘JN’ ‘anspor coms ity report by Gen. William rdson, retired, to come, the vored by him,
arrying on his fotors. veening ambi- ' a wild young or, His touch tke him effeche represents, that it is no ugh the union youth in face That plagues Ly for industrial re. es not show ders, such as with manage- . experts with ey have made hey can about plenty o grey
hing the pube Ss & very ime jaining. Mr, A. the current , in his battle research staff e his points. r after a few ip on. General naking a case id, 1s also the dustrial relaobile industry, formances. | were full of
¥
TUESDAY,
- Invasion Hastened
(Continued From Page One)
forced the German armies to quit | found that the allies made several soon even if the Nazi homeland Mistakes in carrying out their
had not been invaded.
“By the beginning of 1045,” the board said, “Germary was reaching «a state of helplessness. ment production was falling irretrievably , . . and total disruption and disintegration were well along. “Her armies were in the fleld. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they
would have had to ceases , .. an
effective fighting within a few
months.”
OCT. 30, 1945 :
Her arma-
<
On the other. hand, the board
bombing.
It also found that Germany's ability to rebuild and maintain her essential © war industries “clearly surpassed the expectations” of allied leaders and that the German people showed “surprising resistance” to the terror and hardship of repeated air aftack. In all, the U, S, and British air ¥iheavily damaged 3,600,000 dwelling units (20 per cent of all German housing), made 7,500,000 people
eee bee
1944.
Chart above shows how allied bombing strategy reduced Ger-
many’s production of oil and gas
to a point below consumption.
United States Royal Army Air Forces Air Force Tons of Bombs Dropped Oe 1.461.864 1.235.600 Bomber Sorties 754 818 687,462 Fighter Sarties sf Railroods and in 991,750 1,695,049 fond _watervoys p : 23> . were subject. only Claimed Enemy \ N\ to sporadic otAircraft Destroyed p 4 bd tacks until middie 50,000 ond Frobubly of 1944. Transportroye 35783 2162 tation system not given No. 1 attack Bomber riority until 40,000 Planes Lost rch, 1945, 9,949 11,968 . \ \ Fighter “% Planes Lost ; 8,420 10,045 Personnel op Lost in Actior 79265 79,28 Left: Summary of joint U. S. A.
A. F-R. A. F. bombing effort is shown by chart above. More than 1,440,000 bomber sorties were flown against the enemy. The survey plans to make a similar
study of air operations against Japan next.
Report of the U. 8. strategic bombing survey, created Nov. 3, 1944,
in compliance with a suggestion “obtain an impartial and expert attack on Germany,” reveals in
bombing played in the defeat of Germany. The survey team included
300 civilians, 350° officers and 500
Move More Arm
PARIS, Oct. 30 (U. P.) ~Today’s redeployment schedule for American divisions in the European theater: 66th Infantry — 263d Regiment sailed from Marseille last Mon-
day; rest of division to clear port by Oct. 31,
75th Infantry—Now moving into Marseille staging area. 8th Armored-—-Now moving into Le Havre staging ares. 26th Infantry — Advance party
194171942 "1943
5 LAND TRANSPORTATION
Right: Intense concentration on transportation targets, in latter part of war, is shown above.
by the late President Roosevelt, to study of the effects of the aerial accurate detail the important role
enlisted men.
y Units Homeward
now in Camp Pittsburgh, Oise sec~ tion; rest of division due to arrive soon. The 36th, 79th and 89th Infantry and 12th armored divisions, and the 16th corps, have been alerted for shipment home,
| PLAN LUNCHEON |
The ladies auxiliary to the
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’
raids on Germany destroyed or |g”
“Peace, But Bombi
homeless, killed 300,000 and inJured another 780,000. . The board found that the accuracy of allied visual bombing increased “greatly during 1944 and 1945, but 4hat instrument bombing was very much less accurate. Frequently, the board said, there was little difference so far as consequences were concerned between an area, or saturation, bombing and an instrument precision attack. In general, British night bombers carried out the area attacks and . 8. daylight bombers the precision raids. “In many cases bombs dropped by instruments in precision raids against specific targets fell over a wide area comparable to that normally covered in an ‘area’ raid,” the board said. Transit, Oil Crippled The most successful phases of the allied strategic bombing were against the German transportation system and oil production. It was these successes that brought about the collapse of the German economy, Efforts to cripple steel, ball bearing and aircraft industries did not succeed nearly so well, the board reported. The board further reported that: ONE: Even a first-class military power, rugged and resilient as Germany was, “cannot live long under full-scale’ and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory.” TWO: But full air dominance over an enemy is essential before such use of air power can be made. THREE: The practicality of go~ ing underground to escape from air attack is highly questionable, and in fact it is doubtful “if there is any escape from air domination by an enemy.” FOUR: The Nazis found it “clearly more important” to protect their basic industries and services than their factories turning out finished products. FIVE: No indispensable industry was permanently put out of commission by a single air attack. Persistent re-attack was necessary. The board noted that the “extraordinary progress during the war” of allied research, development and groduction was a significant factor Mn the success of the air effort, but warned that the great development and evolution of
{air warfare in world war II carries
no guarantee of future security, Practice Would Change “No greater or more dangerous mistake could be made than to assume that the same policies and practices that won the war in Europe. will be sufficient to win the next one—if there should be another,” the board said, “The results achieved in Europe will not give the answer to future problems. They, should be treated rather as signposts pointing the direction in which such answers may be found.” Although the Germans were unable to prevent the decline, and the eventual collapse, of their economy, they showed immense recuperative and defensive powers. “The speed and ingenuity with which they webuilt and maintained essential war industries in operation clearly surpassed allied expectations,” the board reported. This was best illustrated by the almost complete failure of the costly allied attempt to wipe out the German ball-bearing industry by strategic bombing and by the staying power and recuperative capacity of the heavily-bombed German industrial cities. X Schweinfurt Blow Hardest
Allied heavy bombers struck their first blow at the German ball-bears« ing industry with a 400-ton raid on Schweinfurt on Aug. 17, 1943. More than half the industry was concentrated in this one city. Thie bombings mounted in intensity until Oct. 13, 1943, when the “crucial” raid on Schweinfurt was made by 228 U, S. heavy bombers. In that raid alone 10 per cent of fhe machinery and 20 per cent of the Winished stocks at Schweinfurt were- destroyed—but at a cost of
{62 bombers lost and 138 damaged
beyond repair. The raid also cost, 599 men killed and 40 wounded.
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{ Schwienfurt was not atacked again {for four months. Thus there was |lost that continuity of attack | which is necessary to destroy.—and | keep destroyed—any industry.” As a result, Germany successfully dispersed her ball bearing industry, fell back on stockpiles to tide her over temporary losses, and by September, 1944, had reached the pre~ raid level of ball-bearing produection, Cost to Foe Low
The entire allied effort cost the Germans only the equivalent of about two or three months’ output at the pre-raid level, the board said, {and the Germans were able to boast that “no equipment ever was delayed because bearings were lacking.” she board said German cities displayed “surprising resiliency and
~ rextraordinary ability to recover from
[the effects of ruinous attacks" by |allled heavy bombers. Hamburg in | July and August, 1943, received some of the most devastating air blows jof the war, but: ; “Despite the deaths of over 60. 000 people, the total destruction of nearly one-third of all houses in the eity and the disruption of normal processes of living, Hamburg | as’'an economic unit was not de- | stroyed. Never Recovered “It never fully recovered from the bombing but in five months had regained 80 per cent of its former productivity, despite the fact that great areas of the city lay, and still Me, in dust and rubble.” Under such blows, the morale of the German people, declined but they showed “surprising resistance to terror and hardship, the destruc.tion of their homes and belongings and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live.” “They continued to work efficient. 'y as long as the physical means of Deadusion remained.”
Despite heavy attacks during 1944 in the Ruhr, the board said, “certain German industries had inventories of steel that ranged ffm comfortable to generous” at the end of the war. Plane Output Recovered Similarly, Nazi airplane production was able to recover from tons of high explosives dropped on it and remained good right up to the day Germany collapsed. In 1844, the German air force ac cepted from factories 39807 aircraft, compared with 8295 in 1939 and 15,596 in 1042, - When the offensive against railroads began in September, 1044, freight car loadings stood at 900,000 per week. This was slashed to 214000 by the following March. Thereafter “disorganization was so great no useful statistics were kept.” It was during this period that the dispersed German industry became ineffective because of lack of com-
THE INDIANAPOLIS TIMES ___-
ngs Would Have Defeated Germans, Boar ds 4
Within little more than a’ month coal deliveries to industry dropped from 21,400 cars a day to a point where railroads had: to- confiscate all available fuel for their locomotives. By February, 1945, there was only 4145 days supply of coal on hand for the. locomotives hauling military pessonnel and in March some such locomotives were standinfg idle for lack of coal. Attacks “Catastrophic” The Germans themselves viewed even the earlier attacks on Nazi, oil facilities as “catastrophic.” Though the main blows were not struck until after D-day inv 1944, production of aviation fuel had been cut by 90 per cent by June, 1944. This was one of the great contributing factors to the allied "victory over the Iluftwaffe, the board reported. On the ground, movement of pan-
zer divisions was restricted until, in the breakthrough at Ardennes last winter, the attackers were depend- |
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their ranks rolling. When they failed to get, it, many panzer units were immobilized and: eventually lost. It was found, the board said, that repeated air attacks rather than the severity of any single raid, caused the almost complete breakdown of German oil production. The Nazis were able by quick repairs to get at least partial pro duction of bombed-out plants before the next raid. But, the hoard noted, the allied air offensive failed to exploit at least one “major opportunity” against German oil production, This was the failure to attack the plants that produced indispensable ethyl fluid for the Germans. The board pointed out that the addition of ethyl fluid in very small amounts to gasoline is “so beneficial that no modern aircraft is operated without it.” Plants Not Bombed Yet the four plants that produced
{the entire German supply of tetra-
ethyl lead and ethylele dibromide, from which ethyl fluid is made,
TEP A IG Ae ie
a
“were not bombed . , . although highly vulnerable to air attack,” the board said. 5 The board also found fault with the allied decision not to bomb the’ German electric power production facilities. The decision was taken, the board sald, because the allied high command believed Germany had a country-wide grid by which power losses in one community could be made up from another section of the country. Actually, no such grid existed and the destruction of any substantial amount of German power produce tion facilities would have had “serious results,” the board said. F. D. R. Asked Survey The survey of the aerial attack on Germany was made at the request of the late President Roosevelt, who suggested to former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on Sept. 9, 1944, that an impartial and expert study would be valuable in connec~ tion with air attacks on Japan and for post-war planning. Stimson named D’'Olier as chair-
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man. The group began work November, in some cases going close behind the front to search fo) records, inspect and interview Gers man soldiers and civilians. Other members were George W, Ball, former assistant general couns. sel of the lend-lease . tion; Harry L. Bowman, head the engineering ' department = a Drexel institute, Philadelphia; J hn Kennth Galbraith, an editor of Fortune magazine; Rensis Likert, director of program surveys for the department of agriculture; Frank A. McNamee, Albany, N. Y., attor: ney and former deputy director of the office of civilian defense; Paul H. Nitze, former chief of metals procurement in the foreign €COow - nomic ~ administration; Robert P; Russell, president of the Standard Oil Development Corp.; Fred Searls Jr, vice president of Newmount Mining Co., - and Theodore P. Wright, administrator of the civil aeronautics authority, 2 Judge Charles C. Cabot, associate Justice of superior court of Massa~-
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