Indianapolis Times, Indianapolis, Marion County, 5 September 1945 — Page 3

i Cw er —————— pN0.2] SYSTEMFOLDING Tn 2 ah

, Pa, Sept. 5 Mrs. Hoyte H.

sport, who mar- $7 Writer Unveils Fight to LA STRAUSS SAYS:

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e five weeks ago Preserve 0SS. irst soldier-hus-er China, heard Second of a Series hbors that he is | : ; : 4 + re her devotion § By WALLACE R. DEUEL . = | Times Foreign Correspondent at her first huse . : WASHINGTON, Sept. 5.—AmerZarl L.. “mith, ; ica is going “back to normalcy” ad spoken ms today, just as it did after the last 2s startled, bt war, in at least one important re- ; spect—it is dismantling the intellid by my second gence services built up at staggereans the loss of ing expense and : 5 heartbreak dur- |.

oy, Dickie, was i ing the war, e Smiths. Mrs, - f “he twin en-

4 her first hus : thusiasms for year before he peace and econSmith, a tail i omy already have 5, was reported carried this disver China May. : mantling process of this: year his i : far. lla Smith, was Complex and department of j delicately baln anced organizana gl Mr. Deuel tions are being broken down. Men with priceless “know-how” in this most difficult of all kinds of work are being scattered to the four winds ‘on a few days’ notice. Even the records of the most ambitious attempt America ever —mude to conduct undercover operations jin foreign countries are in danger of getting lost for the lack of personnel to keep track of them and places to file them. The United States has entered all its wars without an intelligence system worthy of the name. It has had to improvise as best it could while the war was going on. When the fighting ended, America promptly junked the system it Had built up. Four Main Reasons

There seems to be four main reasons why the United States has neglected secret intelligence: 1. Many Americans have thought that the United States was so strong and so remote from danger that it didn’t need any intelligence system at all in peacetime, and needed only a rudimentary one even in war. 2. Secret intelligence operations —which are an essential part, although only a part of.a co-ordinat-ed intelligence system—have been looked upon, even in some quarters high in armed forces, as “Immoral” “undemocratic” and “unAmerican.” 4 3. Some people have feared that a secret intelligence service would provoke trouble rather than prevent it, that it would embroil America in foreign complications, rather than help keep the country out of them, 4. A certain number of Americans have feared that a secret intelligence service would be used to spy upon people and threaten their liberties, €ven though originally | created to operate abroad. i Unprepared in 39 | Whatever the reasons, America was no better prepared to conduct adequate intelligence operations when war came in 1939 than it had been when previous wars had struck. For one thing, each department and agency had specialized interests, and collected specialized information, Military and naval attaches were trained primarily to collect information on the armed forces of other countries, Commercial attaches were pMncipally interested in business affairs, treasury attaches in cost of production, agricultural attaches in farm problems. Diplomats and consuls had broader interests, but they, too, thought and ‘worked in a highly specialized tradition. Reports from these and other official representatives abroa d poured into Washington in a great torrent. But in the capital the torrent tended to disappear into the filing cabinets of various departments and agencies. No System There was no. system for bringing all this information together, coordinating it and analyzing it to see what it all meant. 8 There was no way of finding out how complefe the information was on any given subject. Therefore there was no way of knowing at further information was needed in order to get a complete picture. There was no system for getting further information. The longer the war continued, the more pressing became the need for a new approach to the problem, This need became acute with the fall of Denmark, Norway, the low countries and France and the arrival of the Germans on the eastern shores of the Atlantic, New Opportunity and Need Fortunately, the Nazis’ success created new opportunities for Amerjcan intelligence as well as new needs. It was true that Hitler had conquered the continent. But behind his back stood millions’ who hated the eonqueror and would help bring him down. Z Not only could these millions find out what the enemy was doing, but taéy could also. interfere with his doing it. Not only could they spy on him they could also sabotage him. These millions also could operate underground railways behind the enemy's lines. They could receive agents dropped by parachute or put ashore from submarines of small boats. They could smuggle these agents across frontiers and across whole tinents and seas. They”vould feed and clothe and hide and direct. these agents, and _ ‘help them in numberless ways. These were the needs and opportunities out of which developéd America’s undercover 'services—and