Indiana Palladium, Volume 9, Number 38, Lawrenceburg, Dearborn County, 5 October 1833 — Page 2

rrt ;wri e:tifre Hasifi. '

Head to ihe Cabinet on the lSlh of September, 1833. .w.r.jlk' and anxiously considered all i the facts and arguments, which have been submitted to him, relative to a removal of the public deposites from the bank of the United States, the President deems it his duty to communicate in this manner to his Cabinet, the final conclusions of his own mind, and the. reasons on which they are founded, in order to put them in durable form, and to prevent misconceptions. The President's convictions of the dangerous tendencies of the bank of the United States, since signally illustrated by its own acts, were so overpowering when he entered upon the duties of Chief Magistrate, thit hi felt it his duty, notwithstanding the objections of th.s friends by whom he was surrounded, to avail himself of ihe first occasion to call the attention of Congress and ihe ' people to the queslio.i of it3 rc-charler. The opinions expressed in his Annual Message of December, 1S20, wcro reiterated in those of December, 1S30 and 1931, and in tint of 1839, he threw out for consideration, some suji22Slions in relation to a substitute. At tiie session ci an act was pas sed by a majority of both Houses of Congress, rcchaitering iho present B ink, upon which the President felt it his duty to put his constitutional veto. In his Message returning that act, he repeated and enlarged upon the principles and views briefly asserted in lib Annual Messages, declaring the Bank to be, in his opinion, both inexpedient and unconstitutional, and announcing to his countrymen, very unequivocally, his firm determination never to sanction, by his approval, the continuance of that In--stitution, or the establishment of any other upon similar principle?. There are strong reasons for believing that the motive of the Bank in asking for a re-charier at that session of Congress, was to make it a leading question in the election of a President of the Unicd States the ensuing November, &, all stepsdeemcd neces33ry, were taken to procure from the people a reversal of the President's decision. Although the charter was approaching its termination, and the bank was aware that it was the intention of the Government to uso the public deposite as fast as it accrued, in the payment of the public debt, yet did it extend its loans from January, 1831 to May 1S32, from $42,402,304 24 to 70.123,070 72, being an increase of $23,025,760 48, in sixteen months. It is confidently, believed, that the leading object of this immense extension of its loans, was to bring as large a portion of the people as possible under its power and influence; and it has been disclosed that some of the largest sums were granted on very unusual terms to conductors of the public press. In some of these cases, the motive was made manifest by the nominal or insufficient security, taken for the loans, by the large amounts discounted, by the extraordinary time allowed for payment, and especially by the subsequent conduct of those receiving the accommodations. Having taken these preliminary steps to obtain control over public opinion, the Bank came into Congress and asked a new charter. The Bank was to put the President to the test, that the country might know his final determination relative to the Bank prior to the ensuing election. Many documents and articles were printed and circulated at the expense of the Bank, to bring the people to a favorable decision upon its pretensions. Those whom the Bank appears to have made its debtors for the special occasion, were warned of the ruin that awaited them, should the President be sustained, and attempts were made to alarm the whole people by painting the depression in the price of property and produce, and the general loss, inconvenience and distress, which it was represented " would immediately follow the re-electicn of the President in opposition to the Bank. Can it now be said that the question of a re-charter of tho Bank was not decided at the election which ensued? Had the veto been equivocal, or had it not covered tho whole ground if it had merely taken exceptions to the details of the Bill, or to tho lime of its passage if it had not met the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency then there might have been some plausibility for the allegation that the question was not decided by the people. It was to compel the President to take his stand that the question was brought forward at that particular time. He met the challenge, willingly took the position into which his adversaries sought to force him, and frankly de- " clajed his unalterable opposition to the Bank, as being both unconstitutional and inexpedient. On that ground the case was argued to the people, and now that the peoplo Ii3ve sustained the President, notwithstanding the array of influence and ; power which was brought to hear upon him, it is too late, he confidently thinks, to say that the question has not been decided. Whatever may be the opinions of others, the President considers his re-election as a decision of the people against the Bank. In the concluding paragraph of his Veto Message he said: "I have now done my duty to my country. If sustained by my fellow citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if not, I shall find, in the motives which impel me, ample grounds for contentment end peace." Hq was sustained by a just people, and he desires to evince his gratitude, by carrying into effect their decision so fir as it depends upon him. Of all the substitutes for the present Bank which have been suggested, none seems to have united any considerable portion of the public in its favor. Most of them are liable to tho same constitutional objections for which the present Bank has been condemned, and perhaps to all there are strong objections on the score of expediency. In riddim the country of an irresponsible power, which has attempted to control the Government, care must be t alien not to unite the same power with the Execu tive branch. To give a President the control over the currency and the power over individuals now "possessed by the Bank of the U. States, even with the material difference that he is responsible to the .. people, would be as objectionable and dangerous as to leave it as it is. Neither the one nor the other is necessary, and therefore ought net to bo resorted to. On the whole, the President considers it as conclusively settled that the charter of the Bank of the United Stales will not be renewed, and he has no reasonable ground to believe that any substitute will be established. Being bound to regulate his course by the laws as they now exist, and not to anticipate the interferance of the legislative power, for the purpose of framing new systems, it is

proper for him seasonably to consider the means !

by which the services rendered by the Brink of ih-3 umicu oiaies ou uuer us cuarThe cxistinglawsdechre, that "die depositesof the money of the United States in places in which the said Bank and branches thereof may be established, shall be m ule in said Bank, or branches thereof, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at ! any time otherwise order and direct; in which case the becretary of the 1 reasury shall immediately lay before Congress, if in session, and if not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reason of such order or direction." The power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the depositee, is unqualified. The provision that he shall report his reasons to Congress is no limitation. Had it not been inserted, ho would have been responsible to Congress, had he made a removal for any other than good reasons, and his responsibility now ceases, upon the rendition of sufficient ones to Congress. Tho only object of the provision is, to m ike his reasons accessible to Congress, and enable that body the more readily to judge of their soundness and purity, and thereupon to make such further provision by liw as tho legislative power may think proper in relation to the doposito of tho public money. Those reasons may be very diversified. It was asserted by the Secretary of the Treasury without contradiction, as early as 1817, that lie hud power "to control the proceedings"' of the Bank of the United Slates at any moment, "By changing the depositcs to the State Banks," should it pursue an illiberal course towards those institutions; that "the Secretary of the Treasury will always be disposed to support the credit of the State Banks, and will invariably direct ! transfers from the doposites ot the public money in aid of their legitimate exertions to maintain their' credit;" and he asserted a right to employ ! Slates should refuse to receive on deposite the notes of such State Banks as the public interest required -should be received in payment of the public dues. In several instances ho did transfer the public depositcs to State Banks, in the immediate vicinity of branches, for reasons connected only with tho safety of those banks, the public convenience and tho interest of the Treasury. If it was lawful for Mr. Crawford, the Secretary of tfto Treasury at that time, to act upon these principles, it wiil bo difficult to discover any sound reason against the application of similar principles in still stronger cases. And it is a matter of surprise that a power which, in tho infancy of tho bank, was freely asserted as one of the ordinary and familiar duties of the Secretary of Treasury, should now be gravely questioned, and attempts made to excite and alarm the public mind, as if some new and unheard of power was about to be usurped by the Executive branch of the Government. It is but little more than two and a half years to the termination of the charter of the present bank. It is considered as the decision of the country that it shall then cease, and no man, the President believes, has reasonable ground for expecting that any other Bank of the U. States will be created by Congress. To the Treasury Department is entrusted the safe keeping and faithful application of the public moneys. A plan of collecting different from the present, must therefore be introduced, and put in complete operation beforeUhe dissolution of the present bank. When snail it be commenced? Shall no step be taken in this essential concern until the charter expires, and tho Treasury finds itself without an agent, its accounts in confusion, with no depository for its funds, and the whole business of the Government deranged? It is obvious that any new sytem which may be substituted in the place of tho Bank of the United States, could not be suddenly carried into effect on the termination of its existence, without serious inconvenience to the Government and tho people. Its vast amount of notes are then to be redeemed and withdrawn from circulation, and its immense debt collected. These operations must be gradual, otherwise much suffering and distress will be brought upon the community. It ought to be not a work of months only, but of years; and the President thinks it cannot, with due attention to the interest of the people, be longer postponed. It is safer to begin it too soon than to delay it loo long. , It is for the wisdom of Congress to decide upon the best substitute to be adopted in the place of tho Bank of tho United States; and the President would have felt himself relieved from a heavy and painful responsibility, if in the charter to the' Bank, Congress had reserved to itself the power of directing, at its pleasure, the public money to bo elsewhere deposited, and not devolved that power exclusively on one of the Executive Departments. It is useless now to enquire why this high and important power was surrendered by those wiio are peculiarly and appropriately the guardians of the public money. Perhaps it was an oversight, But as the President presumes that the charter of the Bank is to be considered as a contract on the part of tho Government, it is not now in tho power of Congress to disregard its stipulation ; and by the terms cf that contract the public money is to be deposited in the Bank, during the continuance of its charter, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall otherwise direct. Unless, therefore, tho Secretary ofthe Treasury first acts, Congress have no power over the subject, for they cannot add a new clause to the charter or strike one out of it without the consent cf the Bank, and consequently the public money must remain in that institution to the last hour of its existence, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall remove it at an earlier day. The responsibility is thus thrown upon the Executive branch ofthe Government, of deciding how lone before the expiration of the charter the public interest will require the depositcs to be placed elsewhere. And although, according to the frame and principle of our government, this decision would seem more properly to belong to the legislative power, yet asihe law has imposed it upon ihe Executive Department, the duty ought to be faithfully and firmly rnet,and the decision made and executed upon the best lights that can be obtained, and the best judgment that can be formed. It would ill become the Excutivc branch of the Government to shrink from any duty which the law imposes on it, to fix upon others the responsibilty which justly belongs to itself. And while the President anxiously wishes to abstain from the exercise of doubtful powers, and to avoid all interference with ihe rights and duties of others, he must yet, with unshaken constancy, discharge his own obligations and cannot allow himself to turn aside, in order to avoid any responsibility which tho high trust with

'requires him to encounter; and it being the duty of one of tho Executive Departments to decide in the first instance, subject to the future action of the legislative power, whether the public depositcs shall remain in tho i Bank of the United States until the end of its existence, or be withdrawn some time before, the President has fell himself bound to examine the question carefully and deliberately in order toraa ke up-his judgment on the subject: and in his opin ion the near approach of the termination of the charter, and tho public considerations heretofore mentioned, are of themselves amply sufficient to justify tho removal of the depositcs without referonce to the conduct of the Bank, or their safety in its keeping. But in the conduct of tha Bank may be found other reasons very imperative in 'their character, and which require prompt action. Dovelopemcnl? Iinvft lirrn morlr frrmi timo lr l!mr r P !fj C litlJrcj. ness as a public agent, its misapplication of public j funds, its interference in election?, its enorts, by the machinery of committees, to deprive the Gov eminent Directors of a full knowledge of its concern?, and above all, its Migrant misconduct as recently and unexpectedly disclosed in placing all tho funds of the Bank, including the money of the Government, at the disposition of the President of tho Bank, as means of operating upon public opinion and procuring a new charter, without requiring him to render a voucher for tiieir disbursement. A brief recapitulation of the facts which justify these charges and which have come to the knowledge of the public and tho President, wil', ho thinks, remove every reasonable doubt as to tho course i which it is now the duty of the President to pursue. We have seen that an sixteen months, enuing in May, 1832, tho Bank had extended its loans more than S2S,000.000, although it knew the Govern ment intended to appropriate most of its large deposite during that year in payment ofthe public debt. It was in May, 1S32, that its loans arrived at the maximum, and m tho preceding March, so sensible was ihe Bank that it would not be able to pay over tho public deposite when it would be required by the Government, that it commenced a secret negotiation without the approbation or knowledge ofthe Government, with the agents, for about $2,700,000 of tho three per cent, stocks held in Holland, with a view of inducing them not to come forward for payment for one or more years after notice should be given by tho Treasuiy Department. This arrangement would have enabled the Bank to keep and use during that time the public money, set apart for the payment of these stocks. After this negotiation had commenced, the Secretary ofthe Treasury informed tho Bank, that it was his intention to pay off one half of the three per cents on the first of the succeeding July, which amounted to about $0,500,000. The President of the Bank, although the committee of investigation was then looking into its affairs at Philadelphia, came immediately to Washington, and upon representing that the Bank was desirous of accommodating the importing merchants of New York, (which it failed to do,) and undertaking to pay the interest itself, procured the consent of the Secretary, after consultation with the President, to postpone the payment until the succeeding first of October. Conscious, that at the end of that quarter, the Bank would not be able to pay over the doposites, and that further indulgence was not to be expected of the Government, an agent was despatched to England secretly to negotiate with the holders ofthe public debt in Europe, and induce them by the offer of an equal or higher interest than that paid by the Government, to hold back their claims for one year, during which tho Bank expected thus to retain the uso of $5,000,000 of public money, which the Government should set apart for the payment of that debt. The agent made an arrangement on terms, in part which were in direct violation ofthe charter of the Bank, and when some incidents connected with this secret negotiation accidentally came to the knowledge of the public and the Government, then and not before, so much of it as was palpably in violation ofthe charter was disavowed. A modification of the rest was attempted with tho view of getting tho certificates without payment of the money, and thus absolving tho Government from its liability to the holders. In this scheme tho Bank was partially successful; but to this day the certificates of a portion of these stocks have not been paid and the Bank retains the use of tho money. This effort to thwart the Government in the payment ofthe public debt, that it might retain the public money to bo used for their private interests, palliated by pretences notoriously unfounded and insincere, would have justified the instant withdrawal of the public depositcs.- The negotiation itself rendered doubtful tho ability of the Bank to meet the demands of the Treasury, and the misrepresentations by which it was attempted to bo justified, proved that no reliance could be placed upon its allegations. If the question of a removal of the depositcs presented itself to the Executive in the same attitude that it appeared before the House of Representa tives at their last session, their resolution in relation to the safety of tho depositcs would bo entitled to more weight, although the decision of tht question of removal has been confided by law to another department of the Government. But the question now occurs, attended by other circumstances and new disclosures of the most serious import. It is true that in tho message of the President, which produced this inquiry and resolution on the part of the House of Representatives, it was his object to obtain the aid of that body in making a thorough examination into the conduct and con dition ofthe Bank and its branches, in order to enable the Executive Department to decide whether the public money was longer safe in it3 hands. The limited power of the Secretary of tho Treasury over the subject, disabled him from making the investigation as fully and satisfactorily as it could be done by a committee of the House of Representatives, and hence the President desired tho assistance of Congress to obtain for the Treasury Department a full knowledge of all the facts which were necessary to guide his judgment. But it was not his purpose, as the language of his message will shew, to ask tho Representatives of tho people to assume a responsibility which did not belong to them, and relieve tho Executive branch of the government, from tho duty which the law had imposed upon it. It is due to the President that his object in that proceeding should be distinctly understood, and that he should acquit himself of all suspicion of seeking to escape from the performance of his own duties, or of desiring to interpose another

which ho ha3 been honored

'body between himself und tho fteopK in crd, r to

avoid a measure which . is called rsDon to meet. But althoiif'h, as an act of iustico to himself, he dis claims any design of soliciting the opinion of the House of Representatives in re 1 atiou to h'i own duties, in order to shelter himself from responsibility under the sanction of their counsel, yet he is at all times ready to listen to the suggestions of tho Representatives of the people, whether given voluntarily or upon solicitation, &, to consider them with the profound respect to which all will admit that they arc justly entitled. Whatever may be the consequences, however, to himself, he must finally form his own judgment where the constitution and tho law makes it his duty to decide, and must act atcordmgly, and he is hound to supposo that such a course on his put wiil never be regirded by that elevated body as a mail; of disrespect to itself; but that they will, on the contrary, esteem it the strongest evidence ho can cive cf his fixed resolution consistently to discharge his duty to them und tho country A new state of things has, however, arisen since tho close of last session of Congress, and evidence has since been laid before the President, which lie is persuaded would have led the Houso of Representatives to a ditfrrcnt cor.clus'on, if it had come to their knowledge. The fact that tho bank control?, and in some cases substantially owns, and by its money svpjwrts some of tho leading presses, of the country, is now more cleaily established. Editors to whom it loaned extravagant sums in 1S31 and 1632, on unusual timo and nominal security, have sinco turned out to be insolvent, and to others apparently in no better condition accommodations still more extravagant, on terms more unusual, and sometimes without any security, hive also been heedlessly granted. The allegation which has so often circulated through theso channels that the Treasury was bankrupt and tho Bank was sustaining it, when, for many years there has not been lesion an average, than six millions of public money in that institution, might be passed over as a harmless misreprcscntatation; but when it is attempted, by substantial acts, to impair tho credit of the government and tarnish the honor of tho country, such charges require more serious attention. With six millions of public money in its vaults, after having the use of from five to twelve millions for nine years, without interest, it became the purchaser of a bill drawn by our government on that of Franco for about 000,000 dollar?, being the first instalment of the French indemnity. The purchase money was left in the use of the Bank, being simply added to tho Treasury deposite. The bank sold tho bill in England, and the holder sent it to France for collection, and arrangements not having been made by the French government for its payment, it was taken up by the agents of the Bank in Paris with the funds of the Bank in their hands. Under these circumstances it has, through its organs, openly assailed the credit of the Government; and lias actually made and persists in a demand of 15 per cent. $15$,S42 77 as damages, when no damage, or none beyond some trifling expense has in fact been sustained, and when the bank had in its own possession on deposite, several millions ofthe public money which it was then using for its own profit. Is a fiscal agent to the Government which thus seeks to enrich itself at the expense ofthe public, worthy of further trust? There are other important fict3 not in the contemplation ofthe House of Representatives, or not known to tho members at the time they voted for the resolution. Although the charter and the rules of the Bank both declare that "not less than seven directors1' shall bo necessary to tho transaction of business, yet the most important business, even that of granting discounts to any extent is entrusted to a committee of five members who do not report to the Board. To cut off all communication with tho government in relation to its most important acts, at the commencement of the present year, not one of tho Government Directors was pluo d on any one Committee. And although, since by an unusual remoddeling of those bodies some f ihoso directors have been placed on some of th Committees, they are yet entirely excluded from tho Committee of Exchange, thro' which the greatest and most objectionable loans havo been made. When the Government Directors made an effort to bring back the business ofthe Bank to the board, in obedience to tho charter and the existing regulations, the Board not only overruled their attempt, but altered tho rule so as to make it conform to the practice, in direct violation of one of tho most important provisions of the charter which gave them existence. It has long been known that the President of tho Bank by his single will, originates and executes many ofthe most important measures connected with the management and credit ofthe Bank, and that tho Committee, as well as the Board of Director, are left in entire ignorance cf many acts done, and correspondence carried on in their names and apparently under their authority. Tho fact has been recently disclosed, that nn unlimited discretion has been, and is now, vestrd in th; President of uje Buik to rxp- nd its funds m payment fur preparing and circulating articles r.r.d pmclnsing pamphlets, and new?pap--i-,calcuhted by their contents to operate on elections, and secure a renewal of its charter. It appears from the efiicir.l repott of the Public Directors, that, on the 30th November, 13?i0, tho President submitted to the Board an article published in tho American Quarterly Review, containing favorable notices cf the Bank, and suggested tho expediency of giving it a wider circulation at tho expense of the Bank; whereupon tho Board passed tho following resolution, viz: "Resetted, That the President be authorized to take such measures in regard to the circulation of the contents of the said article, cither in whole or in part, as he may deem most for tho interest of the Bank." By an entry in the minutes of tho Bank, dated March 11th, 1631, it appears that the President had not only caused a large edition of that article to be issued, but had also before the resolution of 30th November was adopted, procured to be printed and widely circulated, numerous copies of tho Reports of Gen. Smith and Mr. McDullio, ;n fiver of tho Bank, and on that day ho suggested tho expediency of extending his power to the printing of other articles which might subserve the purposes ofthe institution. Whereupon tho following resolution was adopted, viz: "Resolved, That the President is hereby authorized to cause to be prepared and circulated, such

d:u r. TiM.'T.il pvpcn m msy rr.rr.r'Vj'jieiU.tf. tho popl., information in I'gitd tJ the tiituio and J eralio:i3 ofthe B'tiK." T. o xpeudituii s J urp ut'n to lmvu U en mahi ui:d -r ftitdiority of ihesj ri r ninr;., lurit;g l!m veins 1KU ami lS'.W, weio about HO.OIW. 1 r

portion iheso -xp-nditurr3 Vouchers win? it!;oereti, liom !i:i.h it j-pj e iu that tney wt id int nr. red in tlu purchase i f si-mo lOi'HJO copies i f newspaper, irpi rts nnd pet flu, tn;.d? in On;, grcsf, r.-vitw of spcicto itainst Bmlr, &c. Fur another l uge portion l.o vou hus whatever were tendered, Lm the various Minis wen paid onordas of tho lV'dt ut ef tho Bml;, in.-.-king "refrrencs to the icstlutivii ofthe. 11th Mure!?, isrjl. On ascertaining these fact, and perceiving ihat expenditures (f a fimilar character wite still continued, the Government Dircctois a few weeks g ofllrcd a refutation in the Board, calling fi-r a cific account rf thesu expenditures', t-hewing u) objects to which they hud bun applied and tho pcijjons to whom tho money h id born paid. Thij reasonable proposition was voted down. Tliev also t.ifcred a resolution reeind'ng the resolutions ef Novcn.hr r, liLV, and Milch Rutl. This abo was rejected. Not content with thus refusing to rcrall tho obnoxious power, or even to require such an account of tho expenditure ;:s wtuld hew whether tho money of the Bank had in fiet been applied to the objects contemplated by ihoso resolution?, aj obnoxious as thy were, tho Bond icnewcd ilu rov cr already conferred, and even enjoined renewed attention to ii exercise, by adopting tho fallowing in lieu cf the propositions submitted by the Government Diivc.toic-', vl: "llitofrctt, Tint the Board havo confidence in tho wisdom and integrity of the Piosidt nt, and in the propriety cf ihe resolution of DOth November, 1S30, and 11th Match ami entertain a full conviction of the ncct-ssity of a renewed attention to tho object of those lesulutioti!', and that the President bo authorised and n mieated to continue his exertion for tho piomoiiou of said object. Taken in connexion with the nature of ih expenditures heretofore made, as recently disclosed, which tho Board not only tolerate but approve, this resolution puts tho funds ofthe Bank at ihe disposition ofthe President for ihe puipo.o of employing thewhohs press of tho countiy in the rvieo of tho Bink, to hire writers and newnpapct?, ami to pay out such sums as he pleases, without tho responsibility of rendering any specific account. Tho bank is thus converted into a vast electioneering engine with means to embroil the country in deadly feuds, and, under cover of expenditures in themselves improper, extend its corruption through all tho ramii:cations of society. Some ofthe items fur which accounts hive been rendered, shew tho construction which his been given to tho resolutions, and tho way in which tho powers it confers has been exerted. Tho money has not been expended merely in tho publication and distribution of speeches, reports of committees, or articles written for the purpose of shewing tiio constitutionality (jor usefulness of the Bank, but publications havo been prepared and extensively circulated, containing severe invectives against tho officers of the Covcmmcnt; and the money which belongs to the stockholders and to the public has been freely applied in elforts to degrade, in public estimation, those who were supposed to be instrumental in resisting the wishes of this gr sping and dangerous institution. As the President of tho Bank has not been required to settle his accounts, no one but himself yet knows how much muro lUm tho sum already mentioned may havo been squandered, and for which a credit may hereafter be claimed in his account under this most extraordinary resolution. With these facts before us, can wo bo surprised at tho torrent of abuse incessantly poured out against nil who are supposed to ft and in tho way ofthe cupidity or ambition of the Bmk ofthe U. States? Can we be sut prised at sudden and unexpended changes of opinion in fivor of an institution which has tuitions to lavish, and nvows its determination not to spare its mvuns when they are necessary to accomplish its purpo.us? Tho refusal to render an account ofthe manner in which part of tho money expended has been nppHcd, gives just cause for tint suspicion tint it lus been used for purposes which it is not deemed prudent to expose to tho eyes of an intelligent and virtuouj people. 'Ihoso who act justly do not shun tha light, nor do they refuso explanations when tho propriety of their conduct is brought into question. With these facts before him, in an official report from the (Joverninert Directors, the Prenlcnt would feel that he was not only responsible Ibr all the abuses and corruptions tho Hank has committed, or may commit, but ahnoct an accomplice in a conspiracy ngaiutt the (Jovcrnment, which ho has swora honestly to aihninit-t"r, if he did not take every Hep wjthin his constitut ional nnd legal power likely to bo efficient in putting an end to thec enormities. Ifit to possible, within the ropo of human affairs, to find a reason f r removing the Government depositee and leaving the Bank to its own resources for tho means cf effecting its criminal des-ign-s wo have it here. Was it expected when tho moneys of tho I!. States were direc ted to bo pheed in that Ilink, that they would bo put under tho control ef one man, empowered to spend millions without rendering a voucher or specifying the object! Can they be condored safe with the evidence bolero us, that tens of thou sanus have been spent fer highly improper, if not corrupt purposes?, and that tho sanio motive may lead to tho expenditure of hundreds of thousands, and even millions more And can we justify ourselves to tho peoplo by longer lending to it the money und power ofthe (Jovemmcnt, to bo employed for such purpose?. It has been alleged by pome as an objection to tho removal ofthe doposites, that tho bank has the power, and in that event will havo tho disposition, to de stroy tnoMate Hanks employed by the Government, and bring distress upon tho country. It has been the fortune ofthe President to encounter dangers which wcro represented as equally alarming, and he has seen them vanish before resolution and energy. Pictures equally npalling were paraded before him when this Hank came to demand a new charter. But what was the result! litis tho country boon ruined, or even digressed! Was it ever moro prosperous than eincc that actl The President verily believes the Bank has not the power to produce tho calamities its friendj threaten. The funds of tho Government will not be annihilated by being transferred. They will immediately bo itued tor tho beneiit of trade, S; if the Bank ofthe United States curtails its loans, the Stato Banks strengthened by the public deposes, w ill extend theirs. What comes in through one Hank, will go out through others, and the equilibrium will be preserved, Should thv Bank, for the mere purpetc of prcnlucipj distrete,