Indiana Palladium, Volume 6, Number 51, Lawrenceburg, Dearborn County, 25 December 1830 — Page 2

ration will be saved from prejudice, by a rigjid application of th t portion of the public funds which might otherwise be applied to different objects, to that --highest of all our obligations, the payment of the public debt, and an opportunity be afforded for the adoption of some better rule for the operations of the Government in this matter than any which has hitherto been acted upon. Profoundly impressed with the importance of the subject, not merely as it relates to the general prosperity of the country, but to the safety of the federal system, f cannot avoid repeat

ing my earnest hope that all good citizens, who take a proper interest in the success and harmony of our admirable political institutions, and who are incapable of desiring to convert an opposite state of things into means for the gratification of personal ambition, will, laying aside minor considerations, and discarding local prejudices, unite their honest exertions to establish some fixd general principle, which shall be cal culated to effect the greatest extent of public good in regard to the subject of of internal improvement, and a ;ord the least ground for sectional discontent. The general ground of my objection to local appropriations has been heretofore expressed; and I shall endeavor to avoid h repetition of what has been already urged the importance of sustaining the State sovereignties, as far as is consistent with the rightful action of the Federal Government, and of preserving the greatest attainable harmony between them. I will now only add an expression of my conviction a conviction which every day's? experience serves t confirm that the political creed which inculcate? the pursuit 'of those great objects as a paramount duty, i? tne trufr faith, and one to which We are mairly indebted for the present success of the entire system, and to Tvh ch we must alone look for it future stability. That there are diversities in the interests of the different States which compose this extensive confederacy, mu9t be admitted. Tnose diversities arising from situation, chrrnte, population, and pursuits, are doubtless, as it Is natural they should be, greatly exaggerated by jealousies, and that spirit of rivalry so inseparable from neighboring communities. These circumstances make it the duty of those who are entrusted with the management of its affairs to neutralise their effects as far as practicable, by making the beneficial operation of the Federal Government as equal and equitable among the several States as can be done consistently ith the great ends of its institution. It" is only necessary to refer to undoubted facts, to see how far the past acts of the Government upon the subject under consideration have fallen short of this object. The expenditures heretofore made for internal improvements amount to upwards of five millions of dollars, and have been distributed in very us equal proportions among: the States. The estimated expenfc of works ot which suveys have been made, together with that of others projected !

anu partially surveyed, a mout to more J tor 1 cannot assent to tne justness ot than ninety-six millions of dollars. the apprehension, that the establishThat such improvem nfs. on m count ; ment of the proposed system would of particular circumstances, mav be j tend to the encouragement of improvimore advantageously and beneficially deu legislation of the character suprrade in some States than in others, is j posed. Wh .tever the proper authoridoubtless true; but that they are of a ; ty, in the exercise of constitutional character which should prevent an ! power, shall, at any time hereafter deequitable distribution of the funds! cide to be for the general good, will, in amongst the several States, is not to be that as in other respects, deserve and

conceded. The want of this equitable ! distribution cannot fail to prove a prolific source of irritation amongst the States. VVe have it constantly before our eyes,, that professions of superior zeal in the cause of internal improvement, and a disposition to lavish tne public funds upon objects of that character, are daily and earnestly put forth by aspirants to power, a9 constituting the highest claims to the confidence of the people. Would it be strange, under such circumstances, and in times of great excitement, that grants of this description should find their motives in objects which may not accord with the public good? Those who have not had occasion to see and regret the uw dicationof a sinister influence in these matters in past times, have been more fortunate than myself m their observation of the course of public affairs. If to those evils be added the combinations and angry contentions to which such a course of things gives rise, with their baleful influences unon the legis lation of Congress, touching the leading and appropriate duties of the Federal Government, it was but doing justice to the character of our people to expect the severe condemnation of the past, which the recent exhibition of public sentiment has evinced. Nothing short of a radical change in the action of the Government upon the subject can, in my opinion, remedy the evil. If, as it would be natural to expect, the States which have been least favored in past appropriations should insist on being redressed in those hereafter to he made at the expense of the States which have so largely and wspujpuruonaiejy parucinateu, we nave, as matter now stand, bat little

security that the attempt would do more than change the inequality from one quarter to another. Thus viewing the subject, I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds, which may at any time remain in the treasury, after the national debt shall have been paid, among the States, in proportion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects of internal improvement. Although this plan has met with favor in some portions of the Union, it ha3 also elicited objections, which merit deliberate consideration. A brief notice of of these objections here, will not, therefore, 1 trust, be regarded aa out of place. They rest, as far as they have Come to my knowledge, on the following grounds: 1st, an objection to the ratio

of distribution; 2d, an apprehension that the existence of such a regulation would produce improvident and oppressive taxation to raise the funds for distribution; 3d, that the mode proposed would lead to the construction of works ot a local nature, to the exclusion ol such as are general, and as would consequently be of a more useful character; and, last, that it would create a discreditable and injurious dependence on the part of the Slate Governments, upon the federal power. Of those who object to the ratio of representation as the basis of dis'ribution, soma insist hat the importations of the respective States would constitute one that would be more equitable; and others, again, that the extent of their respective territories would furnish a standard which would be more expedient, and sufficiently equitable. The rrfticrof representation presented itself to my mind, and it still does, ag on'1 cf obviou equity, because cf its being the ratio ot contribution, whether the funds to be distributed be derived from the customs, or from direct taxation. It does not follow, however, that its ad option is indispensable to tNe establish ment of the system proposed. There may be considerations appertaining to the subject which would render a departure, to some extent, from the rule of contribution, proper. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis of distribution be confined to one ground. It may, if, in the judgment of those whose right it is to fix it, it be deemed politic and just to give it that character, have regard to several. In my first message, I stated it to be r.iy opinion that "it is not pi obable that any adjustment of the tariff upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the Government without a considerable surplus in the treasury, beyond what may be required for its current service.' t have had no cause to change that opinion, bat much to confirm it. Should these expectations he realized, a suitable fund would thus be produced for the plan under consideration to operate upon; and if there be no uch fund, its adoption will, in my opinion, work no injury to any interest; receive the acquiescence and support of the whole country; and we have ampie security that every abuse of power in that regard, by the agents of the people, will receive a speedy and effectual corrective at their hands. The views which I take of the future, founded on the obvious and increasing improve, ment of all classes of cur fellow citizens in intelligence and in public and private virtue, leave me without muCh apprehension on that head. I do not doubt that those who come after us will be a9 much alive as we are to the obligation upon all the trustees of political power to exempt those for whom they act from all unnecessary burdens, and as sensible of the great truth, that the resources of the nation, beyond those required for the immediate and necessary purposes of the government, can no where be so well deposited as in the pockets of the people. h may sometimes happen that the interests of particular S ates would not be deemed to coincide with the general interest, in relation to improvement within such states. But if the danger to be apprehended from this source is sufficient to require it, a discretion might be reserved to Congress to direct to such improvements of a general character as the States concerned might not be disposed to unite in, the application of the quotas of those States, under the restriction of confining to each State the expenditure of its appropriate quota. It may however, be assumed as a safe general rule, that such improvements as serve to increase the prosperity of the respective States in which they are made, by giv ing new facilities to trade, and thereby anrrmonlincr ihn wealth and Comfort nf their inhabitants, constitute the surest

mode of conferring permanent and substantial advantages upon thewhole. The strength as well as the true glory of the confederacy is mainly founded on the prosperity and power of the several independent sovereignties of which it is composed, and the certainty with which they can be bro't into successful, active co-operaiion, through the agency of the Federal Government. It is, moreover, within the knowledge of such as are at all conversant with public affaire, that schemes of internal improvement have, from time to time, been proposed, hich, from their extent and seeming magnificence, were regarded as of national concernment; but which, upon fuller consideration and further experience, would now be rejected with great unanimity. That the plan under consideration would derive important advantages from its certainly, and that the moneys set apart for these pu poses would be more judiciously applied and economically expended under the direction of the State Legislature, in which every part of each Siate i immediately represented, cannot, I think, be doubted. In the new Saes particularly, where

a comparatively small population U scattered over an extensive surface, and the representation in Congress consequently very limited, it is natural to expect that the appropriations made by the Federal Government would be more likely to be expended in the vicinity of those members through whose immedi ate agency they were obtained than if the funds were placed under the cory trol of the Legislature, in which every county of the State has its own representative. This supposition does not necessarily impugn the motives of such congressional R preventatives, nor is it gr intended We are all sensible of the bias (o which the strongest minds and purest hearts are, under such cir-cum-tancee, liable. In respect to the lat objection, its probable effect upon the dignity and independence of the State Governments, it appears to me only necessary to state the cate as it is, and as it would b if the measure proposed were adopted, to show that the (.peration is most likely to be the very reverse of that which the objection sapposes. In the cne case, the State would receive i;s quota of the national revenue for domestic use upon a fix d principle, as a matter of right, and from a fund to the creation of which it had itself contributed its fair proportion. Surely there could be nothing deroga'cry in that. Aa matters now stand, the States ihemetves, in their sovereign character, are not unfrequently petitioners at the bar of the Federal Legislature for euch allowances out of the national Treasury as it may comport with their pleasure or sense of duty to bestow upon them, It cannot require argument to prove which of the two courses is most compatible wiih the ofticieucy or respectability of the StateGovernments. But all these are matters for discussion and dispassionate ccnaideration. That the desned adjustment weald be attended with difSculty , a?)rds no rea son why it should not be attempted. The effective operation efsuch motives would have prevented the adoption of the Constitution under which we have so long lived, and under the benign influence of which our 'beloved country has so signally prospered. The framera of that sacred instrument bad greater diffr ultiea to overcome, and they did overcome them. Tha patriotism of the people, directed by a deep conviction of tha importance cf the Uniun, produced mutual concession and reciprocal forbearance. Strict right was merged in a spirit of compromise, and the result has consecrated their distinguished devotion to the general weal. Unless the American people have drgenerated the same result can be again effected, whenever experience points out the necessity of a resort to the same means to uphold the fabric which their fathers have reared. It is beyond the power of mao to make asystem cf government like ours, or any other, operate with precise equality upon States situated like those which compose this confederacy ; nor js inequality always injustice. Every State cannot expect to shape the measures of the General Government to suit its own particular interests. The causes which prevent it are seated in the nature of things, and cannot be entirely counteracted by human means. Mutual forbearance, therefore, becomes a duty obligatory upon all; and we may, I am confident, count on a cheerful compliance with this high injunction on the part of our constituents. It is not to be supposed that they will object to make such comparatively inconsiderable sacrifices for the preservation of rights and privileges which other less favored portions of the world have in vain waded through eeas of blood to acquire. Our courie is a safe one, if it be but faithfully adheredjto. Acquiescence in the constitutionally expressed will of the majority , and the exercise of that will in a spirit of moderation, justice. and brotherly kindness, will constitute! rpmpnf twhirh tvmilrt fnrpvpr nroto wr, oar Unicn. Those who cherish and

inculcate senllmenls like tbese render a most essential service to their country; whilst those who seek to weaken their influence, are, however conscientious and praiseworthy their intentions, iu effect its worst enemies. If the intelligence and influence of the country, instead of laboring to foment sectional prejudices, to be made subservient to party warfare, were, in good faith, applied to the eradication of causes of local discontent, by the improvement of our institutions, and by facilitating their adaptation to the condition of the times, this task would prove one of less difficulty. May we not hope that the obvious interests of our common country, and he dictates of an enlightened patriotism, will, in the end, lead the public mind in that direction? After all, the nature of the subject does not admit of a plan wholly tree from objection. That which has for some time been in operation, is, perhaps, the worst that could exist; and every advance that can be made in its improvement is a matter eminently worthy of your most deliberate attention It is very possible that one better calculated to effect the objects in view

may yet be devised. If so, it is to K hoped that those who disapprove of the past, and dissent from what is proposed for the future, will feel it their duty to direct their attention to it, as they must be sensible that, unless some fixed rule for tha action of the Federal Government in this respect is established, the course now attempted to be arrested will he again resorted to. Any mode which is calculated to give the greatest degree of effect and harmony to our legislation upon the subject -which shall best serve to keep the movements of the Federal Government within the sphere intended by those who modelled and those who adopted it which shall lead to the extinguishment of the national debt in the shortest period, and impose the lightest burdens upon our constituents,shall receive from me a cordial and firm support. Among the objects of great national concern, ! cannot omit to press again upon your attention that part of the Constitution which regulates the election of President and Vice President. The necessity for iU amendment is made so clear to my mind by the observation of its evils, and by the many able discussions which-they have elicited on the fl or of Congress and elsewhere, tha I should be wanting to my duty were I to withhold another expression of my deep solicitude upon the subject. Our system fortunately contemplates a recurrence to first principles; differing, in this respect, from all that have preceded i, and securing it, I trust, equally against the decay and the commotions which have marked the progregs of other Governments. Our fellow-citizens, too, who, in proportion to their love of liberty, keep a steady eye upon the means of sustaining it , do not require to be reminded of the duty they owe to themselves to remedy all essential defects in so vital a part of their system. While they are sensible that every evil attendant upon its operation i3 not necessarily indicative of a bad organization, but may proreed from temporary causes, yet the habitual presence, or even a single instance of evils which can be clearly traced to an organic defect, will net, I trust, be overlooked through a too scrupulous veneration for the work ot their ancestors. Tha Constitution Was an experiment, committed to the virtue & intelligence of the great mass of our countrymen, in whose ranks the fra mers of it themselves were to perform the oart of patriotic observation and scrutiny; and it they have passed from the stage of existence with an increased confidence in its genera? adaption to our condition, we should learn from authority so high the duty of fortify ing the points in it which time proves to be ezposed, rather than be deterred from approaching them by the suggestions of fear, or the dictates of misplaced reverence. A provision which does not secure to the people a direct choice of their Chief Magistrate, but has a tendency to defeat their will, presented to my mind such an inconsistency with the general spirit of our institutions, that I was induced to suggest for your consideration the substitute which appeared to me at the same time the most likely to correct the evil and to meet the views of our constituents. The most mature reflection i - - -" ; since Las added strength to the belief j that the best interests of our country re quire tbe speedy adoption of aorae plan calculated to effect this end. A contingency which sometimes places it in the power of a single member of tLe House of Representatives to decide an election of so high and solemn a character, is unjust to the people, and becomes, wle.n it occurs, a source of embarrassment to the individuals thus brought into power, and a cause of distrust of the representative body. Liable as the confederacy is, from its great extent, to parties founded upon sectional interests, and to a corresponding multiplication ot candidates for the Prcirlunrr fko lonrl tutioaal reference to tbe House of Re-

presentatim, !?, to devolve the ehc lion upon that body in almost every in stance, and, whatever choice may then be made among the candidates thus presented to them, to swell the influence of particular interests to a degree inconsistent with the general good. The consequences of this feature of the Constitution appear far more threatening to the peace & integrity of the Union than any which 1 can conceive as likely to reeult from the simple legislative action of the Federal Government. It was a leading object with the framers of the Constitution to keep as separate as possible the action of the le

gislative and executive branches of the Government. To secure this object, nothing is more essential than to preserve the former from the temptations of private interest, and, therefore, so to direct the patronage of the latter a9 not to permit such temptations to be offered. Experience abundantly demonstrates tha: ever precaution in this respect is a valuable safeguard of liberty, and one which my reflections upon the tendencies of our system incline me to think should be made still stronger. It was for this reason (hat, in connexion witb an amendment of tha Constitution, re moving all intermediate agency in the choice ot the President, 1 recommend ed some restrictions upon the re-eligi-biluy of that oracer, and upon the tenure of ffices generally. The reason still exists; and I renew the recommendation, with an increased confidence that us adoption will strengthen those checks by which the Constitution designed to secure the independence of each department of tin. Go?ernmenf, and promote the healthful and equitable administration of all the trusts which it has created. The agent most likely to contravene this d-sign of the Constitution is the Chief Magistrate. In order, panicuTarly, that bia appointment may, as far as possible, be placed beyond the reach of any improper influences ; in order that he may approach the solemu responsibilities of the highest oflice in the gift of a free people uncommitted to any other course than the strict line of constitutions! duty ; and that the securities for this independence may be rendered as strong as the nature of power, and the weakness of its possessor, will admit, I cannot tooearnestly invite your attention to the pro priety of promting such an amendment of the Constitution as will render him ineligible after one term of service. h gives me pleasure to announce to Cor.gress that the benevolent policy of the Government, steadily pursued fop n aily thirty years, in relation to the removal of the Indians beyond the white settlements, is approaching to a happy consummation. Two important tribes have accepted the provision made for their removal at the last session of Congress; and it is believed that their exjmple will induce the remaining tribes, also, to 6eek the same obvious advantages. The consequences of a speed? rev rauvai win oe important to the United States, to individual States, and to the Indians themselves. The pecuniary advantages which it promises to the Government are tbe least of its recommendations, it puts an end to all possible dinger cf collision between the authorities of the General and State Gevernments on account of the Indians, Jt wiltpla ce a dense and civilized popu fat on in large tracts of country now occupied by a few savage hunters. By opening the t? hole territory between Tennessee on the north, and Louisiana on the south, to the settlement of the whites, il will incalculably strengthen the southwestern frontier, and render the adi - - - w - w v. iu on vile tiiuucil iu 1 1 pel future invasion without remote aid, It will relieve the whole State of Mississippi, and the western part of Alabama, oflodian occupancy, and enable those States to advance rapidly in population, wealth, and power. It will separate the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; freo them from the power of the States; ena ble them to pursue happiness in thei? own way, and under their own rude institutions; will retard the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers; and perhaps cause them gradually, under tbe protection of the Government, and through the influence of good counsel, to cast off their savage habits, and become an interesting, civilized, and Christian community These consequences, some of them so certainr and the rest so probable, make tbe com' plete execution of tbe plan sanctioned by Concress at their last session an ob ject of much solicitude. Towards the aborigines of the country no one can indulge a more friendly feeling than myself, or would go further in attempting to reclaim them from their waudering habits, and make them a happy and prosperous people. I have endeavored to impress upon them my own solemn convictions of the duties and powers of the General Government in relation to the State author ities. For thejustice of the laws passed by the State within tha sco4pe of their reserved powers, they are not res ponsible to this Government. As indU curoninioni ?f tb$ jc(3 ;but as u Gey