Indianapolis Journal, Indianapolis, Marion County, 24 February 1885 — Page 7

ICIYIL SERVICE REFORM. iWby It Should Be Introduced Into the Affairs of the State of Indiana. Armament in the State Senate by Hon. W. 1). Foulke, Delivered on the 7th of February, 1883. The following is the speech of Hon. W. D. Foulke, senator from Wayne county, upon his '"bill providing for a State civil-service reform: With each new political contest the line of Tirinciple dividing the two great parties has been ess clearly drawn, and the platforms of each have become more vague. Their respective candidates become less the exponents of any definite idea. The matter at issue resolves itself more and more into the question “who shall have Hhe offices.” Everything else seems to be secondary to the distribution of the loaves and fi ' • If this continues thus we can have no 'healthful republican government The evils which flow from such a system are manifold. The party in power, however corrupt, feels that it has a vast multitude of supporters- in every district in the country bound body and soul to its maintenance by motives wholly mercenary and selfish. In every political contest hundreds of thousands on each side support the claims of the parties and their candidates regardless of the principles involved, wholly from the hope of private gain, and selfish ambition for office and power. Officials are chosen for the party services they have rendered or will render. The government, which ought to he served by the best men iu the country, is actually served, to great extent, by the most mercenary and incompetent. Men whose talents enable them to acquire a competence in private, life will not enter service, the term of which may expire at any time, and which is certain to end whenever anew party comes into power. “At the end of each four years the entire federal patronage (amounting to one hundred and ten thousand offices) is collected into one lot, and the people divide themselves into two parties, struggling in name to choose a President, but in fact to control this enormous patronage, which the President, when elected, is compelled to distribute. The temptation to fraud, to usurpation, and to corruption, thus created, is beyond calculation. A prize so great, an influence so powerful, thus centralized and put up at short periods, would jeopardize the peace and safety of any nation, ,No nation can withstand a strife among its own people so general, so intense, and so demoralizing. No contrivance so effectual to embarrass govern*ment, to disturb the public peace, to destroy political honesty, and to endanger the common security, was ever before invented.” (Report of committee on election frauds, 1879.) The reform heretofore proposed for these evils Jias been to turn out the party in power under ■which they have existed, and fill the places by new men taken from another political organization. The reform which the Democratic party proposes is to turn cut Republicans and put in Democrats. The reform which the Republican party will propose will be to turn out Democrats and put in Republicans. There must be a “rotation in office,” in the opinion of all those who are cut, while those who are in devote themselves to

the perpetuation of patronage and spoils. A moment’s thought will show that merely to change an administration is a clumsy way to reform its abuses. It turns out the good as well as the bad; the faithful servant as well as the Spoilsman and the sineeurist; the honest officer as well as the jobber. The fear of removal for corrupt practices may operate in some general and impersonal manner upon the party as a whole, and thus act as some slight restraint, but dt does not appeal personally and directly to any individual in the service. But even where reform follows a mere change, it is and always must be of the most temporary character. Neither of the two great parties of the country to-day can say that tho mere personnel of their adherents is such as to secure them against the temptations of long continued power. We are not gods, but men; and the party that cries so clamorously for reform when out of office contains within itself as much of human frailty as that winch holds for the time the reins of power. Every candid Democrat and every candid Republican will concede this. The party that Would weed out abuses to day will bring forth a plentiful progeny ot corruption in a decade. The cry, “turn the rascals out,” proceeding alterenately from the camps of Israel and Judah, and followed by the mere transfer of spoils, is very edifying, but it gives no hope of permanent improvement. We want something that will improve both of the parties, not merely while they are wandering in the desert, but while the flesh•pots of Egypt are before them. We want something that will apply the remedy at the very approach of the disease; something that works, not transiently and spasmodically, but by a constant, natural law. We do not want a nostrum or opiate which gives mere temporary relief from pain and leaves the source of the malady untouched to attack us with greater violence on the morrow. What we need is a “vis medicatrix naturao;*' something in the political system which will restore and retain health without external aid; something which shall bo present wherever tho forces of decay appear, to correct them by its own inherent power. The remedy should be as permanent as the evil. It should be addressed to the known weaknesses of human nature, recognizing that these may appear in Democrat and Republican alike. We must remember that no party ever existed, no, nor any form of government, into which corrupt and selfish motives have not somewhere entered. The question is, what will contract within the closest space the sphere of their activities? Our experience in constitutional restrictions shows that the evils of government are always least where its powers aro limited within certain fixed laws; that it is wiser to trust our rights to general pre-estab-lished rules than to leave them to be determined by the irresponsible will of another. Accordingly, in general matters of law we leave as little discretion as possible to our judges, our Governors, and our political officials. We consider that fixed rules, however imperfect, are better than arbitrary power. Even our own bands, as legislators, are tied by many at ringent provisions of our State and national constitutions. We cannot impair the obligations of contract, nor pass ex post facto laws. We cannot establish a religion, nor create an order of nobility. Why is this? Because it is deemed pafer to trust a general rule in these matters than to leave them to be determined by our arbitrary will. The great feature of all republican institutions is jealousy of official power. We have eliminated it from many parts of cur system. What the civil-service reformer asks is that still other limitations should bo prescribed. Why is it that an appointing officer should be permitted to act any were arbitrarily in his appointments than in respect of any other official act? Public office is a public trust, and he has no more right to bestow ft for his personal gratification or for the success of his party that a judge has to take away your property or mine upon personal or party grounds. If you ask, then, why I want appointments controlled by rules and examinations; why lain not willing to trust the discretion of the executive, or even of the Legislature, 1 answer: “For the same reason that you insist that the judge that passes upon your life, liberty and property shall be governed by fixed rules of law; tor the same reason that you are unwilling to trust his arbitrary discretion to do what to him aeems right.” The further civilization advances the less it leaves to be determined by the caprice of its rulers. Absolutism is an evidence of a low grade of society; and the arbitrary right of appointment to office in a man or a party is a rudimentary form of absolutism still left in civilization which lias, in the main, outgrown it. If new it bo conceded that a system of rules is better than individual discrete, the next question is: What sort of’ rules must they be? We take it that it i.s self evident that the right of appointment to office is a trust; that the duty is to appoint tiie man best qualified for the office. The right i. in the tax payer to have the beat work performed for the money which he is required to pay for it Taxpayers belong to all parties. Yea have no right to tax a Republican to pay for services performed for the Democratic party. All pay taxes alike, and the work for which they pay should be work from which they to receive a benefit. That is, it should be public and not partisan service. It is just as ranch u crime in principle to appoint to office one unfit to perform its duties, on account of personal or party services, as to devote the public mosey to personal or campaign uses. If t '‘re be any claim to office by any person it is of the fihtest person to hold it solely on

account*of his fitness. If these conclusions are correct, the only remaining question is: “By what 83'stem of general rules can the fitness of men for office be best determined!” It will be hard to think of any system worse than the present one. Capacity for party intrigue (for which offices are now made rewards) ought to be rather a disqualification than a reason for adpointment. Prejudice and dishonesty are very frequent companions of partisan zeal and ability. If we selected our officials by lot, and limited their terms of office to two months, as they used to do in the republic of Florence, we should scarcely fare worse than we do now. We have not even the guaranty of the official responsibility of the appointing officer, for appointments are most commonly made upon the influence of some political friend, which the superior is powerless to resist He does not even dare to remove the subordinate after his unworthiness is known, lest it may give offense. Now, no man should fill any office unless he knows enough to perform its duties. This knowledge can be found out in two ways: first, by examining him, and secondly, by trying him. A* man ought not to be a reading clerk who cannot read distinctly, nor an engrossing clerk if he cannot wiite a good hand and spell properly. Yet. I have known reading clerks who could not read, and engrossing clerks who could not write. An hour's examination would easily have exposed these shortcomings. In all matters, then, where there are any duties to be performed in which the candidate’s fitness can be ascertained by an examination, there ought to be such examination. But this is not eaongh; we ought to seek not only to obtain a fit man, but the very fittest. You cannot tell who the fittest will be until you compare one man with another. Examinations should therefore be competitive. Now, the larger the competition the better will be the ability secured. To find out who is the very best, you must give all a chance. This is nothing but simple justice. Every citizen ought to have the right to prove himself the worthiest if he can. This is true democratic equality. It recognizes the broad principle that all men are created equal; that they have an equal right to seek any office in the gift of the government; that neither wealth, nor birth, nor influence, nor political opinion can shut the door on them and say: “You cannot enter.” But it is not enough that the applicant should be examined; he may know his duties and fail to perform them. He must also be tried. If he be found unworthy, let him stand aside and give place to the next upon the list. A period of probation should be imposed, and no officer should receive a permanent appointment until his superior certifies to his proper conduct in the discharge of his duties. There should also be proof ol moral character, and limitations as to age and health. When these safeguards are thrown around the service, and promotions are made to depend solely upon the faithful performance of duty, we have, I think, as good a system as can bo devised We apply to government the great law which nature applies in every gradation of organic life—the survival of tho fittest. The direct result of the competitive system would thus be the appointment of a much better class of public servants, but its indirect results would be still more important. It would give anew impulse to a thorough education in all the elementary branches required for the public service, and indirectly to education of every description. It is not easy to realize how closely a thorough knowledge of a few branches is associated with a good general education. The opening of civil-service to competition would be a more powerful stimulus to education than tho establishment of a thousand scholarships. But the most important gain would be the removal of one of the main causes of the political corruption which now infects our institutions. Theoffices at the disposal of party managers constitute a great mass of political capital wherewith to bribe men to perforin the baser and more dishonorable part} services. It is tire glittering prize of some office hold before the eyes of the ward politician which animates him in his political bartering. To put these offices beyond the power of patronage, to render them no longer attainable by such means, is to wipe out much of the trickery which pervades our political organizations. Arbitrary power corrupts its possessor. This is just as true of a party as of a man. The removal of patronage will make both parties purer and cleaner. The demoralizing solicitations which consume the time of legislative and executive officers will cease, and they can devote their undivided energy to matters of public policy and statesmanship. Public economy will be promoted; legislators will no longer vote exorbitant Bu'urieß to fvror their nppoiiitoeo. Itoiuuvals without cause will be stopped when vacancies must be filled by competition. The officials, no longer subject to political assessments, nor liable to be arbitrarily removed, will work for lower salaries. They will no longer neglect their official duties for politics, since they will no longer owe their office to political work. Hence the same number of persons can do more and better work. The officers will retain their manhood and independence, and will not be required to vote for a person or measure which they do not approve for fear of losing their places. The charge that our best men keep aloof from office because politics is demoralizing will no longer be true. To hold office funder the civil service will be creditable, because it will show that the possessor has ability and knowledge. Executive appointments will no longer be influenced by the Legislature, because they will be beyond the power both of the Legislature and the executive. Politics will become less a trade. Party intrigue will fall more into disrepute, while the general suspicion of corrupt motives which clings to almost every legislative act, will in great measure pass away. The bane of modern political life is an accursed hunger for office. It is the common saying that “Young men should not go into politics because it ruins them for everything else.” The excitement, the intrigue, the passion and ambition attendant upon political life seem to disqualify men for the quiet duties of business. The temporary character of appointments and the arbitrary removals by which sooner or later nearly all are thrown back into private life, are the source of bitter disappointment. Politics wrecks the lives of nearly all who engage in it. In its mad vortex those who enter perish. Such being its tendency, its baleful influence should be confined within the narrowest possible limits. The wisdom of civil service reform is demonstrated, not merely by reason but by experience and historic fact It is no longer an experiment. It has been tried, and is everywhere successful. Its success has been tested, not during a month nor a year, but during a long series of years; not in one form of government alone, but by the governments of many of the most civilized communities in existence; in England, in India, in Australia, in Canada, in France. Sweden, and last of all, in our own federal government, and in the Empire State. It has been tried longest and proved most thoroughly in England and her dependencies. Her history in this respect, as in others which have affected our dearest political rights, is pregnant with instruction. From England we imbibed our first clear notions of constitutional liberty; from her soil we transplanted the jury system into our congenial atmosphere; from her illustrious prototypes have we copied those fundamental declarations in tho bill of rights which rest at the foundation of our government. Our notions of legislative representation, popular education, public trials, free speech and free press are all drawn, together with our Anglo-Saxon blood and instincts, from the great mother of the American Republic. Her experience has been more vast and more varied in matters of administration than that of any nation in existence. Her example is not less instructive in the matter of administrative reform than it was on the great questions of civil liberty. Every evil we have known had long existed there. The theory that offices were the perquisites and property of the governing class or party was there sustained bv the doctrines of divine right and the claims of an hereditary nobility, notions which never invaded the virgin soil of this Republic. Nothing tends more strongly to sustain the idea that patronage is a perquisite of the ruler rather than a trust for the people than the notion that government is based on divine or hereditary right. In feudal times the right of appointments to office was used wholly for selfish purposes. Tho power and pleasure of the great were all; the welfare of the citizen was nothing. Honesty and fidelity were disregarded. The only question was how much -could be made in money, power or influence by the appointment. Offices were openly sold like any other article of private property. Indeed, most offices were hereditary because they were personal privileges. The right of descent gave them additional value. The first reform in this resnect was that which was extorted from King .lohn in the great charter which contained the following provision: “We will not make any justices, constables or bailiffs but of such as know the law of the realm and mean to truly observe it.” Here for the first time the competency of the incubent is made a material inquiry. This has been justly

THE INDIANAPOLIS JOURNAL, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 188a.

called the first civil-service rule. In those early times the progress of reform was slow and difficult. Tyranny was supported by the injunctions of tho chureh, by long usage, by the general iguorance of the masses and the superstition of the people. Henry VII sold pardons, bishoprics and court places; under Henry VIII a considerable part of the House of Commons consisted of the King’s household offices. It soon appears, however, that a considerable portion of the patronage of the crown had passed into the hands of Parliament, just as the appointing power delegated to the President by our national Constitution, has passed by custom from the executive to Congress. Under Edward VI reform made some temporary progress. Under Mary and Elizabeth patronage patents were given for various favors, such as tho privilege of importing wine free of duties. Under James I end his favorite, Buckingham, charters and monopolies were openly sold. This was continued under Charles I with even greater aggravation, until the great revolution put a temporary check on this venality. The policy pursued by Cromwell during his protectorate was closely akin to our spoils system, as introduced by President Jackson. At that time England was divided into something like two great parties, the Puritans and the Cavaliers. Cromwell was a reformer, but he was also a partisan. Money and court favoritism no longer controlled his appointments, and these were made not wholly regardless of merit. But the opposite party was not only excluded from patronage, but all Royalists and Catholies were disfranchised. After the restoration came a carnival of corruption greater than before. The revolution followed, and a better era was inaugurated, upon the accession of William 111. At this time party government had its origin, yet appointments to offices, high and low, were made from the party in power. Members of Parliament required pledges from the Ministers that patronage should be distributed among them. The electors required similar pledges from the members. From this resulted the bribery of voters, both by money and by promises of office. In 1771 we find stockjobbers buying and selling seats in Parliament at the market price of one thousand guineas. In Queen Anne’s reign, patronage passed almost wholly from the crown to Parliament, and that great representative body became in its turn tyrannical and corrupt. New offices were created and the emoluments of office were increased that parliamentary patronage might be extended. Under George I and II corruption grew; it was the main instrument of the governments of Walpole, Pelham and Newcastle. The saying of Walpole that “all men have, their price” passed into a political proverb. When Walpole fell tho relief was not permanent; it was only the man who was removed — the system remained. Partisan government for spoils was not abolished, and on the accession of George 111 the monarch attempted personally to avail himself of Walpole's methods. Toward the close of his reign and during the regency, matters grew better. Many statutes were passed to suppress corrupt practices at elections. Still, all officers continued to be appointed through the patronage of political leaders in Parliament. The demands of members for patronage became so excessive and so conflicting that finally a “Patronage Secretary of the Treasury” was appointed to adjust these claims. In some instances there were opened regular books of account, crediting the member with the amount of his parliamentary influence, and charging him with the patronage which he was permitted to bestow. The character of the civil service under this system was execrable. During the administration of Lord Melbourne the higher officers in the various departments found that they could not work with such grossly incompetent materials as the patronage of Parliament had furnished to them. They demanded that candidates for admission to their respective departments should be required to undergo some sort of examination as to fitness. Melbourne accordingly instituted “pass examinations” in some of tho larger offices. There was no competition, and official favoritism still controlled nominations; yet the reform did much, in the words of John Stuart Mill, “in keeping dunces out.” These examinations were so successful that they were extended from one office to another, until competitive examinations were introduced. An order was made by the Queen in council, May 21, 1855, appointing three commissioners with power to select assistants. All applicants for position in the civil service were to be examined by this commission and receive a certificate entitling them to appoiutmouto, with certain opooitic.il oxaoptions, after six months probation. Competitive examinations were held by the board from tho beginning of its duties. The commissioners reported in March 3,185 G. “The principal subjects of examination were writing, arithmetic, geography, composition, history and book-keeping; but some of the examinations included one or more languages; to which were add* and such practical subjects as the clerk most needed on entering a particular office. A just system of marking and grading was adopted, according to which the relative standing of those examined, as between themselves, was so made up that both the degree of excellence in each subject and the relative, practical importance of that subject, were embraced as factors. Those who stood the highest in qualifications got the appointments.” So large a ?ortion of those nominated by the patronage of ’arliament were found incompetent, that on examination in 1855 for a clerkship in the Council of Education, twenty-one out of thirty-one candidates were rejected. Gradually, however, the character of the applicants improved. Men of bad repute feared to present themselves, where every one who competed searched the records of their lives. Ridicule was heaped upon the incompetents and those who were not qualified ceased to seek from members of Parliament the patronage which merely enabled them to enter upon a hopeless contest. Members of Parliament, thus relieved from much irksome solicitation, began to appreciate the desirability of the new methods. On the 24th of April the Commons resolved that “this House has observed, with great satisfaction, the zeal and prudence with which the commission lias proceeded in applying a remedy to evils of a serious character, the previous existence of which has now been placed beyond dispute.” In 1860 a parliamentary committee of fifteen, of which John Bright and Sir Stafford North Cote were members, made an exhaustive report. Their unanimous conclusions were as follows: 1. Though the pass examinations conducted by the Civil-service Commission are far more effective than pass 'examinations as before conducted in separat. jffices. they are yet greatly inferior to limited competition. 2. Limited competition would be much improved if more persons competed, and more should, therefore, be nominated for each competition. 3. Open competition, wherever it be practicable. should be introduced, after the plan of those which had lately been shown to be satisfactory, in the East Indian service. The salutary system of probation, according to which no one was to be appointed until after a trial of six months, was retained. On the 4th of July, 1870, when matters seemed ripe for the final overthrow of patronage, the government made the following order in council: “All appointments which it may be necessary to make after the 31st of August next shall be made by reason of competitive examinations according to regulation, open to all persons of required age, health, character and other qualifications prescribed in the regulations, who may be desirous of attending the same.” The success'of open competition has now been amply tested. In the report of 1872 it is said that “the standard of proficiency exhibited by the successful candidates has been very satisfactory, and far in advance of any we found it possible to enfore under the previous system of nominations.” John Bright wrote in 1874: “The opening of our civil service has met with general approval, and after the experience of some years it would be impossible to go back to the old svstem. The present plan is one which is felt to be mure just to all classes, and it is calculated to supplv more capable men for the various departments of the public service.” Hon. Hugh McCulloch, now Secretary of our Treasury, wrote in 1877: “I do not hesitate to say that the opinion I have formed of the administration of the civil service of Great Britain is a very favorable one. I consider it vastly superior in all important respects to that of the United States.” The competitive system adopted by the government has proved so salutary that many private corporations have resorted to it, among others the Bank of England, the great printing house of Spottiswoode, the London and Westminster Bank, employing 450 clerks, and the Railway Clearing-house, employing 1,500. Such have been the results of this reform in a nation so similar in its essential character to our own. In the admirable language of Mr. Eaton, “The whole advance in the result of the efforts of

patriots and statesmen for good administration during six centuries —is expressed in this simple fact. In the beginning, a man was in the public service because a corrupt and arbitrary king willed him there; at the end, he was in that service because a fair test of his worth gave him the place as the best man to fill it” The history of France is in many respects similar to that of England. Under the kings all offices were perquisites of royalty; the purchase of offices was legalized, and a bureau was opened for their sale. Gradually appointments have, as in England, become based upon the qualifications of the applicant. The same method <>f examination has been resorted to, and removals must be for cause. In the changes which take place in administration, very few removals are made. In Sweden the government provided many years ago for the examination of candidates for office. The standard of attainment has been, perhaps, needlessly high. The King has surrendered his patronage, and selects the most competent from those examined. Members of the legislature do not interfere. Subordinates are as free to vote against the government as in its favor. But it is the example of our own country most instructive. The Constitution of the United States gave the executive power to appoint and rempve civil officers without notice, trial or cause. The framers of our government trusted to the honor of the President that this arbitrary power should not be abused, and "by the first Presidents this confidence was not betrayed. There were neither removals nor appointments to subserve party or personal ends. Washington removed only nine persons all for cause; John Adams nine. Jefferson thirtynine, Madison five, Monroe nine. .John Quincy Adams two. The work of removal for party purposes began with the presidency of General Jackson. In the first month he removed more incumbents than had previously been displaced since the foundation of tho government. No less than two thousand were removed the first year. General Harrison, who had censured Jackson’s course in the Seminole war, was recalled from a foreign mission within four days. Samuel Swartwout, an incompetent and reckless man of business, sought the New York custom-house and got it. Swartwout writes to Jesse Hoyt, another office-seeker, as follows: ‘‘l hold to your doctrine fully, that no d—d rascal who made use of his office or its profits for the purpose of keeping Mr. Adams in and General Jackson out of power is entitled to the least lenity or mercy, save that of hanging. So we think both alike on that head. Whether or not I shall get anything in the general scramble for plunder remains to be proven; but I rather guess I shall.” After his appointment, he dismissed all the Adams men and put Jackson meD in their place. At this time there was introduced into our civil-service the idea, as Governor Marcy expressed it, that “to the victor belonged the spoils.” a simile take from the military parlance of a barbarous age, when the sacking of towns and the plunder of property constituted the mainspring of military opera tions. The desire for plunder has now ceased to be an impelling motive even in war. llow much earlier should the term have faded from the parlance of peace! Even at the period of its introduction it was reprobated by all good men. Thomas Benton says: “I consider sweeping, removals as now practiced by both parties a great political evil in our country; injurious to indi viduals, to the public service, to the purity of elections, and of the harmony and union of the people. ” De Tocqueville considered removals a reproach to our government. Such has beer, the history of the growth of the spoils system ip America. Let us now trace the progress of the better methods by which, it is to be hoped, this system will soon be wholly overthrown. In 1877 the President appointed a commission of investigation, known as tho Jay Commission, which reported upon the custom-house administration in New York, and in 1878 he insisted that the pass emaminations should give place to open competition. Experience has shown that the cost was one-tenth less than that of any period before. Since the rules took effect, few removals have been made, and all forcause. The appointments have been from those standing highest upon the list. The examinations have had a marked incentive effect upon persons previously in the service, particularly upon those aspiring to promotion. There have been fewer scandals connected with the service; less interference with the elections. The average age of competitors was thirty-seven years. Offt of four hundred and seventeen, two hundred and fifty-nine had only summon school education, one hundred and twenty-four academic, and forty three had college training. Such were the results in the custom house, prior to the present federal civilservice law.

So with the New York postoffice. The partisan administration of this office had been notorious until Mr. James entered it. Peculation, assessments, incompetency, drunkenness existed everywhere. Mr. James had to set up his own tests for employment, and instituted pass examinations to protect himself from political and official pressure; but he soon found them insufficient. In co-operation with President Hayes, he established open competitive examinations in 1878, in which physical capacity was also tested. The New York postoffico "is the model for the country, and only inferior to that of London, where civil-service rules have been longer in operation. At last the present civil-servico act was enacted January, 1883. Vacancies were filled by the old method until July 16. The commission at once entered upon the preparation of rules, which were promulgated in May, when a chief examiner was appointed and entered upon his duties. The commissioners visited every office, except those in California, to select examiners and supervise examinations. Applicants were examined and graded by July 16. The conclusions reported in January, 1881. were extremely favorable to the system: assessments diminished at least one-half; no menaces were employed for contributions; assessment bureaus were "discontinued. Questions as to the results of the examinations show that they have operated favorably at the custom-houses in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, San Francisco, and at the postoffices in Boston, Albany, New York, Newark, Buffalo, Philadelphia, Rochester, New Orleans, Cincinnati, Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Kansas City, San Francisco and Washington. Some of the answers stated that there had not been sufficient time to test the system properly, but only two adverse reports given wero received. The opinions given by members of the Cabinet were nearly all favorable, and President Arthur in his message says: “Upon the good results which that law has already accomplished. I congratulate Congress and the people, and t avow my conviction that it will henceforth to be of still more signal service to the people.” But it is from the example of the State of New York, where the circumstances are quite similar to our own, that we can best tell what the operation of the civil service law will he here, if it should pass. This bill is taken almost literally from the New York law, and we have two reports of the working of the system in that State, one in 1884, and the other about two weeks ago. The first report shows that the commissioners prepared a complete list of the State's civil service. There, as in England, the subordinate force was found too large, and a considerable reduction was recommended. There can be little doubt but that the same is true in this State. It was found that large discrepancies existed in the compensation; some clerks receiving twice what was given to others for the same services. In the preparation of rules, competition was found applicable to clerkships, inspectors of boats and cargoes, messengers in public buildings, guards in prisons, teachers in reformatories and asylums. The system was found applicable to prison -keepers and others whose qualifications were principally physical, physical tests being required. Five schedules were arranged: The first including deputies authorized to act for their principals, confidential agents and clerks, custodians of public money, not subject to examination; the second, of clerks, orderlies, inspectors, prison guards and teachers, to whom open competition was applied; third, positions demanding professional and scientific attainments, where pass examinations were provided; fourth, skilled handicraftsmen. and janitors of public buildings, watch men, firemen, steam engineers, porters, nurses, etc., who pass a non-competitive examination; fifth, higher clerical positions which are filled by promotion from the lower grades. Records of efficiency and conduct are kept for the purposes of promotion. Persons not examined under the rules for admission must be examined before being promoted. Recommendations for promotions, except from the bead of the department, are not considered. The probationary period is three months. None are appointed except citizens and residents for one year, laborers excepted. Applications must be in the handwriting of the applicant, and must sot forth his

residence, citizenship, ape, education and previous occupation. A certificate by a practicing physician of his physical ability is appended. Where physical strength is of prime importance, &3 in prison guards, a rigid examination by a State physician is required. Not less than three nor more than tire certificates from reputable citizens must be furnished as to moral character, temperate and industrious habits. The citizens certifying must not be kinsmen, and shall consent that their certificates shall be published, in case the applicant's unfitness is afterwards discovered. The provision as to cities was at first optional in the New York law, but afterwards, by an amendment, was made mandatory. Brooklyn adopted civil service in December, 1883, and the departments of health, police and fire being among those exempted by the act, advised the mayor of their intention to apply the regulation to their departments. New York city followed Jan. 1, 1884, and civil servyice regulations are now in force in nearly every city in the State. The necessity of civil-service examinations in the schools in the State was shown by a report from Dr. Agnew, from which it appears that malignant contagious diseases, easily prevented, were permitted to spread by the ignorance of teachers and of thoso in charge of schools. By the State rules, the appointments were made from the three highest on the list; in the United States, from the four highest, and in New York from the five highest. Removals are still arbitrary, it being considered that the superior will not remove except for cause, when he cannot determine who the successor will be. The regulations provide that the weight given to each separate subject of examination shall be determined beforehand, and the weight given to the answer to each question shall also be determined. The grade is established by each examiner separately and afterwards averaged. If the standing of the competitor on any subject falls below 50, ho is dropped. If the average is not above 65, ho is dropped. In the report of 18S5 opportunities had been given to test the system, and the regulations were applicable to 3,000 persons in the service of the State, 5,500 in New York city, 1,400 in Brooklyn, and 1,700 in other cities. Numerous employes believed to be in local service were found to be in the service of the State and subjected to the rules. Assistance by examiners was rendered in nearlyevery case without compensation. The commissioners say that in the second year of the civil service there have been developed some rather novel methods admirably adapted to competitive examinations to determine actual fitness —the attainments requisite to the treatment of the insane, the practical experience required by the foreman of the street-repairing gangs, successfully tested at Brooklyn, and new tests of strength, capacity, agility and endurance required for policemen. They say it is rapidly becoming clear that competitive examinations are easily applicable to almost every subordinate post, however high, in each branch of the public service, State or municipal. Os those examined in New York, and in the cities of New York and Brooklyn, the proportion educated in common schools has been 72 per cent.; in the national service 65 per cent.; at the average age of thirty-two years. The commission reports that no additional legislation is needed, the New York act being the same as the present one. In regard to its application to cities, the report from tho Civil-service Commission at Brooklyn contains the following: “These commissioners have been brought to the conclusion that an open, free competition is the essential condition in the reform of the civil service, and that such a competition can be advantageously used for nearly all classos of the municipal servants.” I have made some inquiries as to the civil service of Indiana, and find that the number of persons in the State to whom tho law would properly be applicable is somewhero near 900. The number of officers in the cities would probably be nearly twice that. The number of teachers id the State is 13,312. To a portion of these competitive examinations should be applied. The force of the State could probably be reduced 25 per cent, after the improvements made by this system have been introduced, at a great saving to the tax-payers. Thus, we have developed the subject of civilservice reform both upon principle and by reference to actual examples under conditions similar to our own. Civil-service reform is past its embryonic condition. It is only a que n of a few years until it is introduced into e State and Territory. The times are now for this reform. The thinking people of ti.e Nation demand it I can see other great measures looming up in the more distant future—groat problems in regard to t-ho distribution of wealth —the land question—the labor question. For some of these the world is not yet ready. They must be wrought out in public thought before they can receive definite form in legislation, but this matter has already been developed in a practical shape. It is not a question of the future, but of the present. I do not know what may be the fate of the present bill in this General Assembly, but I know that a similar measure will, before many years, bo passed by the Legislature of this State, as surely as there is a law of development and growth in human society. The Duty of State Legislatures* Legislation in every State should regulate the sale and use of tho many poisons resorted to by women in their desperation to obtain beautiful complexions. There exists in Dr. Harter’s Iron Tonic every requisite to accomplish tho object without iujuring health or endangering life.

FOR FAIN. CURES Rheumatism, Neuralgia, Sciatica, Lumbago, Backache, Headache, Toothache, Sore Throat, KwolitagA. Sprains, Bruises, Burns. Keniii*. Frost Bites. AND AM, OTHER BOMI.Y HA INS AND ACHES. Sold bj Druggists ami Dealer* everywhere. Fifty Ceuta a bottle Directions in 11 Languages. THE CHAKLES A. VtKIKI.ERC®. f&MMMonto A.vno-- - ■ - ” ><•—.. r? . SM..C.B. A.

[OFFICIAL.] COPY OF STATEMENT OF THE CONDITION OV THE PHCENIX MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY On the 31st Day of December, 18S4. Located in Hartford, Connecticut. The amount of its capital stock is SIOO 000.09 The amount of its capital stock paid up is 100,000.00 THE ASSETS OF THE COMPANY ABE AS FOLLOWS: Cash on hand or in the hands of agents or other persons $lB2 010 0!> Real estate, unincumbered 1 305 029 31 Bonds owned by the company, to-wit (market value): ' ’ United States bonds 210 550 OO Town and county bonds """ 3!)1 55“ 75 Railroad stock and bonds *" ‘ikQ 7\n, Ywk Bank and other stocks i .I:::::::::: i&Soo Loans on collateral o qq Loans on bonds and mortgage, being first lieu on unincumbered real estate, worth double the T . , . amount loaned 6,237 053.94 Debts for premiums .TI ””” I" ” 111 II.* " " 1,410.'50i IC4 Total assets $10,537,870.15 _ , , LIABILITIES. Losses du© and unpaid 00(i 00 ia>ss3s not du® mrirrjrrrrrrrrrrrmrrrr 121.5n.00 Losses unadj ust id *j~ t qj 4 Special reserve J.*!!.".150!00<XOO All other claims against the company 70!81ti!78 Amount necessary to reinsure outstanding risks ..!"*!!!.*!*”.”! ”J L 1"! 11*! 11” 1... 8,72?]545.00 Total liabilities $9,100,880781 The greatest amount in any one risk. SIO,OOO. State of Indiana, Office of Auditor of State. I, the undersigned. Auditor of State of the State of Indiaua, hereby certify that the above Is a corveofc copv of the statement of the condition of the above mentioned company on the 31st day of December, ISS4. as shown by the original statement, and that the said original statamout is now on file in this office. In testimony whereof, I hereunto subscribe my twine and affix ray official seal this 21st day of Febrrnrv [SEAL.] 1885. JAS. U. RICE, Auditor of State.

olden|j|mes The formula by which Mishler f s Herb Bitters is compounded is over two hundred years old, end of German origin. The entire range of proprietary medicines cannot produce a preparation that enjoys so high a reputation in the commuriiy where it is made as MISH LEU'S Bitters* It is the best remedy for Kidney and Liver Complaints, Byspepsia f Cramp in the Stomach, Indigestion, Malaria, Periodical Complaints, etc. Asa Blood Purifier f it has no equal. It tones the system, strengthening , invigorating and giving new life. The late Judge Hayes, of Lancaster Cos., Pa., aa jurist and an honored citizen, once wrote: Mishler s Herb Bitters is very widely known, and has acquired a great reputation for medicinal and curative properties. I have used myself and in my family several bottles, and I am satisfied that the reputation is not unmerited.” MISHLER HERB BITTERS CO., 625 Commerce St., Philadelphia. Parser’s Pleasant Worm Syrup Never Fail* From experience l think Swift’s Specific is a very valuable remedy for cutaneous diseases, and at ti* same time an invigorating tonic. James .Jackson, Chief-justice of Georgia. Atlanta, Sept., 1881. INOCULATED POISON.—After trying all th* other remedies, Swift’s Specific has cured me sound and well of a terrible blood poison contracted from a nurse. Mus. T. W. Lee, Greenvillo, Ala. POISON OAK.—A lady here has been entirely cured of poison oak poison by the use of two bottles of S. S. S. R. S. Bradford, Tiptonvillo, Tenn. ULCERS 25 YEARS.—A member of my church has been cured of an ulcerated leg of 25 years’ standing with two bottles of Swift’s Specific. P. H. Crumpler, Pastor Methodist Church, Macon, Ga. Swift’s Specific is entirely vegetable. Treatise ot Blood and Skin Diseases mailed free. THE SWIFT SPECIFIC CO., Drawer 3, Atlanta, Ga., or 159 W. 23d street, New York. vurßaby thrives on Horiick’s Food,” write hundreds of grateful mothers. Mother's milk contains no starch. An artificial food for Infants should contain no starch. The best and meet nutritious food in health ■ ■ ■ ■ I 9 a the best diet for SfV H B I ||| a W DYSPEPTICS 818 S 8 1 3 teJ sta O HAlrkady Digested, free from starch and requires no cooking. Recommended by Physicians. Highly beneficial to Nursing Mothers as a drink. Pnoe 40 and 75 cents. By all druggists, the Treatment of Children, free, “Easilv digested aud nutritious."— Q. W. Btilty, M. D., Klitabeth, If. J. _ “ Find it ail that could be desired.”— W. W. Beii, Stilton, Kaunas. “No hesitancy in pronouncing it superior to any. thing svtant. ’—if. S. Cobum, M. V.. Trog, If. T. Will be sent bjr mail on receipt or price m stamps. UOKLICK’S FOl> CO., Racine, Wis. JfcirUsK Hoi.lice’s Dry Extract on Mibift* Cleveland,Columbus, Cincinnati & Indianapolis BAILWAY, CLEVELAND, 0., Feb. 11, 1885. The annual meeting of tho stockholders of this company. for the election of directors and the transaction of other business, will be heid at the office of th* company, in Cleveland, 0., on WEDNESDAY, March 4, next, at 10:30 o’clock a. m. The transfer books will be closed from the evening of February 18 until March 5. GEO. H. RUSSELL, Secretary.

GAS STOVES. No Kindling Required. No Coal to Cartji No Aft!) as to Remove. Prices from $2 to sl*s. GA.S ENGINES, From Horse-power up. We sell to gas consumers in this city oaly. On exhibition and for sale by the • G .A.S COMPANY, No. 47 South Pennsylvania Street.

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