Indiana American, Volume 2, Number 19, Brookville, Franklin County, 9 May 1834 — Page 2

a separate vote had been taeach particular act, inclu-

. neral terms, the accusers of

ht, on any such vote, hare minority.

cempliiY this feature of the

lnortant to be remarked,

. as originally offered to the with adequate precision President, which it delicti of the constitution and as not until the very close when, perhapsit was apnaiority might not sustain

ition contained in it, that so modified ns to assume its

more striking illustration of

id necessity of the rules

e and indefinite cenerali

reasonable certainty in all

: and a more elarin

feon of those rules, has seld. the resolution it must cer-

1. not as a vindication of

ision of the law or the con-

Iv as an official rebuke or

ence, too general and in

repelled, butyetsufficientinto discredit the conduct

I Executive. Butwhency

n intended to accomplish? 3 vague, general, and abe resolution, is in perfect

i other departures from first

ed improvements in juris

ty the boast of free coun ses. And it is not too much

b of these proceedings, that

iroved and sustained by an

, then will that great con- ' power, which had estab-

ceivable, why they are placed, in our ci ra

tion, upon a tenure dulerent Irom tna .

other effaces appointed by the liXecut: v ." . w. -less it be for the same purpose. But if there were any just ground fc - d ;".; i on the face of the constitution, whethe u! creculive officers are removable at the .v"'l

the President, it is obviated by the Cuinpo-

raneous construction of the instrument, and the uniform practiceunder it.

The power of removal was a topic ot solemn bate in the Congress of 17S9, while orgs

! 1

del

izinsr the administrative departments of the

government, and it was finally decided, that the president derived from the constitution, the power of removal, so far as it regards that department for w hose acts he is responsible. Although the debate covered the whole ground ; embracing the Treasury as well as all other Executive Departments, it arose on a motion to strike out of the bill to establish

a Department of Foreign Affairs, since called

the Department ot State, a clause declaring

the Secretary "to be removable Irom oince ov

the President of the United States." After

that motion had been decided in the negative.

it was perceived that these words did not convey the sense of the House of Representa

tives, in relation to the true source ot the pow

er of removal. With the avowed object of

preventing any future inference, that this nower was exercised by the President in vir-

fn nf ji orr:iir Irnm I .nntrros"!- when in. J

vn- v. to- . j- -

that fcodr cfneUcfcd It as derived irom me constitution, the words which had been the subject of debate were struck out, and in lieu

thereof a clause was inseriea in a provision concerning the Chief , Clerk of the Depart-

ment, which declared that "whenever the saw

principal officer shall be removed from ofacc by the President of the U. States, or in any

other case of vacancy," the Chief Clerk should, durine such vacancy, have charcc of the pa

in bills of rights, in sacred pers of the office. This change having been

l constitutions ot uovern- made for the express purpose ot declaring the

sense of Congress, that the President derived the power of removal from the constitution, the act as it passed has always been considered as a full expression of the sense of the Le

gislature on this important part ot the Ameri

can constitution.

Here then we have the concurrent authori

ty of President Washington, of the Senate,

and the House of Representatives, numbers

of whom had taken an active part in the con

vention which framed the constitution, and in

the State conventions, which adopted it, that

the President derived an unqualified power of removal from that instrument itself, which is "beyond the reach of Legislative authority.'

Upon this principle the Government has now been steadily administered, for. about forty-

tive years, during which there have been numerous removals made by the Presidertt or

by his direction, embracing every grade of Executive office'rs, from the Heads of Depart

ments to the messengers of Bureaus. .

Ihe lreasury Department, in the discis

sions of 1789, wa3 considered on the same

footing as the other Executive Departments,

and in the act establishing it, the precise

words were incorporated indicative or the

sense of Congress, that the President derives

his power to remove the Secretary from the constitution, which nppear in the act stab-

Ushing the Department ot roreign Auairs. An assistant Secretary of the Treasury was

created, and it was provided that he should

take charge of the books & papers of the De-

r to :..'; present, the Secretary ..;r, ihe Treasurer, Register, ors and Clerks, who fill department, have in the comment, been considered -i; :u

i - i tr. nfu i ra lie same woune wim wi-

.puuiug grades of officers in all the other Executive Departments.

Jfhe custody of the.public property, under surh'reoulations as may be prescribed by le

gislative authority, has always been considered an appropriate function of the Executive

1 m .f A .

Department in this and all other jovernmenis.

In accordance witn mis principle, eeij species of property belonging to the United

States, fexceotins? that which is in the use of

th several coordinate departments of the

Government, as means to aid them in perfor

mine their appropriate functions,) is in charge

of officers appointed by the President, wheth

er it be lands, or buildings, or merchandize.

or provisions, or clothing, or arms rnd muni

tions war. The superintendents and keepers

of the whole are appointed by the president

and removable at his will.

Public money is but a speccies of public

property. It cannot be raised by taxation or customs, nor brought into the treasury in any

other way, except bylaw; but whenever or howsoever obtained, its custody always has "been, and always must be, unless the Constitution be changed, intrusted to the Executive

ssvctsi. iso oau-cr can De created oy

the duty of the President to see that law faith-

fully executed, man cmer "3 rujviiu5 ties upon subordinate officers or private citizens. If there be any difference, it would

seem that the obligation is the stronger in re-

intinn tn the former; because the neglect is in

his presence, and the remedy at hand. - It cannot be doubted that it was the legal duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to order

and direct the aeposues oi me jjuu.it.

to be made elsew here man in me oauki

United States, whenever sufficient reasons exis

ted fjr making the change. If, in such a case

hf nep-lected or reiusea to b, uc uuw neg

lect or refuse to execute the law. What

would then be the sworn duty of the President? Could he say that the Constitution did not bind him to see the law faithfully execu

ted, because it was one of his Secretaries, and

whom me service was spc-

ceeded, with iny srinciiun, to mate a ments for depositing the rri&nejs cf tl ted States in other safe insti'utlcrs. The resolution of the Senate, as cr framed, and as passed if it refers to th. presupposes a right in that bedj to i with this exercise of executive pe v er. principle be once admitted, it is r,tt

lO Jlcl l t ivc niiEivikuiiir cmii 11, a I nunciation like this resolution, the 1 should ever be induced to act, in a r official duty, contrary to the hone?t coi , oftiisowr. mind, in compliance with t' es of the Senate, the constitutional dence of the Executive Deparfmcu be as affeclually destroyed, and it r effectually transferred to the Senate.: end had been accomplished by an

ment of the consLituuon. Hut if th

have a nght to interlere w nh tne I

nnf himself, nnon

cially imposed! Might he not be asked wheth- powers, they have also the right to n er there was any such limitation to his obliga- interference effective; and if the as:

tions prescribed in the Constitution t Wheth

er he is not equally bound to take care thatj the laws be faithfully executed, whether they; impose duties on the highest officer of the

State, or the lowest suDorumaie in any oi uc

departments? Might he not be told, that it

was for the sole purpose oi causing an executive officers, from the highest to the lowest,

7

faithfully, to perform the service required oi

them by law. that me people oi me unuea States have made him their Chief Magistrate,

.vaged in vain.

left in its ongi-

f every citizen, to a notice 'hearing before conviction, ial tribunal for deciding on

been

n had been

to be presumed that it could

ci the assent of a majority

' the acts therein specified as constitution and laws were

; limits of the Executive auire the "dismissing the late

A reasury, because he would

his sense of his own duty

by of the U. States in de

tank of the U. States and its fortuity with the President's

inting his successor to ef-

al, which has been done."

education has been substi

c were the "Executive pro-

ion to the public revenue,

Ed to in the course of the

II doubtless be generally re-

mtended to be denounced

of authority and power not

constitution or laws, but in

h." It is therefore due to

i condensed summary of the

:utive in respect to them,

libited.

ion, wthe Executive power

idem of the united States." s imposed upon him, and

to perform, is that of "ta-

iws be faithfully executed.

responsible for the entire

CJneress for the uroose of taking charec of and the Constitution has clothed him with the

it, whose appointment would not,by the Con- executive power of this Government? The

stitution, at once devolve on the President, principles implied in these questions appear

ana wno wouia not oe responsioie 10 mm loriioo piain vo neeu eiutiuauuu

the faithful performance of his duties. The

legislative power may undoubtedly bind him and the President, by any laws they may

think proper to enact; they may prescribe in

what place particular portions of the public

money shall be kept, and. for what reason it

shall be removed, as they may direct that sup

plies for the army or navy shall be kept in

particular stores: and it will be the duty of the

President to see that the law is faithfully ex

ecuted yet will the custody remain in the

Executive Department of the Government.

But here, also, we have a cotemporaneons

construction of the act, which shows that it

was not understood as in any way changing the relations between the President and Sec

retary of the Treasury, r as placing the latter out of Executive control, even in relation to the deposites of the public money. Nor on this point are we left to any equivocal tes

timony. 1 he documents ol the 1 reasury Lfepartment shows that the Secretary of the Treasury did apply to the President, and ob

tained his approbation and sanction to the

Were the Congress to assume, with or with- original transfer of the public deposites to the

out legislative act, the power of appointing officers,independently of the President, to take

trretTvafgeand custody ot the public propertv

contained in the military and naval arsenals,

magazines and store-houses, it is believed that

such an act would be regarded by all as a

palpable usurpation of executive power, sub

versive of the lorm as well as the lundamcn

tal principles of our Government. .. But where

is the difference in principle, whether puhlic

property be in the form of arms, munitions of

war, and supplies, or in gold and silver, or

bank notes? None can.be perceived none

is believed to exist. Congress cannot, there

fore, take out of the hands of the Executive

Department, the custody of the public proper

ty or money, without an assumption of execu

tive power, and a subversion of the first prin

ciples of the Constitution.

The Congress of the United States have

never' passed an act imperatively directing

mat the public moneys shall be kept m any

present Bank of the United States, and did carry the measure into effect in obedience to bis decision. They al show that transfers

of the public deposites from the Branches of

the Bank of the United States to State banks,

at Chiliicothe, Cincinnati, and Louisville, in

1819, were made with the approbation of the

President, and by hi authoritj', . They show,

that upon all important questions, appertain

ing to his department, whether they related

to the public deposites or other matters, u was the constant practice of the Secretary of the Treasury to obtain for his acts the approval and sanction of the President.

These acts and the principles on which

they were founded, were known to all the de

partments of the Government, to Congress

and the country; and, until very recently, ap

pear never to have been called in question.

1 hus was it settled by the constitution, me

laws and the whole practices of the Govern

ment, that the entire .Executive power is ves-

particular place or places. From the origin of ted in the President of the United States; that

the Government to the year 1816, the statute

books was w holly silenton the subject. In 1789

a 1 rcasurer was created subordinate to the Se

cretary of the Treasury, and through him to the President. He was required to give bond,

salely lo keep, and laithfully to disburse the

as incident to that power, the right of appoint

ing and removing those officers who are to aid him in the execution of the laws, with such

restrictions only as the constitution prescibes,

is vested in the President; that the Secretary of the Treasury is one of those officers; that

the power implied in the resolution '

acquiesced in, we may reasonably aj that it will be followed, at seme tutor an attempt to actual enforcement. 1 ate may refuse, except on the condi he will surrender his opinions to th obey their will, to perform their cw: tutional functions; to p's the neccss to sanction appropriations propose! House of Representatives, and to

proper nominations made by the I It has already been maintained not conceivable that the resclufid

Senate can be based on r.ny other that the SecreUiry of the Tiensury

cer of Congress, and independent oft dent; that the Tcesident bns no rit,) trol him, and consequently 'none ti him. With the same propriety,ant lar grounds, may the Secretary of Secretaries of War and the Kavyi Postmaster General, each in fuccS declared independent of the TresH subordinates of Congress, and remo with the concurrence of the Senate.ed to its consequences, this princirj found effectually to destroy one ci Department of the government,

trate in the hands of the Senate the ecutive power, and to leave the Prj powerless as he would be uselcs? off of authority, after the substano parted. The time and the occasion - wli called forth the resolution of the Sen to impose upon me an additional not to pass it over in silence. Nen five years had the. President cxr.rc:$f a question as lb his rightful nnt5:ori powers forthe. recent assumption of is now denounced. The vicissitude

and war had attended our Oovcrnr lent parties, watchful to take advj any seeming usurpation on the p.n Fxecutivc, had distracted our cow quent removals, or forced resignatic ery sense tantamount to remayai?, I made'of ihe Secretary and other r the Treasury? and yet, in no ore ir it known, .that any man, whether partisan, had raised his voice apair violation of thea Constitution. The ency and justice of such changes, in to public officers of all grades, have 1 ly been the topics of discussion ; but stitutional right ot the President to

control, and remove the Head of th

partment, "whenever the Secretary shall be public moneys, without any direction asto the the custody of the public property and money ury, as well as all other Department s removed from office bj -the President oTiner, rfaffner3r-p!ae in which they should be is an executive function, which, in relation to to have been universally conceded United States." The Secretary of the. Treas- tent. Rv referent? in tK

Utive Department, it was

t the power of appointing, ury being appointed by the President,and be-

trohng those who execute ling considered as constitutionally removable

by him, it appears never to have occurred to

any onem the Congress of 1789, or since, on

til very recently, that he was other than an

Executive omcer, the mere instrument of the

Chief Magistrate in the execution of the laws,

subject, like all other Heads of Departments,-

to his supervision and control. No such idea as an officer of the Congress can be found in the constitution, or appears to have suggested

itselt to those who organized the Government,

l here are onicers 01 each House, me appointment of which is authorized by the constitution, but all officers referred to in that

instrument, as coming within the appointing

power ot the President, whether established

thereby or crented by law, are "officers of the

United States." No joint power of appoint

ment is given to the two Houses of Congress,

nor is there any accountability to them as

one body: but as soon as any office is created

by law, of whatever name or character, the

appointment of the person or persons to fill it,

devolves by me constitution upon the Fresi

dent, with the advice and consent of the Senate, unless it be an inferior office, and the an-

t that the subordinate cxe- pointment be vested br the law itself. in the

the judicial offices shall b, j President aloTie, in the courts of law, or in the and competent men. Heads of Departments."

fcutive power being vested But at the time of the organization of the

ivofiujHns vfi uc.;.- iicomij ucjjiiruiicni, id iiiciueni occurrea ;ssary consequence, that he which distinctly evinces the unanimous conht to employ agents of his currence of the first Congress in the principle

"U1 1,1 " penormancc oi mat me i reasury department is wholly Ex-

uuviimcb ukui nucu ire u enure u lis CDamctpr nd rennniMiiti-

, --v- iwjiuuaure iui uicir n ujuuuu w nmae to stTiice out the provis-

-uiu4m.c wiui uiiaprin-ipiiiou oi uie Diu maKin? it the datr of toe Sec-

itii.u, ii&b vutt.oi p- reiary-io aigest anu report plans for the in

ongmal executive power, islprovement and management of the revenue,

and for the support of public credit," on the ground that it would give the Executive Department of the Government too much influence and power in Congress. The motion was not opposed on the ground that the Secretary was the officer of Congress and responsible to that body, which would have been conclusive, if admitted, but on other grounds which conceded his Executive character throughout. The whole discussion evinces an unanimous concurrence in the principle, that the Secretary of the Treasury is wholly an Executive officer, and the struggle of the minority was to restrict his power as such. From

in its nature executive

is hands. It is, therefore, but the constitution makes "nate, and by and with the of the Senate appoint," all

ited States whose appoint-

the constitution otherwise

i a proviso that the appoint-

icers may be vested in the

'i the Courts of Justice, or

epartments.

power vested in the Senate,

'nominating norMappoint-

y a checlt upon the tixecu-

pointmcnt. If individuals appointment by the presi-

iemed incompetent orun-

withhold their consent, and

cannot be made. They

of the executive, but canto those very subjects, act irect him. Selections are President, and the negative

te, without diminishing his I

nisnes an additional euran-

Government, it is found, that from its first or

ganization, the Secretary of the Treasury, acting under the supervision of the President,

designated the places in which the public

moneysshould be kept, and specially directed

all transfers Irom place to place. This prac

nee was conunuea, witn me silent acquieseoce of Congress, from 1789 down to 1816,

tSttghrmanv banks were selected and

discharged, and although a portion of the mo

neys were nrst placed in the State banks, and

then in the former Bank of the United States,

and upon the dissolution of that, were again

- i v wit

the constitution in relation

k v. ' ficers, for whose conduct the .-j isible, while it is taken from :!.-; : judicial officers, for whose

tv.v sponsible. In the Govern

- -y. : i many of the fundamental

, Department originally had

I 1 1 11 iT

uiivo ." id Judicial. It was to take

, c it c" this general power of remo-h-is -ra'ce them independent of the , t!nt th ? tenure of their offices was i o pv -;d behaviour. Nor is it con-

the Secretary of the Treasury and his subor

dinates; that in the performance of these du

ties, he is subject to the supervision and con

trol ot me resident, and in all important measures having relation to them, consults

the Chief Magistrate, and obtains his approval and sanction; that the law establishing

me vh.uk. uiu noc,asit couiu cnange the relation between the President and the Secreta-

ry aid not release the lormer from his obli-

cipiesnave neen hrst onicially arres Bank of the United States, great monopoly, had attempted to obtain s of its charier, by controlling the ck the People and the action of the Go) The use of its corporate funds and that attempt, was fully disclosed; ai made known to the President that ft ration was putting in train the same

measure, with the view of making an

ii an interfere

gation to see the law faithfully executed, nor orous effort. thrrl

the latter irom the -President a sunprvisinn fWtinne nrK ti

rfA .n.lnl. .U i. 1 . ..I. . . 1'

nnu luuuui, mill uiicrwaras,' na Deiore the

transierred to the State banks, no legislation Secretary did in fact consult and obtain the

was uiougm necessary oy congress, and all sanction of the Presiding to transfers and re-

iue operations were originated and perlected movals ofme public deposites; and that all de-

V cc,-uuve aumoniy. ine secretary ol partments or the Government, and the nation

j ';r"i.mJ pwoiu.c w uie k rcMaeni, useu, approved or acquiesced in these acts

am mm iiisnpjjruuauon, maue contracts and arrangements in relation to the whole subject matter, which was thus entirely committed to

the direction of the President, under his res

ponsibilities to the American people, and to those who were authorized to impeach and punish him for any breach of this important

trusi.

ion and force the government to )

demands. This with its corrupt!! press, its violation of its charter, its of the Government Directors fron ceedings, its neglect of duty, and i pretentions, made it, in the opini President, incompatible with thepuj pef anI tlSA A-.f r f" -t i t- i tuf inri

I In rintr rha I rc tk . ft 1 - . . r'.

,-..w6 UJ . Jtttl, uie approacning ter- shouldbenolcngeremployedasthehi minaUon, according to the provisions of its of the Treasury. A Secretary oft) charter, and the solemn decision of the Amer- ury, appointmed in the lecess of th ican People, of the Bank of the United States, who had not been confirmed by tl made it expedient, and its exposed abases and and whom the President might or rt

cwrrupuon8, maae u,in my opinion, the duty 1 at his pleasure nominate io them, i

and principles, as in strict conformity with

our constitution ana laws.

Thair ici .i.i.-.u. " .t-n -.. r y.i " upmion, in

:..utr a. i.' . . r. --""V. i ;---. v. omics in otner aeposi- ment considered th mnst imneratl

e

public money to be made in the bank and its! tories.

hrnnrbp inM.u.MA ..sj u-l.! "V"," r .r,! ' '" wcur in mat i amies and became in fact, however

1 brancb.fma7brb.

m a ai - aa . m ' I w- 1 t. LIIC K

"unless the Secretary of the Treasury should

otherwise order and direct," in which event, hft was required to give his reasons to Con

gress. This was but a continuation of his pre-

cxistiDg powers as tne neaa ot an Executive

elarinsr were the nou

ses and corruptions of the Bank, so evident its fixed purpose to persevere in them, and so palpable its design, by its money and power, to control the Government and change its character, that I deemed it the imperative du-

Department to direct where the deposites ty rtitotoZZSE KhonlH he maifp. with th ixiMn L.V " ie exertion

should be made, with the superadded obliga

uou oi giving nis reasons to congress lor m

king them elsewhere than in the Bank of the Uuited States and its branches. It is not to

be considered that this provision in any degree altered the relation between the Secretary of the Treasury and the President, as the

responsible head of the Executive Denart-

ment, or released the latter from his constitu

tional obligation to "take care that the lavs

be rlthfu,!y executed." On the contrary if

increased his responsibilities, by adding another to the long list of laws whic h it was his duty to carry into etfoct. It M ould be an extraordinary result, if, because the person charged by law with a public duty, is one of the Secretaries, it were less

of every power confided to it bv the rnnsfim

tion and laws, to check its career, and lessen its ability to do mischief, even in th nain Till

alternative of dismissing the Head of one of

me departments. At the time the removal was made, other causes sufficient to justify it existed; but if they had not, the Secretary would have been dismissed for this cause only. His place I supplied by one whose opinions were well known lo me, and whose frank expression of them, in another situation, and whose generous sacrificesof interest and feeling, when unexpectedly called to the station he now occupies, ought forever to have shielded his motives from suspicion, and bis character from reproach. In accord. wi ih ik

opinions long before expressed by him.hepro-

oh this occasion it is discovered foi time, that those who framed the co misunderstood it; that the first Cor all its successors have been under a that the practice of ncaforty-five but a continued usurpation: that t!) ry of the Treasury is not resqonsili President; and that to remove him i tion of the constitution and law?, the President deserves to 'stand fc honored on the journals of the Sera There are also some other circi connected with the discussion and the resolution, to which I feel it to le my right, but my duty, to refer, h by the journal of the Senate, that a twenty-six Senators who voted for t tion on its final passage, and who lw ed it in debate, in its original form, of the Senators the state Maine, the ators from New Jersery, and one of alors from Ohio. It also appears bj journal, and by the files of the Ser the Legislatures of these states had