Indiana American, Volume 1, Number 42, Brookville, Franklin County, 18 October 1833 — Page 1

Vol. I.

OCR COUNTRY OUR COUNTRY'S INTEREST, AND OUR COUNTRY FRIENDS.

BROOKt1IjIjE? IAt OCTOBER 18, 1833.

No. 49.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED WEEKLY BT C. F. CL.ARKSOX,

At $2 in advance $2,50 in six months; or $3,00 at

the expiration oi me year.

Advertisements. Twelve lines, orless. will be insnr.

ted once or three times, for one dollar; and 2o cents

will be charged for each additional insertion. UNITED STATES BANK. THE PUBLIC DEPOSITES.

It has been generally know n for some months past

that the propri ety of withdrawing the public deposites

from the Bank of the United States wa s under consid

eration, and engaged much of the attention of the Pres

ident and of the different members of his Cabinet, all of whom had been called upon by the President to as

sist him in his deliberations on this subject. After a very full and careful examination, the President came to the conclusion that the public deposites ought to be changed to the State Banks; and his opinion was communicated in writing to his Cabinet on Wednesday last, at a meeting held especially for that purpose, and the facts and reasons on which it was founded. As public attention has been drawn to this subject, it is deemed proper, in order to prevent misunderstanding or misrepresentation, to lay before the people the communication made by the President as above mentioned; and a copy has been furnished to us for that purpose, which we now proceed to publish. Globe, Sept. 23 Read IcTlhe Cabinet on the ISth of September, 1S33. Having carefully and anxiously considered all the facts and arguments, which have been submitted to him, relative to a removal of the public deposites from the Bank of the United States, the President deems it his duty to communicate in this manner to his Cabinet the final conclusions of his own mind, and the reasons on which they are founded, in order to put them in durable form, and to prevent misconceptions. The President's convictions of the dangerous tendencies to the Bank of the United States, since signally illustrated by its own acts, were so overpowering when he entered upon the duties of Chief Magistrate, that he felt it his duty, notwithstanding the objections of friends by whom he was surrounded, to avail himself of the first occasion to call the attention of Congress and the people to the question of its rc-charter. The opinions expressed in his Annual Message of december, 1830 and 1831: and in that of 1830 he threw out for consideration, some suSgeslions in relation to a substitute. At the session of 1831-2, an act was passed by a majority of both Houses of Congress re-chartering the present Bank, upon which the President, felt it his duty to put his constitutional veto. In his Message, returning the act, he repeated and enlarged upon the principles and views briefly asserted in his Annual Message, declaring the Bank to be, in his opinion, both inexpedient and unconstitutional, and announcing to his countrymen very unequivocally, his firm determination never to sanction, by his approval, the continu

ance of that institution, or the establishment of

any other upon similar principles. There are strong reasons for believing that the motive of. the Bank in asking for a re-charter at that session of Congress, was to make it a leading question in the election of a President of the United States, the ensuing November and all steps deemed necessary, were taken " procure from the people a reversal of the President's decision. Although the charter was approaching its termination, and the Bank was aware that it was the intention of the Government to use the public dcposilcs as fast as it accrued, in the payment of the public debt, vet it did extend its loans from January lS21,to May, 1833, from $42,402,304 24 to $70. 12,070 72, being an increase of $'28,025,706 48, in sixteen months. It is cofidently believed, that the leading objections of this immense extension of its loans, was to bring as large a portion of the people as possible under its power and influence; and it has been disclosed, that some of the largest sums were granted on every unusual terms to conductors of the public press. In some of these cases, the motive was made manifest by the nominal or insufficient security taken for the loans, by the large amounts discounted, by the extraordinary lime allowed for payment, and especially by the subsequent conduct of those receiving the accommodations. Having taken these preliminary steps to obtain control over public opinion, the Bank came into Congress and asked a new charter. The object avowed by many of the advocates of the Bank, was to put the President to the. test, that the country might know his final determination relative to the Bank, prior to the ensuing election. Many documents and articles were printed and

circulated at the expense of the Bank, to bring the people to a favorable decision upon its pre

tentions. Those whom the Bank appears to na e made its debtors for the special occasion, were warned of the ruin which awaited them, should

the President be sustained, and attempts were made to alarm the whole people by painting

a depression in the price of property and produce

and the general loss, inconvenience, and distress, which was represented would immediately follow the re-election of the President in opposition

to the Bank. Can it be said that the question of the re-char

ter of this Bank was not decided at the election

which e'hsued? Had the Veto been equivocal,

or had it not rnvered the whole ground if it had

merely taken exceptions to the details of the Bill, or to the time of its passage if it had not met

me whole ground ot constitutionality, auu expe diencv, then there might have been some plau

sibility for the allegation that the question was ot decided by the people. It was to compel the President to take his stand that the question

was brought forward at that particular time. He met the challenge, willingly, took the position into which his adversaries sought to force him and frankly declared his unalterable opposition to' the Bank, as being both unconstitutional and inexpedient. On that ground the case was argued to the people, and now that the people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the array of influence and power which was brought to bear upon him, it is too late, he confidently thinks, to say that the question has not been decided. Whatever may be the opinions of others, the President considers his re-election as a decision of the people against the Bank. In the concluding paragraph of his Veto Message, he said :

"I have now done my duty to my country. If

susiuuieu Dy my ieiiow-citizens, I sliall be grateful and happy; if not, 1 shall find in the motives which impel me, ample grounds for content and peace." He was sustained by a just people, and he desired to evince his gratitude by carrying into effect their decision, so far as it depends upon

him.

Of all the substitutes for the present Bank

which have been suggested, none seems to have united any considerable portion of the public in it its favor. Most of them are liable to the same constitutional objections for which the present Bank has been condemned, and perhaps to all there are strong objections on the score (expe

diency. In ridding the country of an irresponsible power which has attempted to conlroll the

Government, care must be taken not to unite the same power with the Executive branch. To give a President control over the currency, and the powes over individuals now possessed by the Bank of the United States, even with the material difference that he is responsible to the people, would be as objectionable and as dangerous as to leave it as it is. Neither the one nor the

other is necessary, and therefore, ought not to be

resorted to.

On the whole, the President considers it as

conclusively settled that the charter of the Bank

of the United States will not be renewed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that any substitute will be established. Being bound to

regulate his course by the laws as they exist, and

not to anticipate the interference of the legislative power, for the purpose of framing new sys

tems, it is proper for him seasonably to consider the means by which the services rendered by the Bank of the. United States are to be preformed after its charter shall expire. The extinguishing laws declare, that "the deposites of the money of the United States, in places in which the said Bank and branches there

of may be established,shall be made in said Bank

or branches thereof, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct, in which case the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately lay before Congress, if in session, and if not immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reason of such order and direction." The power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the deposites, is unqualified. The provis

ion that he shall report his reasons to Congress,

is no limitation. Had it not been inserted, he

would not have been responsible to Congress,

had he made a removal for any other than good reasons, and his rcsponsibiliy now ceases, upon

the rendition of sufficient ones to Congress. The only object of the provisions, is to make his rea

sons accessible to Congress, and enable that body the more readily to judge of their soundness and purity and thereupon to make such further pro

visions,! law, as the legislative power may think

proper in relation to the deposites of the public

money. 1 hose reasons may be very diversified.

It was asserted by the Secretary of the Treasury without contradiction, as early as 1817, that he had power "to control the proceedings" of the

Bank of the United States at any moment, "by-

changing the deposites of the State Banks," should it pursue an illiberal course towards those

institutions; that "the Secretary ot the ireasury will always be disposed to support the credit of

the State Banks, and will invariably direct transfers from the deposites of the public money in aid of their legitimate exertions to maintain their credit;" and he asserted a right to employ the

State Banks when the Bank of the United States should refuse to receive on deposites the notes of such State Banks as the public interest required

should be received in pay of the public dues. In several instances he did transfer the public deposites to the Slate Banks, in the immediate vicinity of branches, for reasons connected only with the safety of those Banks, the public convenience, and the interests of the Treasury. If it was lawful for Mr. Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury, at that time, to act on these principles, it will be difficult to discover any sound reasons against the application of similar nrincioles in still stronger cases. And it is a

matter of surprise that a power which, in the infancy of the Bank, was freely asserted as one of

the ordinary and family duties oi me oecici.uj of the Treasury, should now be gravely questioned, and attempts made to excite and alarm the public mind as if some new and unheard of power was about to be usurped by the Executive branch of the Government. It is but a little more than two and a half years to the termination of the charter of the present Bank. It Ls considered as the decision of the

country that it shall then cease to exist, and no man. h President believes, has reasonable

ground for expectation that any other Bank of

the United States win De creaieu vj vuuguK. To the Treasury Department is entrusted the i faithful nnnliration of the

public moneys. A plan of collection different

from the present f -iu-i uitu-wic,

and put in complete operation before the dissolution of the present Bank. When shall it be commenced? Shall no step be taken in this essential concern until the charter expires, and the Treasury fnds itself without an agent,its accounts in confusion, with no depository for its funds, and the whole business of the Government deranged? Or shall it be delayed until six months or a year, or two years before the expiration of the charter? It is obvious'that any new system which may be substituted in the place of the Bank of the United States, could not be suddenly carried int effect on the termination of its existence without serious inconvenience to the Government and the people. Its vast amount of notes are then to be redeemed and withdrawn from circulation and its immense debt collected. These operations must be gradual, otherwise much suffering and distress will be brought upon the community. It ought to be not a work of months only, but of years, and the President thinks it cannot with due attention to the interests of the people, be longer postponed. It is safer to begin it too

soon, than to delav

it too long.

money to be elsewhere deposited, and had not devolved that power exclusively in one of the Executive Departments. It is useless now to inquire how this high and important power was surrendered by those who are peculiarly and appropriately the guardians of the public money. Perhaps it was an oversight. But as the President presumes that the charier of the Bank is to be considered a contract on the part of the Government, it is not now in the power of Congress to disregard its stipulations; and by the terms of that contract the public money is to be deposited in the Bank, during the continuance of the charter, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall otherwise direct. Unless, therefore, the Secretary of the Treasury first acts, Congress has no power over the subject, for they cannot add a new clause to the charter, or strike one out of it without the consent of the Bank; and, consequently, the public money must remain in that institution to tlie last hour of its existence, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall remove it at an earlier day. The responsibility is thus thrown upon the Executive branch of the Government, of deciding how long before the expiration of the charter, the public interest will require the deposites to be placed elsewhere. And although, according to the frame and principle of our Government, this decision would seem more properly to belong to the Legislative power, yet as the law has imposed it on the Executive Department, the duty ought to faithfully and firmly met, and the decision made and executed upon the best lights that can be obtained, and the best judgment that can be formed. It would ill become the Executive Branch of the Government to shrink from any duty which the law imposes on it, to fix upon others the responsibility which justly belongs to itself. And while the President anxiously wishes to abstain from the exercise of doubtful powers, and to avoid all interference with the rights and duties of others, he must yet, with unshaken constanc-, discharge his own obligation?; and cannot allow himself to turn aside, in order to avoid any responsibility which the high trust with which he has been honored, requires him to encounter: and it being the duty of one of the Executive Departments to decide in the first instance, subject to the future action of the Legislative power, whether the public deposites shall remain in the Bank of the United Stales, during existence, or be withdrawn sometime before, the President has felt himself bound to examine the question carefully and deliberately, in order to make up his judgment on the subject; and in his opinion, the near approach of the charter and the public considerations heretofore mentioned, are of themselves amply sufficient to justify the removal of the deposites without reference to the conduct of the Bank, or their safety in its keeping. But in the conduct of the Bank maybe found other reasons very imperative in their character, and which require prompt action. Devclopcmcnts have been made from time to time of its faithlessness as a public agent, its misapplication of public funds, its interference in elections, its efforts by the machinery of committees, to deprive the Government Directors of a full know ledge of its concerns, and above all, its flagrant misconduct as recently and unexpectedly disclosed in placing all the funds of the Bank, including the money of the Government, at the disposition and pleasure of the President of the Bank, as mcans"of operating upon public opinion and procuring a new charter, without requiring him to render a voucher for their disbursement. A brief recapitulation of the facts which justify these charges, and which have come to the knowledge of the public and the President, will, he thinks, remove every reasonable doubt as to the course which is now the duty of the President to pursue. We have seen that, in sixteen months, ending in May, 1832, the Bank had extended its loans more than .$28,000,000, although it knew the Government intended to appropriate most of its

larsre deposites during that vcar in payment of

of the public debt. It was in May, i832, that its loans arrived at the maximum, and in the preceding March, so sensible was the Bank that it would not be able to pay over the public de

posits when it would be required by the Gov

ernment, that it commenced a secret negotiation without the approbation or knowledge of the

Government, with the agents, for about 2,700,000 dollars of the three per cent, stocks held in Holland, with a view of inducing them to come forward for payment for one or more years after notice should be given by the Treasury Department. Tfcis arrangement w ould have enabled the Bank to keep, and use during that time, the public money set apart for the payment of these stocks. After this negotiation had commenced, the Secretary of the Treasury informed the Bank, that it was his intention to pay off one half of three per cents on the first: of the succeeding July,which amounted to abo ut 6,500,000 dollars. The President of the Bank, although the Committee of Investigation was then looking into his affairs at Philadelphia, came immediately to Washington, and upon representing that the Bank was desirous of accommodating the importing merchants at New York, (which it failed to d o) and undertaking to pay the interest itself, procured the consent of the Secretary, after consultation with the President, to postpone the payment until the succeeding first of October. Conscious that at the end of that quarter the Bank would not be .able to pay over the deposites, and that further indulgence was not to bo expected of the Government, an agent was despatched to England secretly to negociate with

the holders ot the public debt in Europe, and

It is for the wisdom of Congress to decide upon the best substitute to be adopted in the place of the Bank of the United Slates; and the President would have felt himself relieved from a heavy and painful responsibility if, in the charter to the Bank, Congress had reserved to itself the

power of directing, at its pleasure, the public I induce them by an offer of an equal or higher

interest than that paid hy the Government, to hold back their claims for one year, during which the Bank expected thus to retain the use of five million dollars of public money, which the Government should set apart for the payment of that debt. The agent made an arrangement on terms, in part, which were in direct violation of the charter of the Bank, and when some incidents connected with this secret negociation accidentally came to the knowledge of the public and the Government, then, and not before, so much as wras palpably in violation of the charter was disavowed! A modification of the rest was attempted, and with the view of getting the certificates without payment of the money, and thus absolving the Government from its liability to the holders. In this scheme the Bank was partially successful, but to this day the certificates of those stocks have not been paid, and the Bank retains the use of the money. This effort to thwart the Government in (lie payment of the public debt, that it might retain the public money to be used for their private interests, palliated by pretences notoriously unfounded and insincere, would have justified the instant withdrawal of the public deposities. The negociation itself rendered doubtful the ability of the Bank to meet the demands of the Treas

ury, and the misrepresentations by which it was attempted to be justified, proved that no reliance could be placed on its allegations. If the question of a removal of the deposites presented itself to the Executive in the same attitude that it presented itself before the House of Representatives at their last session, their resolution in relation to the safety of the deposites would be entitled to more weight, although the decision of the question of removal has been confided by law to another department of the Government. But the question now occurs, attended by other circumstances; and new disclosures of the most serious import. It is true, that in the message of the President, which produced this inquiry and resolution on the part of the House of Representatives, it was his object to obtain the aid of that body in making a thorough examination into the conduct and condition of the Bank and its branches, in order to enable the Executive Department to decide whether the public money was longer safe in its hands. The limited power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the subject, disabled him from making the investigation as fully and satisfactorily as it could be done by a Committee of the House of Representatives, and hence the President desired the assistance of Congress, to obtain for the Treasury Department a full knowledge of all the facts which were necessary to guide his

judgment. But it was not his purpose, as the

language of the message will show, to ask the Representatives of the people to assume a responsibility which did not belong to them, and relieve the Executive Branch of the Government from the duly which the law had imposed unon it. It is due to the President, that his ob

ject in that proceeding should be distinctly un-

dcrstood, and that ne snouio acquit, niiiisciiui an suspicion of seeking to escape from the performance of his own duties, or of desiring to interpose another body between himself and the people, in order to avoid a measure which he is called upon to meet. But although, as an act of justice to himself, he disclaims any intention of soliciting the opinion of the House of Representatives in relation to his own duties, in order to shelter himself from responsibility under the sanction of their counsel, yet he is at all times ready to listen to the suggestions of the Representatives of the people, whether given voluntary or upon solicitation, and to consider them with the profound respect to which all will admit tha'. they are justly entitled. Whatever may be the consequences,"howevcr, to himself, he must finally form his own judgment where thfvconstitution and tne law mates it his duty to decide, andlmust act accordingly; and he is bound to suppose that such a course on his part, will never lie regarded by that elevated body, as a mark of disrespect to itself; but that they will, on the contrary, esteem it the strongest evidence he can give of his fixed resolution conscientiously to discharge his duty to them and the country. A new state of things has, however, arisen since the close of the last session of Congress, and evidence has since been laid before the President, which he is persuaded would have led.

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