Evening Republican, Volume 23, Number 38, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 12 February 1920 — HOW COAL SUPPLY WAS CARED FOR DURING STRIKE OF MINERS [ARTICLE]

HOW COAL SUPPLY WAS CARED FOR DURING STRIKE OF MINERS

Unde Sam Set Up His Own Coal Pile as Soon as Strike Began and Kept Replenishing It From Mines Which Continued to Work —Ration Able to Last Out the Six Weeks Through Efficiency of Government Control.

By BRUCE CLAGETT, AMictant to Director General of Rallroads. — I have the thought that the people •f the United States would -ke to know how their coal supply was hanBled during the Mx weeks' strike of bituminous coal miners, which has lust come to an end. This was the nrst na-tion-wide coal strike the country ever experienced, and therefore the problems arising were novel. Necessarily, during the continuance of the strike, the exact stacks on hand could not be made public at all times, although as to all vital facts, the public seems to have been kept fully informed day by day. Uncle San- set up bis own coal pile as soon as the strike began and kept replenishing it from*the mines which continued to work, but meanwhile the plie was being diminished more rapidly than new supplies were coming in, and before long It became ■ question of keeping people warm rather than what industries should be continued. Had the strike continued much longer many Industries would have had to shut down and people thrown out of work, but on the restricted basis to which the country finally came and with the part-time production obtained undoubtedly the nation could have “carried on" for weeks longer. If not months. Strike Anticipated. began on November 1 Its coming was therefore the director general of railroads. Walker D. Hines, consulted with all the regional directors of railroads and the principal members of his staff, and decided that If the strike came It would he the job of the railroad administration to make the «oal produced go as far as possible. After thorough discussion the plan was adopted of allowing all coal mined up to the time of the trike proceed as billed to consignees

on the idea that once the strike actually began the railroads could after their own and the emergency needs of the country by taking over coal, actually on the rails at that time. Through this methodr foresighted consumers were placed in a position to atore up. The alternative method would have been for the railroadstb have begun to buy coal early In preparation for the strike, thus keeping ".uch coal out of normal channels. Prior to the strike a very careful aurvey of stocks on hand, both of railroads, industries and individuals (as far as possible) was conducted so that the railroad administration went Jnto the strike with as accurate knowledge of the coal situation throughout the country as was obtainable.__ The administratlon's original survey on November 1 showed 22,000,000 tons of bituminous coal on wheels and in railroad storage subject to distribution under the administration’s supervision. To this was added the daily production which totaled 18,800,000 tons in November, and of the aggregate the ■tocks still available for the country’s protection on December 1, 12,300,000 tons and on December 8, 11,475,000 tons. Prior to the strike orders were Is■ued by the railroad administration to give preference to coal loading, and this naturally resulted in hardship on some industries. The result was however, that in the week ended October 25 a total of 13.200,000 tons of coal was produced and moved In the United States, this constituting a record for ” the country. It took hard work by everyone concerned to distribute this enormous amount of coal. Once the ■trike was on, the production never reached 50 per cent of normal, with the result shown above, viz., that in addition to using the production every day, the stored coal in possession of the railroads was depleted in the six

weeks of the strike from 22,000,000 tons to 11.375.000 tons. - At times during the strike some complaints were made regarding the holding of this coal in storage and on wheels by the railroads. Without such a storage, however, the country would have suffered much more than ft did, and It would have been Impossible to have looked after the emergency requirements of the parts of file country in greatest need. Throughout the strike practically all of the coal moved wks produced in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, although some coal was produced In Kentucky. Alabama and Wyoming and a few other states. The great central competitive fields, however, closed down completely and outside of the stocks on hand the people in that territory had to depend entirely on the coal from the East add upon the coal tn the hands of- the railroads to meet just this emergency. At the beginning of the strike coal was delivered freely to all of the ten classes on the fuel administrator’s priority list, but soon afterward it was necessary to restrict deliveries to the first five classes, which included railroads, army and navy, together with other departments of the government, state and county departments and Institutions, public utilities, and retail dealers, and toward the end of the strike It was difficult in some parts of the country to meet even these requirements. due to the fact that principally in the midd 1 e West the stocks became almost exhausted and it was necessary to—depend practically entirely upon the coal produced in the East. The amount which eould be shipped West was limited, not by car supply, but by transportation facilities and the necessity for moving tills coal West was one of the reasons for the curtailment of passenger service in all parts of the country, which naturally led to some hardships and some complaints. With regard to these complaints, a careful survey shows that, token--as a whole, the country has stood remarkably well the restrictions which had to be placed. The action of the government during the strike which caused the greatest comment was the placing of restrictions in connection with the use of bituminous coal and coke in supplying light, heat and power to stores, office buildings, manufacturing establishments. etc. These regulations were put into effect by the railroad administration oh the advice of the cCrtral coal committee and under authority of ; the fuel administrator. They were put , into effect primarily as a coal con- , serration measure and ■ their issuance local regulations, sometimes more stringent than these regulations, had already been laid down in many sections of the. country. Prior to the issuanee of these regulations the fuel administrator had issued a request that coal for light, neat and power be conserved as much as possible; Just as soon as the Indianapolis settlement was reached the at- ! tomey general, following out a prior arrangement, immediately notified the railroad administration, and plans were at once begun to modify restrictions, with the result that within two days (after thestrike was formally ended, instructions were issued to regional directors permitting them to remove ‘he restrictions' WTO the furnishing of light, heat and power, and also permitting them to restore passenger trains which had been taken off as a coal conservation measure. The receipt of the word from Indianapolis was also the signal for the releasing of instructions already prepared for the turning of empty coal cars towards mines which were expected th begin operation in order to transport the maximuuj production of all such mines at once.

Probably there was never a more unique organization ever set up in the United States than the central coal committee of the United States railroad administration at Washington, which throughout the strike bad complete control over the distribution of coal mined and over supplies of coal In storage and on wheels on the railroads when the miners stopped work. The committee ha<4 back of it: all the power of the fuel administration tinder the Ixwer act. There was no precedent to go by. Being bound byTib precedents, it could go ahead In a common-sense way and that Is exactly what It did. Harry B. Spencer, director of division of purchases of the railroad administration. formerly vice president of the Southern railroad, and a man of long experience in dealing with coal questions, was given the unenviable job of handling the situation as chairmnn of the central coal committee. Before the strike actually began, he bad his assistants aH picked.hlgirtawLatt made, his orders written and everything prepared to take charge. Therefore, the evening of October 31 Dr. Harryt A. Garfield, the fuel administrator, who had tendered his resignation months before, but whose resignation had- not been accepted and whose powers had only been suspended, not annulled, was called back into service and issued an order re-establishing control over the distribution of coal, making the director general of railroads his agent, and re-establishing the priority orders In effect during the war. At the sajne time, and to prevent profiteering, the fuel administrator issued orders re-establishing the government maximum prices on bitumtnous coal. The day the strike began Mr. Spencer put his organization into effect throughout the country, and from then on the problem was one ofTdlstributing coal and looking after the constantly decreasing stock of the country.

On the Job Every Day. The committee remained in practically continuous session every day of the strike, including Sundays, .and as rapidly as telegrams and letters came in. took immediate action. Back of this committee and co-oper-ating closely with it have been regional and district local coal committees, picked in advance of the strike and established immediately after the strike began. On these regional and local coal committees. haS fallen a very large share of the burden pf handling the coal distribution problems from day to day, and It Is to the credit of these committees that they have had a minimum of clashes with state or local authorities when it is appreciated that on these committees fell many of the duties exercised by the fuel administration through the war and when it is apprewere limited in vyhat they could do by the stocks of coal on hand, It will ~se realized" that their work was of the most difficult character. One of the chief difficulties in the situation was the fact that conditions throughout the United States were so widely different that It was apparent that it would be impossible to deal with all sections of the country alike. Therefore a great deal of responsibility was left with the regional directors of railroads rtnd with the regional and local eoal committes. However, some general prihciples were laid down Immediately which were followed in a general way throughout the coal strike. The preliminary rtile was laid down thatntreoftl should be givem to any consumer who had a reserve supply, and that coal should only be given to meet emergency needs.

Get Reports Daily. In order to avoid long distance communication, the rule was set up that persons desiring coal should make application on the road ordinarily supplying them with coal and in order that the central coal committee should be kept constantly supplied with information machinery was set up under which each railroad should promptly report to the central coal committee and to the regional, coal committee Hie name, title, location and telephone address of the representative of that railroad in whom the whole coal question would be centered for that railroad.

Summed up, the result of the handling of the coal supply of the nation by the government has been that with a mobile supply at the beginning of the strike of 22,000,000 tons of coal at the disposal of the entire country, and a production which never reached 50 per cent of normal, with cold weather existing in most parts of the country during part of the strike, and blizzards tn some parts of the country throughout most of the strike, the nation was able to last out six weeks with very litUe actual lack of coal by householders, with practically all public utilises supplied with sufficient ieoal to meet emergency needs, with very few industries actually closed down, although many would have had to close down had the strike continued much longer and with a reserve stock in the hands of the railroads at the end of the strike ofmore than 11,000,000~Tons of coal wiiich was available for emergency railroad needs and for :the emergency needs of governmental institutions, of public utilities and retailers supplying coal to domestic coaromers. ,