Evening Republican, Volume 22, Number 292, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 5 December 1919 — MYTHICAL “X ARMY” HELPED WIN VICTORY [ARTICLE]

MYTHICAL “X ARMY” HELPED WIN VICTORY

American Subalterns’ Trick Kept Five German Divisions on the Qui Vive. ENEMY DECEIVED BY RADIO Telephone Squad Alto Conducted Misleading Conversations for German Listeners’ Benefit Staff Worked Overtime on Game of Camouflage. With the American Forces in Germany.—Tricks of the game of war are coming to light from time to time as each side tells its story. One of the most successful of them was practiced by American forces in the Meuse-Ar-—gonne battle last fall, when the last great allied offensive was at its height, from Switzerland to the sea. All imaginary army, conceived by a handful of American junior officers, ■was “thrown into the field” overnight, and for days five crack German divisions just east of Verdun, in the Etain region, were kept on their toes, momentarily expecting an attack which never came.

At a dinner table in a Coblenz case overlooking the Rhine an American intelligence officer recently told the story of the creation of the mythical army,” as it was called. It appears that the Germans were expecting an attack in the Etain sector'at any time, and the Americans knew it; Ibut at that stage of the game the First American army was devoting its energies to driving the enemy out of the Argonne forest and the hill country on either side. So the mythical army was tereated, in preference to a real diversion, requiring many men. to convince the German commander that it would >not be wise to weaken the Etain front for the benefit of the Meuse-Argonne front. Commanded by Captain. Five fresh divisions had been placed Jby, the Germans on the Etain line. These constituted their last and finest reservoir of available divisions. The Americans realized that the minute •the Germans decided that this was not * danger point any or all of the five divisions could be withdrawn, replaced by exhausted and fragmentary divisions coming from the battle fronts, and that the appearance of the fresh troops in the line west of the Meuse would have a tremendous effect on the American offensive. The “X army” was assigned to a front from Bezonvaux to Fresnes. From the morning of October 22 until Just before the armistice this army *fu!)ctione<f“ Capt. Charles H. Matz of Hubbard Woods, 111., was commander in chief; Capt. William H. Dearden of Springfield. Mass., and Washington, D. C.. was chief of staff; Lieut. John H. Graham of Lexington, Va„ was chief of “troop movements Capt. O. W. Neidert was’in charge of G-l, or administration, and Lieut. H. T. Griswold of Old Lynn. Conn., was >chief of artillery. The staff of tire “X army” were all members of the intelligence section of the First army, and, of course, before beginning operations, had obtained the consent of their chief, Col. Willey HowelL J The wireless and the telephone were freely used to convince the Germans that the Americans were prepared for an attack in the Etain sector. To make sure that the Germans would be able to “break into” the code used, the Americans furnished them with a satisfactory key. Functioned Until End. ' One wireless station of the "X army” was established in a dump of woods near Verdun arfd was called “headquarters of the X army.” This station functioned until the end of the game, all "orders” for the army going out from this place by wireless. Soon after the station began working the Germans located its whereabouts and frequently shelled the woods and vicinity, apparently in hope of breaking up the radio of the latest of annoyances. The “X army” also had a portable radio station, which moved about

and represented itself at a different station every day or two. The first message from the “X army” headquarters was a general dispatch to all wireless stations in the army area (none of which actually’ existed), in the new code of course,-di-recting that none of the stations answer or make use of their sending instruments, for fear of the enemy locating- them, but that they be on the alert at fixed hours to receive messages. The effect was to convince the Germans that a large number of wireless stations had been set up and to advise them of the hours when the enemy intercepting stations should be on the alert for the American messages. This was followed by a series of messages designed to indicate that the “X army” was preparing for a fullfledged operation. In order to inform the enemy of the geographical -limits of the sector of the “X army," many messages were directed to imaginary officers at existing towns on the Etain front.. Wireless Works Night and Day. Meanwhile the roving wireless station was working overtime day and night. It began sending out messages

in the Fresnes sector and trying to give the impression that It was several stations at widely separated locations. One message In particular was peculiarly designed to add to the enemy’s suspicion of the approaching trouble—an Imperative demand for 200 copies more additional of the Conflans sheet, “plan dlrecteur map.” This could only be Interpreted by the Germans. the Americans agreed, as preparation for a coming drive on the Brley iron center. In addition to the wireless the “X army" also had in operation, on the front between Bezonaux and Fresnes, a telephone squad—a careless squad which set up telephone stations here and tYiere and sent messages and talked shop and gossiped all night about the arrival of some old friends from America with such and such an outfit.

The “X” army telephone squad took no chances that the Germans might not hear the conversations the Americans desired them to record. They deliberately grounded their wires, so the enemy could “listen in" and crawled out into No Man’s Land in the darkness and hooked one of the American wdres on a German barbed wire in front of an abandoned trench system. In the front line of modern warfare the telephone Is a most dangerous Instrument, for both sides devised apparatus which within certain limits could pick up conversations over enemy lines with which it was not even connected. So the Americans felt certain that all their conversations were heard by the Germans. Get Results at Once. Two days after the “X army" began its operations the results began to be noticeable, the nervousness on the part of the Germans being exhibited in many ways, the enemy first sending ovef a large number of airplanes to make reconnoissances. The Germans also began a series of trench raids to obtain prisoners for the purpose of identifying units of the forces opposlte them. German prisoners captured by the French told of wild alarms in the night on the part of the German forces, hurried re-enforcement of the main line of resistance, and various other movements which indicated that the enemy was exerting extreme watchfulness on account of the activity of the "army” operated by a handful of Americans. When the armistice became effective on November 11 the little American **X army” still held its ground in the field near Verdun, and opposite its supposed position five crack German divisions stood their guard, not even suspecting that they had been tricked by a few ingenious young Yankees who were delighted at the results obtained by their mischievous schemes, which had worked so successfully in deceiving the wise German veterans of a five years’ war.