Evening Republican, Volume 22, Number 70, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 25 March 1919 — HUN NAVY TIMID JELLICOE SHOWS [ARTICLE]

HUN NAVY TIMID JELLICOE SHOWS

British Officer Surprised by Caution of Foe During First of War. GRAND FLEET IN DANGER . ,_L - -■ ■ • - ■ * . . - Short of Cruisers, Destroyers and Had Defenseless Bases in Early Months ©^Conflict—Describes Big Battle of Jutland. London. —The dangers to which the British grand fleet, short of cruisers, destroyers and with defenseless bases, was exposed during the first two and one-half years of the war, owing to the German use of submarines, mines and torpedoes, is described in a book written by Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, former commander of the fleet, covering the activities of 1914-16. Admiral Jellicoe points out that the German high seas fleet possessed 88 destroyers, compared with 42 for the grand fleet, and reveals that, owing to the submarine menace, the- grand fleet, in the fall of 1914, moved from Lough Swilly and only returned to the North sea when the anchorage in Scapa Flow became reasonably safe. Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, Admiral Jellicoe says, did the British margin of superiority justify him in disregarding the enemy’s torpedo fire. The situation gradually improved after 1916, especially as the light cruiser and destroyer forces with the grand fleet increased steadily after the battle of Jutland, considerably re-

ducing the danger of successful torpedo attack, while the inclusion of class K submarines made it probable that the enemy would suffer more severely from submarine attack than the British. . Tables Are Turned. Regarding 1918, Admiral Jellicoe savs;- ; —— “The position was assured and we could have afforded to take risks winch in 1916 would have been unwise. If the German fleet had come out to battle, a terrible punishment awaited them.” One-third of the admiral’s book-is devoted to the battle of Jutland. In summing up the lessons of the battle. Admiral Jellicoe dwells upon “the danger involved in<4ea*Lng too much to chance in fleet action, because our fleet was the one and only factor vital to the existence of the empire, and, indeed, to the allied cause.” HWe had no reserve outside the battle fleet which could in any way replace it in the event of disaster or even should its margin of superiority be eliminated.” the admiral continues. Admiral Jellicoe says he knew that his ships were Inadequately protected with armor compared to the German vessels of the battle cruiser type, while the German fleet in the battle of Jutland was far better off in the number of destroyers. In addition, theGermans possessed “a most efficient armor-piercing shell.” The admiral continues: . “When the battle fleets approached

there was a difference of reckoning between the British battle fleet and the battle cruiser squadrons, due to the cruisers having been engaged for several hours and having repeatedly altered their course. Hence, instead of being encountered right ahead, the enemy appeared on the starboard boyv.” Instant action was necessary, the admiral says, and he decided to deploy on the port wing division, thus compelling the Germans to turn off to starboard to avoid being crossed. This maneuver, which has been described as masterly by reviewers, threw the enemy into complete confusion. The German commander in chief realized that his only hope lay in escape, profiting -by his superiority In torpedo craft, low visibility, the approach of darkness and the proximity of his bases and mine fields. The enemy at this period fired hundreds of torpedoes, as German officers ■fiave since stated. Admiral Jellicoe continues, and although the Germans were in the gravest peril, the position of the grand fleet itself was menaced by determined torpedo attacks/thick weather. But the British flee Thy turning its battle line four times during the action,’ the admiral says, got clear of the torpedoes, which were racing toward the British ships, and defeated the tactics upon which the Germans based their hopes. After estimating the relative strength of the two fleets early in the war, Admiral Jellicoe expresses surprise that the Germans were so cautious and says: “If this country in the future decided to’ rely for safety against raids or Invasion on the fleet' atone, it is essential that we possess a considerably greater margin of superiority over a possible enemy in all classes of vessels than we did in August, 1914.”